Following Wiggins’ seminal article, On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time, this article presents the first comprehensive account of the relation of material constitution, an asymmetrical, transitive relation which totally orders distinct ‘entities’ (individuals, pluralities or masses of stuff) which ‘spatially coincide.’ Their coincidence in space is explained by a recursive definition of ‘complete-composition’, weaker than strict mereological indiscernibility, which also explains the variety of logically independent similarities in such cases. This account is ‘analytical’, dealing with ‘putative’ (...) cases in general. The main strategy is to rationally reconstruct Aristotle’s notion of material cause. It is developed more fully with a theory of how to justify admitting generable and perishable things into the natural world, in The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument (Open Court, 1996). (shrink)

The main contribution of this work is to develop the account of material constitution presented in Spatially Coinciding Objects (Ratio 24, 1982) and a series of related articles. This account was merely ‘analytical’ in that it applied generously to ‘putative’ examples of distinct entities (individuals, pluralities and masses of stuff) in the same place at the same time. The account herein is ‘critical’ in that it seeks justification for recognizing the existence of entities constituted in addition to the entities that (...) allegedly constitute them. While the earlier account used examples such as a clay statue and the clay of the statue for purposes of illustrating material constitution, the present account would consider ‘reducing’ the statue to the clay, and seeks justification for how to resist this and admit the existence of generable and perishable natural objects in general. The justification sought is ‘deep’ in the sense that (unlike the popular ‘method of cases) it does not belong to ‘descriptive’ metaphysics (in Strawson’s sense) but is sufficiently potent to counter ‘revisionist’ views. Transcendental arguments, beginning with austere assumptions of justification itself, are thereby employed. Suggestions are made about what to conclude about our own identity, which amount to supporting animalism. (shrink)

I defend a theory of philosophy, suggested explicitly by Allan Gibbard (and inspired by Kant), in which the main branches may be considered as fundamental inquiry into norms of different kinds. Special attention is given to how even metaphysics fits the description. The theory is defended by explaining a variety of ‘known facts’ about philosophy, understood as facts commonly recognized in academic philosophy. These include: that philosophy spans a diversity of areas, including logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics; that philosophy (...) has seemed, at least, to be different in kind from other areas of inquiry; that philosophy lacks experts and official procedures of justification; that philosophy appears important to some but not to others. (shrink)

This introductory text offers a coherent treatment of issues in a wide range of areas of philosophy. It begins with logic (in a broad, traditional sense that includes epistemology), since the concepts of this area illuminate metaphysics, covered next in the sequence. (Consider, for example, how material reality is what is known through sensation or how mind is what is known through introspection.). Ethics is covered next, because views on well-being and morality have been deepened by being couched in metaphysical (...) views that yield conceptions of human nature. For similar reasons, the section on ethics comes before that on social philosophy. It is my firm belief that the greatest philosophers achieve the depth for which they are admired by constructing systems in which the various areas of philosophy are unified. With this inspiration, I have put the discussions in a logical order, in which the earlier ones anticipate and illuminate later ones. Something like a story is told. (shrink)

‘Second substances’ are Aristotle’s species and genera that reveal the general nature of a thing. Sortals correspond to the most specific, least abstract of these, normally thought of as ‘the’ kind to which a thing belongs. I argue against a common view that artifact terms such as ‘clock’ or ‘pen’ are suitable as sortals and for their being regarded as more like genera. If we can individuate clocks and pens as we do trees and rocks, by a combination of sortal (...) plus ostension, then we must use more specific sortals which indicate the structures by virtue of which the objects perform the functions of clocks or pens. Functions by themselves do not supply the identity conditions of sortals. Similar reasoning supports Wiggins’ view that ‘the kind’ to which we belong is our biological species, not the purely functional kind of being a person. (shrink)

