У статті на основі аналізу ролі загальнологічних методів та аналізу принципів причинності, інваріантності, збереження, симетрії та спостережуваності розкривається методологічний зміст об’єктивності. З’ясування філософського, зокрема онтологічного, змісту цих принципів стає основою їх регуляторної ролі в науковому пізнанні. Обґрунтовано релевантність принципу об’єктивності типу наукової раціональності. Показано релевантність принципу об’єктивності сучасному стану методологічної свідомості певної науки. Досліджено еволюційний вимір релевантності об’єктивності знання науковій раціональності. Показано значення суб’єктного виміру у функціонуванні методологічних трендів у сучасній науці. Суб’єктний вимір розкрито як когнітивний вимір виробництва знання. З’ясовано (...) його значення для становлення науки як когнітивної системи. (shrink)

The focus of the article is scientific rationality. Drawing from the historical development of science, the author identifies three main types of scientific rationality: classical rationality, nonclassical rationality, and post-nonclassical rationality. They are distinguished based on such criteria as 1) features of systematic organization of the objects studied by science; 2) the system of ideals and norms used in research; 3) different types of philosophical-methodological reflection on cognitive activity. The essay discusses each (...) of the three identified types providing a thorough analysis of their main features and characteristics. (shrink)

Contents Preface General Introduction 1 | Science and Pseudoscience Introduction Karl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refutations Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research? Imre Lakatos, Science and Pseudoscience Paul R. Thagard, Why Astrology Is a Pseudoscience Michael Ruse, Creation-Science Is Not Science Larry Laudan, Commentary: Science at the Bar---Causes for Concern Commentary 2 | Rationality, Objectivity, and Values in Science Introduction Thomas S. Kuhn, The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions Thomas S. Kuhn, Objectivity, (...) Value Judgment, and Theory Choice Ernan McMullin, Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science Larry Laudan, Kuhn’s Critique of Methodology Helen E. Longino, Values and Objectivity Kathleen Okruhlik, Gender and the Biological Sciences Commentary 3 | The Duhem-Quine Thesis and Underdetermination Introduction Pierre Duhem, Physical Theory and Experiment W. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism Donald Gillies, The Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis Larry Laudan, Demystifying Underdetermination *Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, The Duhem Problem Commentary 4 | Induction, Prediction, and Evidence Introduction Peter Lipton, Induction Karl Popper, The Problem of Induction Wesley C. Salmon, Rational Prediction Carl G. Hempel, Criteria of Confirmation and Acceptability Peter Achinstein, Explanation v. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight? *Nelson Goodman, The New Riddle of Induction Commentary 5 | Confirmation and Relevance: Bayesian Approaches Introduction Wesley C. Salmon, Rationality and Objectivity in Science *Deborah G. Mayo, A Critique of Salmon’s Bayesian Way *Alan Chalmers, The Bayesian Approach Paul Horwich, Therapeutic Bayesianism Commentary 6 | Models of Explanation Introduction Rudolf Carnap, The Value of Laws: Explanation and Prediction Carl G. Hempel, Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation Carl G. Hempel, The Thesis of Structural Identity Carl G. Hempel, Inductive-Statistical Explanation Peter Railton, A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation *Philip Kitcher, Explanatory Unification *James Woodward, The Manipulability Conception of Causal Explanation Commentary 7 | Laws of Nature Introduction A. J. Ayer, What Is a Law of Nature? Fred I. Dretske, Laws of Nature D. H. Mellor, Necessities and Universals in Natural Laws Nancy Cartwright, Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts? Commentary 8 | Intertheoretic Reduction Introduction Ernest Nagel, Issues in the Logic of Reductive Explanations Paul K. Feyerabend, How to Be a Good Empiricist *Jerry A. Fodor, Special Sciences Philip Kitcher, 1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences Commentary 9 | Empiricism and Scientific Realism Introduction Grover Maxwell, The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities Bas C. van Fraassen, Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism Alan Musgrave, Realism versus Constructive Empiricism Larry Laudan, A Confutation of Convergent Realism *Juha T. Saatsi, On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies Ian Hacking, Experimentation and Scientific Realism David B. Resnik, Hacking’s Experimental Realism *Martin Carrier, What Is Right with the Miracle Argument Arthur Fine, The Natural Ontological Attitude Alan Musgrave, NOA’s Ark---Fine for Realism Commentary Glossary Bibliography Name Index Subject Index. (shrink)

An organizing theme of the dissertation is the issue of how to make philosophical theories useful for scientific purposes. An argument for the contention is presented that it doesn’t suffice merely to theoretically motivate one’s theories, and make them compatible with existing data, but that philosophers having this aim should ideally contribute to identifying unique and hard to vary predictions of their theories. This methodological recommendation is applied to the ranking-theoretic approach to conditionals, which emphasizes the epistemic (...) class='Hi'>relevance and the expression of reason relations as part of the semantics of the natural language conditional. As a first step, this approach is theoretically motivated in a comparative discussion of other alternatives in psychology of reasoning, like the suppositional theory of conditionals, and novel approaches to the problems of compositionality and accounting for the objective purport of indicative conditionals are presented. In a second step, a formal model is formulated, which allows us to derive quantitative predictions from the ranking-theoretic approach, and it is investigated which novel avenues of empirical research that this model opens up for. Finally, a treatment is given of the problem of logical omniscience as it concerns the issue of whether ranking theory (and other similar approaches) makes too idealized assumptions about rationality to allow for interesting applications in psychology of reasoning. Building on the work of Robert Brandom, a novel solution to this problem is presented, which both opens up for new perspectives in psychology of reasoning and appears to be capable of satisfying a range of constraints on bridge principles between logic and norms of reasoning, which would otherwise stand in a tension. (shrink)

In the modern world of total technologization, scientific knowledge devoid of worldview correction (humanitarian expertise) carries a threatening tendency of self-denial: without a constant, philosophically correct transformation of objective knowledge about certain fragments (branches) of the surrounding reality into human knowledge (questions) about itself, the practical effectiveness of such knowledge inevitably accumulates in itself the threat of practical helplessness. Aim and the tasks of the research. Based on an in-depth analysis of the category of existence, as well as (...) on modern philosophical reflections on the methodological and cognitive insolvency of the idea of the world, to find out the real meaning of those changes that this idea meaningfully undergoes in the conditions of the modern total technologization of human life. The research methodology. From a methodological point of view, the author prefers a dialectical approach, considering the analyzed phenomena, regardless of the mode of their reality, in their development and internally contradictory essence. H. Plesner’s theory of eccentric positionality serves as a certain base point for the analysis of human nature and, accordingly, the world of human existence. Research results: The problematic existence of the world and the epistemological «failure» of the corresponding category, declared in some modern philosophical reflections, are connected exclusively with its anthropological and worldview function, which is based on the fundamental uncertainty of a man’s place in the world. The «worthlessness» («futility») of worldview thematization is derived from the allencompassing inability of the human figure in the world, from that «emptiness» and «invisibility» (specific own transparency) of the spiritual dimension of human existence, on which, however, this existence is based. Discussion. The human «option» of fulfilling the unity of living being can be characterized as extremely intense. In this variant, the phylogenetic line of development turns into an ontogenetic point of worldliness devoid of predetermined content, a fundamentally new type of integration. The horizons of such integration far exceed primarily because of its understanding. And the subject of such a meaningful life is forced to integrate everything that happens to him every time into a certain system (synthesis) of the world. That subjectivity the world has distinguishes the subject from the thing. Subjectivity and the world mutually belong to each other - they are correlative. A thing exists because it is what it is. The subject (and with it his world) does not exist like that. A subject is how and to what it relates. But the relation «how» and «to what» is not carried out completely anew and isolated every time, but exists in its multiplicity in a certain relationship. Each individual case, each individual action (method of action) acquires its meaning from a wider, structured context – in whole or in part. This context is the «world», the «life world» of the real subject, or the «world» as an anthropological idea. Conclusions. The task of modern humanitarianism is not only to find opportunities for rational use of the fact of the fundamental openness of the human being, but also to cultivate the ability to reconcile a man with himself, to accept himself. This gives us certain reasons to hope for the enduring significance of worldview thematization. Criticism regarding the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that to become a man, one must already be one, could be considered fair, but only if one does not take into account the principled nature of such an aphoristic position, because this is exactly how the human world exists - as the art of tolerance uncertainty. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to discuss the nature of social phenomena, and to determine the appropriate way to explain them. Many of the contentions advanced rest largely upon the fact that social phenomena can be investigated only by methods which respect their distinctive character and status as social phenomena. In chapter I it is argued that the most important difference between the social and the natural sciences is that the former have to employ intentional criteria to identify their (...) explananda-phenomena. Because human and societal phenomena are intrinsically meaningful, the type of causation which prevails in the social realm is fundamentally different from that which prevails in the physical. In chapter II the claim of Popper and Hayek that the task of the social sciences is to trace the unintended consequences of human actions is critically examined. Two examples of economic explanation are given in order to show the importance of unintended consequences, and to illustrate the general form explanations of social phenomena should adopt. In chapter III the contention that the social sciences deal with inherently complex phenomena is examined and defended, and the main implications of this contention for social analysis are drawn. The extent to which social phenomena are in principle predictable is discussed. In chapter IV the structural properties of formal scientific theories are briefly characterised, and then Friedman's famous argument on the testability of economic theories is analysed and rejected. The role within a scientific theory of statements formulated with reference to idealisations of the phenomena being studied, and the role within a social explanation of the 'principle of rationality', are discussed. In chapter V the central questions behind the methodological individualism/methodological holism controversy are brought to light. Provided that methodological individualism is not construed as a reductionist or mechanistic principle, it can successfully avoid the main objections of its detractors. It is argued that the method of functional analysis in sociology is consistent with methodological individualism. Finally, it is claimed that the principle of methodological individualism does indeed recommend the appropriate way to explain societal phenomena. In chapter VI, the various strands of thought running through the five preceding chapters are drawn together in a brief summary of the most important points raised by this thesis. (shrink)

The articles discusses the philosophical foundations and the traditions of the theory of the humanitarian and technological revolution. The subject-matter of HTR theory is the description and forecast of the transition from the industrial to the post-industrial phase of civilization development as well as the strategy and the most effective methods of management of various socio-economic systems. This theory, actively developing in recent years, focuses on goal setting and on determining priorities and development criteria in the field of technology, science (...) and education. The current revolution largely justifies the forecast of D. Bell, an author of the theory of post-industrial development, about the transition from the world of technology to the world of people. The human is the main subject and object of the changes. In this regard, we review an interdisciplinary program on human research, initiated in the 1980s by I.T. Frolov. The ongoing scientific revolution in genetics and the transition to autoevolution make these ideas even more relevant. The concept of universal evolutionism proposed by N.N. Moiseev is fundamental. This concept originates from philosophical and methodological generalizations based on the vast experience of computer modeling of “human-dimensional” systems. The principles of co-evolution of man and biosphere, the strategies for finding compromises are very close to the ecology of technologies, developed by the theory of HTR. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the interdisciplinary concept of self-organization for many scientific fields and, in particular, for the theory of HTR. In our days, proposed by an outstanding mathematician, methodologist and thinker S.P. Kurdyumov, the interpretation of synergetics as a bridge between humanities and natural science, as a common language of natural scientists, mathematicians, scholars has become generally accepted. Kurdyumov predicted that many concepts and ideas of synergetics, through their philosophical understanding, would change the outlook and become an element of scientific culture. We show that this forecast turns into reality and in the process of HTR the ideas of synergetics begin to change our world. We pay special attention to the concept of self-developing systems, the theory of global scientific revolutions and the types of scientific rationality proposed by V.S. Stepin. In this regard, we can say that the HTR brings even more large-scale changes, covering not only science but also technology, society, the inner world of man. Identifying the philosophical foundations of HTR, we contribute to the development of methodology of this approach, enhance intra-scientific reflection and make possible to formulate unsolved problems more accurately. (shrink)

The issue of methodological solipsism in the philosophy of mind and psychology has received enormous attention and discussion in the decade since the appearance Jerry Fodor's "Methodological Solipsism" [Fodor 1980]. But most of this discussion has focused on the consideration of the now infamous "Twin Earth" type examples and the problems they present for Fodor's notion of "narrow content". I think there is deeper and more general moral to be found in this issue, particularly in light of (...) Fodor's more recent defense of his view in Psychosemantics [Fodor 1987]. Underlying this discussion are questions about the nature and plausibility of the claim that scientific explanation should observe a constraint of methodological individualism . My goal in what follows is to bring out this more general problem in Fodor's "internalist" account of the mental. (shrink)

**No longer the current version available on SEP; see revised version by Sharon Crasnow** -/- Feminists have a number of distinct interests in, and perspectives on, science. The tools of science have been a crucial resource for understanding the nature, impact, and prospects for changing gender-based forms of oppression; in this spirit, feminists actively draw on, and contribute to, the research programs of a wide range of sciences. At the same time, feminists have identified the sciences as a source as (...) well as a locus of gender inequalities: the institutions of science have a long tradition of excluding women as practitioners; feminist critics of science find that women and gender (or, more broadly, issues of concern to women and sex/gender minorities) are routinely marginalized as subjects of scientific inquiry, or are treated in ways that reproduce gender-normative stereotypes; and, closing the circle, scientific authority has frequently served to rationalize the kinds of social roles and institutions that feminists call into question. -/- Feminist perspectives on science therefore reflect a broad spectrum of epistemic attitudes toward and appraisals of science. Some urge the reform of gender inequities in the institutions of science and call for attention to neglected questions with the aim of improving the sciences in their own terms; they do not challenge the standards and practices of the sciences they engage. Others pursue jointly critical and constructive programs of research that, to varying degrees, aim at transforming the methodologies, substantive content, framework assumptions, and epistemic ideals that animate the sciences. The content of these perspectives, and the degree to which they generate transformative critique, depends not only on the types of philosophical and political commitments that inform them but also on the nature of the sciences and subject domains on which they bear. Feminist perspectives have had greatest impact on sciences that deal with inherently gendered subjects—the social and human sciences—and, secondarily, on sciences that study subjects characterized in gendered terms, metaphorically or by analogy (projectively gendered subjects), chiefly the biological and life sciences. Feminist perspectives are relevant to sciences that deal with non-gendered subject matters, but perspectives vary substantially in content and in critical import depending on the sciences and the particular research programs they engage. (shrink)

