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  1. A fictionalist theory of universals.Tim Button & Robert Trueman - forthcoming - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones (eds.), Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
    Universals are putative objects like wisdom, morality, redness, etc. Although we believe in properties (which, we argue, are not a kind of object), we do not believe in universals. However, a number of ordinary, natural language constructions seem to commit us to their existence. In this paper, we provide a fictionalist theory of universals, which allows us to speak as if universals existed, whilst denying that any really do.
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  2. Linceo e la presbiopia ontologica. Considerazioni sul nominalismo di Achille Varzi.Francesco F. Calemi - forthcoming - Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho.
    According to Varzi's nominalism properties are typical examples of ontological hallucinations. In this brief paper I'll focus on an interesting argument that Varzi puts forward against the Realists’ tenet according to which predicates have properties as ontological correlates. I’ll argue that even if Varzi's argument is not convincing, the metalinguistic nominalism he espouses has sufficient resources to meet the realists' challenge concerning the phenomenon of predication. Furthermore, I'll make some methodological remarks about the relationship holding between the «dot quote» analysis (...)
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  3. Platonic Realism.Chad Carmichael - forthcoming - In Anna-Sofia Maurin & Anthony Fisher (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Properties.
    In this chapter, I make the case for platonic realism, the thesis that there are properties that lack spatial locations. After criticizing the one-over-many argument for realism and Lewis's argument for realism, I endorse a modal argument that derives the existence of platonic properties from considerations involving necessary truth. I then defend this argument from various objections. Finally, I argue that epistemic considerations and considerations of parsimony favor a weak form of platonic realism on which there are platonic properties, but (...)
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  4. Uddyotakara on Universals I: Against Resemblance Nominalism.Nilanjan Das - forthcoming - Journal of Hindu Studies.
    Universals are properties that are shared by multiple objects. In classical South Asia, Brahmanical thinkers from Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā text traditions were realists about universals, while most Buddhists were nominalists. In this paper, my aim is to reconstruct the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of universals, with special emphasis on the arguments of the Nyāya philosopher Uddyotakara (6th century CE) against a Buddhist strand of resemblance nominalism. I show that Uddyotakara's contribution to this debate is twofold. First, he is possibly (...)
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  5. Against Instantiation.Christopher Frugé - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    According to traditional universalism, properties are instantiated by objects, where instantiation is a ‘tie’ that binds objects and properties into facts. I offer two arguments against this view. I then develop an alternative higher-order account which holds that properties are primitively predicated of objects yet, unlike traditional nominalism, are nevertheless genuinely real. When it’s a fact that Fo, it’s not because object o instantiates F-ness, but just that Fo – where F still exists. Against orthodox higher-order approaches, however, my arguments (...)
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  6. Property dualists shouldn't be nominalists about properties.Daniel Giberman & David Mark Kovacs - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Substance dualism is the view that there are two fundamentally different kinds of substances: physical and mental. By contrast, according to property dualism there is only one kind of substance (physical) but two fundamentally different kinds of properties: physical and mental. Property nominalism is the view that there are neither repeatable nor non-repeatable fundamentally predicable entities (i.e. neither universals nor tropes) and that things being a certain way or being related in a certain way must ultimately be accounted for in (...)
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  7. Higher-order logic as metaphysics.Jeremy Goodman - forthcoming - In Peter Fritz & Jones Nicholas (eds.), Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter offers an opinionated introduction to higher-order formal languages with an eye towards their applications in metaphysics. A simply relationally typed higher-order language is introduced in four stages: starting with first-order logic, adding first-order predicate abstraction, generalizing to higher-order predicate abstraction, and finally adding higher-order quantification. It is argued that both β-conversion and Universal Instantiation are valid on the intended interpretation of this language. Given these two principles, it is then shown how we can use pure higher-order logic to (...)
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  8. Quantification and ontological commitment.Nicholas K. Jones - forthcoming - In Anna Sofia Maurin & Anthony Fisher (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Properties.