That no member of a natural kind can switch kinds is a consequence of David Wiggins’ view that the identity conditions for such things are given by the natural kind itself. If dog is a natural kind, then dogs must be dogs and one dog cannot ‘turn into’ something else, say, by gradually ‘becoming’ a mass of tissue (as Marjorie Price had held). Were such a transition to involve the persistence of the same thing, then the thing in question would (...) comply with conditions of identity not restricted to dogs. To provide for such transitions James Baillie suggests alternative conditions of identity, based on Andrew Brennan’s notion of ‘survival’ (itself borrowed from Parfit). Survival requires that the earlier thing be ‘structurally similar to’, and ‘play a significant and direct role in the production of’ the later thing (sufficiency is gained if, in addition, they are composed of the same kind of matter). Unlike identity, however, survival is what Wiggins calls a ‘branching’ relation, capable of linking a single thing with two or more equal ‘competitors’ (as apparently happens in cases of brain fission). To provide conditions of identity per se, Baillie follows Parfit, who claimed that our identity is preserved by psychological continuity when there is no branching. Members of natural kinds, such as dogs, are now said to be reidentifiable over time by the relation of non-branching survival. I argue against this on the ground that we can know when this relation obtains only when we are already able to individuate things by a different sort of relation, such as those associated with natural kinds. (shrink)

I defend Locke’s claim that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at that time. In the relevant sense of ‘kind’, a kind is a sortal, which, with an appropriate ostension, is enough to indicate which object is meant. To perform this function sortals must be sufficient to determine the persistence conditions of the thing ostended.

The general account of material constitution presented in my article, Spatially Coinciding Objects (Ratio vol. 24.1, June 1982), is further developed. There we saw how distinct objects in the same place at the same time can be strictly ordered by an asymmetrical, transitive relation of material constitution. I show herein how this relation can conceivably form ‘upright trees’ in which one object constitutes two other objects, neither of which constitutes the other. It is, however, impossible to have ‘inverted trees’ in (...) which one thing is constituted by two things neither of which constitutes the other. (This impossibility is implied when supposing that there is just one thing which counts as the proximate matter of a thing.). (shrink)

Support is given to Habermas's argument that we interpret thoughts only by seeing persons as actually justified in their circumstances. Habermas holds further that his argument extends to moral thinking, in that we understand it only by actually taking the moral point of view, and he thinks this is illustrated by Kohlberg's theory of moral development. While this illustration is denied here on the ground that Kohlberg's theory accepts Rawls's theory of justice, it is argued that the extension to morality (...) can be made with a theory like Gewirth's, in which morality appears as a form of rationality. (shrink)

The ‘step’ to individuation is taken when one can perceive an object as a single, countable thing. While Strawson envisages this step as one from feature placing, I argue that the presence of demonstratives renders this problematic. The step is best seen as taken from universal recognition, as explained by Price. This shows that the step is ‘greater’ than we might have expected. There is a mutual dependence of the abilities to individuate, to grasp demonstrative concepts and to draw a (...) distinction between appearance and reality. (shrink)

In this ambitious and stimulating book, Frederick Doepke defends a view of persons as Aristotelian continuants. He says that he was inspired by Kant’s critique of Locke and Hume on self-reference and personal identity to write this book. He also claims that Kant’s critique was successful not only against eighteenth century empiricists, but also against neo-Lockeans in our own times, such as Parfit. However, Doepke does not then get involved in Kant scholarship, but instead presents his own (...) argument, first, for a metaphysical account of persons and, then, for its “practical” importance. (shrink)

This study examines the philosophical foundations of Hegel's social theory by articulating the normative standards at work in his claim that the central social institutions of the modern era are rational or good.

When historians of philosophy turn to the work of distinguished philosopher Frederick L. Will, Pragmatism and Realism will be an important part of the ...

