We were relaxing after supper, my daughter, who was ten, and my ninety-six-year-old grandmother, and I. Marcella had long known that I was a lesbian, and in her simple child's way understood perfectly. Grandma was another matter; I would have to wait for her to die before I could be open in the family about who I was. She could never be told. I loved her; there seemed no reason to distress her, who kept herself so deliberately innocent about the (...) facts of life, let alone their infinite variety. (shrink)

Analyzes the poem "On Nature" by Parmenides, arguing that is actually a philosophical argument disguised as Homer-like mythological journey. Original.

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Alexander R. Pruss examines a large family of paradoxes to do with infinity - ranging from deterministic supertasks to infinite lotteries and decision theory. Having identified their common structure, Pruss considers at length how these paradoxes can be resolved by embracing causal finitism.

We study computable Polish spaces and Polish groups up to homeomorphism. We prove a natural effective analogy of Stone duality, and we also develop an effective definability technique which works up to homeomorphism. As an application, we show that there is a $\Delta ^0_2$ Polish space not homeomorphic to a computable one. We apply our techniques to build, for any computable ordinal $\alpha $, an effectively closed set not homeomorphic to any $0^{}$-computable Polish space; this answers a question of Nies. (...) We also prove analogous results for compact Polish groups and locally path-connected spaces. (shrink)

The philosophical investigation of perceptual illusions can generate fruitful insights in the study of subjective time consciousness. However, the way illusions are interpreted is often controversial. Recently, proponents of the so-called dynamic snapshot theory have appealed to the Waterfall Illusion, a kind of motion aftereffect, to support a particular view of temporal consciousness according to which experience is structured as a series of instantaneous snapshots with dynamic qualities. This dynamism is meant to account for familiar features of the phenomenology of (...) time, such as succession, continuity, and change. Previous theories have typically appealed to a subjective present occupying an interval of time; that is, a “specious present.” I argue, through analysis of motion aftereffect illusions and the rare condition of akinetopsia, i.e. motion-blindness, that the Waterfall Illusion fails to support the dynamic snapshot theory as intended. Furthermore, I suggest that future theories of subjective time should see temporal phenomenology as the result of non-localised processes closely tied to the mechanism underlying consciousness generally. (shrink)

Over recent years, science and technology have been reassessed increasingly in ethical terms. Particularly for life science governance, ethics has become the dominant discourse. In the course of this ‘‘ethical turn’’ national ethics councils were set up throughout Europe and in the United States to advice politics in ethically controversial issues such as stem cell research and genetic testing. Ethics experts have become subject to traditional warnings against expertocracy: they are suspected to unduly influence political decision-making. However, any reliable ethics (...) expertise has to reflect societal disagreements in moral issues. Therefore, expert dissent is a normal feature of legitimate ethics expertise. Based on theoretical considerations we argue that in principle, expert dissent does not cause problems for political legitimacy; rather, it enhances the salience of politics: obviously decisions on ethical issues cannot be taken on the basis of expert knowledge alone. We therefore conclude that expert dissent, not consent, supports politics. Focussing on Germany and Austria, we show how politics deal with expert dissent in practice. While in Germany politics acknowledge dissent and use it to foster a fundamental political debate, Austrian politics attribute authoritative power to ethics expertise and try to construct an overall consensus. This illustrates how the drawing of boundaries between politic and expertise differs. (shrink)

Despite the widespread presence of public arts funding in liberal societies, some liberals find it unjustified. According to the Neutrality Objection, arts funding preferences some ways of life. One way to motivate this challenge is to say that a public goods-styled justification, although it could relieve arts funding of these worries of partiality, cannot be argued for coherently or is, in the end, too susceptible to impressions of partiality. I argue that diversity-based arts funding can overcome this challenge, because it (...) invests in non-excludable infrastructure that fosters cultural literacy. We all have some interest as citizens in living in a society which fosters cultural literacy, seeing as this helps others to understand us, supports us to understand ourselves, and helps alleviate confusion and alienation we feel toward social difference. While some of these benefits can be enjoyed by those who make and consume art, they are also gained by those who don’t, because arts funding affects the makeup of public spaces and the communicative practices we all use to make sense of the world. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate the trust-based mechanisms underlying the relationship between ethical leadership and followers’ organisational citizenship behaviours (OCBs). Based on three-wave survey data obtained from 184 employees and their supervisors, we find that ethical leadership leads to higher levels of both affective and cognitive trust. In addition, we find support for a three-path mediational model, where cognitive trust and affective trust, in turn, mediate the relationship between ethical leadership and follower OCBs. That is to say, we found that (...) ethical leadership leads to the development of cognitive trust, which subsequently influences the development of affective trust. Affective trust, in turn, induces followers to exhibit OCBs as a means of reciprocating the leader’s favourable behaviour. Our findings suggest that both affective and cognitive trust plays an important role in the social exchange processes that underlie the relationship between ethical leadership and the discretionary behaviour of followers. (shrink)