    This chapter discusses ontological commitment to properties, understood as ontological correlates of predicates. We examine the issue in four metaontological settings, beginning with an influential Quinean paradigm on which ontology concerns what there is. We argue that this naturally but not inevitably avoids ontological commitment to properties. Our remaining three settings correspond to the most prominent departures from the Quinean paradigm. Firstly, we enrich the Quinean paradigm with a primitive, non-quantificational notion of existence. Ontology then concerns what exists. We argue (...)
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  9. Ontologiset Kategoriateoriat.Markku Keinänen & Jani Hakkarainen - forthcoming - Ensyklopedia Logos.
    Ontologiset kategoriateoriat pyrkivät vastaamaan metafysiikan klassiseen ongelmaan: kysymykseen siitä, mihin eri kategorioihin oliot eli entiteetit jakaantuvat. Olioilla tarkoitetaan tässä mitä tahansa, joka on olemassa. Olevan kategoriat eli ontologiset kategoriat (lyhyesti kategoriat) ovat alustavasti olioiden hyvin yleisiä lajeja. Jäsenyys olioiden kategoriassa ei niinkään kerro sitä, mitä piirteitä oliolla on, vaan sen olemisen tavan ¬– miten se esimerkiksi on tai voi olla maailman rakenneosa. Esimerkkejä mahdollisista kategorioista ovat konkreettiset partikulaariset yksilöoliot (substanssit), ominaisuudet, relaatiot, prosessit, tapahtumat ja joukot.
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  10. Metaethics and the Nature of Properties.Jussi Suikkanen - forthcoming - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume.
    This paper explores the connection between two philosophical debates concerning the nature of properties. The first metaethical debate is about whether normative properties are ordinary natural properties or some unique kind of non-natural properties. The second metaphysical debate is about whether properties are sets of objects, transcendent or immanent universals, or sets of tropes. I argue that nominalism, transcendent realism, and immanent realism are not neutral frameworks for the metaethical debate but instead lead to either metaethical naturalism or non-naturalism. We (...)
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  11. A Counterexample to Deflationary Nominalism.Nicholas Danne - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1721-1740.
    According to Jody Azzouni’s “deflationary nominalism,” the singular terms of mathematical language applied or unapplied to science refer to nothing at all. What does exist, Azzouni claims, must satisfy the quaternary condition he calls “thick epistemic access” (TEA). In this paper I argue that TEA surreptitiously reifies some mathematical entities. The mathematical entity that I take TEA to reify is the Fourier harmonic, an infinite-duration monochromatic sinusoid applied throughout engineering and physics. I defend the reality of the harmonic, in Azzouni’s (...)
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  12. A Lewisian Argument Against Platonism, or Why Theses About Abstract Objects Are Unintelligible.Jack Himelright - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):3037–3057.
    In this paper, I argue that all expressions for abstract objects are meaningless. My argument closely follows David Lewis’ argument against the intelligibility of certain theories of possible worlds, but modifies it in order to yield a general conclusion about language pertaining to abstract objects. If my Lewisian argument is sound, not only can we not know that abstract objects exist, we cannot even refer to or think about them. However, while the Lewisian argument strongly motivates nominalism, it also undermines (...)
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  13. Defense of Emergent Effects in Astrology Research: Rebuttal of Dean and Kelly (2023).Kenneth McRitchie - 2023 - Journal of Scientific Exploration 37 (3):576-579.
    The article I wrote on the astrology research program (2022) has drawn criticism from G. Dean and I. Kelly (2023) that scarcely touches on my topics of effect sizes in single-factor, multi-factor, and automated whole-chart experimentation. They ignore the meta-analysis of current research and my explanation of emergent effects. Instead they try to impugn all of astrology by arguments that date from the time of Cicero and Augustine.
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  14. How to Think about the Astrology Research Program: An Essay Considering Emergent Effects.Kenneth Douglas McRitchie - 2023 - Journal of Scientific Exploration 36 (4):706-716.
    As it has been shaped by improvements in its tools and methods, and by its discourse with critics, I describe how the astrological research program has advanced through three stages of modelling and design limitations. Single-factor tests (for example, the many Sun-sign–only experiments that have been published) are typically underdeterministic. Multi-factor tests, unless they are very well designed, can easily become overdeterministic. Chart-matching tests have been vulnerable to confirmation bias errors until the development of a machine-based, whole-chart matching protocol that (...)
