Proposes a new way of understanding the nature of metaphysics, focusing on nonreductionist emergence theory, both in ancient and modern philosophy, as well as in contemporary philosophy of science.

There is a strange contrast between, on the one hand, the prominent place generally assigned to Parmenides in the history of Greek philosophy, and on the other hand, the persistent uncertainty in the understanding of his teachings, as demonstrated by the large number of conflicting interpretations. In particular, there is no consent on the question whether Parmenides, in spite of the obvious weaknesses of his arguments, ought to be seen as the first proponent of a purely rational metaphysics, or whether, (...) in view of his assertion of the unreality of change and plurality and of the identity of thinking and being, we should first of all view him as a precursor of Plotinus, or even as a mediator between Indian Advaita-philosophy and Neo- Platonism. That question is the central issue considered in this paper. For it, only the first part of Parmenides’ poem is relevant: his “way of truth”. (shrink)

The relationship between philosophy and medicine in antiquity has been extensively discussed by commentators and scholars. The objective of this article was to determine if it is possible to assert that the Hippocratic treatise De prisca Medicina is a criticism directed at Philolaus and, if possible, in what terms it could be stated. With this in mind, the work concentrates on the characterization of the position of the opponent of the author of said treatise in DM § 1. 15-21. Particular (...) emphasis will be placed on the terms “hypothesis” and “principle”. Thus, from four possible proposed interpretations of the first of these terms, namely: a proposition postulated but not affirmed sharply, a proposition whose veracity is supposed, a proposition that must be proved, and an object put to discussion or a purpose, the criticisms that could be at stake in DM in each of these will be outlined and then contrasted with the doctrine of the Pythagorean philosopher that can be reconstructed from the fragments attributed to him as authentic, as well as some testimonies about his medical and epistemological approaches. Finally, it was stated by way of conclusion that the Hippocratic treatise that is thematized in it can be, in various ways, conceived as a criticism of Philolaus. However, it is necessary to emphasize that this inquisition on this subject is not intended to be conclusive; rather, it seeks to provide relevant elements to this debate. (shrink)

Fragment 17 of Empedocles has long been recognized as the most important in the corpus. In 1998, the significance of this 35-line fragment was further increased by the publication of the Strasbourg papyrus, containing roughly 74 lines of Empedocles.

Parmenides formulated a formal ontology, to which various additions and alternatives were proposed by Melissus, Gorgias, Leucippus and Democritus. These systems are here interpreted as modifications of a minimal Le?niewskian ontology.

Although the Parmenidean poem is in epic meter and teems with vivid imagery, it has been translated into the domain of philosophy since its earliest reception. Within this domain it has traditionally been interpreted as the first "explicit and self-conscious argumentation" of western philosophy. Yet, the poem aims at persuasion and affect rather than logical demonstration.Working primarily with a sense of translation as critical reception, this paper articulates the history of a translational protocol that excises conceptual matter from linguistic form, (...) reducing the semantic range of the Parmenidean poem. Beginning with Zeno and Melissus, a series of translations reduces the Parmenidean poem into a vehicle for a separable and fully translatable doctrine, stabilizing and homogenizing a thinking that otherwise persists as polyvalent and heterogeneous. (shrink)

In this article, both Anaxagoras' theory of multiple worlds and the principles of his theory of matter are examined. It is argued that the five principles, which are set out explicitly in the extant fragments, (No Becoming, Indefinite Types, Universal Mixture, Predominance, and Infinite Divisibility) form a consistent set. Further, it is argued that the principle of Homoeomereity, which Anaxagoras attributes to Anaxagoras, is consistent with Anaxagoras' other principles and is likely to be a genuine principle of Anaxagoras' physics.