Introduction. A human and the world are an organically connected part and whole, they are always a single World, and therefore they can only evolve together, in one direction. The human world consists of many interconnected and interdepend- ent parts. If any one of the parts (for example, technology) begins to dominate and claim the sta- tus of the whole, then the problem of violating the optimal ratio in the coexistence and co-evolutionary development of each of the parts, and hence (...) the whole itself, becomes aggravated. Hence, the eco-humanistic problem arises. The purpose of the work is to present the content and substantiate the theoretical and practical significance of eco-humanism as a new humanitar- ian knowledge and methodology for understanding the specifics of the relationship “man — technical and-technological world”. Methods. The author uses the methods of dia- lectics, systemic and synergetic approaches, the project (projective) method, which is implemented in the design and development of a new philo- sophical and scientific discipline of eco-humanism, and ideas of co-evolution. Scientific novelty of the research. The author determines basic foundations of eco-humanism as a new type of humanitarian knowledge; formulates and meaningfully substan- tiates the main principles of eco-humanism as a methodological setting for the ecologization of a person and the world: optimality, coordination and dominance of the whole (integrity) in relation to its parts. Results. Eco-humanistics is defined as a new type of knowledge about a person and a specific setting of his thinking and practical activities, focused on finding ways and means to achieve op- timality in relation to various aspects (for example, technical and anthropological) in a person’s being to ensure the possibility of their fruitful existence, to preserve and reproduce a person (as a unique integrity) and his world (as a universal integrity), in their interconnected and interdependent unity. Conclusions. The author of the article comes to the conclusion that the theoretical development of eco-humanistics will make it possible to study and analyze the phenomena of modern culture in a more multifaceted way, to get a more accurate interpretation of the ways of human existence and eco-cultural practices that provide the effect of the state of the “ecosystem” in situations of any intense socio-cultural transformations. (shrink)

One of the innovative approaches in contemporary philosophical ontology consists in the assumption of a plurality of ontologies based on different metaphysical presuppositions. Such presuppositions involve, among others, the identification of relevant properties for the objects of our domain as a guiding principle in uncovering what it is to be considered intrinsic and what could be the mere effect of selection preferences based on objective or subjective criteria. A remarkable example of the application of a background metaphysical theory (...) in astrophysics is the problem of selection biases in detecting cosmological objects, such as supernovae, galaxies and gamma-ray bursts. We will show that it is valuable to be aware of the importance of uncovering this type of background theory to better understand selection effects and to promote a novel approach in scientific research. (shrink)

The purpose of the present report is to draw the philosophical community’s attention to the universal principle of cognition, the principle of extrapolation, capable of integrating the present and possibly, the future methods of man’s cognitive attitude to the world. Extrapolation is interpreted as a key logical-and-gnosiological procedure and, depending on subject/object relationships, is subdivided into “actual” and “real”. According to the actual extrapolation principle in any kind of cognition, it is important to take account of the (...) fact of the ontological presence of the individual in the world. The real extrapolation method is based on the available gnosiological content of a cognizing subject and on the use of a totality of the logical, gnosiological, epistemological, methodological, content-related and even psychological wealth of accumulated knowledge with the aim of its augmentation. The all-important aim of new gnosiology (theory of knowledge) should consist in studying permissible bounds of extrapolation, and in identifying basic laws of extrapolation of knowledge in two forms of its being as a necessary condition of their possible synthesis. (shrink)

Decision-theoretic approach and a nonlinguistic theory of norms are applied in the paper in an attempt to explain the nature of scientific rationality. It is considered as a normative system accepted by scientific community. When we say that a certain action is rational, we express a speaker‘s acceptance of some norms concerning a definite action. Scientists can choose according to epistemic utility or other rules and values, which themselves have a variable nature. Rationality can be identified (...) with a decision to accept a norm. This type of decision cannot be reduced only to its linguistic formulation; it is an act of evolvement of the normative regulation of human behavior. Norms are treated as decisions of a normative authority: a specific scientific community is the normative authority in science. These norms form a system and they are absolutely objective in the context of individual scientists. There exists an invariant core in all the norms of rationality, accounting for their not being liable to change, as compared with the flexibility of legal norms. The acceptance of and abidance by these norms is of social importance—it affects the aims of the community. A norm only defines the common framework and principles of scientific problem-solving; its application is a matter of professional skills and creative approach to a particular problem. It is of no importance at all, if an agent‘s cognitive abilities do not live up to the requirements of a norm. Such discrepancy can be compensated for by the fact that a scientist carries out work in a conceptual and normative framework established by a respective scientific community. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Decision-theoretic approach and a nonlinguistic theory of norms are applied in the paper in an attempt to explain the nature of scientific rationality. It is considered as a normative system accepted by scientific community. When we say that a certain action is rational, we express a speaker’s acceptance of some norms concerning a definite action. Scientists can choose according to epistemic utility or other rules and values, which themselves have a variable nature. Rationality can be (...) identified with a decision to accept a norm. This type of decision cannot be reduced only to its linguistic formulation; it is an act of evolvement of the normative regulation of human behavior. Norms are treated as decisions of a normative authority: a specific scientific community is the normative authority in science. These norms form a system and they are absolutely objective in the context of individual scientists. There exists an invariant core in all the norms of rationality, accounting for their not being liable to change, as compared with the flexibility of legal norms. The acceptance of and abidance by these norms is of social importance – it affects the aims of the community. A norm only defines the common framework and principles of scientific problem-solving; its application is a matter of professional skills and creative approach to a particular problem. It is of no importance at all, if an agent’s cognitive abilities do not live up to the requirements of a norm. Such discrepancy can be compensated for by the fact that a scientist carries out work in a conceptual and normative framework established by a respective scientific community. (shrink)

There have been persistent philosophical efforts to demarcate the province of science. Fewer attempts have been made to explore whether these demarcation strategies are consistent with the liberal promise of religious neutrality. Within this framework, most liberal political theorists seem to agree that hypotheses suggesting supernatural agency should remain outside the purview of science by principle. In their view, this rule of methodological naturalism is neutral in the relevant sense, since it is silent towards ultimate questions. This paper (...) examines whether this is so, especially when discussing the content of the science curriculum in public education. In this context, advocates of the status of Intelligent Design creationism as a scientific theory argue that MN arbitrarily dismisses a type of supernatural agency that is fundamental to several branches of theistic belief. Drawing on Thomas Nagel’s position, the paper contends that MN assumes a meta-scientific position to which either god does not exist, or god does not intervene in cosmic history. To that extend, MN cannot be reconciled with LPRN. However, this conclusion does not entail that hypotheses that suggest supernatural agency must be included in the science curriculum. Creationist theories may remain excluded to the extent that they fall short of the standards that are required for a proficient scientific account. But, crucially, it will not be their religious character what keeps them out of the classroom, but a series of pseudoscientific wrongs which are non-exclusive to supernaturalistic hypotheses. The paper thus suggests the exploration of an alternative demarcation strategy, one that is consistent with LPRN. (shrink)

Background and Objectives: In this research article, the researcher addresses the issue of creating public understanding in a democratic society about the progress of science, with an emphasis on pluralism from philosophers of science. The idea that there is only one truth and that there are just natural laws awaiting discovery by scientists has historically made it difficult to explain scientific progress. This belief motivates science to develop theories that explain the unity of science, and it is thought that (...) diversity in the way different ideas presented by scientists is a problem that results in time being wasted in search of the most accurate theory. Some scientists perceive a benefit in having a range of scientific hypotheses, though. One benefit that is frequently cited is that scientific diversity as a whole contributes to the development of a democratic society that permits the expression of a range of viewpoints. The road to accountable scientific pluralism is fraught with difficulties, though. Therefore, it is crucial to take into account both pluralism's advantages and disadvantages. This research aims at: 1. analyzing in an epistemological way the interpretation of scientific theories and the progress of science from the perspectives of scientific pluralists; 2. analyzing the relationship between science and democracy in explaining scientific significance and progress; and 3. synthesizing new knowledge on epistemic dependentism and to argue that it plays a significant role in evaluating research issues related to scientific pluralism. Methodology: The research methodology involves the application of documentary investigation along with philosophical discourse. The method of philosophical argumentation involves analyzing the lines of arguments found in relevant academic publications in order to assess their validity and soundness. Main Results: One key argument of the pluralists is the use of the concept of theoretical pluralism, which suggests that scientific knowledge is created from a variety of perspectives according to the social and cultural context of knowledge creation. It is found that part of Longino's argument is based on the negation of rational/social dichotomy. Moreover, her theory is a departure from philosopher of science Philip Kitcher, who advocates the creation of scientific knowledge and the evaluation of scientific progress through the means of democratic society. He explains that these procedures will lead to "well-ordered science" in democratic society. Discussions: The researcher examines the underlying ideas accepted by these two philosophers of science and finds that although their opinions differ, they have common ground in the acceptance of consensus. However, the views of both philosophers still lack weight in explaining the knowledge itself. The researcher argues that the acceptance of pluralism as a way of understanding scientific progress necessarily lends itself to dependentism, which points to interdependence in comparisons of superiority/inferiority between scientific theories. It is undeniable that the situation has emerged all the time, even though the success of the scientific theories being compared to each other comes from different social and cultural grounds of thought. Conclusions: Some popular models of scientific pluralism in the philosophy of science still lack a compelling justification, particularly on the epistemic grounds. By elucidating the epistemic significance of the interdependence of these things, scientific pluralism can be strengthened by incorporating the notion of epistemic dependentism into the analysis of scientific progress. (shrink)

In every domain, the philosopher finds some principle which is unfalsifiable in so far as all experience is interpreted in accordance with it. This principle is tautologous or analytic-within-its domain in that it defines fundamental terms with which it characterizes experiences: Newton’s Laws define “mass” and “the equality of times”; the Principle of the Rectilinear Propagation of LIght defines “light”; the Principle of Evolution defines “adaptation” and “natural selection”; and the Principle of the Conservation of (...) Energy defines “a closed system.” Moreover, each principle is employed as a methodological rule or a tacit imperative to the investigator to interpret experience or to draw inferences in accordance with it. Nevertheless, each principle has empirical content: not only by virtue of its place within its respective domain but also because there are sufficient rules of correspondence which make the statement-form empirically relevant; not only because the principle itself is taken to be true but also because empirical inferences are drawn in accordance with it. To construe these principles as mere counterfactuals would be clearly incorrect. Counterfactuals, as Rescher would characterize them, are “belief-contravening suppositions” because certain beliefs are excluded if one is to be consistent. Although this is certainly true of these principles, the range of beliefs contravened is far larger than those beliefs excluded in mere laws of nature. For, to give up these principles would be to give up explaining the entire domain of experience to which they are applicable. (shrink)