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  15. Ontology Generator.Alik Pelman - 2023 - Metaphysica 24 (1):109-128.
    The paper proposes a simple method for constructing ontological theories—an ‘ontology generator’. It shows that such a generator manages to produce major existing ontological theories, e.g., Realism, Nominalism, Trope theory, Bundle theory, Perdurantism, Endurantism, Possibilism, Actualism and more. It thus turns out, surprisingly, that all these seemingly unrelated different ontological theories that were designed by thinkers hundreds of years apart, can all be generated using the same simple mechanism. Moreover, this same generator manages to produce entirely novel ontological theories, that (...)
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  16. The «One over Many» Argument for Propositions.Esteban Withrington - 2023 - Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 28 (1):61-79.
    The meanings of utterances and thoughts are commonly regarded in philosophical semantics as abstract objects, called «propositions», which account for how different utterances and thoughts can be synonymous and which constitute the primary truth-bearers. I argue that meanings are instead natural properties that play causal roles in the world, that the kind of «One over Many» thinking underlying the characterization of shared meanings as abstract objects is misguided and that utterances and thoughts having truth-values in virtue of their meanings does (...)
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  17. Teogonia technologiczna. Nominalistyczna koncepcja bóstwa dla transhumanizmu i posthumanizmu.Rachel 'Preppikoma' Palm - 2022 - In Kamila Grabowska-Derlatka, Jakub Gomułka & Rachel 'Preppikoma' Palm (eds.), PhilosophyPulp: Vol. 2. Kraków, Poland: Wydawnictwo Libron. pp. 129–143.
  18. Does everything resemble everything else to the same degree?Ben Blumson - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-21.
    According to Satosi Watanabe's "theorem of the ugly duckling", the number of predicates satisfied by any two different particulars is a constant, which does not depend on the choice of the two particulars. If the number of predicates satisfied by two particulars is their number of properties in common, and the degree of resemblance between two particulars is a function of their number of properties in common, then it follows that the degree of resemblance between any two different particulars is (...)
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  19. In Favour of Mereological Nominalism: reply to Cumpa and Declos.Nikk Effingham - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1707-1719.
    Mereological nominalism is the thesis that properties are identical to mereological fusions of their instances. Cumpa and Declos have raised two problems for the view. This paper is a reply to both problems.
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  20. Naturalness, Arbitrariness, and Serious Ontology.A. R. J. Fisher - 2022 - In Helen Beebee & A. R. J. Fisher (eds.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of David K. Lewis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 134-53.
    David Lewis is typically interpreted as a class nominalist. One consequence of class nominalism, which he embraced, is that the reduction of ordered pairs, triples, etc to unordered sets of sets is conventional. The reaction by his Australian counterparts D.M. Armstrong and Peter Forrest was that Lewis was not being ontologically serious. This chapter evaluates this debate over serious ontology. It is argued that in one sense Lewis is ontologically serious, but that his additional commitment to structuralism about classes should (...)
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  21. Sparse Causation and Mere Abundant Causation.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3259-3280.
    Setting off from a familiar distinction in the philosophy of properties, this paper introduces a tripartite distinction between sparse causation, abundant causation and mere abundant causation. It is argued that the contrast between sparse and mere abundant causation allows us to resolve notorious philosophical issues having to do with negative causation, causation involving institutional properties and physical macro-causation in a way that is unified, intuitive and in line with scientific doctrines and practices.
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  22. Safety first: making property talk safe for nominalists.Jack Himelright - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-26.
    Nominalists are confronted with a grave difficulty: if abstract objects do not exist, what explains the success of theories that invoke them? In this paper, I make headway on this problem. I develop a formal language in which certain platonistic claims about properties and certain nominalistic claims can be expressed, develop a formal language in which only certain nominalistic claims can be expressed, describe a function mapping sentences of the first language to sentences of the second language, and prove some (...)
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  23. Review of Tropes, by Douglas Ehring. [REVIEW]Jessica M. Wilson - 2022 - Mind 131 (521):369-379.
    Tropes is a systematic investigation into the metaphysics of properties, aiming to motivate and defend trope theory, and more specifically Natural Class Trope Nominalism (NCTN). Ehring’s book treats an impressive span of relevant positions, considerations, debates and objections with charity and clarity; it’s also a real page-turner, at least if one has (as I do) a taste for analytic twists and turns.
