Reflexió dedicada al cos humà. Per tal d’analitzar algunes de les característiques del cos humà en la societat dels nostres dies, es procedeix, d’entrada, a una breu exposició de la història del cos en la cultura occidental i, més endavant, s’analitzen alguns aspectes laterals, però tanmateix essencials per a un tractament antropològic del cos com poden ser, per exemple, el cos de la dona en la cultura occidental i el patriarcalisme com a forma d’organitzar els cossos humans.

Les nouvelles technologies de l’information et de la communication (NTIC) se sont infiltrées dans notre vie quotidienne. Ces technologies, representées dans cet article par l‘internet et par le téléphone portable, devront montrer un potentiel encore plus remarcable dans le future, pouvant changer non seulement les structures économiques et industrielles, mais aussi la façon de penser et d’agir des êtres humains.

O ponto de partida do presente artigo é a idéia adorniana de que os conceitos como formas de pensamento são constelações de poder. Diferentemente de muitas interpretações que vêem em Adorno um resignado, Demirovic mostra que essa idéia permite que o filósofo dê à sua própria teoria o caráter de intervenção no consenso ideológico da vida quotidiana no tocante à emancipação.

The starting point of Demirovic's text is Adorno’s idea that concepts as forms of thinking are constellations of power. Differently from many interpretations of Adorno as resigned, Demirovic shows that this assumption enables Adorno to give his own theory the character of interventions in the ideological consensus of everyday life with regard to emancipation.O ponto de partida do presente artigo é a idéia adorniana de que os conceitos como formas de pensamento são constelações de poder. Diferentemente de muitas interpretações que (...) vêem em Adorno um resignado, Demirovic mostra que essa idéia permite que o filósofo dê à sua própria teoria o caráter de intervenção no consenso ideológico da vida quotidiana no tocante à emancipação. (shrink)

Há longo tempo considerado um dos sentidos menores e mais fracos nos animais humanos, o olfato na realidade assume na nossa modalidade de existência uma função bem menos marginal, antes central, nos comportamentos socio-emocionais, na evocação das memórias e na comunicação não verbal, e não último na nossa vida quotidiana, especialmente pelo seu papel na percepção do sabor dos alimentos. Graças aos progressos que a pesquisa alcançou nas últimas décadas, a ponto de justificar entre outras coisas o nascimento de (...) uma nova área científica chamada neurogastronomia, o olfato, e especialmente o olfato retronasal, se configura como uma das nossas habilidades mais espécie-específicas, à qual devemos, inclusive, uma das maiores alegrias da vida: o prazer consciente de saborear e de apreciar alimentos e bebidas. Partindo deste tema, o objetivo deste ensaio è, portanto, mostrar em que medida uma experiência radicada no corpo, como a percepção do sabor, remonte às características espécie-específicas desenvolvidas pelo olfato humano no curso da evolução, configurando-se como uma forma complexa de cognição encarnada, cujas possibilidades dependem tanto da estrutura biológica, quanto do uso efetivo que fazemos deste extraordinário dispositivo corpóreo. _Palavras-chave:_ odores, olfato retronasal, percep;ção do sabor, gosto, neurogastronomia, anosmia, ageusia. (shrink)

El cuidado en el florecimiento o desarrollo humano personal: reflexiones desde la psicología para la bioética del cuidado Cuidado no florescimento ou desenvolvimento humano pessoal: reflexões da psicologia para a bioética do cuidado This paper looks into the place care holds in personal development. It begins considering care as a universal and necessary category for human life and asks about the role it plays and how it influences one’s own personal development. Even though the framework that surrounds this reflection is (...) a multidimensional humanistic anthropological perspective—that is, it recognizes the richness of the person with his different dimensions: biological, psychological, and social, all of them involved in personal development—, it specifically analyzes the psychological dimension of care under three aspects: being taken care of, taking care of others, and being aware of both realities. Para citar este artículo / To reference this article / Para citar este artigo Hernáez-García M. El cuidado en el florecimiento o desarrollo humano personal: reflexiones desde la psicología para la bioética del cuidado. pers. bioét. 2018; 22: 271-287. DOI: 10.5294/pebi.2018.22.2.6. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v37-moulines.

