In this paper we investigate with a case study from chemistry under what conditions a simulation can serve as a surrogate for an experiment. The case-study concerns a simulation of H2-formation in outer space. We find that in this case the simulation can act as a surrogate for an experiment, because there exists comprehensive theoretical background knowledge in form of quantum mechanics about the range of phenomena to which the investigated process belongs and because any particular modelling assumptions as can (...) be justified. If these requirements are met then direct empirical validation may even be dispensable. We conjecture that this is not the case in the absence of comprehensive theoretical background knowledge. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr’s computational theory of vision is not intentional, claiming that the formal scientific theory does not include description of visual content. They also argue that the theory is internalist in the sense of not describing things physically external to the perceiver. They argue that these claims hold for computational theories of vision in general. Beyond theories of vision, they argue that representational content does not figure as a topic within formal computational theories (...) in cognitive science. I demonstrate that Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims about Marr’s theory are false. Marr’s computational theory contains a mathematical theory of visual content, based on empirical psychophysical evidence. It also contains mathematical descriptions of distal physical surfaces and objects, and of their optic projection to the perceiver. Much computational research on vision contains these types of intentional and externalist components within the formal, mathematical, theories. Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims demonstrate inadequate study and understanding of Marr’s work and other research in this area. Computational theories of vision, by containing empirically based mathematical theories of visual content, to this extent present naturalizations of semantics. (shrink)

Anhand von unveröffentlichten Briefen an die Herausgeber Hans Delbrück und Karl Muth wird im vorliegenden Beitrag nachgewiesen: Bernarda von Nell, die Mutter des Jesuitenpaters und Sozialethikers Oswald von Nell-Breuning, ist die Verfasserin des anonymen Artikels „Wie denkt Professor Harnack über die Enzyklika Pascendi?“ . Ihr Angriff auf Adolf Harnack ist Teil einer über Jahre andauernden, teils kritischen, teils bewundernden Auseinandersetzung mit dem protestantischen Gelehrten. Harnacks Antwort an die – ihm namentlich bekannte – Angreiferin ist vor dem Hintergrund seiner Unterstützung für (...) das „Bildungsstreben der Frauen“ zu sehen.Anhang; aus: A. Harnack, Die päpstliche Enzyklika des Jahres 1907. Ein Schlußwort.*[Man ist] der Enzyklika die Erklärung schuldig, die mir in den Kritiken kaum entgegengetreten ist, daß sie nach langer, langer Zeit von höchster katholischer Stelle die Glaubens- und Weltanschauungsfrage, nicht aber die Frage des Papsttums, in den Mittelpunkt stellt. Wir sind daran gewöhnt worden, von Rom aus vor allem diese Frage uns aufgerückt zu sehen; in der Enzyklika aber tritt sie ganz hinter jene andere zurück. Ich stehe nicht an, darin einen Fortschritt zu erkennen. Fast möchte ich sagen, der Papst rüttelt die Gewissen seiner Gläubigen auf! Sollten wir uns darüber nicht freuen? Er zwingt sie freilich alsbald auf einen ganz bestimmten Weg und bringt seine Macht in den Disziplinarvorschriften, die er erläßt, in eine fürchterliche Erinnerung; aber er lenkt ihre Aufmerksamkeit doch auf Glaubensfragen, er lenkt sie auf den „Modernismus“, den er nicht ohne Aufbieten von Kenntnissen eingehend schildert! Er nimmt also die unausbleiblichen Folgen aller geistigen Unruhe in den Kauf, weil er die Sache, den wahren, rechten Glauben, für so wichtig hält. Wäre es ihm nur um die eigene Herrschaft zu tun, so wäre diese Enzyklika das ungeschickteste Schriftstück von der Welt – es ist ihm wirklich um den christlichen Glauben und die rechte Theologie zu tun, wie er sie versteht, also um das Seelenheil seiner Gläubigen! Das soll man nicht verkennen, und darin liegt bei aller Rückständigkeit in bezug auf das Wesen des Wahrheitssinns und der Wissenschaft doch ein erfreuliches Moment. Auch wird ja der Versuch gemacht, den „Modernismus“ zu widerlegen, und so kläglich dieser Versuch auch ausgefallen ist – einige unvermeidliche Schatten und Fehler der modernen Wissenschaft sind nicht ungeschickt benutzt, und auf die Abgründe, die sie umgeben, ist nicht ohne Recht hingewiesen.Drawing its evidence from hitherto unpublished letters to the editors Hans Delbrück and Karl Muth , the present study proves the following fact: Bernarda von Nell, mother of the Jesuit priest and professor of social ethics Oswald von Nell-Breuning, is the author the anonymous article „Wie denkt Professor Harnack über die Enzyklika Pascendi?“ . This attack on Adolf Harnack is part of her continuous, sometimes critical, sometimes admiring discussion of the protestant scholar. Harnack’s reply to his challenger – known to him by name – should be appreciated in connection with his public support of “women’s pursuit of education”. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 2 Seiten: 694-697.

