O presente trabalho tem por objetivo fornecer uma resposta à crítica direcionada pelo jurista Fábio Konder Comparato ao formalismo jurídico de Kant. Explicarei porque essa crítica se equivoca quando identifica, na Doutrina do Direito de Kant, uma Teoria do Direito incompleta e insatisfatória. Para tanto, pretendo mostrar que o propósito do filósofo alemão não era apresentar uma teoria do direito, mas sim uma Metafísica do Direito. O que explica, por conseguinte, a razão para o direito ter sido concebido como um (...) conceito puro. Além disso, a fim de determinar o significado do formalismo jurídico, ocupar-me-ei da crítica hegeliana ao suposto formalismo ético de Kant, bem como da resposta a essa crítica. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende mostrar que e como ocorrem, na Doutrina da virtude de Kant, problemas relativos aosentido e referência dos juízos e conceitos fundamentais dessa obra, isto é, problemas semânticos. Tendo em vistaesse fim, explicitaremos de forma breve o desenvolvimento dessa problemática na filosofia prática de Kant e, em seguida, realizaremos a análise da Doutrina da virtude a partir do ponto de vistasemântico, a fim de identificar os mencionados problemas e as soluções fornecidas por Kant para estes problemas. -/- This (...) paper intends to show what and how problems related to the sense and reference of the fundamental judgments and concepts in Kant's Doctrine of virtue happen, that is, semantic problems. In order to perform this end, I shortly make explicit the development of this problematic in Kant's practical philosophy and, soon after, we will accomplish the analysis of the Doctrine of virtue from the semantic point of view, in order to identify the mentioned problems and the solutions supplied by Kant for these problems. (shrink)

The present paper aims to discuss Kant’s critical solution for the possibility problem of the transcendental idea of freedom. The problem consists in the supposed incompatibility between that idea and the natural causality. Despite the impossibility of a dogmatic solution for the conflict, the philosopher proposes a critical solution. This critical solution frequently is interpreted as a attempt to make freedom compatible with natural causation. There are, however, some divergences about the form and the implications of that compatibility. I intend (...) to defend that the compatibilism that result from Kant’s critical solution doesn’t assure the real possibility of freedom, but only its logical possibility. (shrink)

: Este trabalho pretende mostrar em que consiste e qual é a importância de se investigar e oferecer uma resposta ao problema da possibilidade dos deveres de virtude. Sendo assim, faremos, em primeiro lugar, uma aproximação do problema da possibilidade dos deveres de virtude a partir de problemas que dizem respeito a outros juízos sintéticos a priori para, em seguida, indicarmos os requisitos que devem ser cumpridos pelos deveres de virtude para que sejam considerados possíveis. Esta investigação está comprometida com (...) a leitura semântica de Loparic. (shrink)

This paper intends to show what it consists and which is the importance of investigating and offering an answer to the problem of the possibility of the virtue duties. Therefore, we will, at first, approach the problem of the possibility of the virtue duties starting from problems that refer to other a priori synthetic judgments in order to, soon after, indicate the requirements that should be accomplished by the virtue duties so that they are considered possible. This investigation is commited (...) with Loparic's semantic interpretation.Este trabalho pretende mostrar em que consiste e qual é a importância de se investigar e oferecer uma resposta ao problema da possibilidade dos deveres de virtude. Sendo assim, faremos, em primeiro lugar, uma aproximação do problema da possibilidade dos deveres de virtude a partir de problemas que dizem respeito a outros juízos sintéticos a priori para, em seguida, indicarmos os requisitos que devem ser cumpridos pelos deveres de virtude para que sejam considerados possíveis. Esta investigação está comprometida com a leitura semântica de Loparic. (shrink)