The paper explicates the stages of the author’s philosophical evolution in the light of Kopnin’s ideas and heritage. Starting from Kopnin’s understanding of dialectical materialism, the author has stated that category transformations of physics has opened from conceptualization of immutability to mutability and then to interaction, evolvement and emergence. He has connected the problem of physical cognition universals with an elaboration of the specific system of tools and methods of identifying, individuating and distinguishing objects from a scientific theory domain. (...) The role of vacuum conception and the idea of existence (actual and potential, observable and nonobservable, virtual and hidden) types were analyzed. In collaboration with S.Crymski heuristic and regulative functions of categories of substance, world as a whole as well as postulates of relativity and absoluteness, and anthropic and self-development principles were singled out. Elaborating Kopnin’s view of scientific theories as a practically effective and relatively true mapping of their domains, the author in collaboration with M. Burgin have originated the unified structure-nominative reconstruction (model) of scientific theory as a knowledge system. According to it, every scientific knowledge system includes hierarchically organized and complex subsystems that partially and separately have been studied by standard, structuralist, operationalist, problem-solving, axiological and other directions of the current philosophy of science. 1) The logico-linguistic subsystem represents and normalizes by means of different, including mathematical, languages and normalizes and logical calculi the knowledge available on objects under study. 2) The model-representing subsystem comprises peculiar to the knowledge system ways of their modeling and understanding. 3) The pragmatic-procedural subsystem contains general and unique to the knowledge system operations, methods, procedures, algorithms and programs. 4) From the viewpoint of the problem-heuristic subsystem, the knowledge system is a unique way of setting and resolving questions, problems, puzzles and tasks of cognition of objects into question. It also includes various heuristics and estimations (truth, consistency, beauty, efficacy, adequacy, heuristicity etc) of components and structures of the knowledge system. 5) The subsystem of links fixes interrelations between above-mentioned components, structures and subsystems of the knowledge system. The structure-nominative reconstruction has been used in the philosophical and comparative case-studies of mathematical, physical, economic, legal, political, pedagogical, social, and sociological theories. It has enlarged the collection of knowledge structures, connected, for instance, with a multitude of theoreticity levels and with an application of numerous mathematical languages. It has deepened the comprehension of relations between the main directions of current philosophy of science. They are interpreted as dealing mainly with isolated subsystems of scientific theory. This reconstruction has disclosed a variety of undetected knowledge structures, associated also, for instance, with principles of symmetry and supersymmetry and with laws of various levels and degrees. In cooperation with the physicist Olexander Gabovich the modified structure-nominative reconstruction is in the processes of development and justification. Ideas and concepts were also in the center of Kopnin’s cognitive activity. The author has suggested and elaborated the triplet model of concepts. According to it, any scientific concept is a dependent on cognitive situation, dynamical, multifunctional state of scientist’s thinking, and available knowledge system. A concept is modeled as being consisted from three interrelated structures. 1) The concept base characterizes objects falling under a concept as well as their properties and relations. In terms of volume and content the logical modeling reveals partially only the concept base. 2) The concept representing part includes structures and means (names, statements, abstract properties, quantitative values of object properties and relations, mathematical equations and their systems, theoretical models etc.) of object representation in the appropriate knowledge system. 3) The linkage unites a structures and procedures that connect components from the abovementioned structures. The partial cases of the triplet model are logical, information, two-tired, standard, exemplar, prototype, knowledge-dependent and other concept models. It has introduced the triplet classification that comprises several hundreds of concept types. Different kinds of fuzziness are distinguished. Even the most precise and exact concepts are fuzzy in some triplet aspect. The notions of relations between real scientific concepts are essentially extended. For example, the definition and strict analysis of such relations between concepts as formalization, quantification, mathematization, generalization, fuzzification, and various kinds of identity are proposed. The concepts «PLANET» and «ELEMENTARY PARTICLE» and some of their metamorphoses were analyzed in triplet terms. The Kopnin’s methodology and epistemology of cognition was being used for creating conception of the philosophy of law as elaborating of understanding, justification, estimating and criticizing legal system. The basic information on the major directions in current Western philosophy of law (legal realism, feminism, criticism, postmodernism, economical analysis of law etc.) is firstly introduced to the Ukrainian audience. The classification of more than fifty directions in modern legal philosophy is suggested. Some results of historical, linguistic, scientometric and philosophic-legal studies of the present state of Ukrainian academic science are given. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Standards and Assumptions, the Limits of Inclusion, and Pluralism in PsychiatryBennett Knox*, MA (bio)Let me begin by expressing my gratitude to AAPP, PPP, and the Jaspers Award Committee—I am deeply honored to receive this award. So too let me thank Anke Bueter (2022) and Awais Aftab (2022) for their thought-provoking commentaries. Many of the concerns they bring up are ones that I share, so I am delighted to have (...) a chance to discuss them in my response. I will bring up three central issues in turn: 1) the role of shared standards versus background assumptions, 2) the limits of inclusion, and 3) pluralism in psychiatry.Shared Standards or Background Assumptions?Both Bueter and Aftab reference Longino's "shared public standards" criterion for social objectivity (1990, p. 77; 2002, p. 130), which I did not explicitly discuss in the original paper (Knox, 2022). This was a choice I made partly because in the case of psychiatry determining what constitutes an appropriate "shared public standard" is often not at all straightforward, which points to a potential problem for Longino's view. Namely, in some cases it is a matter of dispute whether some assumption shared within a scientific field should be counted as a "shared public standard" (which Longino requires that there be) or a "background assumption" (which she requires be subjected to critical scrutiny). And it is sometimes unclear how we could effectively adjudicate this type of disagreement.Take the example Bueter uses of "psychiatrists aiming for biomedical explanations of a particular mental disorder, whereas the critics value research that does not assume the existence of mental disorders" (2022, p. 273). A conflict along these lines often does arise between advocates of the pathology paradigm and the neurodiversity paradigm with regard to Autism, for example.1 A psychiatrist working within the pathology paradigm may argue that something like "psychiatry must deal only with mental disorders, understood as pathologies" constitutes a shared standard, and so psychiatric research on Autism must understand it as a pathology. An advocate of the neurodiversity paradigm, however, might argue that this same proposition [End Page 275] is merely a normative background assumption shared among many psychiatrists, which ought to be questioned and ultimately rejected. How might we adjudicate this meta-disagreement about the status of this standard/assumption?Bueter gives some helpful guidance on this issue by pointing to Carrier's requirement that participants exhibit the "epistemic attitude" (2013). I agree that if all participants commit themselves to this attitude, then "…differences in conceptual resources and standards of assessment need not make shared deliberation impossible, and the standards can be a subject of discussion themselves" (Bueter 2022, p. 273). For instance, since this attitude requires some commitment to empirical adequacy, we might search for some empirical evidence that favors one paradigm over the other. But advocates of both paradigms might actually agree on all the empirical facts, and yet still have a deep disagreement about which paradigm's understanding should be accepted as a shared standard. If participants are committed to some common standards and goals, we may often be able to resolve this sort of problem. But there is still a danger that we may arrive at an impasse, with no clear idea how to proceed.Though in many cases scientific experts must be allowed some power to set the standards in their domain (lest we dilute that expertise in ways that Aftab rightly points out would be problematic), I would also caution against accepting that something is a legitimate shared public standard just because the members of a scientific community say so. In keeping with the spirit of Longino's reliance on Quine, none of our shared standards are in principle immune from revision—save perhaps a minimal commitment to empirical evidence and rational argument.The Limits of InclusionMy impression is that Longino's response to the "Nazi problem" presented by Hicks (2011) might be to bite the bullet: her account does require allowing Nazi scientists to participate, and perhaps even cultivating their participation. But if (as seems likely) the Nazi shows themself to be unable to adhere to the shared standards... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Trinity by Thomas Joseph White, O.P.:A Model of Living ThomismSerge-Thomas Bonino O.P."The human being naturally seeks wisdom." From the very first line of the magisterial work we are dealing with, Fr. Thomas Joseph White's 2022 The Trinity: On the Nature and Mystery of the One God, it is all about wisdom. Wisdom was already at the heart of a previous work by Fr. White devoted to the natural (...) theology of St. Thomas, his 2009 Wisdom in the Face of Modernity. Wisdom is more than the accumulation of information or the juxtaposition of knowledge. It is an eminent form of knowledge that, on the one hand, involves the person of the thinker in all its dimensions, intellectual, emotional, existential, and on the other, seeks to understand its object in the light of the most fundamental causes, which are simultaneously the most enlightening and explanatory principles because they are the most universal. The Trinity: On the Nature and Mystery of the One God is undoubtedly a work of wisdom. Fr. White grasps the entire Christian mystery from its Trinitarian source, since, as we shall see, the entire Mystery (in the Pauline sense of the economy of salvation in Jesus Christ as the fulfillment of the Father's benevolent purpose) is at the same time rooted in the eternal mystery of the triune God and makes it known to us as it unfolds its truth and saving power in time.But the sapiential nature of the object studied has some effect on the form of the work itself. Indeed, if Fr. White were not Rector Magnificent of the Angelicum, he would be a magnificent architect, because he possesses a sense of order to the highest degree and knows how to introduce unity in diversity. The presentation of The Trinity is perfectly structured, and therefore very [End Page 461] clear and didactic. Among many other factors that create its unity, I was especially interested in the highlighting of what the philosopher André de Muralt calls "structures of thought": similarities of proportionality between the ways in which authors from even very different theological epochs have treated a problem.1 I am thinking for instance of how Fr. White shows the strong structural similarities between contemporary Trinitarian theologies and the three types of medieval Trinitarian theology (the Franciscan, the Thomist, and the Nominalist). "My claim here is that the modern Trinitarian tradition tends to reproduce various elements of the medieval traditions, … albeit in creative and unexpected ways" (399). So it is a conceptually well-unified work, and where there is unity, there is being, goodness and beauty.The introduction, as I said, is placed under the sign of wisdom. Fr. White takes up there the neo-Scholastic theme of the "three wisdoms": philosophical wisdom, theological wisdom, and mystical wisdom.2 The book's perspective is explicitly that of theological wisdom, as a scientific form of the intelligence of faith, but (we shall return to this point in connection with the place given to philosophy) it puts into practice in an exemplary manner the collaboration, without confusion or separation, between the three wisdoms.3My purpose, of course, is not, nor can it be, to "summarize" the contents of a book of more than seven hundred pages, which manages to be both a comprehensive handbook for higher theological education and a true personal theological essay. I will therefore limit myself to highlighting three partial but significant aspects.(1) The first is the explicit and overt Thomistic character of the book (see 6–7). The Trinity is in fact a vibrant plea in favor of the relevance of the theology of St. Thomas, as indicated by the very last sentence:The Church today can and should still have recourse to the theology of Thomas Aquinas, and to the living Thomistic tradition, as a privileged means of interpreting and advancing her own understanding of the mystery of God.(690) [End Page 462]The Trinity is the demonstration in actu exercito of the truth of this concluding statement. I therefore propose to reflect, in the first part of my paper, on the nature of Fr. White's Thomism, which depends, as we... (shrink)

The primary goal of this monograph is to justify the possibility of building a hybrid theory of normative ethics which can combine ethical consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics. The aim of the book is to demonstrate the possibility of constructing a synthetic theory from ethical traditions that are generally considered to be contradictory. In addition, I propose an outline of an original theory which tries to carry out such a synthesis. I call it Institutional Function Consequentialism. The justification for a (...) hybrid theory of normative ethics requires the resolution of certain meta-ethical issues. I discuss them in part 1.1. After a brief overview of my research aims I consider the answer to the following questions: “What kind of meta-ethical beliefs must we assume for normative ethics?” and "Why should we build ethical theories?". I also discuss the various forms of ethical scepticism, which should be rejected if we develop a hybrid theory of normative ethics. I also describe possible methods of justifying any ethical theory. At the end of part 1.1 I explain that the best method for justifying any ethical theory is the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In parts 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 I analyse three main types of normative ethics which are considered to be competitive: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. Part 1.2 is about consequentialism and its difference between utilitarianism and teleological theories. I also present the main reasons for the popularity of consequentialism. In part 1.3 I define deontology, present its variations and show important benefits that motivate its continuous growth. In part 1.4 I discuss virtue ethics, which is often referred as the viable alternative to consequentialism and deontology. If we want to build any new ethical theory, first we should describe the problems of the old ones. For this reason, in chapter 2 I describe the most important arguments against ethical consequentialism, and in chapter 3 I explain the difficulties of deontology. Critical remarks on virtue ethics are considered in part 1.4. The last two chapters directly concern the main aim of the monograph. Because in chapter 3 I show that deontology suffers from a number of problems such as the paradox of deontology, in chapters 4 and 5 I present only consequentialist versions of hybrid theories. These versions try to avoid the common pleas of utilitarianism and combine the advantages of opponents to utilitarianism. I answer the question (4.1) "What is hybrid consequentialism?" and briefly describe (4.2) the most important examples of hybrid theories by others. I discuss the prerogatives without restrictions idea by Samuel Scheffler, rule consequentialism by Brad Hooker, Kantian consequentialism by Richard M. Hare, David Cummiskey and Derek Parfit and consequentializing procedure proposed by Douglas W. Portmore. In the last chapter I present a new hybrid version of consequentialism that I call Institutional Function Consequentialism. I start from the thesis (5.1) that traditional meta-ethics of analytic philosophy incorrectly defines the main field of its research. Rather than focusing on the philosophy of language and metaphysics it should try to answer one question: “What should morality and ethics be for?”. Therefore I introduce an original methodology for meta-ethics that I call the Functional Model of Analysis (FMA). It is a meta-ethical framework in which the fundamental questions concern the practical functions of normative domains such as morality and ethics and the most rational way of achieving them. FMA is meta-ethical project that (a) explains the persistence of fundamental ethical disagreement among experts, (b) sets the background for explaining or justifying the correct structure of the ethical theory, (c) gives the possibility to create a hybrid theory of normative ethics. In part 5.2 I formulate a generalized argument against various popular theories of normative ethics which states that most of the popular theories are too narrow and one-sided, causing permanent dispute between them. There are many distinct practical functions of morality that are usually based on different types of normative theories such as Aristotelian ethics, utilitarianism, contractarianism and contractualism. In order to remove these conflicts, the correct ethical theory should try to take into account all of these relevant features of moral life. Unfortunately, most ethical theories are mono-functional. This means that their supporters consciously or unconsciously (1) recognize or accept only one genuine practical function, (2) think that this one practical function overrides all other practical functions or (3) try to reduce all practical functions to the one that is chosen. In part 5.2 I present a description and justification of a new normative account that I call Hybrid Function Consequentialism. The formal scheme of this consequentialism can be summarized in the following way: we should act according to some important focal points P1…Pn with contents C1…Cn that are selected on the basis of considerations about which kind of P with C will bring the best realization of the best mix of normative functions F1...Fn. In the next part (5.2.2) I present the new way of “consequentializing” particular theories of normative ethics by applying the scheme of Hybrid Function Consequentialism. As an example of the use of this procedure, I formulate perfectionist virtue consequentialism, contractarian institution consequentialism, contractualist rule consequentialism and consequentialism of salvation. In part 5.3 I formulate an original theoretical concept that I call Institutional Function Consequentialism (IFC). It is a hybrid theory that is based on the previously described Functional Model of Analysis and a reflection on the role of institutions in modern developed societies. IFC claims that we should always act according to some rules, virtues, motives and intentions that constitute the homeostasis of normative institutions whose internalization by the overwhelming majority of each new generation has maximum expected value in terms of the best realization of the equilibrium of the most important practical functions of normative domains. Responsibility and sanctions related to wrongful actions should be dependent on the particular institution whose standards have been violated. IFC has several unique features which are described and justified in part 5.3. It is a form of hybrid consequentialism – it mixes features of consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics. It does this on three different levels: justification, structure and content. The main focal point of the theory is not rules or virtues, but normative institutions. Values to be optimized in the framework of consequentialism are not "happiness", "well-being" or "preferences", but the fulfilment of normative functions. IFC is not limited to the field of ethics only, but it is a meta-normative account of justification for an entire social order which is comprised of a number of different institutions. It also assumes a specific, circular relationship between practical ethics (e.g. research on such important issues as civil disobedience, fair distribution of wealth, philosophy of punishment or autonomy of conscience), and the content of the general rules that may constitute the optimal homeostasis of institutions. It rejects the simplistic belief that moral thinking is based solely on deductive implications from general ethical principles or meta-ethical beliefs. (shrink)

