Following Wiggins’ seminal article, On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time, this article presents the first comprehensive account of the relation of material constitution, an asymmetrical, transitive relation which totally orders distinct ‘entities’ (individuals, pluralities or masses of stuff) which ‘spatially coincide.’ Their coincidence in space is explained by a recursive definition of ‘complete-composition’, weaker than strict mereological indiscernibility, which also explains the variety of logically independent similarities in such cases. This account is ‘analytical’, dealing with ‘putative’ (...) cases in general. The main strategy is to rationally reconstruct Aristotle’s notion of material cause. It is developed more fully with a theory of how to justify admitting generable and perishable things into the natural world, in The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument (Open Court, 1996). (shrink)

The main contribution of this work is to develop the account of material constitution presented in Spatially Coinciding Objects (Ratio 24, 1982) and a series of related articles. This account was merely ‘analytical’ in that it applied generously to ‘putative’ examples of distinct entities (individuals, pluralities and masses of stuff) in the same place at the same time. The account herein is ‘critical’ in that it seeks justification for recognizing the existence of entities constituted in addition to the entities that (...) allegedly constitute them. While the earlier account used examples such as a clay statue and the clay of the statue for purposes of illustrating material constitution, the present account would consider ‘reducing’ the statue to the clay, and seeks justification for how to resist this and admit the existence of generable and perishable natural objects in general. The justification sought is ‘deep’ in the sense that (unlike the popular ‘method of cases) it does not belong to ‘descriptive’ metaphysics (in Strawson’s sense) but is sufficiently potent to counter ‘revisionist’ views. Transcendental arguments, beginning with austere assumptions of justification itself, are thereby employed. Suggestions are made about what to conclude about our own identity, which amount to supporting animalism. (shrink)

That no member of a natural kind can switch kinds is a consequence of David Wiggins’ view that the identity conditions for such things are given by the natural kind itself. If dog is a natural kind, then dogs must be dogs and one dog cannot ‘turn into’ something else, say, by gradually ‘becoming’ a mass of tissue (as Marjorie Price had held). Were such a transition to involve the persistence of the same thing, then the thing in question would (...) comply with conditions of identity not restricted to dogs. To provide for such transitions James Baillie suggests alternative conditions of identity, based on Andrew Brennan’s notion of ‘survival’ (itself borrowed from Parfit). Survival requires that the earlier thing be ‘structurally similar to’, and ‘play a significant and direct role in the production of’ the later thing (sufficiency is gained if, in addition, they are composed of the same kind of matter). Unlike identity, however, survival is what Wiggins calls a ‘branching’ relation, capable of linking a single thing with two or more equal ‘competitors’ (as apparently happens in cases of brain fission). To provide conditions of identity per se, Baillie follows Parfit, who claimed that our identity is preserved by psychological continuity when there is no branching. Members of natural kinds, such as dogs, are now said to be reidentifiable over time by the relation of non-branching survival. I argue against this on the ground that we can know when this relation obtains only when we are already able to individuate things by a different sort of relation, such as those associated with natural kinds. (shrink)

I defend Locke’s claim that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at that time. In the relevant sense of ‘kind’, a kind is a sortal, which, with an appropriate ostension, is enough to indicate which object is meant. To perform this function sortals must be sufficient to determine the persistence conditions of the thing ostended.

The general account of material constitution presented in my article, Spatially Coinciding Objects (Ratio vol. 24.1, June 1982), is further developed. There we saw how distinct objects in the same place at the same time can be strictly ordered by an asymmetrical, transitive relation of material constitution. I show herein how this relation can conceivably form ‘upright trees’ in which one object constitutes two other objects, neither of which constitutes the other. It is, however, impossible to have ‘inverted trees’ in (...) which one thing is constituted by two things neither of which constitutes the other. (This impossibility is implied when supposing that there is just one thing which counts as the proximate matter of a thing.). (shrink)

I defend a theory of philosophy, suggested explicitly by Allan Gibbard (and inspired by Kant), in which the main branches may be considered as fundamental inquiry into norms of different kinds. Special attention is given to how even metaphysics fits the description. The theory is defended by explaining a variety of ‘known facts’ about philosophy, understood as facts commonly recognized in academic philosophy. These include: that philosophy spans a diversity of areas, including logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics; that philosophy (...) has seemed, at least, to be different in kind from other areas of inquiry; that philosophy lacks experts and official procedures of justification; that philosophy appears important to some but not to others. (shrink)