O objetivo deste artigo é compreender o fenómeno da propaganda indirecta no cinema enquanto dispositivo ideológico de controlo da vida privada, identificando a forma como foram tratados os papéis do feminino e do masculino no que à intriga amorosa conducente ao casamento diz respeito.Para o efeito, foram analisados, à luz do contexto sociocultural e político das duas primeiras décadas do Estado Novo em Portugal, sete filmes de ‘comédia à portuguesa’ marcantes do chamado ‘período de ouro’ do cinema português.A análise (...) comparada do enredo faz emergir um paradoxo: por um lado, o casamento, tido à luz da época como epicentro da vida privada e unidade primária da vida social e afetiva, é naturalmente um dos tópicos centrais nessas narrativas - tudo se encaminha para ele como concretização e realização individual. Porém - salvo raríssimas exceções -, nada dele é retratado. A sua vivência exterior ou social, e sobretudo quotidiana, privada, é omissa. Tratado dessa forma, o casamento não é mais do que um “desfecho ornamental” e uma utopia: o círculo da vida comum a dois nunca é invadido pelo espetador. (shrink)

«Així doncs, qualsevol activitat que emprenem, la nostra acció més quotidiana, ens demana un esforç de la voluntat. En la consagració de les nostres forces a véncer totes les dificultats que se’ns presenten a diari ens determinen a nosaltres mateixos. Solament hem de vigilar de no cedir en el nostre afany de superació. Perquè si el treball que tenim per davant al llarg d’una existència el deixàvem de colp algun dia per algun motiu sobtat, això seria com una mort en (...) vida, com una rendició. Però no podem renunciar a ser nosaltres mateixos, sinó que ens hem de guanyar pas a pas, dia a dia». (shrink)

O academicismo trancafiou a Universidade na sua autorreferencialidade. Raramente se acha um jovem licenciado que descreve a importância e a utilidade dos próprios estudos superiores nas contingências novas que a vida e o trabalho o levam a enfrentar: a Universidade é “diferente” da vida. As ciências da educação, se assumissem claramente, também a partir do próprio estatuto, a concepção de serem “instrumentos” a entregar a mãos competentes, a pessoas autênticas e com rosto humano, poderiam oferecer uma grande contribuição (...) à pessoa-educador como auxílio para o discernimento dos modos e das possibilidades de companhia à pessoaeducando no seu crescimento e no seu caminho não sisífico em direção à meta ideal! Contrariamente, acontece de ter de constatar quanto inútil para tal fim seja a competência que adquirem, melhor, quanto perniciosa é a ação que sai destes “educadores especializados”: um endurecimento geral, um achatamento indolente no cotidiano, a perda de toda idealidade, a inversão de toda realidade! Então tudo está perdido na sociedade cientificada? A resposta, estranha para muitos, mas verdadeira: a destruição não aconteceu pela persistência nela de costumes morais tradicionais na vida cotidiana das pessoas reais, as pessoas continuam vivendo e manifestando o mal-estar existencial e o desejo de algo que parece ter fugido, mas que não está completamente perdido. Tudo é possível, então, se nos pomos na perspectiva de busca humilde, leal e apaixonada das molas capazes de lançar o homem a desejar ir além do seu próprio presente atual, buscando caracterizar a própria tarefa educativa, não como atuação inteligente e interesseira deteorias na prática quotidiana, mas como encontro pessoal e real no qual cada um cresce e amadurece a sua personalidade: o encontro com pessoas verdadeiras e autênticas faz surgir o amor por esta humanidade e o desejo de transcendê-la como ideal e caminho de vida. A experiência de um encontro entre humanidades verdadeiras pode fazer renascer o ideal e despertar o desejo de realizá-lo. (shrink)