This is the first book in English to elucidate the central issues in the work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, a figure crucial to the movement of philosophy from Kant to German idealism. The book explains Fichte's notion of subjectivity and how his particular view developed out of Kant's accounts of theoretical and practical reason. Fichte argued that the subject has a self-positing structure which distinguishes it from a thing or an object. Thus, the subject must be understood as an activity (...) rather than a thing and is self-constituting in a way that an object is not. In the final chapter, Professor Neuhouser considers how this doctrine of the self-positing subject enables us to understand the possibility of the self's autonomy, or self-determination. (shrink)

This book is the first comprehensive study of Rousseau's rich and complex theory of the type of self-love (amour proper) that, for him, marks the central difference between humans and the beasts. Amour proper is the passion that drives human individuals to seek the esteem, approval, admiration, or love--the recognition--of their fellow beings. Neuhouser reconstructs Rousseau's understanding of what the drive for recognition is, why it is so problematic, and how its presence opens up far-reaching developmental possibilities for creatures that (...) possess it. One of Rousseau's central theses is that amour proper in its corrupted, manifestations--pride or vanity--is the principal source of an array of evils so widespread that they can easily appear to be necessary features of the human condition: enslavement, conflict, vice, misery, and self-estrangement. Yet Rousseau also argues that solving these problems depends not on suppressing or overcoming the drive for recognition but on cultivating it so that it contributes positively to the achievement of freedom, peace, virtue, happiness, and unalienated selfhood. Indeed, Rousseau goes so far as to claim that, despite its many dangers, the need for recognition is a condition of nearly everything that makes human life valuable and that elevates it above mere animal existence: rationality, morality, freedom--subjectivity itself--would be impossible for humans if it were not for amour proper and the relations to others it impels us to establish. (shrink)

Written by one of the pre-eminent interpreters of Heidegger, this book is an important statement about the basis of human sociability that is a major contribution to the continuing debates about Heidegger in particular, and ethics in general. Existential philosophy is often thought to promote moral nihilism in which everything is permitted. This book demonstrates that, in the case of Martin Heidegger, any such accusation is unjust. On the contrary, Heidegger thought seriously about the implications of human co-existence, and this (...) book shows that conceptions of trust and responsibility that lie at the very heart of morality are to be found in the sketch of Mitsein - our being together with one another in the world - offered in Being and Time. That Heidegger never developed these conceptions may explain why they have been overlooked, but renders them no less important for that. (shrink)

n his Lectures on the Histmy 0f Philosophy Hegel credits Rousseau with an cpoch-making innovation in the realm 0f practical philosophy, an innovation said to consist in thc fact that Rousseau is thc first thinker t0 recognize "the free will" as thc fundamental principle 0f political philosophy} Since Hcgcl’s 0wn practical philosophy is explicitly grounded in an account 0f thc will and its freedom, Hcgcl’s assertion is clearly intended as an acknowledgment 0f his deep indebtedness t0 R0usscau’s social and political (...) thought. What is not s0 clear, however, is how this indebtedness is t0 bc understood: What precisely docs it mean t0 say that the political theories 0f Hegel and Rousseau share the same first principlc? In this paper I intend t0 follow up 0n this interpretive suggestion 0f Hcgcl’s by claborating, much more explicitly than he himself docs, thc sense in which R0usscau’s political thought is founded 011 thc principle 0f the "frcc wiil." While accomplishing this task will put us in a better position t0 clarify thc obscurc philosophical strategy behind Hcgcl’s 0wn social theory, my primary interest here is t0 illuminate thc foundations 0f R0usscau’s political thought, especially its account 0f the connection between freedom and the general will. I argue that it is necessary t0 distinguish two ways in which Rousseau takes the general will t0 secure, or realize, thc freedom of individual citizens, namely, by functioning as an embodiment as well as a precondition of such freedom. Understanding both 0f these points will lead us t0 scc: that R0usscau’s thought rests 0n two distinct, though not incompatible, accounts 0f how citizens whose actions are constrained by thc general will are in fact subject 0nly to their 0wn wills and therefore free in their 0bcdience to thc general will. As we shall scc, these two accounts arc implicitly based upon distinct conceptions 0f political freedom. (shrink)

Edited by Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch & Christopher Zurn. This volume collects original, cutting-edge essays on the philosophy of recognition by international scholars eminent in the field. By considering the topic of recognition as addressed by both classical and contemporary authors, the volume explores the connections between historical and contemporary recognition research and makes substantive contributions to the further development of contemporary theories of recognition.