This thesis presents a novel theory of temporal experience. While time as measured by the clock is a perennially popular topic, the time of experience remains relatively neglected and poorly understood despite its centrality to our existence. This thesis therefore sets out to address the following questions: 1) How should we characterize experiential time and the experienced present? 2) How might such distinctively temporal experience arise in the first place? While the first of these is a “what is it like” (...) question, and thus in the realm of phenomenological analysis, the second is ostensibly closer to the realm of scientific inquiry in that it concerns an empirical phenomenon. The goal of this thesis is to synthesize plausible answers to both of these questions. As to the first question, there is already a lively debate ongoing in the philosophy of mind between various camps, each offering what they see as the most plausible analysis of the phenomenology of time. Regarding the second, there is an interdisciplinary investigation of mechanisms at various levels of abstraction, notably the levels of neurophysiology and information processing. This thesis proposes, among other contentions, that the time of experience is best characterized by a combination of retentional and extensional phenomenological analyses. This means the actual temporal extension of experience and its correlates determines, to some degree, the felt temporal character of experience. At the same time, perhaps the greater part of temporal phenomenology is determined by content: mental processes can be about temporal properties in addition to their primary contents and the way they are so partially determines the temporal character of experience as well. This analysis dovetails nicely with contemporary theories of consciousness that maintain the brain is fundamentally a complex predictive engine actively and adaptively guiding behavior. The thesis thus represents a multi-level framework for understanding the experience of time and the mechanisms underpinning it. It is my hope this perspective advances the debate on time-consciousness and can guide further work towards understanding this most fundamental aspect of our lives. (shrink)

John Rawls argues that it is possible to describe a suitably defined initial situation from which to form reliable judgements about justice. In this initial situation, rational persons are deprived of information that is . It is rational, Rawls argues, for persons choosing principles of justice from this standpoint to be guided by the maximin rule. Critics, however, argue that (i) the maximin rule is not the appropriate decision rule for Rawls's choice position; (ii) the maximin argument relies upon an (...) imprecise account of the satisfactory minimum to be secured under the maximin rule; or that (iii) Rawls relies upon unrealistic assumptions about diminishing marginal value. These critics, I will suggest, argue from a number of assumptions that are confused or false. The satisfactory minimum that choosers in the original position seek to achieve is not a minimum level of primary goods, nor is the satisfactory minimum sought under the maximin rule supplied by the difference principle. I will argue that the maximin argument is more robust than has generally been recognized and that this argument performs a number of important functions in clarifying the nature and implications of Rawls's argument for justice as fairness. (shrink)

Reflecting current debates on ‘organizational virtues’ as going beyond the capitalocentrist bias of contemporary economies and to see diversity as ‘ethical responsibility,’ this article explores ‘ethical organizing’ at the intersection of alternative organizations and diversity. Our interest in a diversity-oriented analysis of alternative organizations stems from the assumption that those which question taken-for-granted notions of existing economies and follow alternative values of autonomy, solidarity, and responsibility might also be likely to challenge existing diversity relations and, thus, potentially open up new (...) avenues for ethical organizing. Discussing our findings in terms of Lewis and Simpson’s (in)visibility vortex, our study shows that even though organizations position themselves discursively as ‘alternative,’ this positioning is not related to diversity issues. We conclude that a shift is needed to fully constitute ethical organizing, namely the establishment of a strong connection between alternative organizations’ virtues with, e.g., the feminist, anti-racist, queer, and disability rights movements. (shrink)