El siguiente artículo tiene dos intenciones: por un lado, a través de Levinas y Merleau- Ponty, mostrar la relevancia de las herramientas fenomenológicas en el debate actual de la estética de lo cotidiano; por otro, defender la tesis de que lo específico de la estética de lo cotidiano consiste en comprender que nuestra cotidianidad está fundada inherentemente en elementos estéticos que se integran en nuestra vida de forma irreflexiva. A su vez, dichos elementos estéticos, a pesar de su irreflexividad, (...) componen un elemento esencial en la construcción de nuestra subjetividad y nuestro mundo propio. A través de Levinas nos serviremos de su concepto de gozo para fundar una ética de lo cotidiano; a través de Merleau-Ponty acudiremos a sus reflexiones sobre la corporalidad para describir la fenomenología de esta experiencia. La característica cercanía, inatención y falta de diferenciación analítica de la estética de lo cotidiano constituirá, a su vez, una de las diferencias principales con otras teorías estéticas caracterizadas por la contemplación, la objetualidad y el desinterés. (shrink)

According to an attractive conception of love as attention, discussed by Iris Murdoch, one strives to see one’s beloved accurately and justly. A puzzle for understanding how to love another in this way emerges in cases where more accurate and just perception of the beloved only reveals his flaws and vices, and where the beloved, in awareness of this, strives to escape the gaze of others - including, or perhaps especially, of his loved ones. Though less attentive forms of love (...) may be able to render one’s continued love coherent and justifiable in these cases, they risk further alienating the beloved precisely because they are less attentive and because of the operations of the beloved’s shame. I argue that attentive love is well-suited to alleviate this problem of alienation, but that in order to do so, it must be supplemented with grace. I propose a conception of gracious love as an affectionate love for the qualities of human nature, distinguishing this from a love of humanity, and show how this complex emotion, in being responsive to the complexities of shame, is able to alleviate the problem of alienation. (shrink)

Giorgio Levi Della Vida (1886-1967) was not only an eminent Islamologist, belonging to that tradition of Italian Oriental studies that stretches from Ignazio Guidi to Leone Caetani, Carlo Alfonso Nallino and Francesco Gabrieli - he was also a man with solid roots in his own time. He taught in Naples and Rome, then for the ten years 1939-1948 at the University of Pennsylvania. He was one of the few university teachers who, when the oath of loyalty to the Italian (...) fascist regime was introduced, in October 1931, opted not to accept that act of submission. (shrink)

Giorgio Levi Della Vida (1886-1967) was not only an eminent Islamologist, he was also a man with solid roots in his own time. He taught in Naples and Rome, then for the ten years 1939-1948 at the University of Pennsylvania. He was one of the few university teachers who, when the oath of loyalty to the Italian fascist regime was introduced in October 1931, opted not to accept that act of submission. His memoirs, Fantasmi ritrovati, were published in 1966; (...) the book, now out of print, conjures up a tableau vivant of half a century of intellectual encounters in Italy and Europe between the wars. Among the portraits he paints there is the astounding story of those crucial days in June 1924 when the fascist government became a full-blown regime. This article presents extended extracts from that story. (shrink)

The guise of the good thesis can be understood as an attempt to distinguish between human motivations that are intelligible as desires and those that are not. I propose, first, that we understand the intelligibility at stake here as the kind necessary for the experience of reactive attitudes, both negative and positive, to the behavior and motivations of an agent. Given this, I argue that the thesis must be understood as proposing substantive content restrictions on how human agents perceive objects (...) of their desires; it cannot be a purely formal constraint. Moreover, while proponents of the guise of the good thesis who posit substantive content restrictions on human desire are right to do so, they are mistaken to claim that we always desire the apparently good. Instead, I propose a different limit: the naturally attractive. This alternative to the guise of the good thesis nonetheless captures the compelling idea that human desires are intelligent, quasi-perceptual responses to the world. (shrink)