This chapter contains sections titled: Further Reading.

This book shows the vital relationship between human life and the philosophical placement of value, emphasizing the now-occurring transition from the old mechanical world view to the postmodern alternative inspired by ecology.

Can a human society suffer from illness like a living thing? And if so, how does such a malaise manifest itself? In this thought-provoking book, Fred Neuhouser explains and defends the idea of social pathology, demonstrating what it means to describe societies as 'ill', or 'sick', and why we are so often drawn to conceiving of social problems as ailments or maladies. He shows how Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and Durkheim – four key philosophers who are seldom taken to constitute a (...) 'tradition' – deploy the idea of social pathology in comparable ways, and then explores the connections between societal illnesses and the phenomena those thinkers made famous: alienation, anomie, ideology, and social dysfunction. His book is a rich and compelling illumination of both the idea of social disease and the importance it has had, and continues to have, for philosophical views of society. (shrink)

Introduction The central aim of this book is to focus attention upon and illuminate the character of a certain phase of philosophical reflection: namely, ...

This paper provides a new solution to the epistemic paradox of belief-instability, a problem of rational choice which has recently received considerable attention (versions of the problem have been discussed by — among others — Tyler Burge, Earl Conee, and Roy Sorensen). The problem involves an ideally rational agent who has good reason to believe the truth of something of the form:[Ap] p if and only if it is not the case that I accept or believe p.

In this paper I argue against the usual interpretation of\nMeinong's argument for nonexistent objects, an\ninterpretation according to which Meinong imported\nnonexistent objects like "the golden mountain" to account\ndirectly for the truth of statements like the golden\nmountain is golden'. I claim instead (using evidence from\nMeinong's "On Assumptions") that his argument really\ninvolves an ineliminable appeal to the notion of pretense.\nThis appeal nearly convinced Meinong at one stage that he\ncould do without nonexistent objects. The reason, I argue,\nwhy he nonetheless embraced an ontology of nonexistents (...) has\nto do with the phenomenology of representation, and not\nwith semantics. (shrink)

He demonstrates that a broad parallelism exists between developments in ethical theory among Continental philosophers of the phenomenological persuasion and the more analytically inclined philosophers of the English-speaking world.

Frank B. Ebersole died recently. Here I remind philosophers of the thinking of this reclusive philosopher who brought out the value of Wittgenstein's dictum that philosophers should "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use." I illustrate Ebersole's singular thinking by focusing on his philosophical investigation of Wittgenstein's family resemblance metaphor.

Abstract Modern reflection on the ideal of personal autonomy has its Western origin in the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, where autonomy, or self-legislation, involves citizens joining together to make laws for themselves that reflect their collective understanding of the common good. Four features of this conception of autonomy continue to be relevant today. First, autonomy, a type of freedom, is introduced into modern philosophy in order to make up for a perceived deficiency, or incompleteness, in merely ?negative? freedom (the right (...) to do as one pleases, unimpeded by others). Second, autonomy is taken to be not merely a complement of negative freedom but a higher, more valuable species of freedom. Third, at its origin personal autonomy is not conceived individualistically; rather, on Rousseau's account, autonomy is achievable only if citizens surrender part of their status as individuals and think of their social membership as essential, not merely accidental, to who they are. Finally, Rousseau's conception of autonomy is distinct from the contemporary ideal of autonomy defined as judging or deciding for oneself (according to one's own reason). Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which autonomy as Rousseau conceives it also requires the developed capacity for independent, self-determined judgment. (shrink)

Science traditionally is taught as a linear process based on logic and carried out by objective researchers following the scientific method. Practice of science is a far more nuanced enterprise, one in which intuition and passion become just as important as objectivity and logic. Whether the activity is committing to study a particular research problem, drawing conclusions about a hypothesis under investigation, choosing whether to count results as data or experimental noise, or deciding what information to present in a research (...) paper, ethical challenges inevitably will arise because of the ambiguities inherent in practice. Unless these ambiguities are acknowledged and their sources understood explicitly, responsible conduct of science education will not adequately prepare the individuals receiving the training for the kinds of decisions essential to research integrity that they will have to make as scientists. (shrink)

While at first such a comparison may be startling, Whelan argues convincingly that Hume's writing, commonly regarded as moderate and amiable, is indeed a locus of realist liberal political theory.