This article analyses the parallels between the pre-Qin Daoist notion of heng 恒 as a constancy that is nevertheless ceaselessly in motion, and Karl Barth’s concept of Beständigkeit as God’s constancy throughout infinite transformation. Underlying both concepts is an understanding of the ultimate origin (whether dao 道 or the Christian God) as irreducibly temporal in nature. Stemming from this conviction, both systems of thought ultimately identify the continuous change of the ultimate origin with the flow of time in the universe. (...) The commonalities found between these two traditions provide fresh resources to advance the study of both. On the one hand, Barth’s deliberate juxtaposition of contrary statements to illustrate the union of permanence and transience in Beständigkeit challenges the frequent assumption that similar juxtapositions in the pre-Qin texts comprise careless inconsistency or outright incoherence. By extension, Barth’s metaphysical underpinning of this juxtaposition offers a compelling framework to explicate the Daoist notion of heng. On the other hand, the pre-Qin texts’ confluence of permanence and freedom in the principle of ziran 自然 offers a new lens through which to read and hence redeem Barth’s oft-critiqued attempt to combine the irrevocability and ongoing freedom of God’s decision of election. (shrink)

RESUMEN La presente reflexión tiene como punto de partida la noción de antropotécnica desarrollada por el filósofo Peter Sloterdijk. El autor asume que los humanos somos seres ejercitantes en tanto día a día ejecutamos una serie de rutinas diarias que nos permiten modelar nuestra existencia. En dicho proceso nos encontramos con instituciones sociales que orientan tales ejercicios antropotécnicos. A partir de una caracterización exhaustiva del planteamiento de Sloterdijk, proponemos la noción de antropotécnica negativa, como envés de la antropotécnica, para referirnos (...) a una comprensión alternativa de las ejercitaciones contraindicadas que se realizan en oposición a valores legitimados e idealizados cutralmente sobre cómo modelar la existencia. Concluimos que la antropotécnica negativa puede ser un recurso analítico para aproximarnos a la mala ejercitación como fenómeno histórico y a la potencia existencial de algunas vidas que se expresan privilegiadamente como negatividad, abyección o marginalidad. ABSTRACT This analysis uses the notion of anthropotechnics developed by the philosopher Peter Sloterdijk as its starting point. The author assumes that humans are exercising beings in that day by day we carry out a series of diary routines that allow us to shape our existence. Within this process, we encounter social institutions that guide those anthropotechnics exercises. From an exhaustive characterization of Sloterdijk's approach, we propose the notion of negative anthropotechnics (as the inverse of anthropotechnics) to refer to an alternative understanding of the counterindicated exercises that are performed in opposition to legitimized and idealized values of how to shape existence. We conclude that negative anthropotechnics can be an analytical resource to approach malpractice as a historical phenomenon and to the existential potency of some lives that are expressed as privileged negativity, abjection, or marginality. (shrink)

In 2004 Atserias, Kolaitis, and Vardi proposed $\text {OBDD}$ -based propositional proof systems that prove unsatisfiability of a CNF formula by deduction of an identically false $\text {OBDD}$ from $\text {OBDD}$ s representing clauses of the initial formula. All $\text {OBDD}$ s in such proofs have the same order of variables. We initiate the study of $\text {OBDD}$ based proof systems that additionally contain a rule that allows changing the order in $\text {OBDD}$ s. At first we consider a proof (...) system $\text {OBDD}$ that uses the conjunction rule and the rule that allows changing the order. We exponentially separate this proof system from $\text {OBDD}$ proof system that uses only the conjunction rule. We prove exponential lower bounds on the size of $\text {OBDD}$ refutations of Tseitin formulas and the pigeonhole principle. The first lower bound was previously unknown even for $\text {OBDD}$ proofs and the second one extends the result of Tveretina et al. from $\text {OBDD}$ to $\text {OBDD}$.In 2001 Aguirre and Vardi proposed an approach to the propositional satisfiability problem based on $\text {OBDD}$ s and symbolic quantifier elimination $ algorithms). We augment these algorithms with the operation of reordering of variables and call the new scheme $\text {OBDD}$ algorithms. We notice that there exists an $\text {OBDD}$ algorithm that solves satisfiable and unsatisfiable Tseitin formulas in polynomial time, but we show that there are formulas representing systems of linear equations over $\mathbb {F}_2$ that are hard for $\text {OBDD}$ algorithms. Our hard instances are satisfiable formulas representing systems of linear equations over $\mathbb {F}_2$ that correspond to checksum matrices of error correcting codes. (shrink)

A lavishly decorated handbook of medicine was conceived for the lay public on topics such as human health, healing, medicine, and household management.