Philosophers are now wary of conflating the “fittingness” or accuracy of an emotion with any form of moral assessment of that emotion. Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, who originally cautioned against this “conflation”, also warned philosophers not to infer that an emotion is inaccurate from the fact that feeling it would be morally inappropriate, or that it is accurate from the fact that feeling it would be morally appropriate. Such inferences, they argue, risk committing “the moralistic fallacy”, a mistake they (...) claim is widespread throughout the work of contemporary and historical moral philosophers. I argue that many basic and familiar forms of moral assessment of the emotions are not subject to these arguments. I illustrate this by reconsidering the idea that to assess an emotion as “fitting” is to assess it as what a virtuous person would feel. After showing how assessments akin to this “virtue-theoretical” notion of fit may be prevalent even outside of the Aristotelian tradition, I suggest some more charitable and philosophically productive interpretations of the philosophical views of the emotions that D’Arms and Jacobson criticize, and argue that we cannot coherently theorize about the fittingness conditions of the emotions in a morally neutral way. (shrink)

The book titled The Collaborative Economy in Action: European Perspectives is one of the important outcomes of the COST Action CA16121, From Sharing to Caring: Examining the Socio-Technical Aspects of the Collaborative Economy that was active between March 2017 and September 2021. The Action was funded by the European Cooperation in Science and Technology - COST. The main objective of the COST Action Sharing and Caring is the development of a European network of researchers and practitioners interested in investigating the (...) collaborative economy models, platforms, and their socio-technological implications. The network involves scholars, practitioners, communities, and policymakers. The COST Action Sharing and Caring helped to connect research initiatives across Europe and enabled scientists to develop their ideas by collaborating with peers. This collaboration opportunity represented a boost for the participants’ research, careers, and innovation potential. The main aim of this book is to provide a comprehensive overview of the collaborative economy in European countries with a variety of its aspects for a deeper understanding of the phenomenon as a whole. For this reason, in July 2017, an open call for country reports was distributed among the members of the COST Action Sharing and Caring. Representatives of the member countries were invited to produce short country reports covering: definition of the CE; types and models of the CE; key stakeholders involved; as well as legislation and technological tools relevant for the CE. Submitted reports varied in length and regarding the level of detail included, in accordance with how much information was available in each respective country at the time of writing. Editors of the book have compiled these early reports into a summary report, which was intended as a first step in mapping the state of the CE in Europe. The Member Countries Report on the Collaborative Economy, edited by Gaia Mosconi, Agnieszka Lukasiewicz, and Gabriela Avram that was published on the Sharing and Caring website, represented its first synergetic outcome and provided an overview of the CE phenomenon as interpreted and manifested in each of the countries part of the network. Additionally, Sergio Nassare-Aznar, Kosjenka Dumančić, and Giulia Priora compiled a Preliminary Legal Analysis of Country Reports on Cases of Collaborative Economy. In 2018, after undertaking an analysis of the previous reports’ strengths and weaknesses, the book editors issued a call for an updated version of these country reports. Prof. Ann Light advised the editorial team, proposing a new format for country reports and 4000 words limit. The template included: Introduction, Definition, Key Questions, Examples, Illustration, Context, Developments, Issues, Other Major Players, and Relevant Literature. The new template was approved by the Management Committee in October 2018. The task force that had supported the production of the first series of country reports acted as mentors for the team of authors in each country. The final reports arrived at the end of 2018, bringing the total number of submissions to 30. A call for book editors was issued, and a new editorial team was formed by volunteers from the participants of the COST Action: Andrzej Klimczuk, Vida Česnuityte, Cristina Miguel, Santa Mijalche, Gabriela Avram, Bori Simonovits, Bálint Balázs, Kostas Stefanidis, and Rafael Laurenti. The editorial team organized the double-blind reviews of reports and communicated to the authors the requirements for improving their texts. After reviews, the authors submitted updated versions of their country reports providing up-to-date interdisciplinary analysis on the state of the CE in 2019, when the reports were collected. During the final phase, the chapters were again reviewed by the lead editors together with all editorial team members. At the time, the intention was to update these reports again just before the end of the COST Action Sharing and Caring in 2021 and to produce a third edition. However, the COVID-19 pandemic changed these plans. Thus, this final volume was created by 82 scholars-editors and contributors-and consists of reports on 27 countries participating in the COST Action. M4 - Citavi. (shrink)