In this article, it is argued that, although there is significant debate over the nature of Anaxagoras' response to Parmenides, it is likely that Anaxagoras advances his physical theory in opposition to Parmenides' Numerical Monism. It is unlikely that Anaxagoras aims to develop a theory that harmonizes with the Predicational Monism that is sometimes ascribed to Parmenides. In addition, it is argued that, although some modern scholars suggest that Anaxagoras posits nous as a planning cause, no compelling argument has yet (...) been advanced against Plato's interpretation, according to which Anaxagoras is not a proponent of teleological explanation. (shrink)

According to current interpretations of Parmenides, he either embraces a token-monism of things, or a type-monism of the nature of each kind of thing, or a generous monism, accepting a token-monism of things of a specific type, necessary being. These interpretations share a common flaw: they fail to secure commensurability between Parmenides’ alētheia and doxa. We effect this by arguing that Parmenides champions a metaphysically refined form of material monism, a type-monism of things; that light and night are allomorphs of (...) what-is ; and that the key features of what-is are entailed by the theory of material monism. (shrink)

Are all forms of difference contained in what is, or is there some form of difference that escapes, negates, or constitutes what is? Parmenides and Heraclitus may have had the greatest effect on how philosophy has answered this question. This paper shows that Heraclitus is not a partisan of difference: identity and difference are mutually generative and equally fundamental. For his part, Parmenides both makes an argument against opposing being and non-being in the False Road Story, and then uses precisely (...) this opposition to put up signs on the Way of Truth. The paper responds to this impasse by making the case that the poem’s philosophical character is didactic, rhetorical, and mythological, which is why both these signs, and the opposition between non-being and being, are presented as names created by mortals. (shrink)

The paper demonstrates that Parmenides’ monism is a logical consequence of his criteria for philosophy, in conjunction with the logical operators he uses, and their holistic connection. Parmenides, I argue, is the first philosopher to set out explicit criteria for philosophy, establishing as criterion not only consistency, but also what I call rational admissibility, the requirement when giving an account of something that the account be based on rational analysis and can withstand rational scrutiny. I give a detailed account of (...) the logical operators Parmenides uses in his argument and of the way in which his notion of being is tailored to fit both them and his criteria for philoso-phy. (shrink)

At a crucial juncture in Plato’s Sophist, when the interlocutors have reached their deepest confusion about being and not-being, the Eleatic Visitor proclaims that there is yet hope. Insofar as they clarify one, he maintains, they will equally clarify the other. But what justifies the Visitor’s seemingly oracular prediction? A new interpretation explains how the Visitor’s hope is in fact warranted by the peculiar aporia they find themselves in. The passage describes a broader pattern of ‘exploring both sides’ that lends (...) insight into Plato’s aporetic method. (shrink)

The extraordinary overall textual situation of Parmenides’ B1,1-3, due to complex, variegate and polymorphous causes, entailed and still entails diverse sorts of problematic issues so to constitute a true labyrinth of philological, hermeneutical and theoretical instances interwoven each other in almost inextricable way. In this analysis, a first substantial knot of philological type resulted necessary to a preliminary discrimination for making sure the textual reconstruction in order to argue then its most literarily clear and specifiable meaning. In this way it (...) was also possible to make sure its semantic and theoretical relevancies. This research leaded to outline and, hopefully, to demonstrate no textual corruption and following misunderstanding happened before sec. XIII, namely corresponding to the lecture present in the first available manuscript, the so-called cod. N, universally excluded and entirely misevaluated, even discarded; instead it is not only the principle, but the unique reliable codex. The detailed analyse including the autoptic exam is the result of enlightening the absolute goodness of this version and the reasons both philological and hermeneutical comparations, which allow to achieve its complete textual rehabilitation and so to grasp its real conceptual content. (shrink)

Modern logicians have sought to unlock the modal secrets of Aristotle's Syllogistic by assuming a version of essentialism and treating it as a primitive within the semantics. These attempts ultimately distort Aristotle's ontology. None of these approaches make full use of tests found throughout Aristotle's corpus and ancient Greek philosophy. I base a system on Aristotle's tests for things that can never combine (polarity) and things that can never separate (inseparability). The resulting system not only reproduces Aristotle's recorded results for (...) the apodictic syllogistic in the Prior Analytics but it also generates rather than assumes Aristotle's distinctions among 'necessary', 'essential' and 'accidental'. By developing a system around tests that are in Aristotle and basic to ancient Greek philosophy, the system is linked to a history of practices, providing a platform for future work on the origins of logic. (shrink)