A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE, ancient and modern alike, have always found in Socrates what seemed to them a suspicious, if not actually repugnant, aspect. This aspect, to put the point first in crude terms, is his devotion to philosophy, which presupposes an apparently unshakable faith in reason, in the power of understanding to secure goodness, and in the power of goodness to provide us with happiness.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 11, Page 22-23, November 2011.

We prove the following Main Theorem: $ZF + AD + V = L(R) \Rightarrow DC$ . As a corollary we have that $\operatorname{Con}(ZF + AD) \Rightarrow \operatorname{Con}(ZF + AD + DC)$ . Combined with the result of Woodin that $\operatorname{Con}(ZF + AD) \Rightarrow \operatorname{Con}(ZF + AD + \neg AC^\omega)$ it follows that DC (as well as AC ω ) is independent relative to ZF + AD. It is finally shown (jointly with H. Woodin) that ZF + AD + ¬ DC (...) R , where DC R is DC restricted to reals, implies the consistency of ZF + AD + DC, in fact implies R # (i.e. the sharp of L(R)) exists. (shrink)

This article discusses Xenophanes' “cloud astro-physics”. It analyses and explains all heavenly and meteorological phenomena in terms of clouds. It provides a view of this newer Xenophanes, who is now being recognized as an important philosopher-scientist in his own right and a crucial figure in the development of critical thought about human knowledge and its objects in the next generation of Presocratic thinkers. Xenophanes' account has been preserved in Aëtius, the doxographic compendium reconstructed by Hermann Diels late in the nineteenth (...) century mainly from two sources that show extensive parallelism: pseudo-Plutarch Placita Philosophorum or Epitome of Physical Opinions ; and Ioannes Stobaeus' Eclogae Physicae or Physical Extracts. In the Stobaeus version, which is also the one printed in the standard edition of the Pre-socratics. (shrink)

Let the chain antichain principle (CAC) be the statement that each partial order on $\mathbb{N}$ possesses an infinite chain or an infinite antichain. Chong, Slaman, and Yang recently proved using forcing over nonstandard models of arithmetic that CAC is $\Pi^1_1$-conservative over $\text{RCA}_0+\Pi^0_1\text{-CP}$ and so in particular that CAC does not imply $\Sigma^0_2$-induction. We provide here a different purely syntactical and constructive proof of the statement that CAC (even together with WKL) does not imply $\Sigma^0_2$-induction. In detail we show using a (...) refinement of Howard's ordinal analysis of bar recursion that $\text{WKL}_0^\omega+\text{CAC}$ is $\Pi^0_2$-conservative over PRA and that one can extract primitive recursive realizers for such statements. Moreover, our proof is finitary in the sense of Hilbert's program. CAC implies that every sequence of $\mathbb{R}$ has a monotone subsequence. This Bolzano-Weierstraß}-like principle is commonly used in proofs. Our result makes it possible to extract primitive recursive terms from such proofs. We also discuss the Erdős-Moser principle, which—taken together with CAC—is equivalent to $\text{RT}^2_2$. (shrink)

Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical (...) challenge. (publisher). (shrink)

A consistent finding reported in the literature is that epistemically suspect beliefs are less frequently endorsed by individuals with a greater tendency to think analytically. However, these results have been observed predominantly in Western participants. In the present work, we explore various individual differences known to predict epistemically suspect beliefs across both Western and Eastern cultures. Across four studies with Japanese and Western individuals, we find that the association between thinking style and beliefs varied as a function of culture. Specifically, (...) while Westerners who scored higher on measures of Type-2 analytic thinking tended to endorse epistemically suspect beliefs less, this association was not observed in Japanese samples, suggesting that the often-observed negative association between analytic thinking and epistemically suspect beliefs may be exclusive to Western individuals. Additionally, we demonstrate that a tendency to think holistically is positively associated with the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs within both samples. Overall, we discuss how various individual differences predict the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs across cultures. (shrink)

In the work of interpreting Parmenides we have witnessed in the ’sixties and ’seventies, in English language scholarship, that rarest of phenomena in the study of ancient philosophy, the emergence of a consensus. Four interpretive theses now seem quite widely shared: Parmenides deliberately suppresses the subject of esti, “is,” or einai, “to be,” in his statement of the two “routes” in B2, his intention being to allow the subject to become gradually specified as the argument unfolds. The negative route, ouk (...) esti, “is not,” or mē einai, “not to be,” is banned because sentences that adhere to it fail to refer to actual entities—the latter to be understood broadly, as will shortly be stated in thesis. The argument does not depend on a confusion between the “is” of predication and the “is” of existence. In the relevant contexts, esti and einai involve a “fused” or “veridical” use of the verb “to be”; in other words, esti or einai have the force of “is actual” or “obtains,” or “is the case,” envisaging a variable subject x that ranges over states-of-affairs. (shrink)