Participation in healthcare decision-making is considered to be an important right of minors, and is highlighted in both international legislation and public policies. However, despite the legal recognition of children’s rights to participation, and also the benefits that children experience by their involvement, there is evidence that legislation is not always translated into healthcare practice. There are a number of factors that may impact on the ability of the child to be involved in decisions regarding their medical care. Some of (...) these factors relate to the child, including their capacity to be actively involved in these decisions. Others relate to the family situation, sociocultural context, or the underlying beliefs and practices of the healthcare provider involved. In spite of these challenges to including children in decisions regarding their clinical care, we argue that it is an important factor in their treatment. The extent to which children should participate in this process should be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking all of the potential barriers into account. (shrink)

ABSTRACT What is the ethical significance of the suffering of nonhuman animals? For many, the answer is simple. Such suffering has clear moral significance: nonhuman animal suffering is suffering, suffering is something bad, and the fact that it is bad gives us reason to alleviate or prevent it. The practical problem that remains is how to do this most efficiently or effectively. I argue that this does not exhaust the ethical significance of certain evils, once we consider how the existence (...) of those evils may detract from the meaning of human life, even on fully “naturalistic” conceptions of meaning in life. I will draw a distinction between what I will call “spiritual” problems and “moral” problems and consider why moral philosophers may be well suited to addressing both problems, as long as the domain of the ethical is not taken to be exhausted by the domain of the moral. Finally, I will elaborate on why marking a distinction between these problems—the moral and the spiritual—may help illuminate some disagreements between Utilitarians and their opponents about the ethical significance of the suffering of nonhuman animals. (shrink)

L.A. Paul argues that “transformative experiences” challenge our hopes to live up to an ideal that she believes is upheld within western, wealthy cultures. If these experiences reveal information to us about the world and ourselves that is in principle unavailable to us before we undergo them, it seems that there is no hope for us to be rational, authentic and autonomous masters of our own lives. Supposing that Paul is right about this, how concerned should we be? Here, I (...) challenge the ideal of "rational mastery" that guides Paul’s project, and which must be granted in order to motivate the philosophical challenge purportedly generated by experiences that drastically change who we are and what we know. (shrink)

On one predominant conception of virtue, the virtuous agent is, among other things, wholehearted in doing what she believes best. I challenge this condition of wholeheartedness by making explicit the connections between the emotion of boredom and the states of continence and akrasia. An easily bored person is more susceptible to these forms of disharmony because of two familiar characteristics of boredom. First, that we can be – and often are – bored by what it is that we know would (...) be best to do, and second, that occurrent states of boredom tend to give rise to positive interest in performing actions that we know are bad to perform. Moreover, while a person’s susceptibility to boredom can indicate a lack of attentiveness or acuity, or be evidence of a vice such as ingratitude or shallowness, it can in others indicate positive qualities of character, such as perspicacity, liveliness, and certain forms of intelligence. Upon imagining certain bored akratics without the psychological qualities that give rise to their boredom, we will either imagine them without these positive qualities, or with others that – though perhaps psychologically possible – are not clearly better. This yields the result that a person who is continent or even akratic because of her susceptibility to boredom may have a character no less excellent than that of the wholehearted agent. (shrink)

As with certain other self-reflexive emotions, such as guilt and shame, our understanding of self-hatred may be aided by views of the mind which posit an internalized other whose perspective on oneself embodies and focuses a set of concerns and values, and whose perspective one is in some sense vulnerable to. To feel guilt for some transgression is not solely to feel the anger that one would feel toward another’s trespasses, now directed back onto oneself as an object of that (...) anger; it is at the same time to react to that anger – perhaps, for example, to accept it as deserved, or to welcome the lashing of one’s bad conscience. To feel shame before oneself is not just to see oneself in some compromising way, it is to feel compromised by one’s own gaze. Likewise, the person who hates herself does not feel the hatred that she might have for another, simply taking herself as object of that attitude. She is not merely the seat of an internalized hostile voice and perspective that she may, for example, react to with indifference. She does not only tell herself that she is “worthless” but, will typically feel herself so in response. And her suffering may not just result from pain she is inclined to inflict, but suffering that, in some sense, she is inclined to suffer. But how is this so? How, in self-hatred, does one become not only subject to, but vulnerable and even receptive to one’s own hostility? (shrink)

Journal of Global Ethics, Volume 9, Issue 3, Page 329-343, December 2013.