Purpose. Based on the study of philosophical anthropological concepts, to highlight the project of personality in different historical periods, to reveal the meaning of humanistic issues in the postmodern epoch, to identify the essential features of the image of human of the second half of the XX the beginning of the XXI century. Theoretical basis. The methodological basis of the article is the principles of historicism, integrity, objectivity regarding the mastery of the issue of person’s image in postmodernism. The (...) research applied comparative-historical, culturological, analytical, axiological approaches to reveal the problem of individuality in the second half of the XX the beginning of the XXI century. The theoretical basis of the article consists of scientific works in the field of philosophical anthropology, history, cultural studies, and aesthetics. Originality. The author revealed the peculiarities of transformation of the personality model from antiquity to postmodernism, specified the image of man of the second half of the XX the beginning of the XXI century. Conclusions. The analysis of anthropological ideas of Western philosophy of different ages shows the variety of views about understanding the nature of the person, its complexity and ambiguity. In the epoch of postmodernism humanistic issues are of particular relevance, which is connected with social and political uncertainty, domination of mass consciousness, loss of national and cultural identity. The image of a person of this period is deprived of a solid foundation, it is blurred and relative. The destruction of faith in the absolute in the context of the second half of the twentieth century contributed to the formation of confidence in the interdependence of all things, raised the problem of the personality image to a new ontological level. Orientation in the achievements of European civilization, perception of its anthropological experience, intercultural dialogue contribute to the productive use of the achievements of mankind in order to understand the modern person and to form its adequate image. In its essence, postmodernism does not set the goal to realize a retrospection of subject type. However, separating from the cultural memory the excerpts of ideas about a person, by certain styles and directions, it builds on their formations its own eclectic image of the individual. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 12.2 (2004) 102-125 [Access article in PDF] Towards an Ecology of Music Education June Boyce-Tillman King Alfred's College, England Western culture has developed a concept of knowledge as divided into discrete categories, which are reflected in the disconnected subjects of our school curricula and the titles of our university faculties. However, music should be intimately bound up with the wider curriculum, particularly in the (...) areas of personal, social, cultural, moral, and spiritual education. From an examination of the values that are implicit in the musical traditions that dominate music education in Western culture, in this paper I will set out some pointers towards a more ecological understanding of music education, drawing on experiences I have had with music and music education in a variety of settings. I will examine how musicology has concentrated only on certain aspects of the musical experience, ignoring areas such as expressive character, value systems, and spirituality, which are the areas that link the musical experience to the fabric of life as lived beyond the confines of the classroom and academe. This paper seeks to re-establish a notion of connectedness both within the musical experience and also beyond it and through it to other areas of knowledge and understanding. For this I have adopted the term "ecology." To explicate this notion of ecology, I have developed a model which incorporates the values that are both usually associated with Western culture and are subjugated by it, drawing on the experience of music itself. [End Page 102] Ways of Knowing The first of these models deals with the social construction of knowledge. Stan Gooch defines two systems of thought embodied in various cultures in the world. He identifies the favored characteristics of one system (Type A) as activity leading to products; objectivity; impersonal logic; thinking and thought; detachment; and discrete categories of knowledge that are based on proof and scientific evidence. The other system (Type B) favors being; subjectivity; personal feeling; emotion; magic; involvement; associative ways of knowing; and belief and non-causal knowledge.1Gooch suggests that the Western world has chosen to value the first of these systems and neglect the other. This is done by a process of devaluation that can be carried out in various ways. In the Western media this devaluation can be manifested as public ridicule or by simply ignoring those events that reflect Type B values. Community-building activities based on associative ways of knowing and acknowledgement of people's feelings and sensibilities are not reported, while a considerable amount of space is given to the essentially dehumanizing practices of warfare and the dissociative practices of violence and crime. For example, reports and articles on holistic, associative approaches to health based on belief systems that defy rational explanation often end with throw-away comments like "If you believe that, then you will believe anything!" Public figures sometimes indulge in similar practices in their pronouncements by initiating policies to outlaw health practices that cannot be supported by scientific methodologies and appealing to the grounds of public safety. People who wish to embrace the values of Type B can easily be pathologized or criminalized as the dominant culture seeks to reinforce the validity of its Type A values. Academic, medical, psychological, and even sociological research concentrates on so-called objective methodologies associated with scientific ways of knowing and the use of numbers in some shape or form. Qualitative methodologies that collect people's stories are often regarded with suspicion because of the alleged subjectivity of the approach.So the values of Type B have become hidden or repressed by Western culture. I have therefore called the ways of knowing that characterize Type B "subjugated ways of knowing,"2 following the work of Michel Foucault and his notion of subjugated knowledges.3 This paper will concentrate on how the ideas of the subjugated ways of knowing can be used to understand where we are in music education, drawing on my experience in the UK. I shall look at ways of bringing the two ways of knowing-Type A and... (shrink)

The urgency of the study lies in the fact that modern socio-economic development is characterized by a constant updating of the system of scientific knowledge, an intensive increase in the number and complexity of information. In these conditions, the task of highly qualified specialists, who on a qualitatively new theoretical and methodological basis, can analyze the complexities of the modern world deeply and systematically, make optimal solutions for society as a whole and for the economy, in particular rises (...) as the main task of high school. The central problem is the study of methods and approaches of scientific knowledge, through which one can deeply penetrate into the essence of the investigated phenomena and processes of objective reality. The objectives of the study are to analyze a set of methods and approaches that, in their totality, constitute a methodology and organization of scientific research and are useful for social sciences and humanities and behavioral sciences. Methodology - - the doctrine of the rules of thinking in the creation of the theory of science. The methodology is considered as a doctrine of the scientific method of cognition or as a system of scientific principles, on the basis of which the research is based and the choice of a set of cognitive means, methods and means of research is carried out. The result of the study. Philosophical methodology carries out two types of functions: 1) reveals the meaning of scientific activity and its interrelation with other spheres of activity, that is, examines science in relation to practice, society, human culture; 2) solves the problem of improvement, optimization of scientific activity, going beyond the limits of philosophy, although based on the ideological and general methodological guidelines developed by it. Methodology is a conceptual statement of the purpose, content, research methods, which provide the obtaining of the most objective, accurate, systematic information about the processes and phenomena being investigated. Conclusions. The methodology and organization of scientific researches investigates the regularities of the functioning and development of science, the structure and dynamics of scientific knowledge, deep penetration into the essence of the investigated phenomena and processes. (shrink)

On account of the impressive yield of empirical science since the dawn of modern era, theorists of human behavior have sought eagerly to adopt its methodology to explain and predict behavior in the same way that natural science does with respect to natural phenomena. Thus, the positivist principle endorsed the unity of science approach to both the natural and social worlds. Modern social science, in its specific forms of sociology, economics, and so on, confidently embraced the positivist principle. (...) In a short period of time, political economy was transformed into economic science. The goal was to purge the social sciences of their supposedly evaluative content. In due course, the idea of objective scientific truth came to be questioned along with the positivist paradigm. Epistemological relativism _à la_ Kuhn is to be credited with this intellectual shift. But this novel theoretical approach was more easily accommodated by epistemologists of science than scientists themselves. Scientists hardly questioned their methodologies of research and the cognitive field of successful theories. Similarly, in the social sciences, neoclassical economics remained dominant. The neoclassical motto was that economics as science answered only questions of efficiency, not evaluative questions of social justice. The _Human Project and the Temptations of Science_ argues that the model of epistemological unity, at one time embracing positivism, at another time supporting epistemological relativism, is questionable. While empirical science does yield knowledge of the natural world, knowledge of the social world - the world of humans - is necessarily value-laden. Despite the quantitative veneer of neoclassical economics - the dominant paradigm in economics - economic analysis cannot avoid questions of value. The reason is that its foundational concepts, such as rationality and the maximization of expected utility, reflect the necessary value-oriented nature of human behavior. The question posed, then, by _The Human Project and the Temptations of Science_ is what sort of optimal values should humans adopt. (shrink)

The monograph is an English, expanded and revised version of the book Cheshko, V. T., Ivanitskaya, L.V., & Glazko, V.I. (2018). Anthropocene. Philosophy of Biotechnology. Moscow, Course. The manuscript was completed by me on November 15, 2019. It is a study devoted to the development of the concept of a stable evolutionary human strategy as a unique phenomenon of global evolution. The name “An Evolutionary Metaphysics (Cheshko, 2012; Glazko et al., 2016). With equal rights, this study could be entitled “Biotechnology (...) as a result and factor of the evolutionary processˮ. The choice in favor of used “The Evolutionary Metaphysics of Human Enhancement Technologiesˮ was made in accordance with the basic principle of modern post-academician and human-sized science, a classic example of which is biotechnology. The “Metaphysics of Evolution” and “Evolutionary Metaphysics” concepts are used in several ways in modern philosophical discourse. In any case, the values contain a logical or associative reference to the teleological nature of the evolutionary process (Hull, 1967, 1989; Apel, 1995; Faye, 2016; Dupre, 2017; Rose, 2018, etc). In our study, the “evolutionary metaphysics” serves to denote the thesis of the rationalization and technologization of global evolution and anthropogenesis, in particular. At the same time, the postulate of an open future remains relevant in relation to the results of the evolutionary process. The theory of evolution of complex, including the humans system and algorithm for its constructing are а synthesis of evolutionary epistemology, philosophical anthropology and concrete scientific empirical basis in modern science. ln other words, natural philosophy is regaining the status bar element theoretical science in the era of technology-driven evolution. The co-evolutionary concept of 3-modal stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens is developed. The concept based оn the principle of evolutionary complementarity of anthropogenesis: value of evolutionary risk and evolutionary path of human evolution are defined bу descriptive (evolutionary efficiency) and creative-teleological (evolutionary correctness) parameters simultaneously, that cannot bе instrumental reduced to others ones. Resulting volume of both parameters define the vectors of blological, social, cultural and techno-rationalistic human evolution Ьу two gear mechanism genetic and cultural co-evolution and techno-humanitarian balance. The resultant each of them сап estimated Ьу the ratio of socio-psychological predispositions of humanization / dehumanization in mentality. Explanatory model and methodology of evaluation of creatively teleological evolutionary risk component of NBIC technological complex is proposed. Integral part of the model is evolutionary semantics (time-varying semantic code, the compliance of the blological, socio-cultural and techno-rationalist adaptive modules of human stable evolutionary strategy). It is seem necessary to make three clarifications. First, logical construct, “evolutionary metaphysics” contains an internal contradiction, because it unites two alternative explanatory models. “Metaphysics”, as a subject, implies deducibility of the process from the initial general abstract principle, and, consequently, the outcome of the development of the object is uniquely determined by the initial conditions. Predicate, “evolutionary”, means stochastic mechanism of realizing the same principle by memorizing and replicating random choices in all variants of the post-Darwin paradigm. In philosophy, random choice corresponds to the category of “free will” of a reasonable agent. In evolutionary theory, the same phenomenon is reflected in the concept of “covariant replication”. Authors will attempt to synthesize both of these models in a single transdisciplinary theoretical framework. Secondly, the interpretation of the term “evolutionary (adaptive) strategyˮ is different from the classical definition. The difference is that the adaptive strategy in this context is equivalent to the survival, i.e. it includes the adaptation to the environment and the transformation (construction) of the medium in accordance with the objectives of survival. To emphasize this difference authors used verbal construction “adaptiveˮ (rather than “evolutionaryˮ) strategy as more adequate. In all other cases, the two terms may be regarded as synonymous. Thirdly, the initial two essays of this series were published in one book in 2012. Their main goal was the development of the logically consistent methodological concept of stable adaptive (evolutionary) strategy of hominines and the argumentation of its heuristic possibilities as a transdisciplinary scientific paradigm of modern anthropology. The task was to demonstrate the possibilities of the SESH concept in describing and explaining the evolutionary prospects for the interaction of social organization and technology (techno-humanitarian balance) and the associated biological and cultural mechanisms of the genesis of religion (gene-cultural co-evolution). In other words, it was related to the sphere of cultural and philosophical anthropology, i.e. to the axiological component of any theoretical constructions describing the behavior of self-organizing systems with human participation. In contrast, the present work is an attempt to introduce this concept into the sphere of biological anthropology and, consequently, its main goal is to demonstrate the possibility of verification of its main provisions by means of procedures developed by natural science, i.e. refers to the descriptive component of the same theoretical constructions. The result of this in the future should be methods for assessing, calculating and predicting the risk of loss of biological and cultural identity of a person, associated with a permanent and continuously deepening process of development of science and technology. (shrink)