This introductory text offers a coherent treatment of issues in a wide range of areas of philosophy. It begins with logic (in a broad, traditional sense that includes epistemology), since the concepts of this area illuminate metaphysics, covered next in the sequence. (Consider, for example, how material reality is what is known through sensation or how mind is what is known through introspection.). Ethics is covered next, because views on well-being and morality have been deepened by being couched in metaphysical (...) views that yield conceptions of human nature. For similar reasons, the section on ethics comes before that on social philosophy. It is my firm belief that the greatest philosophers achieve the depth for which they are admired by constructing systems in which the various areas of philosophy are unified. With this inspiration, I have put the discussions in a logical order, in which the earlier ones anticipate and illuminate later ones. Something like a story is told. (shrink)

Support is given to Habermas's argument that we interpret thoughts only by seeing persons as actually justified in their circumstances. Habermas holds further that his argument extends to moral thinking, in that we understand it only by actually taking the moral point of view, and he thinks this is illustrated by Kohlberg's theory of moral development. While this illustration is denied here on the ground that Kohlberg's theory accepts Rawls's theory of justice, it is argued that the extension to morality (...) can be made with a theory like Gewirth's, in which morality appears as a form of rationality. (shrink)

‘Second substances’ are Aristotle’s species and genera that reveal the general nature of a thing. Sortals correspond to the most specific, least abstract of these, normally thought of as ‘the’ kind to which a thing belongs. I argue against a common view that artifact terms such as ‘clock’ or ‘pen’ are suitable as sortals and for their being regarded as more like genera. If we can individuate clocks and pens as we do trees and rocks, by a combination of sortal (...) plus ostension, then we must use more specific sortals which indicate the structures by virtue of which the objects perform the functions of clocks or pens. Functions by themselves do not supply the identity conditions of sortals. Similar reasoning supports Wiggins’ view that ‘the kind’ to which we belong is our biological species, not the purely functional kind of being a person. (shrink)

The ‘step’ to individuation is taken when one can perceive an object as a single, countable thing. While Strawson envisages this step as one from feature placing, I argue that the presence of demonstratives renders this problematic. The step is best seen as taken from universal recognition, as explained by Price. This shows that the step is ‘greater’ than we might have expected. There is a mutual dependence of the abilities to individuate, to grasp demonstrative concepts and to draw a (...) distinction between appearance and reality. (shrink)

The Fate of Reason is the first general history devoted to the period between Kant and Fichte, one of the most revolutionary and fertile in modern philosophy.

Book 1. Volume I, Greece and Rome ; Volume II, Augustine to Scotus ; Volume III, Ockham to Suarez.

This reissue of his collection of early essays, Logico-Linguistic Papers, is published with a brand new introduction by Professor Strawson but, apart from minor ...

A critique of the hypothesis of extended cognition.

The Scientific Attitude presents a systematic account of the cognitive and social features of science. Written by an experimental biologist actively engaged in research, the work is unique in its attempt to understand science in terms of day-to-day practice. The book goes beyond the traditional description of science that focuses on method and logic to characterize the scientific attitude as a way of looking at the world.

Critics of Divine Command Theory (DCT) have advanced the counterpossible terrible commands objection. They argue that DCT implies the counterpossible ‘If a necessarily morally perfect God commanded us to perform a terrible act, then the terrible act would be morally obligatory.’ However, this counterpossible is false. Hence, DCT is false. Philipp Kremers has proposed that the intuition that the counterpossible above is false is due to conversational implicatures. By providing a pragmatic explanation for the intuition, he thinks that DCT proponents (...) can then maintain that the counterpossible is actually true. In this article, I argue that Kremers's conversational implicature response fails because (a) there is good reason to think that no conversational implicature arises given what critics of DCT have expressed, (b) a competent reader would not understand the critics' utterance that TCC is false as implicating that TCC* is false, and (c) the counterpossible terrible commands objection can be easily modified to be immune to the conversational implicature response by cancelling any potential implicature. Thus, an appeal to conversational implicatures cannot save DCT from the counterpossible terrible commands objection. (shrink)

The first half of the book concentrates on key definitions and epistemological issues, including an overview of philosophy as applied to technology, a definition of technology, and an examination of technology as it relates to practical and ...