Pesquisar sobre uma temática de tamanha envergadura e polissemia como a interdisciplinaridade não é uma tarefa simples, ainda mais quando ela está se constituindo em um campo de conhecimento próprio. Sendo assim, tocar no assunto exige cautela e rigorosidade intelectual, visto que a interdisciplinaridade não se resume apenas a uma ponte entre saberes como comumente é acatada. Não é uma questão de deslocamento, mas de vinculação, de atitude, de um olhar cruzado entre o que se sabe e o que sepode (...) aprender com outros sujeitos e outros saberes; em sua gênese, podemos explicitar que a interdisciplinaridade “busca uma nova forma de compreensão a respeito do conhecimento e sua produção”. (shrink)

o presente artigo busca destacar a importância dos “Paralogismos da razão pura” para o projeto kantiano de uma antropologia empírica sistematicamente constituída, isto é, uma ciência do homem. Mais precisamente, defenderá que o principal resultado da crítica à psicologia racional (enquanto doutrina da alma) foigarantir a possibilidade lógica do “eu numênico”. Isso permitiu que o homem fosse pensado como agente livre, capaz de fazer algo de si mesmo, superando sua condição demero produto da natureza. Essa ideia de homem é fundamental (...) para a antropologia kantiana, uma vez que ordena e dirige os conhecimentos empiricamente adquiridos, dando a eles unidade sistemática. (shrink)

What proper role should considerations of risk, particularly to research subjects, play when it comes to conducting research on human enhancement in the military context? We introduce the currently visible military enhancement techniques (1) and the standard discussion of risk for these (2), in particular what we refer to as the ‘Assumption’, which states that the demands for risk-avoidance are higher for enhancement than for therapy. We challenge the Assumption through the introduction of three categories of enhancements (3): therapeutic, preventive, (...) and pure enhancements. This demands a revision of the Assumption (4), alongside which we propose some further general principles bearing on how to balance risks and benefits in the context of military enhancement research. We identify a particular type of therapeutic enhancements as providing a more responsible path to human trials of the relevant interventions than pure enhancement applications. Finally, we discuss some possible objections to our line of thought (5). While acknowledging their potential insights, we ultimately find them to be unpersuasive, at least provided that our proposal is understood as fully non-coercive towards the candidates for such therapeutic enhancement trials. (shrink)

According to a common philosophical intuition, the deep nature of things is hidden from us, and the world as we know it through perception and science is, just like a dream, shadows, or a computer simulation, somehow shallow and lacking in reality. This “intuition of unreality” clashes with a strong, but perhaps more naive, intuition to the effect that the world as we know it seems perfectly real. Shadows, dreams, or informational structures appear too unreal to be identical to the (...) world as we know it! This clash between the two intuitions forms the basis of the “problem of reality.” In the late nineteenth century psychiatrists encountered patients they referred to as “metaphysician doubters” who constantly questioned the reality of the world. This essay draws on studies of these patients in order to reject, and indeed diagnose, the intuition of unreality and recent metaphysical doctrines drawing on it, such as structuralism, digitalism, and virtual realism. (shrink)

Depersonalization is a pathological condition consisting in a deep modification of the way things appear to a subject, leading him to feel estranged from his body, his actions, his thoughts, his mind and even from himself. In this article, I argue that the study of depersonalization raises three challenges for recent theories of the sense of bodily ownership. These challenges—which I call the centrality challenge, the dissociation challenge and the grounding challenge— thwart most of these theories and suggest that the (...) sense of bodily ownership hinges on a phenomenal mark of mineness that can not be accounted for in terms of our sensory, interoceptive, agentive, cognitive or affective dispositions and that is psychologically primitive. In short: that mineness is first. (shrink)

This collection of six essays centers on Professor Koyre's great theme: the relative importance of metaphysics and observation, with controlled experiment a kind of marriage between the two. Professor Koyre's thesis might be summed up as a claim that when one is seeking to explain the scientific revolution, attention must be concentrated on the philosophical outlook of the scientist and away from speculative theories. At the time of his death, Alexandre Koyre was a professor at the Ecole Pratique des (...) Hautes Etudes (Sorbonne) and a memeber of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. (shrink)

In a previous article on cosmological arguments, I have put forward a few examples of complete infinite and circular explanations, and argued that complete non-wellfounded explanations such as these might explain the present state of the world better than their well-founded theistic counterparts (Billon, 2021). Although my aim was broader, the examples I gave there implied merely causal explanations. In this article, I would like to do three things: • Specify some general informative conditions for complete and incomplete non-wellfounded causal (...) explanations that can be used to assess candidate explanations and to generate new examples of complete non-wellfounded explanations. • Show that these conditions, which concern chains of causal explanations, easily generalize to chains of metaphysical, grounding explanations and even to chains involving other “determination relations” such as supervenience. • Apply these general conditions to the recent debates against the existence of nonwellfounded chains of grounds and show, with a couple of precise examples, that the latter can be complete, and that just like in the case of causal explanations, non-wellfoundedness can in fact be an aset rather than a liability. (shrink)