The article discusses the issue of the relationship between ontology and theory of knowledge in the works of Samara philosophers of the late Soviet period. The purpose of the study is to identify the local specifics of Samara philosophical thought by revealing the system-forming significance of the problem of the conditional unity of being and thinking at the level of a distinctive separation between ontological premises and epistemological prospects of methodological reflection in scientific knowledge. The objectives of the (...) article are (1) to establish the characteristic features of the views of Samara philosophers on the general methodological significance of the problem of the relationship between ontology and the theory of knowledge, (2) to demonstrate the methodological relevance of their theoretical principles in the context of the philosophy of science, (3) to substantiate the applicability of the latter for the activity approach to the social interpretation of theoretical results. In the course of the study, the author uses the method of distinctions, formed in onto-epistemology by M.A. Lifshitz, methods of functional analysis, diachronic reconstruction and rationing of the worldview legitimation of a particular subject theoretical entity. Thus, the article reveals the local specificity of the Samara philosophy of the era of developed socialism. The author analyzes the program for optimizing scientific knowledge based on the Borisov–Dukhanin methodology, tied to the materialistic solution of the “main question of philosophy” (i.e., the issue of the relationship of the being and consciousness). The article pays attention to the theory of the style of scientific thinking, proposed by V.T. Salosin, to the methodological foundations and reception of the socio-philosophical theory of M.S. Kvetnoy. The author examines the productivity of the Samara precedent of the interaction of worldview and methodological aspects in philosophy. The article concludes that the specificity of the Samara philosophers’ solution of the problem of the unity of being and thinking on the basis of the Marxist understanding of the the main question of philosophy lies in the fact that it is considered as a methodological problem of achieving logical consistency to express the balance between ontological premises and epistemological perspectives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:846 BOOK REVIEWS Marx's Socwl Critique of Culture. By Loms DUPRE. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. ix + 299. $30.00 (cloth) and $9.95 (paper). Modernity has produced in equal measure material abundance and critical disdain. Its critics may he roughly divided into two groups. Negative critics deny all value to modernity and long for a glorious past or a perfect future; the romanticism of an Othmar Spann (...) or the utopian anarchism of a Mikhail Bakunin provide excellent examples of this type. Of more interest to political theory, however, are the dialectical critics who both affirm and deny the modern project; Rousseau and Marx are the greatest thinkers in this category. Louis Dupre is certainly a critic of modernity. The nature of his complaint remains to he determined. I should begin by saying that Dupre's hook neither condemns nor worships Marx. From the start he sets for himself the unfashionable task of understanding his author before passing judgment on his ideas. Hence, Dupre explicitly distinguishes interpretation from critique and devotes most of this hook to elucidating Marx's ideas. Some readers would perhaps agree with Hahermas that interpretation is always critique, hut I find that Dupre generally maintains this distinction in these pages. I turn first to his reading of Marx. This is not a hook about what might he called high culture, a civilization 's achievements in expressing the human spirit. Dupre relies little on Marx and Engel's scattered reflections on art and society, and he spends relatively few pages on the Frankfurt School and their critique of contemporary popular culture. Dupre is rather a philosopher using Marx to think about culture in a fundamental way. His subject is modernity itself and particularly Marx's criticism of the essentially modern separation of culture and activity. The first part of the hook focuses on Marx's conception of alienation. For almost half a century questions about the unity of Marx's early and late writings have accompanied explications of Entfremdung. Dupre sides with those who see a unity of purpose in the works of the young and the old Marx. Although the idea of alienation appears rarely in Das Kapital, Dupre argues that Marx continually attacked bourgeois society for separating subject and object. Culture thus becomes in capitalist societies an object of exchange value that stands in opposition to its producers, a commodity like all others. The second chapter pursues Marx's belief that alienation must he understood socially and historically. Here Dupre provides a subtle interpretation of Marx's conceptions of base and superstructure. He concludes that Marx rejected the logical extremes of determinism and voluntarism BOOK REVIEWS 847 in history. Instead, the rational will of the proletariat was viewed as the culmination of social development. Yet, as Dupre notes, Marx's belief in the general principle that history is progressive turns on his specific analysis of the spread of capitalism; the generalization about history depends in the end on unproven assumptions about the development of capitalism. Dupre devotes his third chapter to a broad and learned discussion of the role of the dialectic in Marx and Marxist political theory. Marx himself did not provide a complete and clear account of dialectical contradiction; any tension that might lead to the destruction of capitalism fell within Marx's understanding of contradiction. Dupre's conclusion that Marx ultimately founded his dialectical method on an undefended teleology will, I think, ring true to most students of the subject. His discussion of the realist interpretation of the dialectic will occasion controversy largely because Dupre believes Engel's methodological ideas in Anti-Dukring can he legitimately associated with Marx's views. This is an important and damning link, for, of course, the scientism enunciated in Anti-Dukring took Marxism a long way toward both the relatively benign orthodoxy of the German Social Democrats and the horrible monism of Stalin. For Marx, however, the dialectic was more than anything else a way of positing the loss of social and culture unity and of foreseeing their reintegration. His exposition of Marx's atempt to unify economic and social activity contains a thoughtful reconstruction of the concept of value in classical economics... (shrink)

The significance of the research topic is found in the analysis of the problem of thinking, one of the most important abilities of man, which today, in combination with knowledge, appears as a means of creating a new world and man. The purpose of the study is to identify the main content load of thinking in the process of its formation and development in the system of various intellectual and cognitive practices, in the culture of communication, which determines its role (...) in the acquisition and transformation of the surrounding reality - natural, social, spiritual. Objectives of the study - to identify the main directions of development of thinking - logical, philosophical, psychological, to reveal the content of the concept of "productive thinking", its development in classical epistemology and post-classical philosophy of science, which show the polymeaningfulness of the phenomenon of thinking. Methodology of the research - analytical-historical, contaminant, rational-heuristic methods are used, which allows to carry out a systematic analysis of thinking, which acquired a variety of forms and means in the history of philosophy and culture; methods of contemporary socio-philosophical and cognitive analysis showed the relationship of theoretical foundations of thinking with practical principles. The result of the study is the conceptualization of the problem of thinking as an effective intellectual, heuristic, cognitive and theoretical tool in the development of knowledge, objectivized in concepts, principles, and laws. The establishment of the role of thinking in the development of scientific knowledge, in the creation of new paradigms of knowledge is also an important aspect. The result of the analysis is the development of scientific-theoretical and methodological approaches in identifying the heuristic, creative essence of thinking, whose influence on the objective and subjective world causes their transformation and the transition to a new quality. Conclusion - the solution of theoretical problems of intellectual and intellectual activity as a factor in the formation and development of philosophy, culture and creative activity of man. (shrink)

I argue that Kierkegaard has an account of thought experiment. While his contemporary Ørsted’s contributions to the early history of the concept of ‘thought experiment’ have been recently acknowledged, Kierkegaard’s contributions remain largely unrecognized. I argue that Kierkegaard’s method of ‘imaginary construction’ [Tanke-Experiment] aims at identifying underlying invariants in objects of experience. I outline similarities between Ørsted’s pursuit of invariants in the sciences and Kierkegaard’s fictional variations in Repetition. One implication is that Kierkegaard’s view is more scientific and (...) class='Hi'>methodological than is standardly thought by Kierkegaard scholars, who more commonly treat imaginary construction as a literary device. A further implication is that Kierkegaard, like Ørsted, is interested in the success or failure of mental acts, rather than (or in addition to) practical action, as is more standardly associated with Kierkegaard. One original development, beyond what Kierkegaard inherits from Ørsted, is the role of thought experiments as exceptions. An exception is a case that falls outside a rule without breaking it. Exceptions can neither establish a rule nor refute its necessity; however, they turn attention to relevant principles and further determine their content. I highlight similarities between Ørsted’s account of thought experiments and Kierkegaard’s as a method of variation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Foucault’s Renaissance Episteme Reassessed: An Aristotelian CounterblastIan MacleanThere seem to me to be two good reasons for looking at Foucault’s Renaissance episteme again, even though specialists of the Renaissance have given it short shrift and Foucault himself does not seem to have set great store by it in his later writings. 1 The first is that in general books on Foucault accounts of it are still given in a (...) neutral or even approving way, as though neither the concept of episteme (which suggests both that mind-sets or paradigms or epistemes are all-constraining) nor the account of the Renaissance episteme in particular (which is given a predominantly Platonic and hermetic character) require modification, if not refutation. 2 I shall suggest that although in some sense we are all prisoners of our mind-sets, there are ways in which we can escape from this prison 3 ; and with respect to the Renaissance in particular, I shall claim that Aristotelianism, not Platonism, is the appropriate context in which to see the dominant universe of discourse of the day and that this philosophy can be shown to possess the resources for escaping its limitations. To do this I shall [End Page 149] give a brief resume of Foucault’s episteme in general and the Renaissance episteme in particular. Then I shall show first, that the Platonist features which he cites as typical are actively refuted at that time and cannot be described as dominant without severe qualification; second, that the versions of Aris-totelianism widely taught in universities and schools give quite different accounts of these features; and third, that this form of thinking can be shown to have the freedom of self-critique in the very areas in which Foucault chooses to see Renaissance philosophy as both constraining and constrained.In 1969 Foucault produced his “theoretical work” L’Archéologie du savoir as the methodological systematization of his earlier historical writings, L’Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (l961), La Naissance de la clinique (l963), and Les Mots et les choses (1966). In this work man is described as a modern self-invention, fashioned from a particular configuration of knowledge and destined soon to disappear. Foucault’s history of man is a story about the way he constituted himself as a subject and then made his body, his behavior, his reason, and his consciousness the object of his study and a field to be controlled, regulated, trained, and coerced. In this analysis man’s “rationality” becomes not a faculty but an authoritarian straitjacket. What Foucault sets out to investigate is a very fundamental form of ontology but not one associated with profound knowledge; it is a superficial and finite, if largely invisible, field, which is discontinuous, not defined by the agenda of the modern state of any associated discipline, and peopled by “utterances” (énoncés) which are only graspable in their differences and their dispersion. If coagulations of these “utterances” (formations discursives) occur at all, they appear only in the form of consistent relations: the objects to which they “refer” are no more than objectifications whose scientific status cannot be established and whose meaning cannot be recovered by semantic or rhetorical analysis. In calling his previous book Les Mots et les choses, he was being explicitly ironic, for neither the words nor the things of the title have any substance to them: they are not presences but absences. The description made by the historian is remote from his object, indirect, incomplete; it describes a “preconceptual field” in which the “preconcepts” are no more than organizing operators or functions revealing relationships of dependence, processes of validation, contingent theories of truth. The “utterances” which these “preconcepts” inform come together in “discourses” which are neither systems nor mere aggregations of knowledge; archaeological history as practiced by Foucault uncovers not a “mentality” but an “episteme,” which he defines as follows:By episteme we mean... the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, possibly formalized systems.... The episteme is not a form of knowledge or type of rationality which, crossing the boundaries [End Page 150] of the most... (shrink)

This thesis studies the formation of rules of experience in Weberian methodology and its adequacy to scientific validation criteria. It was sought to investigate, in the first part of the work, a proposal of justification for the so-called eligibility criteria. It was also tried to explain the meaning used in this research of the term “reason”, which is based on the theoretical conception of the operative reason exposed by Newton da Costa. Again, with the help of the writings of (...) the same author, we have examined those, so named by him, pragmatic principles of scientific reason. The second section of this study presented the three eligibility criteria, namely: i) the difference between to be (sein) and to ought to be (sollen); ii) the possibility of subsumption of individual action; iii) the construction of concepts as ideal types. In the third part of this work, rationally correct action was justified as an anticipated conjecture for a reflexive operation. However, it was supported that there is a significant difference in relation to the rules of experience when applied for the construction of the agent’s actions and in their use for validating the imputation of causal links between social phenomena. In order to validate the results of the research, the rules of experience must be cleverly designed to be general propositions of the experiment, and for this, the characterization of these rules was based in the so-called “Fermi solution”. Subsequent to this methodological proposal, we pondered how the scientist conducts a thought experiment in the empirical sciences of action and the judgment of objective possibility as a counterfactual proposition was logically structured. Thus, we tried to demonstrate the logical structure of the validation mode of knowledge produced in the empirical sciences of action from Weberian pattern. (shrink)