Literary controversies are instructive both in themselves and by illuminating the historical contexts that surrounded them. The Zurich dispute between Johann J. Bottmer, Johann J. Breitinger, and J...

Literary controversies are instructive both in themselves and by illuminating the historical contexts that surrounded them. The Zurich dispute between Johann J. Bottmer, Johann J. Breitinger, and J...

Inhalt: Thomas Sören HOFFMANN: »… eine besondere Weise, sich selbst zu erblicken«: Zum systematischen Status der Natur nach Fichte. Christian STADLER: Der Transzendentalphilosophische Rechtsbegriff und seine systematische Begründungsleistung. Katja V. TAVER: Fichte und Arnold Gehlen. Fichtes Philosophie des Rechts von 1796 und 1812 im Fokus von Arnold Gehlens philosophischer Anthropologie. Jean-Christophe MERLE: Fichtes Begründung des Strafrechts. Manfred GAWLINA: Verhalten als Synthesis von Recht und Gesinnung. Zur Auseinandersetzung zwischen Kant, Fichte und Hegel. Carla DE PASCALE: Fichte und die Gesellschaft. (...) Carla AMADIO: Die Logik der politischen Beziehung. Christiana SENIGAGLIA: Die Bestimmung des Bürgers beim späten Fichte. Ferenc L. LENDVAI: Stellung und Spuren einer Sozialethik in Fichtes Philosophie. Teil I: Die Stellung einer Sozialethik in Fichtes Philosophie. Judit HELL: Stellung und Spuren einer Sozialethik in Fichtes Philosophie. Teil II: Die Spuren einer Sozialethik in Fichtes Philosophie. Wladimir Alexejevic ABASCHNIK: Das Konzept des geschlossenen Handelsstaates Fichtes in der Rezeption von Vassilij Nasarovic Karasin. Karl HAHN: Die Relevanz der Eigentumstheorie Fichtes im Zeitalter der Globalisierung unter Berücksichtigung Proudhons und Hegels. Hans HIRSCH: Fichtes Planwirtschaftsmodell als Dokument der Geistesgeschichte und als bleibender Denkanstoß. (shrink)

The fourth chapter analyses the establishment of Cartesianism at the University of Leiden in 1650s and 1660s. This was carried out by De Raey, who provided a defence and teaching of Descartes’s physics in his Clavis philosophiae naturalis (1654), although not based on Descartes’s metaphysics: physical principles, indeed, are presented by De Raey as self-evident truths, and consistent with Aristotle’s theory of scientia or universal and necessary knowledge. This was not the only peculiar characteristic of Leiden Cartesianism, as De Raey (...) also provided a differentiation between philosophical and practical knowledge (including medicine and revealed theology), as these are based on different sources of knowledge, namely, intellect and sensory experience. In the hands of Christopher Wittich, the separation thesis became the standard in conceiving the place of Cartesianism in the university, which was confined to natural philosophy in 1650s and strictly secluded from revealed theology. At the same time, the need to develop a moral philosophy consistent with the Reformed creed became the centre of the debate between Revius and Heidanus, a Reformed theologian who saw in Cartesianism a philosophy more consistent with Calvinism than Scholasticism. Accordingly, he was eager to support the appointment in Leiden of Arnold Geulincx, who was developing a philosophical ethics independent of revealed theology but consistent with the Reformed creed. For this purpose, besides the relation of body, soul and world, Geulincx considered those relations of man, world, and God from which moral duties follow. Accordingly, he provided his ethics with a foundation in rational theology. In turn, this foundation entails a reflection on the type of knowledge that constitutes physics and determines its very method. Given the inscrutability of God’s reasons in creating the world, Geulincx could claim that physics has to proceed by hypotheses based on experience rather than by a deduction of natural laws from metaphysical principles. In this way, the epistemic consequences of his foundational theory refuelled a reflection on the method of natural philosophy itself, making his foundation a sample of the transformation of Cartesian foundationalism – dominated by Descartes’s metaphysical physics – into a reflection on physics itself. In other words, Geulincx provided, together with De Raey, a de-metaphysicisation of physics. (shrink)

Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential,autonoeticcharacter. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken toward an event simulation. In this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the (...) past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in future-oriented mental time travel do justice neither to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events. (shrink)