Norms are widely regarded as kinds of templates of performance, resident in agents. As such they are thought to determine unilaterally what kinds of thought or action accords with them. Under philosophical elaboration this view has led to multiple perplexities: among them the question of how there can be evaluation, justification, and rectification of such unilaterally determining entities. Sometimes one can appeal to other, supervening norms; but the need to terminate the regressive procedure typically leads to appeals to dubious "foundations," (...) to conventions, or to sheer prejudice. In a feat of surpassing acuity Wittgenstein exposed this view of norms to be inadequate in the apparently paradigm contexts to which traditionally it seemed best suited, these being those of mathematical rules and principles. An alternative general view of norms is one with important congruences with the view taken by the Critical-Pragmatic philosophy concerning the constitutive role played by norms in creating the texture of human life and thought. This view is that norms are intrinsically socio-psychological entities that interlock with each other and are rooted deeply in the practices of individuals and their communities. Embedded in these practices, norms are in principle open-textured: open to further definition and revision when serious anomalies in their extant forms are encountered. This article explores certain features of the alternative view, concentrating upon the illumination it sheds and the guidance it provides in the conduct of the fundamental philosophical activities of assessment, criticism, and revision of broad and deep personal and communal norms. Normen werden üblicherweise verstanden als eine Art Handlungsschablonen im Innern des jeweils Agierenden. Als solche wird von ihnen angenommen, daß sie einseitig festlegen, welche Arten von Gedanken oder Handlungen mit ihnen übereinstimmen. Bei philosophischer Überprüfung führt diese Sichtweise zu vielfältigen Schwierigkeiten: unter ihnen die Frage, wie solche einseitig bestimmenden Wesenheiten bewertet, gerechtfertigt und berichtigt werden können. Manchmal kann man sich auf andere, übergeordnete Normen berufen; aber angesichts der Notwendigkeit, überhaupt zu einem Ende zu kommen, führt das regressive Verfahren typischerweise zu einer Berufung auf zweifelhafte "Grundsätze", auf Konventionen oder auf ein bloßes Vorurteil. In einer Meisterleistung von außerordentlicher gedanklicher Schärfe hat Wittgenstein diese Sichtweise von Normen als inadäquat gerade für den scheinbar paradigmatischen Zusammenhang entlarvt, auf den sie nach traditioneller Anschauung am besten passen soll: den von mathematischen Regeln und Prinzipien. Eine demgegenüber alternative, allgemeine Sichtweise von Normen stimmt in wesentlichen Punkten mit der Perspektive überein, die von der kritisch-pragmatischen Philosophie im Hinblick auf die konstitutive Rolle eingenommen wird, die Normen bei der Schaffung der Strukturen menschlichen Lebens und Denkens spielen. Diese Sichtweise besteht darin, daß Normen eigentlich sozialpsychologische Entitäten sind, die ineinandergreifen und tief in der Praxis von Individuen und ihren Gemeinschaften wurzeln. Eingebettet in diese Praxis sind Normen prinzipiell offen strukturiert: offen für weitere Definition und für Revision, falls man auf ernstzunehmende Anomalien ihrer bestehenden Fassung stößt. Dieser Beitrag untersucht bestimmte Aspekte jener alternativen Sichtweise. Er konzentriert sich dabei auf die von ihr bewirkte Klärung und die Leitung, die sie bietet, wenn es um die Handhabung so fundamentaler philosophischer Aufgaben wie Bewertung, Kritik und Revision von weit und tief reichenden persönlichen und gesellschaftlichen Normen geht. (shrink)