Insights from social science are increasingly used in the field of applied ethics. However, recent insights have shown that the empirical branch of business ethics lacks thorough theoretical grounding. This article discusses the use of the Rawlsian methods of wide reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus in the field of applied ethics. Instead of focussing on one single comprehensive ethical doctrine to provide adequate guidance for resolving moral dilemmas, these Rawlsian methods seek to find a balance between considered judgments and intuitions (...) concerning particular cases on the one hand and general principles and theories on the other. In business ethics this approach is promissing because it enables decision-making in a pluralist context with different stakeholders who often endorse different or even conflicting cultural and moral frameworks without giving priority to any of them. Moreover, the method is well founded in political theory. A taxonomy of different kinds of applications is developed, and classified according to the purpose, the content, and the type of justification. On the basis of this taxonomy an inventory of 12 recent applications is made. In terms of the purpose and content of the method the applications are rather diverse. Two conceptual obstacles for applying Rawlsian methods are identified, viz. inclusiveness and the communitarian objection that people have to become detached from their personal life. It is found that methodological questions, such as the question how to retrieve the relevant empirical data, are scarcely addressed in the literature. To advance the use of empirical approaches in general, and that of Rawlsian approaches in particular, it is important not only to use empirical data but to use methodological insights from social sciences in order to further advance the field of empirical ethics. It is recommended that stakeholders be given a more active role in the assessment and justification of these methods. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Science Wars and BeyondHarold FrommScandalous Knowledge: Science, Truth and the Human, by Barbara Herrnstein Smith; viii & 198 pp. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005, $21.95 paper.Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism, by Paul Boghossian; 139 pp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, $24.95.Barbara H. Smith, a professor of comparative and English literature at both Duke and Brown, has read widely in philosophy and the sciences. "Scandalous knowledge" is her (...) phrase to describe not the "science wars" (to use the title of the notorious Spring/Summer 1996 issue of Social Text) but the epistemology wars. The chief antagonists in these wars consist, on the one side, of traditional proponents of "classical" philosophy's normative, analytic, justifying, and stable methodologies and proponents, on the other, of such twentieth-century constructivist epistemologies as those of Ludwik Fleck, Thomas Kuhn, Michel Foucault, David Bloor, and Bruno Latour. "The scandal," Smith explains, is classical philosophy's "apparent inability to show how, when and why we can be sure that we know something or, indeed, that we know anything" (p. 1). In her well-executed Introduction, perhaps the best chapter in the book (for its panoramic picture of today's "Theory of Knowledge" conflicts), Smith prepares us for her espousal of constructivist methodologies but first distinguishes between "epistemological constructivism"—a philosophical methodology with an antagonism toward universal rationalities, philosophical "realism," in-itselfness, or [End Page 580] the Correspondence Theory of Truth—and the cultural critique often called "social constructionism," a distinction she acknowledges to be sometimes difficult and hazy. Social constructionism, a highly political activity, is critical of traditional notions of the normative and is engaged with the workings of cultural critics, ethicists, feminists, gender theorists, critics of institutional power, and the "goes without saying" of mainstream assumptions in the treatment of race, sexuality, the "natural" and the innate. In a word, the global conflict she describes is between "reason" (a contested term) and politics (not very contested, except for who and what are political), between the putative eternal verities of thought and the contingencies of daily life. Whereas a "constructivist" sociologist of science would stress the social, collective, intersubjective, institutional aspects of scientific knowledge, questioning "the standard understandings and treatments of such terms as fact, discovery, evidence, proof, objectivity and, of course, knowledge and science themselves" (p. 7), the "social constructionist" would be more likely to focus on class, politics, economics, and culture seen as a congeries of power structures.Smith is particularly distressed by the claims of traditional philosophy when she asks, "May it not be the case that the strict distinctions and divisions of labor that underwrite philosophy's self-honoring role in the study of science and knowledge beg all the relevant questions and, where maintained, insure philosophy's self-confinement?" (p. 10). She sees knowledge as assembled from multiple sources: philosophy, science, social sciences, human animality and subjectivity but she is not suggesting an abandonment of the notion of "truth," just a curbing of the notion of absolute knowledge, or knowledge of things-in-themselves (though even traditionalists believe being known can't be an aspect of a thing-in-itself.) In the process of constructing truths, "reason is not 'abandoned' for 'irrationalism'; scientific knowledge is not 'equated with' myth or ideology; and so forth... but are reconceived as variable gradients rather than fixed, distinct and polar opposites" (p. 11). She prefers to speak of the "superiority" of certain claims rather than their fixed universality via "rationalist-realist-positivist epistemology." As her overall theme, Smith wants to defend constructivist epistemology as the appropriate one for the twenty-first century and, to a slightly lesser extent, the goals of social construction, while deriding as unfounded the attacks against their purported relativism, nihilism, fatuous egalitarianism, and political correctness. Her performance is undeniably impressive but her success is mixed.The stronger first half of the book mounts a plausible defense of [End Page 581] constructivist epistemology. Starting off with a quick survey of "Pre-Post-Modern" relativists from Heraclitus to Wittgenstein, Smith moves on to twentieth-century modernist questioners of objectivist-universalist epistemes, from Heidegger and Einstein to Franz Boas, Edward Sapir, Lenin, and in the arts Woolf, Stravinsky... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Self-Reference:Theory and Didactics between Language and LiteratureSvend Erik Larsen (bio)Semiotics of Self-ReferenceLiterary metafiction constitutes the extreme case of self-referential texts. Therefore we can either discard it as generally irrelevant for the understanding of the cultural functions of texts, or use it as a point of departure for the formulation of both general and basic aspects of such functions. The position taken in this essay will opt for the last (...) possibility, although I know full well that already the term "metafiction" itself inevitably triggers a variety of skeptical reactions. Does it not just refer to some author's self-centered ruminations in the ivory tower? Or a topic for the nerds of literary studies with a taste for theoretical acrobatics? If so, in both cases following metafictional inclinations results in complete isolation from both the context of literature and its readers.However, one may also adopt the opposite position. The metafictional features of literature constitute one of the means by which literature reaches out to its context and also engages its readers. And critical endeavors are not necessarily devoid of anything but their own concepts. They may instead pave the way for methodological and didactic considerations that ultimately make difficult literature more accessible as a cultural phenomenon. Rather than dwelling upon subtle theoretical differences in the definition of what metafiction is, I will therefore engage in a methodological approach: what kind of questions can we put to the texts, and what kind of answers can we reasonably come up with when using metafiction in a methodological and didactic framework?I shall begin by proposing a set of definitions broader than metafiction that will allow me to zoom in on it as a relevant methodological concept that opens for didactic reflections. The notion of metalevel will constitute my starting point. In its broadest sense, a metalevel indicates a position outside a given field of objects or meanings and in relation to it. But rather than relating [End Page 13] to the content of the field in question, the metalevel is supposed to serve as a platform enabling us to observe and evaluate basic principles and function of the field. This is the role of, for example, the theory of science or of epistemology in relation to the particular knowledge of various sciences. We may call it an epistemological metalevel.In a more restricted sense, a metalevel comprises a level in relation to a given sign system — rather than to a given field of objects — from which we can observe and evaluate the basic principles defining the function, range and validity of the sign system. This is the role of, for example, musicology in relationto the acoustic arts, art criticism in relation to the visual arts, medicine in relation to bodily symptoms. We may call it an inter-semiotic metalevel.Finally, in its most restricted sense, a metalevel points toward a level inside a given sign system from which we can refer to this sign system itself,but not in relation to a given field of objects or in relation to another sign system. We may call this level an intra-semiotic metalevel. In this context, language is a unique system, which in this capacity shapes literature as a particular linguistic phenomenon. Only inside the semiotic system of language can the intra-semiotic metalevel have two different functions:The first function is as a science of language, linguistics, which is itself a verbal sign system. In verbal scientific descriptions and arguments we may scrutinize the natural or everyday language as a medium, that is, its basic linguistic structures and principles, without taking into consideration its content, which it may share with other media. Texts and pictures may refer to the same phenomenon even if such references do not overlap completely. All other sciences differ from linguistics in this respect, because they cannot deal scientifically with their non-verbal objects through the same non-verbal medium as that which makes up the object, but need the support of a linguistic metalevel or at least of signs that are linguistically anchored. Even mathematics or other strictly formal sign systems are based on natural languages. We may refer to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment by Frederick C. BeiserJohn W. YoltonFrederick C. Beiser. The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. xi + 332. Cloth, $39.50.Beiser characterizes the methodology of his study as historical and philosophical: historical in placing texts in their own context and in uncovering (...) the intentions of their authors; philosophical in reconstructing and appraising arguments (ix). Both methods are necessary for good historical work. The second is often practiced without the first, to the detriment of philosophy and its history. “A philosopher who reconstructs arguments without the aid of history indulges in mere guesswork and anachronism, measuring the standards of philosophical relevance and importance by the concerns of his own age” (x). Equally, understanding the arguments and ideas of, e.g., seventeenth-century writers, “also involves testing their truth: seeing how they cohere with one another, what their consequences are, whether they follow from the evidence adduced for them, and if they reply to the objections made against them” (x). This splendid study of the role of reason in seventeenth-century religion, science, and philosophy is a fine example of careful textual-historical scholarship with rigorous philosophical analysis.The goal of his study is to tell “the story of how rationalism, in the very specific sense of the sovereignty of reason, arose in seventeenth-century England” (5). Starting with an introduction which discusses such topics as “The Paradox of the English Enlightenment,” “Rationalism in the English Church,” “The Enlightenment and the New Sciences,” Beiser proceeds to detailed presentations and discussions of “The Protestant Challenge” (Chap. 1); Richard Hookers’s defense of reason (Chap. 2); the views of the Great Tew Circle, e.g., Falkland, Chillingworth, Hammond, Hales (Chap. 3); the Cambridge Platonists (Chap. 4); the nature of Enthusiasm (Chap. 5); John Toland and Deism (Chap. 6); and ethical rationalism (Chap. 7).Many of the topics covered have been the subjects of other books and articles. What marks Beiser’s account is the freshness of his approach, the many new insights and suggestions about the tensions between the holders of traditional doctrines and newer challenges. Beiser’s writing is clear, and the issues are carefully presented and analyzed. One of the central themes is the mistake of equating “rationalism with the critique or rejection of religion” (15), of identifying enlightenment with secularization (14). The appeals to reason often emerge from within orthodox religion, whose defenders were trying to cope with their own internal tensions. “Once we consider the Cambridge Platonists’ early reaction to predestination, it becomes clear that it was not Hobbes but Calvin who first posed the danger of atheism for them. For it was Calvin’s theology, and not Hobbes’s materialism, that inspired the fear of God that [End Page 138] they regarded as the source of atheism. In the eyes of the Cambridge Platonists, Hobbes’s materialism was only a false remedy for that fear...” (147). A similar point is made later: “the foundations of a rational theology” in Whichcote “did not arise from any need to combat a creeping Hobbesianism. Rather, it grew up from the inner struggles and torments of the Protestant soul” (165).Equally significant is Beiser’s analysis of enthusiasm, the appeals to divine inspiration rather than to reason or evidence: “We should be aware of accepting the contemporary caricature of the enthusiasts, which portrayed them as zealous and ignorant anti–intellectuals with no cogent or coherent philosophical position of their own” (187). His analysis of the enthusiasts stresses the epistemological nature of their position, rather than the usual theological, ethical, or political dimensions (193). He insists that “enthusiasm is essentially a philosophical concept. Historically, it arose as a response to the problem of the sources and criteria of religious knowledge” (187). The search for criteria is a pervasive feature of Beiser’s study: Luther’s and Calvin’s efforts to draw the boundary between faith and reason (24); Richard Hooker’s failure to “provide an epistemological foundation for his theory of natural law” (67); the need for a criterion to distinguish genuine from false revelation... (shrink)

BackgroundComorbidity between diabetes mellitus and depression is highly prevalent. The risk of depression in a person with diabetes is approximately twice that of a person without this disease. Depression has a major impact on patient well-being and control of diabetes. However, despite the availability of effective and specific therapeutic interventions for the treatment of depression in people with diabetes, 50% of patients do not receive psychological treatment due to insufficient and difficult accessibility to psychological therapies in health systems. The use (...) of information and communication technologies has therefore been proposed as a useful tool for the delivery of psychological interventions, but it continues to be a field in which scientific evidence is recent and controversial. This systematic review aims to update the available information on the efficacy of psychological interventions delivered through ICTs to improve depressive symptomatology in patients with diabetes.MethodsA systematic review of the literature was performed following the PRISMA guidelines and using MEDLINE, Embase, PubMed, Web of Science, PsycINFO, Scopus, and Cochrane Library databases to search for randomized clinical trials of eHealth treatments for patients with diabetes and comorbid depression from 1995 through 2020. In addition, studies related to follow-up appointments were identified. Inclusion criteria were as follows: randomized clinical trials ; patients with type 1 and type 2 diabetes; adult population over 18 years of age; presence of depressive symptomatology assessed with standardized instruments; treatments for depression based on established psychotherapeutic techniques and principles; delivered through eHealth technologies. We did not limit severity of depressive symptomatology, delivery setting or comparison group. Two coauthors independently reviewed the publications identified for inclusion and extracted data from the included studies. A third reviewer was involved to discuss discrepancies found. The PEDro scale was used to assess the quality of the RCTs. No meta-analysis of the results was performed. The protocol used for this review is available in PROSPERO.ResultsThe initial search identified 427 relevant scientific publications. After removing duplicates and ineligible citations, a total of 201 articles were analyzed in full text. Ten articles met the criteria of this review and were included, obtaining very good scientific quality after evaluation with the PEDro scale. The main results show that the eHealth psychological intervention for depression in patients with diabetes showed beneficial effects both at the end of treatment and in the short and long term for the improvement of depressive symptomatology. The methodology used was very heterogeneous. However, all studies were based on cognitive-behavioral tools and used standardized assessment instruments to evaluate depressive symptomatology or diagnosis of MDD. Glycemic control was assessed by glycosylated hemoglobin, but no benefits were found in improving glycemic control. Only four studies included psychoeducational content on diabetes and depression, but none used tools to improve or enhance adherence to medical prescriptions or diabetes self-care.ConclusionsICT-based psychological interventions for the treatment of depression in people with diabetes appear to be effective in reducing depressive symptomatology but do not appear to provide significant results with regard to glycemic control. Nonetheless, the scientific evidence reported to date is still very limited and the methodology very diverse. In addition, no studies have implemented these systems in routine clinical practice, and no studies are available on the economic analysis of these interventions. Future research should focus on studying and including new tools to ensure improvements in diabetes outcomes and not only on psychological well-being in order to advance knowledge about these treatments. Economic evaluations should also be undertaken to analyze whether these treatment programs implemented using eHealth technologies are cost-effective. (shrink)