This open access book considers the development of the sharing and collaborative economy with a European focus, mapping across economic sectors, and country-specific case studies. It looks at the roles the sharing economy plays in sharing and redistribution of goods and services across the population in order to maximise their functionality, monetary exchange, and other aspects important to societies. It also looks at the place of the sharing economy among various policies and how the contexts of public policies, legislation, digital (...) platforms, and other infrastructure interrelate with the development and function of the sharing economy. The book will help in understanding the future economy models as well as to contribute in solving questions of better access to resources and sustainable innovation in the context of degrowth and growing inequalities within and between societies. It will also provide a useful source for solutions to the big challenges of our times such as climate change, the loss of biodiversity, and recently the coronavirus disease pandemic. This book will be of interest to academics and students in economics and business, organisational studies, sociology, media and communication and computer science. (shrink)

Commercial surrogacy arrangements now cross borders; this paper aims to reevaluate the traditional moral concerns regarding the practice against the added ethical dimension of global injustice. I begin by considering the claim that global surrogacy serves to satisfy the positive reproductive rights of infertile first-world women. I then go on to consider three powerful challenges to this claim. The first holds that commercial surrogacy involves the commodification of a good that should not be valued in market terms, the second that (...) it involves the exploitation of the labor of disadvantaged women, and the third that it depends on the illegitimate privileging of positive rights over negative rights. I reject the first of these challenges and argue that global surrogacy arrangements are indeed exploitative on the dual basis of what I call intracontractual injustice and intercontractual coercion. The latter, I contend, depends on a preexisting negative rights violation, which cannot be permitted for the sake of satisfying another's positive reproductive entitlement. I conclude not in favor of a global ban but with suggestions on how developing nations that permit commercial surrogacy might better protect the negative reproductive rights of their female citizens, thereby making them less vulnerable to exploitation. (shrink)

To act akratically is to act, knowingly, against what you judge is best for you to do, and it is traditionally assumed that to do this is to be weak-willed. Some have rejected this identification of akrasia and weakness of will, arguing that the latter is instead best understood as a matter of abandoning one's reasonable resolutions. This paper also rejects the identification of akrasia and weakness of will, but argues that this alternative conception is too broad, and that weakness (...) of will is best understood in relation to certain kinds of pain and pleasure. Moreover, the phenomenon of strong-willed akrasia, cases in which a person must exhibit strength of will to do precisely what she judges she should not do, suggests that strength of will is an executive virtue, and that being weak-willed is just one way (among others) in which a person can fail to manifest this virtue. (shrink)

Boredom can motivate us to perform actions that are painful, imprudent, morally objectionable, or unwise in other respects. It can also give rise to forms of akrasia: we may be unwilling to do what we know we must, simply because we will find it boring; when we are racked with boredom—bored stiff, bored to tears—actions that might otherwise never occur to us to do can begin to appear attractive, and sometimes remain attractive against our better judgment. But boredom is also (...) relevant to another set of moral or ethical con- cerns. Alongside questions about what we may do out of boredom, and about whether such actions are morally justifiable, conducive to our well-being, or instrumentally rational, a person’s character can be revealed by how her dispositions of boredom express themselves. And just as our emotional dispositions can be not just criticized, but also improved, so we may think that our dispositions of boredom, too, may be both criticized and improved. From a virtue-theoretical approach to boredom that would encourage this shift of focus from the ethical significance of actions to include assessments of character and motive as well, three questions emerge. What kind of atti- tude is boredom, such that it can motivate (sometimes objectionable) forms of action, while also reflecting or disclosing something about the kind of character one has? What does it disclose or reveal about a person that she is bored by particular things, and not others, and to greater and lesser extents? And is there a virtue that could come to govern our dispositions of boredom, providing an ideal that one might aspire to? (shrink)