Patients suffering from depersonalization complain of feeling detached from their body, their mental states, and actions or even from themselves. In this chapter, I argue that depersonalization consists in the lack of a phenomenal feature that marks my experiences as mine, which is usually called “mineness,” and that the study of depersonalization constitutes a neglected yet incomparable probe to assess empirically the scope, role, and even the nature of mineness. Here is how I will proceed. After describing depersonalization (§2) and (...) arguing that it involves a lack of mineness (§3) I will confront a series of objections (§4). I will then spell out what depersonalization can teach us about the scope of mineness (§5), about its role and psychological function (§6) and even about its nature (§7). (shrink)

Computational reproducibility possesses its own dynamics and narratives of crisis. Alongside the difficulties of computing as an ubiquitous yet complex scientific activity, computational reproducibility suffers from a naive expectancy of total reproducibility and a moral imperative to embrace the principles of free software as a non-negotiable epistemic virtue. We argue that the epistemic issues at stake in actual practices of computational reproducibility are best unveiled by focusing on software as a pivotal concept, one that is surprisingly often overlooked in accounts (...) of reproducibility issues. Software is not only about designing and coding but also about maintaining, supporting, distributing, licensing, and governance; it is not only about developers but also about users. We focus on openness debates among computational chemists involved in molecular modeling software packages as empirical grounding for our argument. We then identify and analyse four epistemic characteristics as key to the role of software in computational reproducibility. (shrink)

. Computational chemistry grew in a new era of “desktop modeling,” which coincided with a growing demand for modeling software, especially from the pharmaceutical industry. Parameterization of models in computational chemistry is an arduous enterprise, and we argue that this activity leads, in this specific context, to tensions among scientists regarding the epistemic opacity transparency of parameterized methods and the software implementing them. We relate one flame war from the Computational Chemistry mailing List in order to assess in detail the (...) relationships between modeling methods, parameterization, software and the various forms of their enclosure or disclosure. Our claim is that parameterization issues are an important and often neglected source of epistemic opacity and that this opacity is entangled in methods and software alike. Models and software must be addressed together to understand the epistemological tensions at stake. (shrink)

Using emotional film clips is one of the most popular and effective methods of emotion elicitation. The main goal of the present study was to develop and test the effectiveness of a new and comprehensive set of emotional film excerpts. Fifty film experts were asked to remember specific film scenes that elicited fear, anger, sadness, disgust, amusement, tenderness, as well as emotionally neutral scenes. For each emotion, the 10 most frequently mentioned scenes were selected and cut into film clips. Next, (...) 364 participants viewed the film clips in individual laboratory sessions and rated each film on multiple dimensions. Results showed that the film clips were effective with regard to several criteria such as emotional discreteness, arousal, positive and negative affect. Finally, ranking scores were computed for 24 classification criteria: Subjective arousal, positive and negative affect (derived from the PANAS; Watson & Tellegen, 1988), a positive and a negative affect scores derived from the Differential Emotions Scale (DES; Izard et al., 1974), six emotional discreteness scores (for anger, disgust, sadness, fear, amusement and tenderness), and 15 “mixed feelings” scores assessing the effectiveness of each film excerpt to produce blends of specific emotions. In addition, a number of emotionally neutral film clips were also validated. The database and editing instructions to construct the film clips have been made freely available in a website. (shrink)

According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity theories and the (...) psychopathological challenge they face. The chapter’s central goal is to present two new approaches to defending subjectivity theories in the face of this challenge. What distinguishes these two approaches is that they go to great lengths to interpret patients’ reports at face value – greater length, at any rate, than more widespread approaches in the extant literature. (shrink)