The purpose is to identify common and distinctive features of concepts and methodology of the problem of subject within different discourses, implicitly or explicitly relevant to the definition of "clinical" mode of human existence. The research methodology combines techniques of discourse analysis and basic principles of historical and philosophical studies. Scientific novelty of the research lies in definition of the clinical philosophical discourse as a special communicative process, where utterances not only focus on disease syndromes, and reveal phenomenology of (...) inner experience of a pathological self, but also structure a certain type of sociality. Clinical discourse represents the space where the patient is treated not as a subject but as an object of disease. Ontology of clinical discourse prevails over ontology of disease, since its structures determine the notion of disease as such. Categorization of the disease, the idea of disease as a phenomenon subdued to professional authority leads to the idea of the need for patient's isolation from the natural environment and removing him to special social institutions. A great while authenticity of the individual had been determined through the testimony of others and manifestation of one's connection to others; then authenticity begun to establish trough the discourse, which individual was able or obliged to deliver about himself/herself. The clinicist doctrines share the intention to reduce the patient's self to its bodily dimension, while ignoring social determinants of psychological deviations. Conclusions of the study are summarized in the following positions: the current clinical discourse is based on the positivist-biological trend in humanitarian knowledge and it is the basis for the production and reproduction of medical and pharmaceutical repressive ideology; philosophical clinical discourse opens the possibility of overcoming the dominance of purely clinicist discourse; such a transformation is possible only after a paradigm shift in understanding the category of subject. (shrink)

For Kant, the main aim of teleology in nature is to identify or to segregate as a particular class of objects certain types of causal systems, specifically, systems of interdependent parts.With the development of physiology as a distinct science at the beginning of the 18th century, the idea of interdependence or reciprocity of parts in a system was well-established as a fundamental principle for the specification of organisms. Kant combined the ideas of teleology and causal reciprocity in his systems-theoretical (...) foundation of organized beings in nature. In the analysis of such systems teleological thinking, i.e. the focus on end states or outcomes, is prevalent because the outcome of each process is relevant for the perpetuation of the system as a whole. Teleological thinking thus plays a methodological role in Kant’s philosophy of nature. Its status ismerely reflective, in that it neither postulates a separate ontological category for living beings nor does it constrain mechanical explanations. But at the same time, teleology is constitutive for a particular class of objects and their scientific study. In Kants Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften kommt der Teleologie eine wesentliche Rolle in der Identifikation und Ausgliederung einer bestimmten Klasse von kausalen Systemen zu: den Systemen aus wechselseitig voneinander abhängigen Teilen. Die Vorstellung der wechselseitigen Abhängigkeit zwischen den Teilen eines Ganzen entwickelt sich mit der Etablierung der Physiologie als einer besonderen Wissenschaft zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts zu einem grundlegenden Prinzip, das der Spezifizierung von Organismen dient. Kant verbindet diese Vorstellung der Wechselseitigkeit mit der Teleologie in seiner systemtheoretischen Fundierung des Begriffs eines organisierten Wesens der Natur. In der Analyse dieser Systeme spielt die Teleologie im Sinne der Konzipierung eines Prozesses ausgehend von seinem Resultat eine wichtige Rolle, weil die Wirkung eines physiologischen Vorgangs für die Erhaltung des ganzen organischen Systems entscheidend ist. Da das System in seiner Einheit und Ganzheit erst in der teleologischen Beurteilung erkannt wird, kommt dem teleologischen Denken in Kants Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften eine methodologische Funktion zu. Die teleologische Beurteilung hat allerdings einen bloß reflektierenden Status, insofern über sie keine neue ontologische Kategorie für Lebewesen begründet wird und die Reichweite mechanistischer Erklärungen durch sie nicht beschränkt wird. Trotzdem ist die Teleologie konstitutiv für die Erkenntnis einer bestimmten Klasse von Gegenständen und deren wissenschaftliche Untersuchung. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Scrutinizing Studio Art and Its StudyHistorical Relations and Contemporary ConditionsElizabeth M. Grierson (bio)Yet art is nevertheless an inquiry, precise and rigorous.—Maurice BlanchotIntroductionThe modern disciplines of art and art history have been going through significant revisions since the 1980s, when the objective domain of knowledge was placed in a contested position by the multiplicity of narratives characterizing postmodern social spaces. Whether there was or was not any disciplinary "crisis" (...) at that time is not at issue here.1 What is of concern is to identify the ways the academy—and specifically the art academy—sought to respond by rethinking disciplinary knowledge and thereby problematizing traditional methodologies of scholarly inquiry. Through the academic privileging of aesthetics and scientific discourses, modern knowledge brought with it a metanarrative appeal to the transcendence of the human spirit through art and religiosity, coupled with the identification of the rational human subject as agent of progress. This discussion is concerned with asking how these metanarratives were intervened or interrogated through art and its study and how those moments of displacement could be identified and analyzed. Ultimately, we may address the question of how discourses of power operate to normalize social practices and silence difference in institutional practices of art and art education. [End Page 111]Crisis in the DisciplinesIn 1982 an issue of Art Journal was dedicated to the theme of the crisis in the disciplines. However, as Donald Preziosi2 points out, if the disciplines of art and art history were deemed by Art Journal to be in crisis, there was only one article (by Oleg Grabar) in that journal issue that addressed this crisis and problematized "the history of the discipline and its methodological prospects for the future."3 In other words, if there was a crisis, and art educators or art historians were feeling it, what constituted the crisis was not yet being addressed. What is of interest is that this was a time when the object of study was under reconsideration and art and its history were part of a revisionist climate of scrutiny and reconsideration. This being so, there was significant expansion to the way fine arts and art history were being approached in the 1980s and 1990s in response to revisionist scholarship. This trend continued to be reinvigorated with the transformations of digital technologies in the 2000s.Art academies of the early 1990s in New Zealand and Australia were starting to grapple with methodological regimes of art history as a discipline in the context of intellectual challenges of postmodernity. Directing these issues to artists and their scholarly needs, educators were opening the discrete academic disciplines to wider intellectual, social, and cultural possibilities of inquiry. Standing before a "great" work of art and proclaiming its greatness had lost its meaning. Jean-François Lyotard had written it thus: "The time is past when we can plant ourselves in front of a Vernet and sigh along with Diderot, 'How beautiful, grand, varied, noble, wise, harmonious, rigorously coloured this is!'"4Threading throughout this discussion is the way one particular art academy was facing this challenge in those postmodernist years of the 1990s. The account tells of processes and principles of pedagogical change, but the implications of this case are not limited to one academy in one location. It was the early 1990s, and the writers of the first degree nominated as "visual arts" in New Zealand were addressing some of the issues of disciplinarity in fine arts and art history. This was the first degree situating what might be called a postmodernist pedagogical approach to fine arts studio and its study. This was at a time when changes in the New Zealand Education Act (1989, 1990) enabled degrees in art to be formally accredited and resourced in tertiary institutions beyond the long-established universities of Auckland (North Island) and Canterbury (South Island). This political move gave opportunity for educational innovation in the pedagogies of fine arts and art history. It was in this context that one independent art school in Auckland, ASA School of Art, seized the moment to work toward a more interdisciplinary notion of practice and theory. Given the opportunity to introduce a more... (shrink)

Topicality of the study lies in the fact that modern rationality as a significant achievement of civilization is simultaneously becoming a real threat to the mankind.Science, undertaking a humanistic mission, at the same time dehumanizes what it was aimed at: the system of values, education and culture.Acquired knowledge is often used to destroy the environment and humanity, and not for progress and well-being.Disruption of the harmony of natural, social and spiritual, underestimation of the anthropocentric dimension of scientific (...) class='Hi'>rationality put Homo sapiens on the brink of being.Recently, in philosophical and social thought, the problem of the ways of forming a new humanistic world attitude and humanistically oriented science and ethical rationality has acquired particular urgency. Analysisoftheliterature. Scientific works of foreign and native authors, who began the study of this problem, are used:R. Andryukaitene, V. Vernadsky, M. Vishnevsky, V. Voronkova, J. Habermas, A. Gritsanov, I. Kasavin, A. Kornienko, K. Korsak, A. Lazarevich, V. Lectorkog, A. Mercier, R. Nugaev, V. Ratnikov, O. Sosnin, V. Stepin, J. Nikitina, M. Ratz, N. Reimers, A. Tolstoukhov, O. Tsira, V. Shvyrev, V. Shuper. Purposeofthearticle –philosophical understanding of the new rationality as a factor in the formation of a coevolution-innovation strategy for themodern world development. Theobjectiveofthestudy isananalysis of the essence of rationality, the characteristics of its main features and role in the formation of a coevolution-innovation strategy for the sustainable development of the mankind. The methodology of the study is based on an interdisciplinary approach, integrates modern practices of philosophy, philosophy of science, epistemology, ecology, ethics and axiology.Comprehension the complex problems of the rational / irrational, evolution / co-evolution, crisis / sustainable development dichotomy and their influence on the humanization of scientific knowledge was encouraged by the principles of historicism and global evolutionism, the dialectical method, methods of abstraction, generalization and conceptualization,as well as the methodology and principles of synergetics. The conclusions : The article studies the essence of rationality and the limitations of its current concept, the causes and features of the crisis of rational awareness of the modern world, due to the dehumanizing role of scientific and technological progress.It justifies the thesis that the situation can be changed by giving the scientific progress of the humanistic direction, forming the anthropocentric dimension of scientific rationality.Humanity must resolve an issue of rationality from the position of the humanistic world outlook and create a new model of science. The basis for solving this problem may be the modern understanding of humanism, which, in turn, will serve as the basis for the emergence of a new type of rationality.It is the rationality based on humanism ethics that can become the core of the co-evolution and innovation strategy for the sustainable development of mankind. Study findings are that it is humanistic rationality, based on co-evolutionary and innovative ethics, that provides global society as a system with a high level of stability regarding the destructive impact of crises,the formation of an innovative orientation, taking into account the need to bridge the potentially dangerous gap between modern civilizations – the scientific, technological and social humanistic ones. (shrink)

“Objectivity” is an important theoretical concept with diverse applications in our collective practices of inquiry. It is also a concept attended in recent decades by vigorous debate, debate that includes but is not restricted to scientists and philosophers. The special authority of science as a source of knowledge of the natural and social world has been a matter of much controversy. In part because the authority of science is supposed to result from the objectivity of its methods and results, objectivity (...) has been described as an “essentially contested,” and even an “embattled” concept. The concept of objectivity has important but contested applications outside of scientific practices as well. Philosophers, psychologists, and theologians debate whether there is an objective basis for ethical claims and demands. Legal scholars debate what it would mean for laws to be objectively derivable from basic assumptions about justice and equality. One aim of this book is to guide readers through the often volatile debates over the nature and value of objectivity. Another aim is to contribute to that debate through articulating the domain-variance of norms of objectivity, and their different functions for inquirers. A better understanding of the underdetermination problem, and of the many ways that "epistemic" and "social" values rub shoulders in the course of inquiry, aids the development of my pragmatic pluralist account of objectivity. (shrink)

Scientists need that scientific descriptions meet request methodological principles. Science knowledge is independent. Methodological principles guarantee autonomic regime of scientific investigations. Methodological principles are requirements the process of descriptive knowledge receiving as result of methodological analysis on best samples of scientific investigations, or methodological standards in history of science. There are mane principles in methodology of science: autonomic scientific investigation, competence, objectivity, expedience, systemness, verification, coherence, unity of methods, integration, differentiation, many-variation (...) of formulizations, modernizations, diversity of chosen types of descriptions, two logical meanings – truthfulness and falseness. (shrink)

A cognitive relation presumes the presence of two terms: the subject and the object. The process of cognition can be realized only in forms characteristic of the subject. However, cognition faces the task of reproducing the properties of the object "in itself," and not in its relation to any given "point of view" of the subject. Lenin singles out objectivity of examination as the first, the starting element in scientific dialectics . This is also testified to by the very (...) meaning of the concept "knowledge": one can only know something that is outside knowledge; knowledge points to some external reality. This is confirmed by the very nature of sensorily elementary forms of cognition: "The luminous effect of any thing upon the optic nerve is perceived not as the subjective stimulus of the optic nerve itself, but as the objective form of a thing outside the eye" . In activity in the realm of scientific theory, the principle of objective reproduction of an object is formulated as a conscious methodological requirement. But are there rationally formulable criteria permitting the discrimination of objective knowledge from all sorts of subjective psychological forms ? (shrink)