In a series of articles specifically commossioned for this volume, some of today's most distinguished business ethicists survey the main areas of interest and ...

' ...this volume extracts the moral and ethical conflicts presented by everyday police activity and makes explicit the assumption that shape the police response... '.

Hannah Arendt disavowed the title of “philosopher,” and is known above all as a political theorist. But the relationship between philosophy and politics animates her entire oeuvre. We find her addressing the topic in The Human Condition (1958), in Between Past and Future (a collection of essays written in the early 1960s), and in Men in Dark Times (another collection of essays, this one from the late sixties). It is treated in her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, composed during the (...) seventies, and also in the posthumous Life of the Mind, two of three projected volumes of which were complete when she died in 1975. Certainly, Arendt’s thought cannot be understood without taking into account her deep suspicion of and equally deep commitment to philosophy in the context of political reflection. For all that, her writings on this abiding preoccupation do not gel into a systematically articulated theory or programmatic statement. Instead, they reflect Arendt’s appreciation of what remained for her a “vital tension” – an enigma. (shrink)

Philosophy in Russia covers its subject broadly and in detail from the eighteenth century to Lenin and beyond into the post-Stalin period. It offers a continuous history of the development of philosophical thought in Russia, and portraits of individual and influential thinkers. The author devotes careful analysis to radicals such as Bakunin, Herzen, Chernyshevsky and Lavrov, and to the Marxists such as Plekhanov and Lenin. He also discusses the thought of writers such as Kireevsky, Leontiev and Solovyev, and examines the (...) philosophically relevant ideas of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He also discusses Russian thinkers in exile, such as Berdyaev, Frank, N. O. Lossky and Shestov.For historical reasons philosophical thought in Russia has tended to become socially or politically committed thought. To what extent genuine philosophical thought has proved to be compatible with the monopoly enjoyed by Marxism-Leninism in the fields of education and publishing is a crucial question discussed in this authoritative study. (shrink)

A new approach to understanding the nature of ethics and ethical decision making, not only in the context of business, but also in other life contexts.

One of the very few accounts in English of German idealism, this ambitious work advances and revises our understanding of both the history and the thought of the classical period of German philosophy. As he traces the structure and evolution of idealism as a doctrine, Frederick Beiser exposes a strong objective, or realist, strain running from Kant to Hegel and identifies the crucial role of the early romantics—Hölderlin, Schlegel, and Novalis—as the founders of absolute idealism.

That about sums up what is wrong with Clark's view.

Child labor is often condemned as a form of exploitation. I explore how the notion of exploitation, as used in everyday language, can be made precise in economic models of child labor. Exploitation is defined relative to a specific social welfare function. I first show that under the standard dynastic social welfare function, which is commonly applied to intergenerational models, child labor is never exploitative. In contrast, under an inclusive welfare function, which places additional weight on the welfare of children, (...) child labor is always exploitative. Neither welfare function captures the more gradual distinctions that common usage of the term exploitation allows. I resolve this conflict by introducing a welfare function with minimum altruism, in which child labor in a given family is judged relative to a specific social standard. Under this criterion, child labor is exploitative only in families where the parent (or guardian) displays insufficient altruism towards the child. I argue that this welfare function best captures the conventional concept of exploitation and has useful properties for informing political choices regarding child labor. (shrink)

Hegel is one of the major philosophers of the nineteenth century. Many of the major philosophical movements of the twentieth century - from existentialism to analytic philosophy - grew out of reactions against Hegel. He is also one of the hardest philosophers to understand and his complex ideas, though rewarding, are often misunderstood. In this magisterial and lucid introduction, Frederick Beiser covers every major aspect of Hegel's thought. He places Hegel in the historical context of nineteenth-century Germany whilst clarifying (...) the deep insights and originality of Hegel's philosophy. A masterpiece of clarity and scholarship, _Hegel_ is both the ideal starting point for those coming to Hegel for the first time and essential reading for any student or scholar of nineteenth century philosophy. Additional features: glossary chapter summaries chronology annotated further reading. (shrink)