The debate over environmental, health, and safety regulation has reached a new crescendo in the 104th Congress. So impassioned is the debate on occasion, and so high the feelings, that even the tools of regulatory analysis have become part of the combat.To some, the term cost-benefit analysis, for example, is virtually a swearword, a nefarious tool used by big business to undermine regulations aimed at benefiting the people at large. To others, it is the mechanism for achieving more effective regulation (...) at less cost.This new book on the subject of reforming regulation is aimed at increasing the light and turning down the heat. It consists of an introduction and nine chapters written by scientists, public policy analysts, and economists on various aspects of regulation and regulatory analysis.The book advances the latest knowledge and evidence on risk analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and related techniques for improving regulation--all based on experience and data accumulated over the quarter century since regulation in the areas of environment, health, and safety became a major player on the governmental stage. The strengths and limitations of those analytical tools are an important part of the portrait that is painted, but a common thesis is that, properly used, the tools can be helpful in getting better regulatory results. (shrink)

The Chairman of Volkswagen's Board of Management made the following presentation in London last November at a Conference on‘Business and Moral Standards in Post‐Communist Europe’, held under the auspices of the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster and sponsored by the Sedgwick Group and KPMG Peat Marwick. Dr Hahn's lecture is reproduced with permission.

This paper focuses on one particular case that connects climate justice and climate economics. Its contribution is twofold. First, it aims at providing a sound normative foundation for carbon pricing mechanisms around the notions of a ‘right to energy’, the ‘duty not-to-harm’ and an argument for ‘restricted compensation’. Second, it identifies the normative elements from theories of climate justice that should guide the design of market-based instruments for climate change mitigation. This will cast light on the particular moral relevance of (...) the act of internalizing a negative externality and of the funds generated by putting a price on carbon. (shrink)

Depersonalization consists in a deep modification of the way things appear to a subject, leading him to feel estranged from his body, his actions, his thoughts, and his mind, and even from himself. Even though, when it was discovered at the end of the 19th century, this psychiatric condition was widely used to probe certain aspects of bodily awareness, and more specifically the sense of bodily ownership (SBO), it has been strangely neglected in contemporary debates. In this chapter, I argue (...) that because of three specific features, depersonalization raises some important challenges for current theories of the SBO. The first feature — call it “generality” — is that depersonalization does not only affect the sense of bodily ownership but also, typically, the sense of ``mental ownership’’ (SMO), the sense of agency or ``action ownership’’ (SOA), and the subject’s core sense of herself (CSS), that is, her awareness of herself as an I. The second feature is that except for the symptoms of depersonalization, depersonalized patients are hard to distinguish, psychologically, from normal subjects. This makes it hard to find psychological features that might explain their condition. The last feature, call it “fundamentality” is that the psychological features that do seem abnormal among depersonalized patients seem more likely to be explained by depersonalization than to explain it. These three features raise three challenges — the centrality challenge, the dissociation challenge, and the grounding challenge. Taken together, I will argue, these challenges suggest that the SBO depends on a form of phenomenal “mineness” that would mark my mental states as mine and that cannot be accounted for in sensorimotor, cognitive, or even affective terms. A phenomenal mineness that indeed seems to be psychologically primitive, and only accountable in neurophysiological terms. (shrink)

Natural modalities are often analysed from an abstract point of view where they are associated with putative laws of nature. However, the way possibilities are represented in physics is more complex. Lagrangian mechanics, for instance, involves two different layers of modalities: kinematical and dynamical possibilities. This paper examines the status of these two layers, both in the classical and quantum case. The quantum case is particularly problematic: we identify four possible interpretive options. The upshot is that a close inspection of (...) the way possibilities are represented in physics could lead to new ways of thinking about natural modalities. (shrink)

Shape and locomotion of tissue cells depend on the interaction of elements of the cytoskeleton, adhesion to the substrate and an intracellular hydrostatic pressure. The existence of this pressure becomes obvious from increase in cell volume on cessation of contractile forces and from observations with ultrasound acoustic microscopy. Wherever such an internal pressure is established, it is involved in generation of shape and driving force of cell locomotion. Therefore each hypothesis on cell shape and locomotion must consider this property of (...) a living cell. Apparently different types of locomotion depend on differences in substrate adhesion and/or cytoskeleton organisation. (shrink)

the term as used by sunstein seeks to bring together various traditions. however, there are significant differences between uses of the term in the cognitive and the social psychological research, and these differences are accompanied by very distinct evidential criteria. we suggest the term should refer to processes, which means that further evidence is required.