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  24. Nominalism and Material Plenitude.Uriah Kriegel - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):89-112.
    The idea of “material plenitude” has been gaining traction in recent discussions of the metaphysics of material objects. My main goal here is to show that this idea may have important dialectical implications for the metaphysics of properties – more specifically, that it provides nominalists with new resources in their attempt to reject an ontology of universals. I will recapitulate one of the main arguments against nominalism – due to David Armstrong – and show how plenitude helps the nominalist overcome (...)
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  25. Should a higher-order metaphysician believe in properties?David Liggins - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10017-10037.
    In this paper I take second order-quantification to be a sui generis form of quantification, irreducible to first-order quantification, and I examine the implications of doing so for the debate over the existence of properties. Nicholas K. Jones has argued that adding sui generis second-order quantification to our ideology is enough to establish that properties exist. I argue that Jones does not settle the question of whether there are properties because—like other ontological questions—it is first-order. Then I examine three of (...)
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  26. Deflationary theories of properties and their ontology.Thomas Schindler - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
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  27. More Grounds for Grounding Nominalism.Alexandre Declos - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):49-70.
    In this paper, I examine Peter Schulte’s “Grounding Nominalism” (Schulte, 2018), understood as the claim that first-order properties and relations are grounded in the concrete particulars which instantiate them. While Schulte offered reasons to think that this view is consistent, along with answers to a number of objections, a more straightforward argument for GN is still needed. I take on this task here, by discussing and defending what I call the “argument from abstraction”. The latter, I suggest, offers more grounds (...)
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  28. A Common Sense Defence of Ostrich Nominalism.Jean-Baptiste Guillon - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):71-93.
    When the meta-philosophies of Nominalism and Realism are compared, it is often said that Nominalism is motivated by a methodology of ontological economy, while Realism would be motivated by an appeal to Common Sense. In this paper, I argue that this association is misguided. After briefly comparing the meta-philosophy of Common Sense and the meta-philosophy of economy, I show that the core motivation in favour of Realism relies in fact in a principle of economy which violates the methodology of Common (...)
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  29. Paraphrasing away properties with pluriverse counterfactuals.Jack Himelright - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10883-10902.
    In this paper, I argue that for the purposes of ordinary reasoning, sentences about properties of concrete objects can be replaced with sentences concerning how things in our universe would be related to inscriptions were there a pluriverse. Speaking loosely, pluriverses are composites of universes that collectively realize every way a universe could possibly be. As such, pluriverses exhaust all possible meanings that inscriptions could take. Moreover, because universes necessarily do not influence one another, our universe would not be any (...)
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  30. Properties.Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    2020 update of the entry "Properties".
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  31. Naturalness and Convex Class Nominalism.Ben Blumson - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):65-81.
    In this paper I argue that the analysis of natural properties as convex subsets of a metric space in which the distances are degrees of dissimilarity is incompatible with both the definition of degree of dissimilarity as number of natural properties not in common and the definition of degree of dissimilarity as proportion of natural properties not in common, since in combination with either of these definitions it entails that every property is a natural property, which is absurd. I suggest (...)
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  32. Nominalism.Ghislain Guigon - 2019 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    ‘Nominalism’ refers to a family of views about what there is. The objects we are familiar with (e.g. hands, laptops, cookies, and trees) can be characterized as concrete and particular. Nominalists agree that there are such things. But one group of nominalists denies that anything is non-particular and another group denies that anything is non-concrete. These two sorts of nominalism, referred to as ‘nominalism about universals’ and ‘nominalism about abstract objects’, have common motivations in contemporary philosophy.
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  33. Talking about Properties. A Couple of Doubts on Hofweber’s Internalist View.Elisa Paganini - 2019 - In Richard Davies (ed.), Natural and Artefactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics. Londra, Regno Unito: pp. 80-89.
    A couple of doubts are raised concerning Hofweber’s internalist view of our talk about properties. The first doubt relates to the argument used in support of the internalist view of talk about properties: I suspect that one of the premises of the argument is not granted and therefore that the argument’s conclusion is undermined. My second doubt concerns a claimed consequence of Hofweber’s internalist view, i.e. conceptual idealism. It seems to me that conceptual idealism is incompatible with the internalist view (...)