People tend to be repulsed by the idea of cash markets in kidneys, but support the trading of kidneys through paired exchanges or chains. We reject anti-commodification accounts of this reaction and offer an egalitarian one. We argue that the morally significant difference between cash markets and kidney chains is that the former allow the wealthy greater access to kidneys, while the latter do not. The only problem with kidney chains is that they do not go far enough in addressing (...) equality concerns, and we show how the introduction of cash payments by the state could remedy this. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPrevious research on the development of emotion recognition in music has focused on classical, rather than popular music. Such research does not consider the impact of lyrics on judgements...

Consensus is lacking among research ethicists on the question of how broadly to understand the requirements of non-exploitation in international clinical research. Two types of principles have been proposed, minimalist and non-minimalist, grounded in two opposing conceptions of exploitation, transactional and systemic. Transactionalists have offered principles, which, it has been argued, are satisfied by minimal gains to vulnerable subjects measured against an unjust status quo. Systemicists have advanced principles with decidedly non-minimal mandates but only by conflating the obligations of clinical (...) research with those of First World citizenship. My aim here is to break this deadlock by offering grounds for a non-minimal requirement of international research ethics grounded in a transactional conception of exploitation. I do this by arguing that a subject's gains must be measured not only within the transaction, relative to her own starting point and to the share of gains enjoyed by her co-transactor, but also across transactions, so as to ensure parity of benefit to trial participants whenever, and wherever, parity of burden is assumed. (shrink)

The term collaborative economy itself is relatively new, and according to the European Commission, the term is used interchangeably with the term sharing economy. The term SE was frequently used when early models, such as Airbnb or ZipCar, appeared and gained popularity, especially in the United States, but it was afterwards substituted with the term CE in the European contexts. The country reports in this collection often use the two terms interchangeably, further illustrating the fact that a generally agreed definition (...) is still missing. However, the ambition driving the term CE is to create specific European economic models with greater emphasis on the community’s involvement. In Europe, it is still the case that the definition of the CE and SE remains fuzzy, including both non-profit and for-profit models, supported by both monetary and non-monetary exchanges among participants. The phenomenon is complex, covering various fields of activity, as well as operating at various levels, ranging from the international to the national, regional, and local. Some definitions focus mostly on sustainability, while others highlight technological and financial aspects and business models specific to the phenomenon. This chapter is organized as follows. First, a short overview of the basic theoretical approaches to CE is presented. Further, the structure of the book is discussed in detail, and the text closes with a summary. M4 - Citavi. (shrink)

A private, for-profit company has recently opened a pair of plasma donation centres in Canada, at which donors can be compensated up to $50 for their plasma. This has sparked a nation-wide debate around the ethics of paying plasma donors. Our aim in this paper is to shift the terms of the current debate away from the question of whether plasma donors should be paid and toward the question of who should be paying them. We consider arguments against paying plasma (...) donors grounded in concerns about exploitation, commodification, and the introduction of a profit motive. We find them all to be normatively inconclusive, but also overbroad in light of Canada’s persistent reliance on plasma from paid donors in the United States. While we believe that there are good reasons to oppose allowing a private company to profit from Canada’s blood supply, these concerns can be addressed if payment is dispensed instead by a public, not-for-profit agency. In short, we reject profiting from plasma while we endorse paying for plasma; we therefore conclude in favour of a new Canadian regime of public sector plasma collection and compensation. (shrink)