From the older handbooks to the more recent scholarly literature, Gorgias's professions about his art are taken literally at their word: conjured up in all of these accounts is the image of a hearer irresistibly overwhelmed by Gorgias's apagogic and psychagogic persuasions. Gorgias's own description of his art, in effect, replaces our description of it. "His proofs... give the impression of ineluctability" . "Thus logos is almost an independent external power which forces the hearer to do its will" . "Incurably (...) deceptive," logos has an "enormous power" that acts upon opinion, which is "easy to change" . Surprisingly, the urge to describe or paraphrase Gorgias's art has caused commentators to overlook the very best witness of it that we have: its enactment, which is to say the performative value of Gorgias's writings, especially the speeches. For if Gorgias's literary remains do nothing else, they demonstrate how one can do things with words without being explicit about what is being done, even if this means contradicting, performatively, what is being said-as for instance in his statements, so unconvincingly made, about the ostensible aims of rhetoric. Was Gorgias persuasive in practice? Was persuasion even the goal? Is logos the solitary arbiter of reality that it is so often made out to be? Through close examination of Gorgias's Helen and parts of On Not-Being, I attempt to show that persuasion is manifestly not the goal of his arguments, which in the first instance are aporetic paradoxes that expose the difficulties of defining the nature of either language or reality, and which in the last instance are instruments of cultural demystification. The only deception at work in Gorgias's writings is that of the self-deception of their audience. It is this that gives these curiously revealing documents of fifth-century Greek culture their "dissuasive," not persuasive, character. (shrink)

Parmenides and Melissus employ different deductive styles for their different kinds of argumentation. The former’s poem flows in an interesting sequence of passages: contents foreword, methodological premises, krisis, conclusions and corollaries. The latter, however, organizes an extensive process of deduction to show the characteristics of what is. In both cases, the strength of their argument rests on their deductive form, on the syntactical level of their texts: the formal structure of their reasonings help to identify the features and logical intersections (...) of their thoughts. On the one hand, Parmenides uses modal reasoning, enforcing the employment of the principle of the excluded middle. On the other hand, Melissus radicalizes the use of modal reasoning and employs counterfactual statements in order to develop his doctrine of what is. Despite their differences, both deserve a place in the Stone Age of logic and theory of argumentation due to their common ambition to demonstrate what is. (shrink)

Fragment B 1 of Parmenides describes a youth's journey to the house of a goddess who enlightens him as to the nature of all things. The task of translating Parmenides' Greek text is beset with many difficulties, most notably the phrase kata pant' atê at B 1.3. There, the neuter accusative plural panta ('all things') combines with the feminine nominative singular atê (heavenly sent blindness') to render translation impossible. Some have proposed emending the text to read a<s>tê ('down to all (...) cities'), understood in connection with the pathway of divine inspiration. Others reject the emendation in so far as the youth is said at B 1.27 to travel 'far from the beaten path of men.' I argue in defense of the reading kata pant' a<s>tê in so far as references to pathways of inspiration and poetic journeys to the cities of men occur frequently in the poetry of Parmenides' era. (shrink)

: Metaphysics B considers two sets of views that hypostatize mathematicals. Aristotle discusses the first in his B.2 treatment of aporia 5, and the second in his B.5 treatment of aporia 12. The former has attracted considerable attention; the latter has not. I show that aporia 12 is more significant than the literature suggests, and specifically that it is directly addressed in M.2 – an indication of its importance. There is an immediate problem: Aristotle spends most of M.2 refuting the (...) view that mathematicals are separate; but the B.5 mathematicals are inherent. I argue that the B.5 inherence is compatible with the M.2 separateness, and further, that aporia 12 is more than just a puzzle about the hypostatization of mathematicals. It is also a puzzle about the ontological status of mathematicals relative to sensibles. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to investigate Gorgias’ argument against motion, which is found in his Peri tou meontos and preserved only in MXG 980a18. I tried to shed new light both on this specific reflection and on the reliability of Pseudo-Aristotle’s version. By exploring the so called “change argument” and the “argument from divisibility”, I focused on the particular strategy used by the Sophist in his synthetike apodeixis, which should be investigated in relation to the dispute between monistic (...) and pluralistic ontology. In this regard, the puzzle from “divisibility everywhere” and its connection with the void as not-being can provide new elements to grasp the philosophical background in which the Sophist moves. On the one hand, Gorgias’ argument against motion is part of a broader dispute on the divisibility/indivisibility of being; on the other, his original elaboration of this puzzle seems to be perfectly understandable within the controversy between Eleatics and Atomists, and coherent with the argumentative style of the Sophist. (shrink)