Episodic representations can be entertained either as “remembered” or “imagined”—as outcomes of experience or as simulations of such experience. Here, we argue that this feature is the product of a dedicated cognitive function: the metacognitive capacity to determine the mnemicity of mental event simulations. We argue that mnemicity attribution should be distinguished from other metacognitive operations (such as reality monitoring) and propose that this attribution is a “cognitive gadget”—a distinctively human ability made possible by cultural learning. Cultural learning is a (...) type of social learning in which traits are inherited through social interaction. In the case of mnemicity, one culturally learns to discriminate metacognitive “feelings of remembering” from other perceptual, emotional, action-related, and metacognitive feelings; to interpret feelings of remembering as indicators of memory rather than imagination; and to broadcast the interpreted feelings in culture- and context-specific ways, such as “I was there” or “I witnessed it myself.” We review evidence from the literature on memory development and scaffolding, metacognitive learning and teaching, as well as cross-cultural psychology in support of this view before pointing out various open questions about the nature and development of mnemicity highlighted by our account. (shrink)

In “Some Remarks on Extending and Interpreting Theories with a Partial Truth Predicate”, Reinhardt [21] famously proposed an instrumentalist interpretation of the truth theory Kripke–Feferman ( $\mathrm {KF}$ ) in analogy to Hilbert’s program. Reinhardt suggested to view $\mathrm {KF}$ as a tool for generating “the significant part of $\mathrm {KF}$ ”, that is, as a tool for deriving sentences of the form $\mathrm{Tr}\ulcorner {\varphi }\urcorner $. The constitutive question of Reinhardt’s program was whether it was possible “to justify the (...) use of nonsignificant sentences entirely within the framework of significant sentences”. This question was answered negatively by Halbach & Horsten [10] but we argue that under a more careful interpretation the question may receive a positive answer. To this end, we propose to shift attention from $\mathrm {KF}$ -provably true sentences to $\mathrm {KF}$ -provably true inferences, that is, we shall identify the significant part of $\mathrm {KF}$ with the set of pairs $\langle {\Gamma, \Delta }\rangle $, such that $\mathrm {KF}$ proves that if all members of $\Gamma $ are true, at least one member of $\Delta $ is true. In way of addressing Reinhardt’s question we show that the provably true inferences of suitable $\mathrm {KF}$ -like theories coincide with the provable sequents of matching versions of the theory Partial Kripke–Feferman ( $\mathrm {PKF}$ ). (shrink)

In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness.

In this essay, Johannes Giesinger comments on the current philosophical debate on educational justice. He observes that while authors like Elizabeth Anderson and Debra Satz develop a so-called adequacy view of educational justice, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift defend an egalitarian principle. Giesinger focuses his analysis on the main objection that is formulated, from an egalitarian perspective, against the adequacy view: that it neglects the problem of securing fair opportunities in the competition for social rewards. Giesinger meets this objection (...) by expressing two basic theses: First, he argues that Brighouse and Swift themselves fail to give an adequate account of fair competition; and, second, he shows that the adequacy view provides the theoretical resources to face this problem. (shrink)

This paper examines cave environments as unique spaces of knowledge production and shows how visualizations of natural cavities in maps came to be powerful tools in scientific reasoning. Faced with the challenge of limited vision, mapmakers combined empiricism and imagination in an experimental setting and developed specific translation strategies to deal with the uncertain origin of underground objects and the shifting boundaries between the known and the unknown. By deconstructing this type of cartographic representation, which has barely been studied, this (...) paper furnishes surprising insights into the scholarly practices and tools used to deal with this considerable epistemic uncertainty and to signal credibility and trust to potential users. The array of maps used for this study includes both archival and published sources, depicting caves in Europe, America and Siberia. (shrink)

This book is the first to trace the origins and significance of positivism on a global scale. Taking their cues from Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill, positivists pioneered a universal, experience-based culture of scientific inquiry for studying nature and society—a new science that would enlighten all of humankind. Positivists envisaged one world united by science, but their efforts spawned many. Uncovering these worlds of positivism, the volume ranges from India, the Ottoman Empire, and the Iberian Peninsula to Central Europe, (...) Russia, and Brazil, examining positivism’s impact as one of the most far-reaching intellectual movements of the modern world. Positivists reinvented science, claiming it to be distinct from and superior to the humanities. They predicated political governance on their refashioned science of society, and as political activists, they sought and often failed to reconcile their universalism with the values of multiculturalism. Providing a genealogy of scientific governance that is sorely needed in an age of post-truth politics, this volume breaks new ground in the fields of intellectual and global history, the history of science, and philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In social evolution theory, biological individuals are often represented on the model of rational agents, that is, as if they were ‘seeking’ to maximize their own reproductive success. In the 1990s, important criticisms of this mode of thinking were made by Brian Skyrms and Elliott Sober, who both argued that ‘rational agent’ models can lead to incorrect predictions when there are positive correlations between individuals’ phenotypes. In this article, I argue that one model of rational choice—namely, Savage’s model —can (...) actually be vindicated in evolutionary biology, provided that the pay-offs are computed in inclusive fitness terms. I also show that the use of this model is better avoided when pay-offs are non-additive, or when certain causal influences affect the outcome of natural selection. The result is a partial rehabilitation of this mode of thinking, conditional on both the additivity of the pay-off structure and the absence of any form of manipulation or coercion. _1_ Introduction _2_ When Natural Selection and Rational Deliberation Part Ways _3_ A Simple Solution: Redefining the Pay-offs in Inclusive Fitness Terms _4_ Sober on Inclusive Fitness Maximization _5_ Inclusive Fitness with Non-additive Pay-offs _6_ Causal Influences and the Savage– Hamilton Model _6.1_ Reciprocity and partner choice _6.2_ Coercion and manipulation _7_ Conclusion Appendix. (shrink)