The term collaborative economy itself is relatively new, and according to the European Commission, the term is used interchangeably with the term sharing economy. The term SE was frequently used when early models, such as Airbnb or ZipCar, appeared and gained popularity, especially in the United States, but it was afterwards substituted with the term CE in the European contexts. The country reports in this collection often use the two terms interchangeably, further illustrating the fact that a generally agreed definition (...) is still missing. However, the ambition driving the term CE is to create specific European economic models with greater emphasis on the community's involvement. In Europe, it is still the case that the definition of the CE and SE remains fuzzy, including both non-profit and for-profit models, supported by both monetary and non-monetary exchanges among participants. The phenomenon is complex, covering various fields of activity, as well as operating at various levels, ranging from the international to the national, regional, and local. Some definitions focus mostly on sustainability, while others highlight technological and financial aspects and business models specific to the phenomenon. This chapter is organized as follows. First, a short overview of the basic theoretical approaches to CE is presented. Further, the structure of the book is discussed in detail, and the text closes with a summary. (shrink)

In this paper, I situate Hans Blumenberg historically and conceptually in relation to a subtheme in the famous debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer at Davos, Switzerland in 1929. The subtheme concerns Heidegger’s and Cassirer’s divergent attitudes toward philosophical anthropology as it relates to the starting points and goals of philosophy. I then reconstruct Blumenberg’s anthropology, which involves reconceptualizing Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms in relation to Heidegger’s objections to the philosophical anthropology of his day (e.g., Max Scheler, Helmuth (...) Plessner, and Arnold Gehlen) as unduly anthropocentric. Blumenberg builds on anthropologist Gehlen’s assumption that human beings are biologically underdetermined and therefore world-open. With this starting point, symbolic forms, such as myth and language, make up a compensatory life-world that supports human existence. Action, or self-assertion, which is necessary given the lack of a seamless fit between human beings and the environment, is thus circumscribed and shaped by the historied, cultural constructs that constitute a life-world. Human beings can thus be characterized as a species that continually renegotiates the shape of its existence through its relation to biological limits on the one hand and cultural constants on the other. Because Blumenberg and philosophical anthropology are relatively unexplored by Anglophone philosophers, and because philosophical anthropology is central to Blumenberg’s methodology generally, this study provides an introduction to both. (shrink)

Anti-commodification theorists condemn liberal political philosophers for not being able to justify restricting a market transaction on the basis of what is sold, but only on the basis of how it is sold. The anti-commodification theorist is correct that if this were all the liberal had to say in the face of noxious markets, it would be inadequate: even if everyone has equal bargaining power and no one is misled, there are some goods that should not go to the highest (...) bidder. In this paper, I respond to the anti-commodification critique of liberalism by arguing that the political liberal has the wherewithal to account not only for the conditions under which goods should not be sold, but also for what kinds of goods should not be for sale in a market economy. The political liberal can appeal to a principle of equal basic rights, and to one of sufficiency in basic needs and the social bases of self-respect, I argue, to account for what’s problematic about markets in civic goods, necessary goods, and physical goods including body parts and intimate services. (shrink)

The Canadian province of Quebec recently amended its Health Insurance Act to cover the costs of In Vitro Fertilization . The province of Ontario recently de-insured IVF. Both provinces cited cost-effectiveness as their grounds, but the question as to whether a public health insurance system ought to cover IVF raises the deeper question of how we should understand reproduction at the social level, and whether its costs should be a matter of individual or collective responsibility. In this article I examine (...) three strategies for justifying collective provisions in a liberal society and assess whether public reproductive assistance can be defended on any of these accounts. I begin by considering, and rejecting, rights-based and needs-based approaches. I go on to argue that instead we ought to address assisted reproduction from the perspective of the contractarian insurance-based model for public health coverage, according to which we select items for inclusion based on their unpredictability in nature and cost. I argue that infertility qualifies as an unpredictable incident against which rational agents would choose to insure under ideal conditions and that assisted reproduction is thereby a matter of collective responsibility, but only in cases of medical necessity or inability to pay. The policy I endorse by appeal to this approach is a means-tested system of coverage resembling neither Ontario nor Quebec's, and I conclude that it constitutes a promising alternative worthy of serious consideration by bioethicists, political philosophers, and policy-makers alike. (shrink)