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  34. Partial Resemblance and Property Immanence.Paul Audi - 2018 - Noûs 53 (4):884-903.
    Objects partially resemble when they are alike in some way but not entirely alike. Partial resemblance, then, involves similarity in a respect. It has been observed that talk of “respects” appears to be thinly‐veiled talk of properties. So some theorists take similarity in a respect to require property realism. I will go a step further and argue that similarity in intrinsic respects (partial intrinsic resemblance) requires properties to be immanent in objects. For a property to be immanent in an object (...)
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  35. Mereological Nominalism.Nikk Effingham - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):160-185.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  36. Repeatable Artworks and the Relevant Similarity Relation.Sherri Irvin - 2018 - Journal of Aesthetic Education 52 (2):30.
    Repeatable artworks, such as novels and musical works, have often been construed as universals whose instances are particular printings or performances. In Art and Art-Attempts, Christy Mag Uidhir offers a nominalist account of repeatable artworks, eschewing talk of universals. Mag Uidhir argues that all artworks are concrete, and artworks that we regard as repeatable are simply unified by a relevant similarity relation: we use the name Beloved to refer to two concrete printed novels because they are relevantly similar to each (...)
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  37. Properties, Predicates, Davidson and Deflation.Justin Robert Clarke - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1085-1090.
    I want to motivate an account of what it is for an object to have a property, which may as well be called a deflationary view about properties. Such a view follows from a conception of predication I ground in the work of Donald Davidson, some of which remains unpublished. I claim that if we take seriously Davidson’s account of predication, by maintaining that sentences are the primary linguistic unit, we can define properties in terms of predicates. The aim of (...)
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  38. Abstract Entities.Sam Cowling - 2017 - New York: Routledge.
    Think of a number, any number, or properties like fragility and humanity. These and other abstract entities are radically different from concrete entities like electrons and elbows. While concrete entities are located in space and time, have causes and effects, and are known through empirical means, abstract entities like meanings and possibilities are remarkably different. They seem to be immutable and imperceptible and to exist "outside" of space and time. This book provides a comprehensive critical assessment of the problems raised (...)
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  39. ‘Comments on Robert Brandom’s From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars’.James O'Shea - 2017 - In David Pereplyotchik & Deborah Barnbaum (eds.), Sellars and Contemporary Philosophy. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 232-243.
    These comments, which include informal offhand asides made during delivery, derive from an ‘Author Meets Critics’ session on Robert Brandom’s book, From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars’ (2015), held at Kent State University and published subsequently in Sellars and Contemporary Philosophy (2017).
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  40. Brentano’s Reism.Sauer Werner - 2017 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 133-143.
    On 7 January 1903, Brentano wrote to Anton Marty that by now he thinks it to be “impossible that factuality (Tatsächlichkeit) should belong to an irreale except in dependence on something real” as “concomitantly” occurring (Brentano 1966a: 106). For instance, when someone is thinking of a reale, or thing (Ding) A, say the sun or a centaur, there exists concomitantly to the A-thinker (who is a thing) also an irreale, viz., a thought-of-thing (Gedankending) which is the thought-of-A (Brentano 1930: 31, (...)
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  41. It was the 15th of December.James Bardis - 2016 - Jpeg Cover-Dubai2016 ISSN: 2189-1036 – The IAFOR International Conference on Education – Dubai – 2016 Official Conference Proceedings:87-93.
    A reflection on the merits of an a priori poeto-epistemology in relation to tacitly held assumptions about the a fortiori validity of computational logic to transcend the limits of contradiction and infinite regression and establish a valid ontology.
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  42. Aquinas on the Problem of Universals.Jeffrey E. Brower - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):715-735.
  43. The Bradleyan Regress, Non-Relational Realism, and the Quinean Semantic Strategy.Jonathan Reid Surovell - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (1):63-79.