The core sense of pistis as understood in Posterior Analytics, De Anima, and the Rhetoric is not that of a logical relation in which cognitively grasped propositions stand in respect to one another, but the result of an act of socially embedded interpersonal communication, a willing acceptance of guidance offered in respect to action. Even when pistis seems to have an exclusively epistemological sense, this focal meaning of pistis is implicit; to have pistis in a proposition is to willingly accept (...) that proposition as a basis for some kind of activity (albeit possibly theoretical) as a result of some kind of communicative act. This is in accordance with Aristotle’s understanding of argumentation as a social practice, entered into in order lead others to certain actions, for certain ends. Understanding pistis in this way allows us to understand how it is that pistis admits of quantitative variation. (shrink)

This paper critically examines a prominent and perennial strategy—found in thinkers as diverse as Kant and Shamik Dasgupta—of simultaneously embracing the Principle of Sufficient Reason and also limiting it so as to avoid certain apparently negative consequences of an unrestricted PSR. I will argue that this strategy of taming the PSR faces significant challenges and may even be incoherent. And for my purposes, I will enlist a generally derided argument by Leibniz for the PSR which will help us to see (...) the connections between the PSR and a radical form of monism. (shrink)

Contemporary Western thinkers recognise the destructive effects of long-standing attitudes of mastery over nature and the dualistic and hierarchical thinking that informs them. Heraclitus’ metaphysical position is ideal for reframing these traditional stances for several reasons: first, Heraclitus’ concept of identity is dynamic and relies on a sophisticated understanding of opposites that recognises ambiguity; secondly, his philosophical position produces a model of truth as multiple rather than univocal; and finally, in Heraclitus’ self-making kosmos, human beings are not separate from the (...) processes of physis but inextricably entangled in them. Heraclitus’ philosophy offers relevant avenues for reimagining contemporary philosophical issues, particularly theories of identity, the multiplicity of truth, and the proper ethical human relation to nature. (shrink)

La Déesse de Parménide annonce toujours que les δόξαι sont un produit humain. Mais il y a un point qui n'a pas été en général remarqué dans les études consacrées à l'étude des δόξαι: elles décrivent une activité humaine qui consiste a expliquer la réalité par la présence de principes opposés, et qui est toujours en rapport avec la "nomination". Il y avait à l'époque de Parménide une école qui correspondait à ce portrait robot, ou s'agit-il d'un collage de Parménide? (...) Quoi qu'il en soit, il est attesté la présence d'une branche du Pythagorisme qui se caractérisait, précisément, pour "placer" des noms sur les choses. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders the debates around the interpretation of Parmenides’ Being, in order to draw out the preconceptions that lie behind such debates and to scrutinize the legitimacy of applying them to a text such as Parmenides’ poem. With a focus on the assumptions that have driven scholars to seek clarity within the notoriously ambiguous verse of the poem, I ask whether it is possible to develop an analysis of Parmenides’ Being that is sympathetic both to his clear interest in (...) argument, logic, knowledge and truth and to his ambiguous expression and cultural and literary resonances. (shrink)

Herodotus uses the encounter between the Milesian tyrant Aristagoras and the Spartan king Cleomenes to further his authorial self-presentation. He contrasts his own aims and methods as an inquirer with those of Aristagoras, who becomes a “rival” inquirer for Herodotus in this passage. Seeking military aid from Cleomenes for the Ionian Revolt, Aristagoras points to his bronze map of the world and gives an ethnographical and geographical account of the peoples and land of Asia, from Ionia to Susa. Aristagoras accordingly (...) takes on many of the characteristics of Herodotus himself, including the use of shared ethnographical language. Aristagoras' ethnographical account is marred, however, by a rhetorical strategy that depicts the Asians as wealthy, but weak adversaries. While careful not to criticize Aristagoras' map itself, Herodotus is able to exploit Aristagoras' verbal description of his map to illustrate his own forthcoming account of the Persian Royal Road , which Herodotus assures readers is even more “accurate” than Aristagoras' account had been . Aristagoras is “deceiving” Cleomenes “well,” says Herodotus, until he tells the “truth” about the length of the journey to Susa . Telling the truth is a mistake for the deceiver Aristagoras, but an obligation for the inquirer Herodotus. (shrink)