It is virtuous for individual and collective agents to be tolerant. However, toleration is difficult, both in practice and in conceptualization. Firstly, given that toleration can be understood in various ways (Walzer 1997, Forst 2007), it seems that to determine what is the proper conception of toleration would be controversially difficult. Here I shall suggest one particular conception of toleration is more suitable than others. This conception allows, as I shall explain, us to better understandthe difficulties of toleration. Thus, this (...) particular conception of toleration should lead us to see what is more adequate for dealing with the difficulties of toleration. To be more precise, I shall argue for a political conception of toleration, which different from the attitudinal conception of toleration as being indifferent, or the ethical conception of toleration as respect. There is the suggestion of toleration as recognition (Galeotti 2002). These alternative understandings of toleration do not provide better diagnoses of the difficulties of toleration. The political conception of toleration is intended to be grounded on some moral considerations, notpragmatic purpose. It is political in that it recognizes the fact that toleration is essentially practiced to deal with a power relationship among the parties of toleration. Where these is no such power relationship, as I shall argue, there is no issue of toleration. Secondly, this proposed conception of toleration is political in the sense that it shall not deal with differences coming from, to use John Rawls’s phrase, the fact of pluralism by adopting any comprehensive doctrine such as an ethics of respect or recognition. (shrink)

Several advocates of the lively field of “metaphysics of science” have recently argued that a naturalistic metaphysics should be based solely on current science, and that it should replace more traditional, intuition-based, forms of metaphysics. The aim of the present paper is to assess that claim by examining the relations between metaphysics of science and general metaphysics. We show that the current metaphysical battlefield is richer and more complex than a simple dichotomy between “metaphysics of science” and “traditional metaphysics”, and (...) that it should instead be understood as a three dimensional “box”, with one axis distinguishing “descriptive metaphysics” from “revisionary metaphysics”, a second axis distinguishing a priori from a posteriori metaphysics, and a third axis distinguishing “commonsense metaphysics”, “traditional metaphysics” and “metaphysics of science”. We use this three-dimensional figure to shed light on the project of current metaphysics of science, and to demonstrate that, in many instances, the target of that project is not defined with enough precision and clarity. (shrink)

The latest volume in the Cambridge Histories of Philosophy series, The Cambridge History of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century brings together twenty-nine leading experts in the field and covers the years 1790-1870. Their twenty-seven chapters provide a comprehensive survey of the period, organizing the material topically. After a brief editor's introduction, it begins with three chapters surveying the background of nineteenth century philosophy: followed by two on logic and mathematics, two on nature and natural science, five on mind and language, (...) including psychology, the human sciences and aesthetics, four on ethics, three on religion, seven on society, including chapters on the French Revolution, the decline of natural right, political economy, and social discontent, and three on history, dealing with historical method, speculative theories of history and the history of philosophy. The essays are framed by an editor's introduction and a bibliography. (shrink)

The main response to the multiple crises besetting Western societis in the past decades has been the attempt of the academic and scientific as well as political circles to gain a sense of orientation—and of social cohesion—by two main modes of thinking: identity politics and evidence-based knowlegde. Regarding the latter, I argue that if scientific knowledge is reduced to facts, data and numbers, as the basis for political decisions without any alternatives, it would become a dogma propagating the truth—that is, (...) a new religion. Politicians will no longer have to struggle with other perspectives, once there is a consensus about following the line that “the numbers or the facts speak for themselves.” While many people would perhaps find in this new religion a guarantee of security in an insecure world, this sense would be illusionary. I argue that the role intellectuals should play in a spiritual crisis of this kind is paradoxically to cultivate a sense of more security by strengthening a culture of “insecureness” or docta ignorantia against the dogmas within science and religion. To create and encourage a new art of questioning and listening, and of learning to appreciate non-knowledge as the basis of coming together. This notion is found in the Greek and Christian as well as the Jewish tradition of European thought, and it continues in the works of modern thinkers such as Paul Ricoeur, Hermann Cohen, Martin Buber, Hartmut Rosa, and of philosophers who focus on the question of the ineffable. My aim is to present this quality of certainty within uncertainty by examples from different fields, including philosophy, art and psychotherapy, and to elaborate on the paradoxical question: does a troubled Geist need more trouble in order to help us find a sense of orientation through disorientation? (shrink)