This collection introduces readers to some of the most respected Pre-Socratic scholarship of the twentieth century. It includes translations of important works from European scholars that were previously unavailable in English and incorporates the major topics and approaches of contemporary scholarship. Here is an essential book for students and scholars alike. "Students of the Pre-Socratics must be grateful to Mourelatos and his publishers for making these essays available to a wider public."--T. H. Irwin, American Journal of Philology "Mourelatos is a (...) superb editor, and teaching Pre-Socratics in the future with this collection on the reading list will not only be easier but also better."--Jorgen Mejer, The Classical World "The editor has done his work judiciously. It would be difficult to devise a better balance between different parts of the subject."--Edward Hussey, Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences "[This book] will undoubtedly become an indispensable aid for beginning and advanced students of the Pre-Socratics."--David E. Hahm, Isis. (shrink)

§1. I will start with a quick definition of descriptive set theory: It is the study of the structure of definable sets and functions in separable completely metrizable spaces. Such spaces are usually called Polish spaces. Typical examples are ℝn, ℂn, Hilbert space and more generally all separable Banach spaces, the Cantor space 2ℕ, the Baire space ℕℕ, the infinite symmetric group S∞, the unitary group, the group of measure preserving transformations of the unit interval, etc.In this theory sets are (...) classified in hierarchies according to the complexity of their definitions and the structure of sets in each level of these hierarchies is systematically analyzed. In the beginning we have the Borel sets in Polish spaces, obtained by starting with the open sets and closing under the operations of complementation and countable unions, and the corresponding Borel hierarchy. After this come the projective sets, obtained by starting with the Borel sets and closing under the operations of complementation and projection, and the corresponding projective hierarchy.There are also transfinite extensions of the projective hierarchy and even much more complex definable sets studied in descriptive set theory, but I will restrict myself here to Borel and projective sets, in fact just those at the first level of the projective hierarchy, i.e., the Borel (), analytic () and coanalytic () sets. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that Crispin Wright’s defence of the claim that the truth about intention is judgement-dependent is unstable because it can serve also to establish that the truth about shape is judgement-dependent, thereby violating his constraint that in developing the distinction between judgement-independent and judgement-dependent subject matters we have to be driven by the assumption that colour and shape will fall on different sides of the divide.

In his 1982 book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke develops a famous argument that purports to show that there are no facts about what we mean by the expressions of our language: ascriptions of meaning, such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” or Smith means green by ‘green’”, are according to Kripke’s Wittgenstein neither true nor false. Kripke’s Wittgenstein thus argues for a form of non-factualism about ascriptions of meaning: ascriptions of meaning do not purport to state (...) facts. Define semantic realism to be the view that ascriptions of meaning are apt to be assessed in terms of truth and falsity, and are, at least in some instances, true. Semantic realism, thus defined, is a form of cognitivism about semantic judgement, according to which judgements ascribing meaning express beliefs, states apt for assessment in terms of truth and falsity. Kripke’s Wittgenstein thus argues against semantic realism, and in favour of a form of semantic non-cognitivism.1 En route to semantic non-cognitivism, Kripke’s Wittgenstein argues against dispositionalist theories of meaning, which hold something roughly along the lines of the following: Jones means magpie by “magpie” if and only if Jones is disposed to apply “magpie” to magpies in ideal conditions (where the ideal conditions can be specified in terms that don’t presuppose the notion of meaning, and are such that in those conditions Jones applies “magpie” to a thing if and only if that thing is a magpie). (shrink)

The concept of the Anthropocene reflects a particular meaning of the “human” as it exists in society, and a specific understanding of freedom, which only became possible at the close of the twentieth century. Whereas Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant, Rousseau, and Adam Smith attempted to grasp the potential for humanity to be changed through society in a self-conscious process of attaining freedom, the “Age of Man” today appears entirely disconnected from human agency. Indeed, the Anthropocene is associated not with (...) the flourishing of life but with the sixth mass extinction. Drawing insight from classical and contemporary critical theory, this paper seeks to explicate the emancipatory potential within the concept of the Anthropocene, and the ways in which this potential is blocked by material circumstances that masquerade as “freedom.”. (shrink)