What role, if any, does dialectic play in Aristotle’s epistemology in the Topics? In this paper I argue that it does play a role, but a role that is independent of endoxa. In the first section, I sketch the case for thinking that dialectic plays a distinctively epistemological role—not just a methodological role, or a merely instrumental role in getting episteme. In the second section, I consider three ways it could play that role, on two of which endoxa play at (...) least a co-starring role. But in the third section, I argue that endoxa don’t play that co-starring role, by arguing for a deflationary account of what endoxa are. For that reason, the third view emerges as the most plausible; but the third view is, I’ll suggest, Platonic. (shrink)

This article considers an interpretative model for the study of Heraclitus, which was first put forward by Alexander Mourelatos in 1973, and draws upon a related model put forward by Julius Moravcsik beginning in 1983. I further develop this combined model and provide a motivation for an interpretation of Heraclitus. This is also of interest for modern metaphysics due to the recurrence of structurally similar problems, including the ‘colour exclusion’ problem that was faced by Wittgenstein. Further, I employ the model (...) to shed new light on Heraclitus’ image of the river, while relating potential readings to various contemporary metaphysical views. (shrink)

In contemporary metaphysics, the Eleatic Principle (EP) is a causal criterion for reality. Articulating the EP with precision is notoriously difficult. The criterion purportedly originates in Plato’s Sophist, when the Eleatic Visitor articulates the EP at 247d-e in the famous Battle of the Gods and the Giants. There, the Visitor proposes modifying the ontologies of both the Giants (who are materialists) and the Gods (who are friends of the many forms), using a version of the EP according to which only (...) items which have the capacity to affect or to be affected are real. Recently, it has been argued that while there are some genetic connections between the EP and the views of some of the historical Eleatics (Parmenides and Zeno), the views of Melissus are generally incompatible with the EP. This raises the following question: What, exactly, is Eleatic about the Eleatic Principle? In this paper, I look to the dialectical context in which the Visitor’s appeal to the EP appears, and I propose that there are at once three relevant senses of affecting and being affected in the text: (1) tangible contact (as in the interactions between the bodies of the materialists), (2) Cambridge change (as in the form's being affected by a soul via the act of coming to know), and (3) the notion of a cause that does not itself change (as in a form’s affecting another form, a soul, or any sensible item). I argue that these have clear parallels to the metaphysics of all three main Eleatic philosophers, and that the views of Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus are therefore compatible with the EP. This has interesting consequences for narratives about the reception of the Eleatics in Plato, the inclusion of an Eleatic Visitor as an interlocutor in the Sophist, and for the metaphysics of subsequent schools (such as the Stoics) who are widely thought to have been influenced by the EP. (shrink)

Celebrando o papel de Newton da Costa na história da paraconsistência, este trabalho examina o uso e abuso da deliberada auto-contradição. Iniciado por Parmênides, desenvolvido por Platão, e continuado por Cícero, uma antiga tradição filosófica usava deliberadamente discursos paraconsistentes para revelar a verdade. Nos tempos modernos, o decisionismo tem usado uma deliberada auto-contradição contra a revelação Judaico-Cristã. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p1.

Resumen: El presente trabajo esbozará ciertos elementos para una interpretación global del proemio de Parménides, a partir del análisis de uno de sus elementos centrales: las doncellas hijas del sol. Tras examinar las acciones que éstas realizan dentro de la narración, y con el objetivo de defender una interpretación alegórica, se definirá la actividad alegórica arcaica mediante algunos ejemplos. Finalmente, se trazarán los cimientos para una revalorización crítica de la interpretación de sexto Empírico y se argumentará que la alegoría platónica (...) del carro alado como símbolo de la se halla motivada por la ambigüedad intrínseca del relato, ambigüedad que tiene por objeto mostrar la unidad real de los contrarios aparentes a través del símbolo de las doncellas hijas del sol.: This paper will outline several guiding principles concerning a comprehensive interpretation of Parmenides' proem through the analysis of one of its essential elements: the daughters of the Sun. After examining the actions they perform throughout the narrative and in order to defend an allegorical interpretation of them, some features of the archaic allegorical activity will be defined by the analysis of some examples. Finally, we will trace the foundations for a critical reappraisal of Sextus Empiricus' interpretation and we will argue that Plato's allegory of the "winged chariot" as a symbol of the ψυχή in the Phaedrus could well be closely recreating and evoking the Parmenidean myth of the proem. The hermeneutic disjunction may be motivated by the intrinsic ambiguity of the narration, an ambiguity intended to show the real unity of apparent opposites by using the symbol of the daughters of the Sun. (shrink)