In social evolution theory, biological individuals are often represented on the model of rational agents, that is, as if they were ‘seeking’ to maximize their own (expected) reproductive success. In the 1990s, important criticisms of this mode of thinking were made by Brian Skyrms ([1994], [1996]) and Elliott Sober ([1998]), who both argued that ‘rational agent’ models can lead to incorrect predictions when there are positive correlations between individuals’ phenotypes. In this article, I argue that one model of rational choice—namely, (...) Savage’s model ([1954])—can actually be vindicated in evolutionary biology, provided that the pay-offs are computed in inclusive fitness terms. I also show that the use of this model is better avoided when pay-offs are non-additive, or when certain causal influences (due to manipulative behaviours) affect the outcome of natural selection. The result is a partial rehabilitation of this mode of thinking, conditional on both the additivity of the pay-off structure and the absence of any form of manipulation or coercion. 1 Introduction2 When Natural Selection and Rational Deliberation Part Ways3 A Simple Solution: Redefining the Pay-offs in Inclusive Fitness Terms4 Sober on Inclusive Fitness Maximization5 Inclusive Fitness with Non-additive Pay-offs6 Causal Influences and the Savage– Hamilton Model6.1 Reciprocity and partner choice6.2 Coercion and manipulation7 ConclusionAppendix. (shrink)

The question of what it means to be aware of others as subjects of mental states is often construed as the question of how we are epistemically justified in attributing mental states to others. The dominant answer to this latter question is that we are so justified in virtue of grasping the role of mental states in explaining observed behaviour. This chapter challenges this picture and formulates an alternative by reflecting on the interpretation of early joint attention interactions. It argues (...) that the standard picture is committed to an implausible account of children's awareness of the co-attender's focus of attention. On a more natural interpretation, children engaged in joint attention perceptually recognize the co-attender's attitude to some object, as something like the (correct) answer to the question of what the object is like. The developmentally basic case is not that of attributing mental states as the causes of observed behaviour but of understanding perceived attitudes and actions as appropriate responses to the shared world. The chapter concludes by exploring how this developmental claim bears on mature adult knowledge of other minds. (shrink)

The main thesis of the paper is that in the case of modern statistics, the differences between the various concepts of models were the key to its formative controversies. The mathematical theory of statistical inference was mainly developed by Ronald A. Fisher, Jerzy Neyman, and Egon S. Pearson. Fisher on the one side and Neyman–Pearson on the other were involved often in a polemic controversy. The common view is that Neyman and Pearson made Fisher's account more stringent mathematically. It is (...) argued, however, that there is a profound theoretical basis for the controversy: both sides held conflicting views about the role of mathematical modelling. At the end, the influential programme of Exploratory Data Analysis is considered to be advocating another, more instrumental conception of models. 1. Introduction2. Models in statistics—‘of what population is this a random sample?’3. The fundamental lemma4. Controversy about models5. Exploratory data analysis as a model-critical approach. (shrink)

Thinking about organisms as if they were rational agents which could choose their own phenotypic traits according to their fitness values is a common heuristic in the field of evolutionary theory. In a 1998 paper, however, Elliott Sober has emphasized several alleged shortcomings of this kind of analogical reasoning when applied to the analysis of social behaviors. According to him, the main flaw of this heuristic is that it proves to be a misleading tool when it is used for predicting (...) the evolution of cooperation. Here, I show that these charges raised against the heuristic use of this analogy are misguided. I argue, contra Sober, that such a heuristic turns out to be a perfect predictive tool in all relevant contexts where cooperation can at least evolve. Moreover, I argue that it constitutes a powerful and sufficient methodological framework for the analysis of social evolution. (shrink)

This article is about the analogy between inclusive fitness and utility. In behavioral ecology, it is often assumed that individual organisms behave as if they were “striving” to maximize their inclusive fitness—a measure analogue to the kind of utility function that is used to represent the preferences of rational agents. Here, I explore some conceptual puzzles related to this view and question whether the kind of biological utility posited by the advocates of the “maximizing agent analogy” can be adequately interpreted (...) in inclusive fitness terms. (shrink)