    Non-Relational Realism is a popular solution to the Bradleyan regress of facts or truths. It denies that there is a relational universal of exemplification; for an object a to exemplify a universal F-ness, on this view, is not for a relation to subsist between a and F-ness. An influential objection to Non-Relational Realism is that it is unacceptably obscure. The author argues that Non-Relational Realism can be understood as a selective application of satisfaction semantics to predicates like ‘exemplify’, and that (...)
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  44. Is Trope Theory a Divided House?Robert K. Garcia - 2015 - In Gabriele Galluzzo Michael Loux (ed.), The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 133-155.
    In this paper I explore Michael Loux’s important distinction between “tropes” and “tropers”. First, I argue that the distinction throws into relief an ambiguity and discrepancy in the literature, revealing two fundamentally different versions of trope theory. Second, I argue that the distinction brings into focus unique challenges facing each of the resulting trope theories, thus calling into question an alleged advantage of trope theory—that by uniquely occupying the middle ground between its rivals, trope theory is able to recover and (...)
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  45. Two Ways to Particularize a Property.Robert K. Garcia - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):635-652.
    Trope theory is an increasingly prominent contender in contemporary debates about the existence and nature of properties. But it suffers from ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope. Disambiguation reveals two fundamentally different concepts of a trope: modifier tropes and module tropes. These types of tropes are unequally suited for metaphysical work. Modifier tropes have advantages concerning powers, relations, and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes have advantages concerning perception, causation, character-grounding, and the ontology of substance. Thus, the choice between modifier (...)
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  46. Coextension and Identity.Ghislain Guigon - 2015 - In Ghislain Guigon & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Nominalism About Properties: New Essays. Routledge. pp. 135-155.
    This chapter is concerned with the coextension difficulty for nominalist theories of properties that reject tropes alongside universals. After carefully explaining the coextension difficulty and describing the theories it targets, the chapter describes different solutions to the difficulty. These solutions differ with respect to how much involved they are into a dualist approach to coextension. A dualist approach to a case of coextension consists in agreeing with the realist that the relevant ascriptions of properties are numerically distinct. A monist approach (...)
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  47. Nominalism About Properties: New Essays.Ghislain Guigon & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) - 2015 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    Nominalism, which has its origins in the Middle Ages and continues into the Twenty-First Century, is the doctrine that there are no universals. This book is unique in bringing together essays on the history of nominalism and essays that present a systematic discussion of nominalism. It introduces the reader to the distinction between particulars and universals, to the difficulties posed by this distinction, and to the main motivations for the rejection of universals. It also describes the main varieties of nominalism (...)
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  48. Thought and Thing: Brentano's Reism as Truthmaker Nominalism.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):153-180.
    The ontological theory of the later Franz Brentano is often referred to as ‘reism.’ But what exactly is reism, and how is it related to modern-day nominalism? In this paper, I offer an interpretation of Brentano’s reism as a specific variety of nominalism. This variety, although motivated by distinctly modern concerns about truthmakers, adopts a strategy for providing such truthmakers that is completely foreign to modern nominalism. The strategy rests on proliferation of coincident concrete particulars. For example, ‘Socrates is wise’ (...)
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  49. L’argomento dell’uno sui molti. Il dilemma dello struzzo.Francesco F. Calemi - 2014 - Rivista di Estetica 57:219-240.
    The purpose of this paper is to defend the so-called Ostrich Nominalism against the influential criticism that has been put forward by David M. Armstrong. First, I reconstruct Armstrong’s “One over Many” argument for universals (§§ 1-2), reviewing his main reasons for rejecting the foremost kinds of nominalism (§ 3). I then argue that Ostrich Nominalism has been underrated by Armstrong (§ 4) and that, consequently, his strategy for dealing with it results in misleading and elusive conclusions. I conclude that (...)
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  50. Ostrich Nominalism and Peacock Realism: A Hegelian Critique of Quine.Paul Giladi - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (5):734-751.
    My aim in this paper is to offer a Hegelian critique of Quine’s predicate nominalism. I argue that at the core of Hegel’s idealism is not a supernaturalist spirit monism, but a realism about universals, and that while this may contrast to the nominalist naturalism of Quine, Hegel’s position can still be defended over that nominalism in naturalistic terms. I focus on the contrast between Hegel’s and Quine’s respective views on universals, which Quine takes to be definitive of philosophical naturalism. (...)
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