The modernist movement has been regarded as representing a crisis point in Western thought. This volume looks at that crisis in terms of its reinterpretation of ideas concerning vitalism: the animation of the universe, whether spiritual or based in physical energies) of the universe. Beginning with vitalism's historical background in the enlightenment and the nineteenth century, and moving through scientific, philosophical and literary disciplines, the contributors chart the progress of vitalism and its influence on modernist thought. The focal point is (...) the work of Henri Bergson, whose part in this powerful reinterpretation had a considerable bearing on European and American intellectual life, and yet led to a vehement rejection of his work. A previously untranslated and little-known essay by Bakhtin will be of special interest in this stimulating collection, which includes original contributions from leading scholars in literature, the history of science, biology and philosophy, and comprises a wide-ranging reassessment of 'the perpetual crises of modernity'. The modernist movement has been regarded as representing a crisis point in Western thought. This volume looks at that crisis in terms of its reinterpretation of ideas concerning vitalism: the animation of the universe, whether spiritual or based in physical energies) of the universe. Beginning with vitalism's historical background in the enlightenment and the nineteenth century, and moving through scientific, philosophical and literary disciplines, the contributors chart the progress of vitalism and its influence on modernist thought. The focal point is the work of Henri Bergson, whose part in this powerful reinterpretation had a considerable bearing on European and American intellectual life, and yet led to a vehement rejection of his work. A previously untranslated and little-known essay by Bakhtin will be of special interest in this stimulating collection, which includes original contributions from leading scholars in literature, the history of science, biology and philosophy, and comprises a wide-ranging reassessment of 'the perpetual crises of modernity'. (shrink)

Histories of German philosophy in the nineteenth century typically focus on its first half--when Hegel, idealism, and Romanticism dominated. By contrast, the remainder of the century, after Hegel's death, has been relatively neglected because it has been seen as a period of stagnation and decline. But Frederick Beiser argues that the second half of the century was in fact one of the most revolutionary periods in modern philosophy because the nature of philosophy itself was up for grabs and the (...) very absence of certainty led to creativity and the start of a new era. In this innovative concise history of German philosophy from 1840 to 1900, Beiser focuses not on themes or individual thinkers but rather on the period's five great debates: the identity crisis of philosophy, the materialism controversy, the methods and limits of history, the pessimism controversy, and the Ignorabimusstreit. Schopenhauer and Wilhelm Dilthey play important roles in these controversies but so do many neglected figures, including Ludwig Büchner, Eugen Dühring, Eduard von Hartmann, Julius Fraunstaedt, Hermann Lotze, Adolf Trendelenburg, and two women, Agnes Taubert and Olga Pluemacher, who have been completely forgotten in histories of philosophy. The result is a wide-ranging, original, and surprising new account of German philosophy in the critical period between Hegel and the twentieth century. (shrink)

For over four decades, "Introduction to Operations Research" by Frederick Hillier has been the classic text on operations research. While building on the classic strengths of the text, the author continues to find new ways to make the text current and relevant to students. One way is by incorporating a wealth of state-of-the-art, user-friendly software and more coverage of business applications than ever before. The hallmark features of this edition include clear and comprehensive coverage of fundamentals, an extensive set (...) of interesting problems and cases, and state-of-the-practice operations research software used in conjunction with examples from the text. The ninth edition introduces a new partnership with the Institute for Operations Research and Management (INFORMS). These two pillars of the OR world have come together to showcase some of the award-winning applications of operations research and integrate them with this text. (shrink)

Neo-Kantianism was an important movement in German philosophy of the late 19th century: Frederick Beiser traces its development back to the late 18th century, and explains its rise as a response to three major developments in German culture: the collapse of speculative idealism; the materialism controversy; and the identity crisis of philosophy.

This is the first full study in English of the German historicist tradition. Frederick C. Beiser surveys the major German thinkers on history from the middle of the eighteenth century until the early twentieth century, providing an introduction to each thinker and the main issues in interpreting and appraising his thought. The volume offers new interpretations of well-known philosophers such as Johann Gottfried Herder and Max Weber, and introduces others who are scarcely known at all, including J. A. Chladenius, (...) Justus Möser, Heinrich Rickert, and Emil Lask. Beyond an exploration of the historical and intellectual context of each thinker, Beiser illuminates the sources and reasons for the movement of German historicism—one of the great revolutions in modern Western thought, and the source of our historical understanding of the human world. (shrink)

Neil Levy defends no-platforming people who espouse dangerous or unacceptable views. I reject his notion of higher-order evidence as authoritarian and dogmatic. I argue that no-platforming frustrates the growth of knowledge.