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (a major Greek city of Ionian Asia Minor), a Greek philosopher of the 5th century B.C.E. (born ca. 500–480), was the first of the Presocratic philosophers to live in Athens. He propounded a physical theory of “everything-in-everything,” and claimed that nous (intellect or mind) was the motive cause of the cosmos. He was the first to give a correct explanation of eclipses, and was both famous and notorious for his scientific theories, including the claims that the sun (...) is a mass of red-hot metal, that the moon is earthy, and that the stars are fiery stones. Anaxagoras maintained that the original state of the cosmos was a mixture of all its ingredients (the basic realities of his system). The ingredients are thoroughly mixed, so that no individual ingredient as such is evident, but the mixture is not entirely uniform or homogeneous. (shrink)

En este trabajo se mostrará la posibilidad de establecer dos líneas interpretativas contemporáneas acerca del Poema sobre la Naturaleza de Parménides de Elea tomando como criterio para su delimitación el tratamiento que recibe el problema del “ser” dado que esta noción es clave para configurar todos los temas de la reflexión parmenídea. En este sentido, se presentará una perspectiva que despliega el “ser” en el ámbito de los problemas sobre la noción de existencia (lectura existencial) frente a otra que encuentra (...) en el “ser” la expresión de esencia o naturaleza última (lectura esencial), al tiempo que se revisarán sus implicaciones con relación al establecimiento y diferenciación de las vías de investigación. The question of Being in the Poem about Nature of Parmenides of Elea. Two interpretative alternativesThis paper concerns about the possibility of the establishment of two contemporary interpretational views for approaching Parmenides’ Poem On Nature assuming as a criterion the different treatments about the problem of being, because this notion is the key for configuration of all themes in parmenidean reflection. Therefore, on one viewpoint “being” is at the center of existential questions (this will be called “existential reading”), and, on the other hand, “being” is taken in the sense ofessence or ultimate nature (this will be call “essential reading”); at the same time the implications related to building and differentiating the routes of investigation will be reviewed. (shrink)

Against the traditional interpretation of Doxa as intrinsically and thoroughly deceiving and untrustworthy, the present essay examines the passages which follow the self-characterization of the goddess’ speech as ‘deceitful.’ The traits of an extensive cosmogony and cosmology open up the possibility for discerning two aspects of Doxa: first a presentation of mortal erroneous opinions, but then also their correction within the framework of the ‘appropriate world-arrangement’ presented by the goddess.

This thesis is a study of Archaic and Early Classical philosophical poetry within the competitive context which characterized the poetic production of that period. In particular, I evaluate the ideas and arguments of Xenophanes, Parmenides, Epicharmus and Empedocles in the context of the social and cultural aspects of Archaic poetic performance in order to evaluate their response to traditional agonism. As I argue, these figures entered the poetic contest not only to defeat their poetic adversaries, but also to transform and (...) redefine the terms of the competition itself. Chapter 1 is devoted to the analysis of three institutionalized forms of poetic agonism: sympotic games, rhapsodic contests, and dramatic performances. In chapter 2, I evaluate the socio-political import of Xenophanes' poetry and argue that his conception of the greatest god serves to substantiate his moral prescriptions aimed at eliminating civic conflict. In chapter 3, I examine Parmenides' original notion of alētheia as logical deduction, whereby he provides a solution to the problem of the truth-status of poetry stemming from the Muses' ability to inspire both genuine and false accounts, as narrated in Hesiod's Theogony. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of Empedocles' polemic allusions to his poetic and philosophical predecessors. I argue that Empedocles' confidence in his poetic authority is ultimately grounded on his self-declared divine status, which grants him a unique and comprehensive poetic knowledge. In chapter 5, I evaluate Epicharmus' philosophical fragments against the background of early rhetoric and argue that, through the use of philosophically inspired arguments, Epicharmus aimed to make manifest philosophy's agonistic potential and to show how it could be exploited to one's own advantage. (shrink)