The aim of this article is to depict as accurately as possible the ideological conflict between liberal democracy and an insidious present-day version of communism, namely cultural socialism. Obviously, it is not easy to describe the essential relationships between two complex phenomena that evolve nonlinearly within a hypercomplex environment. The ideological systems of liberal democracy and cultural socialism involve both objective and subjective facts, material and immaterial components, neutral and emotion-laden aspects, deliberate and unintentional behaviors, linear and nonlinear effects, (...) and planner-dependent and observer-dependent events. They affect each other and also fall under the influence of different non-political factors that characterize the Euro-Atlantic societies. In order to cope with the complexity of this research object we adopt the methodological dualism and a praxeological approach. The system of discursive liberal democracy can be seen – from a praxeological perspective – as a spontaneous order generated and maintained by three classes of attractors: the attractors of democracy (inclusion, political equality, high level of political participation, and majority rule), the attractors of liberalism (rule-governed political agency and the right to reasonable self-determination), and the attractors of public rationality (publicness, objectivity, verifiability, and revisability). Liberal democracy subsists in any society only if a sufficient number of its members reproduce the corresponding attractors in their political (and non-political) conduct. It is important to note that it is much easier to reproduce the attractors of democracy than the attractors of liberalism and rationality. Maybe because of that the socialists strive to undermine the system of liberal democracy by perverting – in the first instance – the standards of (public) rationality. One of the most important ingredient of cultural socialism is so-called "political correctness", by means of which people are prevented from expressing genuinely and politely certain beliefs or doubts in the public sphere even if they profess the standards of objectivity, verifiability, and revisability. Under the pressure of political correctness the attractors of public rationality tend to wither, the liberal dimension of the political system disappears too, and democracy becomes a sheer tyranny. Choosing a form of political organization is not a scientific, but a socio-political matter. It is not the job of social scientists to recommend or impose political goals in general and a specific political system in particular. However, inasmuch as some goals are set, social scientists can indicate the most appropriate means of meeting them. If the Euro-Atlantic societies still value liberal democracy and want to preserve it, it is important to teach them how to reproduce its attractors and to counteract the pernicious effects of cultural socialism. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that before the introduction of quantum mechanics, determinism was a straightforward consequence of the laws of mechanics. However, around the nineteenth century, many physicists, for various reasons, did not regard determinism as a provable feature of physics. This is not to say that physicists in this period were not committed to determinism; there were some physicists who argued for fundamental indeterminism, but most were committed to determinism in some sense. However, for them, determinism was often not (...) a provable feature of physical theory, but rather an a priori principle or a methodological presupposition. Determinism was strongly connected with principles of causality and continuity and the principle of sufficient reason; this thesis examines the relevance of these principles in the history of physics. Moreover, the history of determinism in this period shows that there were essential changes in the relation between mathematics and physics: whereas in the eighteenth century, there were metaphysical arguments which lent support to differential calculus, by the early twentieth century the development of rigorous foundations of differential calculus led to concerns about its applicability in physics. The thesis consists of six papers. In the first paper, "On the origins and foundations of Laplacian determinism", I argue that Laplace, who is usually pointed out as the first major proponent of scientific determinism, did not derive his statement of determinism directly from the laws of mechanics; rather, his determinism has a background in eighteenth century Leibnizian metaphysics, and is ultimately based on the law of continuity and the principle of sufficient reason. These principles also provided a basis for the idea that one can find laws of nature in the form of differential equations which uniquely determine natural processes. In "The Norton dome and the nineteenth century foundations of determinism", I argue that an example of indeterminism in classical physics which has attracted attention in philosophy of physics in recent years, namely the Norton come, was already discussed during the nineteenth century. However, the significance which this type of indeterminism had back then is very different from the significance which the Norton dome currently has in philosophy of physics. This is explained by the fact that determinism was conceived of in an essentially different way: in particular, the nineteenth century authors who wrote about this type of indeterminism regarded determinism as an a priori principle rather than as a property of the equations of physics. In "Vital instability: life and free will in physics and physiology, 1860-1880", I show how Maxwell, Cournot, Stewart and Boussinesq used the possibility of unstable or indeterministic mechanical systems to argue that the will or a vital principle can intervene in organic processes without violating the laws of physics, so that a strictly dualist account of life and the mind is possible. Moreover, I show that their ideas can be understood as a reaction to the law of conservation of energy and to the way it was used in physiology to exclude vital and mental causes. In "The nineteenth century conflict between mechanism and irreversibility", I show that in the late nineteenth century, there was a widespread conflict between the aim of reducing physical processes to mechanics and the recognition that certain processes are irreversible. Whereas the so-called reversibility objection is known as an objection that was made to the kinetic theory of gases, it in fact appeared in a wide range of arguments, and was susceptible to very different interpretations. It was only when the project of reducing all of physics to mechanics lost favor, in the late nineteenth century, that the reversibility objection came to be used as an argument against mechanism and against the kinetic theory of gases. In "Continuity in nature and in mathematics: Boltzmann and Poincaré", I show that the development of rigorous foundations of differential calculus in the nineteenth century led to concerns about its applicability in physics: through this development, differential calculus was made independent of empirical and intuitive notions of continuity and was instead based on mathematical continuity conditions, and for Boltzmann and Poincaré, the applicability of differential calculus in physics depended on whether these continuity conditions could be given a foundation in intuition or experience. In the final paper, "Determinism around 1900", I briefly discuss the implications of the developments described in the previous two papers for the history of determinism in physics, through a discussion of determinism in Mach, Poincaré and Boltzmann. I show that neither of them regards determinism as a property of the laws of mechanics; rather, for them, determinism is a precondition for science, which can be verified to the extent that science is successful. (shrink)

The article analyzes the concept of «reception», which has recently gained popularity, but remains not sufficiently clarified in studies of the history of philosophy. It is assumed that the concept has become the subject of explicit methodological reflection only in the reception aesthetics (Rezeptionsästhetik) of the Constance School of Literary Studies, where it not only opposes the concept of influence, but is interpreted in the context of a horizontal structure for text understanding. At the same time, it is important (...) to distinguish not only the «historical horizon» and the «horizon of modernity» (Gadamer), but also the «horizon of expectations» in its duality: both coded in the text itself and the life practice of the reader, «inter literary» and «external literary» horizons of expectation. The empirical trend of the reception study, developed later, makes it possible to formulate a number of specific proposals for the methodology of historical and philosophical research, which focuses on the principle of «history of receptions». It is clear that only «reproductive» and «productive» reception categories are relevant to this type of research. In particular, it is an analysis of the institutional prerequisites for the reception, the classification of the source base of that received, the channels (re)broadcast of that received, the specification of the types of scientific communication, the tradition determined positive or negative factors of reception, the status of philosophy in particular historical periods. (shrink)

The present essay takes issue with the idea of moral supervenience. It is argued that this idea is subject to fatal objections that can be brought to light by utilizing the resources of a phenomenological approach guided by demands of descriptive authenticity and rational principles. This critical project is carried out by focusing on Robert Audi’s sophisticated moderate ethical intuitionism which has rightly gained prominence recently. The relevant problems are addressed by comparing Audi’s notion of supervenience with Edmund Husserl’s account (...) of foundation. The latter refers to different types of contents and their relatedness in terms of ontological dependence. Husserl’s notion of foundation challenges the view that higher-order complex intentional unities like evaluative acts could be analyzed in terms of ‘adding up’ purely descriptive and non- descriptive contents. Or : in terms of anchoring moral properties in natural properties. My main thesis is that applying the idea of supervenience to the field of morality involves a circularity problem that undermines the taken-for-granted presupposition of a clear-cut distinguishability of natural and moral properties. Appropriately specifying one’s duties in situations of moral conflicts, according to the idea of supervenience, calls for identifying all those natural properties or facts that are relevant for morally assessing the situation in the first place. This practical task of solving the problem of moral salience, however, cannot be met by referring to pure facts that could be determined in an independent manner, that is, as uninfluenced by those moral perceptions or moral assessments whose appropriateness or permissibility, as assumed, is under consideration. Though we may grant that supervenience delivers a plausible general or abstract picture of how morality can be part of the world we experience, it does not help us properly assessing moral issues in concrete situations. Rather, from a moral-practical point of view, it is a thoroughly suspicious idea. (shrink)

Theory in the traditional sense of the word comprises a deductive system in which hypotheses and their logical consequences are compared with empirical observations. Such comparison is usually regarded as a verification of the theory. The ideal for this conception of theory is a universal scientific system in which the theories of the different scientific disciplines are brought together under the head of a few fundamental principles.Traditional theory and reality belong to two distinct and separate provinces. Insofar as (...) men make forecasts with the help of theory and attempt to change reality, they do not act as theoreticians. Theory remains in the realm of contemplation. Philosophers have frequently made something absolute out of this aspect of theory and, under the title of,logosf or.spirit', have deified the subject of these intellectual activities. It appears in their systems as the creator of the world. What they are really doing, however, is treating the scholar’s activity, which is based on the division of labor in modern society, as an dbjective and independent substance. The real subject of theory in its traditional aspect is not pure spirit but the scholar who performs definite and necessary functions in modem society.If such an analysis is accepted, the philosophical naiveté of the theoretician disappears. He perceives that not only thinking as such, but also its task, its direction, and the structure of the objective world are ultimately connected with human activity and work. Out of the historical process by which men wrest their living from nature, there emerges the separation of material and intellectual work, as well as the structure and the content of the latter. The dogmatic differentiation between the logical and historical premises of science cannot be maintained. The theoretician is himself part and parcel of the subject which forms the real objective world. To take an active part in the direction of the social life of humanity, therefore, becomes a function and a requirement of science.So it is as theory, in the critical sense of the word, that the author regards the type of reasoning which attempts to impart to social life in its totality a rational form and which does not limit itself to working within the framework of the given system of the division of labor. The history of different scientific theories shows theory, with its unity and clarity, in contrast and opposition to the heterogeneity and disharmony of the real world. In the attempts to achieve harmony in society, thought may play an important role.The author analyses the logical structure of critical theory in the performance of such a function. Its content is the description of present society in terms of a development towards a rational form. Critical theory, therefore, always remains intimately linked up with the reality of existence. It needs for its development in each and every instance the existence and assistance of the various scientific disciplines. Its logical structure, however, is more complicated than that of theory in the traditional sense, because it does not regard its objectives as a separate and foreign province. Science, in the traditional sense, even where it formulates developments in nature and human history, regards interests and purposes as given facts and guideposts that are foreign to its own structure. It has a utilitarian character in a directly understandable sense. Critical theory, however, is confronted with the task of justifying its own problems and their differentiation and has to adjust its internal structure accordingly. It does not set up an unchanging system but sees as its purpose the attempt to apply the knowledge that has been accumulated in the traditional theories to the social totality in the direction that critical theory itself indicates.La théorie, au sens traditionnel, est un système déductif. La confrontation des connaissances obtenues par voie déductive avec les faits constatés permet la vérification de la théorie. L'idéal est un système universel de la science dans lequel les théories des différentes disciplines, toutes ensemble, sont rattachées à un petit nombre de propositions premières.La réalité demeure extérieure à une théorie ainsi conçue. Dans la mesure où les hommes utilisent la théorie pour faire des prévisions et pour modifier la réalité, ils ne sont plus des théoriciens. En ce sens, la théorie est purement contemplative. Les philosophes qui ont analysé la connaissance ont souvent porté à l'absolu cet aspect de la théorie et ont fait du sujet des opérations intellectuelles, sous les noms de,Logos4 ou de,Esprit4, le démiurge du monde. En vérité, ils ont ainsi hypostasié l'activité, qui dans la société moderne revient au savant du fait de la division du travail. Le sujet réel de la théorie sous sa forme traditionnelle, loin d'être l'esprit pur, est le savant qui remplit dans la société bourgeoise une fonction nécessaire, bien déterminée.Après cette prise de conscience, la naïveté philosophique du théoricien doit disparaître. Il comprend que la pensée, ses tâches et son orientation, l'organisation du monde qui lui est donné, se ramènent en dernière analyse au travail humain. Le combat de l'homme avec la nature est la condition de l’évolution historique, dans laquelle le travail matériel se sépare du travail intellectuel, il détermine la structure et le contenu de ce dernier. La séparation rigide des hypothèses logiques et historiques de la science est impossible à maintenir. L'activité du théoricien exprime le sujet concret qui ne donne pas forme à la seule théorie, mais aussi au monde réel. Prendre position dans la vie sociale, l'influencer consciemment devient une tâche immanente à la science.Par théorie au sens critique, H. entend la connaissance qui ne se contente pas de construire ses systèmes en respectant les cadres de la division du travail existante, mais qui s'efforce de donner à la totalité sociale une forme raisonnable. Dans l'histoire, la cohérence logique et comme transparente qui caractérise les théories traditionnelles, était en contradiction avec les rapports réels. Dans les tentatives pour rendre la société conforme à l'harmonie de la pensée, celle-ci peut jouer un rôle important.H. étudie la structure logique que présente la pensée lorsqu'elle exerce une telle fonction. Elle a pour contenu la représentation de la société actuelle, envisagée par rapport à révolution vers la raison. La théorie critique forme par conséquent un jugement existentiel unique. Pour développer et justifier celui-ci, elle a besoin, à chaque instant, de la science spéciale. Mais comme la théorie ne conçoit pas les buts qu'elle s'assigne comme extérieurs à elle, elle est logiquement plus compliquée que la théorie traditionnelle. Même lorsque la discipline spéciale construit des évolutions comme dans l'histoire naturelle et humaine, elle est orientée par des objectifs et des intérêts. Elle est, en un sens immédiatement compréhensible, utile. La théorie critique, au contraire, doit justifier elle-même la manière dont elle pose les problèmes, qui d'ailleurs sans cesse se transforment, elle doit modifier en conséquence l'ordre de son développement. Elle ne travaille pas en vue d'un système fixe, mais se comprend elle-même comme une tentative pour appliquer le savoir accumulé par les théories traditionnelles, à la marche historique de l'ensemble social, afin d'exercer une action dans un sens bien déterminé.Aussi bien, cette fonction de la théorie est-elle la réalisation des intentions authentiques de la philosophie idéaliste classique. (shrink)

The objective of the paper is the methodological presentation of the basic principles towards a critical interdisciplinary approach for studying the history of monuments restoration, valid for different cultures. The proposed integrated framework offers the possibility to study and document monuments restoration in various spatial levels e.g. global, continental, international, national, regional, and local. The conceptual and methodological aspects are based on the following fundamental pillars a) the development of science and technology, including relevant history of education, (...) b) the evolution of the restoration philosophy, c) the incorporation of the above in restoration projects at a lower level, d) the infiltration of the above in restoration interventions at the lowest level. The author expects that the above successive and/or parallel levels of scientific branches can contribute effectively to the analysis, synthesis and comparative assessment of the aspects and criteria that influenced monuments restoration timeline. The challenge for the researcher of the monuments restoration history is the adjustment of the whole process to his own –under research- level in such a way as to take advantage of all theinterdisciplinary inputs creating, thus, inventive links and stimulating new information and knowledge. The above are briefly tested in the case study of Thessaloniki, Macedonia, Greece. Such an inductive approach will enable all disciplines to devote their finest efforts towards understanding, documenting and studying monuments restoration history and, thus, support effectively a sustainable future for the world’s cultural heritagel audience. (shrink)