Results for 'normative reasons'

988 found
Order:
  1.  8
    (Hard ernst) corrigendum Van Brakel, J., philosophy of chemistry (u. klein).Hallvard Lillehammer, Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, Rational Intelligibility, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Does Practical Deliberation, Crowd Out Self-Prediction & Peter McLaughlin - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):91-122.
    It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on the offered (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  2. Norms, reasons and reasoning: a guide through Lewis Carroll’s regress argument.Corine Besson - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity.
    This paper concerns connection between knowing or accepting a logical principle such as Modus Ponens and actions of reasoning involving it. Discussions of this connection typically mention the so-called ‘Lewis Carroll Regress’ and there is near consensus that the regress shows something important about it. Also, although the regress explicitly concerns logic, many philosophers think that it establishes a more general truth, about the structurally similar connection between epistemic or practical principles and actions involving them. This paper’s first aim is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  3. Normative reasons as good bases.Alex Gregory - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2291-2310.
    In this paper, I defend a new theory of normative reasons called reasons as good bases, according to which a normative reason to φ is something that is a good basis for φing. The idea is that the grounds on which we do things—bases—can be better or worse as things of their kind, and a normative reason—a good reason—is something that is just a good instance of such a ground. After introducing RGB, I clarify what (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  4. Explaining normative reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Noûs 57 (1):51-80.
    In this paper, we present and defend a natural yet novel analysis of normative reasons. According to what we call support-explanationism, for a fact to be a normative reason to φ is for it to explain why there's normative support for φ-ing. We critically consider the two main rival forms of explanationism—ought-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about ought, and good-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about goodness—as well as the popular Reasons-First view, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5.  7
    Normative reasoning by sequent-based argumentation.Christian Straßer & Ofer Arieli - 2015 - Journal of Logic and Computation 29 (3):387-415.
    In this article, we present an argumentative approach to normative reasoning. Special attention is paid to deontic conflicts, contrary-to-duty and specificity cases, which are modelled by means of argumentative attacks. For this, we adopt a recently proposed framework for logical argumentation in which arguments are generated by a sequent calculus of a given base logic of Argument & Computation ), and use standard deontic logic as our base logic. Argumentative attacks are realized by elimination rules that allow to discharge (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  6.  64
    Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation.Arturs Logins - 2022 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    Reasons matter greatly to us in both ordinary and theoretical contexts, being connected to two fundamental normative concerns: figuring out what we should do and what attitudes to have, and understanding the duties and responsibilities that apply to us. This book introduces and critiques most of the contemporary theories of normative reasons considerations that speak in favor of an action, belief, or emotion - to explore how they work. Artūrs Logins develops and defends a new theory: (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):459-484.
    I defend the view that a reason for someone to do something is just a reason why she ought to do it. This simple view has been thought incompatible with the existence of reasons to do things that we may refrain from doing or even ought not to do. For it is widely assumed that there are reasons why we ought to do something only if we ought to do it. I present several counterexamples to this principle and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  8.  12
    Normative Reasons for Mentalism.Eva Schmidt - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 97-120.
    The aim of this paper is to connect the traditional epistemological issue of justification with what one might call the “new reasons paradigm” coming from the philosophy of action and metaethics. More specifically, I will show that Conee and Feldman’s mentalism, a version of internalism about justification, can profitably be spelled out in terms of subjective normative reasons. On the way to achieving this aim, I will argue that it is important to ask not just the oft-discussed (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. Normative Reasons Contextualism.Tim Henning - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):593-624.
    This article argues for the view that statements about normative reasons are context-sensitive. Specifically, they are sensitive to a contextual parameter specifying a relevant person's or group's body of information. The argument for normative reasons contextualism starts from the context-sensitivity of the normative “ought” and the further premise that reasons must be aligned with oughts. It is incoherent, I maintain, to suppose that someone normatively ought to φ but has most reason not to φ. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  10.  55
    Normative Reasons and Theism.Gerald K. Harrison - 2018 - Cham: Palgrave MacMillan.
    Normative reasons are reasons to do and believe things. Intellectual inquiry seems to presuppose their existence, for we cannot justifiably conclude that we exist; that there is an external world; and that there are better and worse ways of investigating it and behaving in it, unless there are reasons to do and believe such things. But just what in the world are normative reasons? In this book a case is made for believing normative (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Normative Reasons for Love, Part II.Aaron Smuts - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (8):518-526.
    Are there normative reasons for love? More specifically, is it possible to rationally justify love? Or can we at best provide explanations for why we love? In Part I of this entry, I discuss the nature of love, theories of emotion, and what it takes to justify an attitude. In Part II, I provide an overview of the various positions one might take on the rational justification of love. I focus on the debate between defenders of the no- (...) view and the reasons view. Along the way, I discuss the significance of falling in love, the problem of trading up, and the notion of irreplaceability. I evaluate attempts to justify love based on the intrinsic and the relational properties of the beloved. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  12. Normative Reasons for Love, Part I.Aaron Smuts - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (8):507-517.
    Are there normative reasons for love? More specifically, is it possible to rationally justify love? Or can we at best provide explanations for why we love? In Part I of this entry, I discuss the nature of love, theories of emotion, and what it takes to justify an attitude. In Part II, I provide an overview of the various positions one might take on the rational justification of love. I focus on the debate between defenders of the no- (...) view and the reasons view. Along the way, I discuss the significance of falling in love, the problem of trading up, and the notion of irreplaceability. I evaluate attempts to justify love based on the intrinsic and the relational properties of the beloved. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  13. Normative reasons and the agent-neutral/relative dichotomy.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2008 - Philosophia 37 (2):227-243.
    The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  14. Normative Reasons without (Good) Reasoning.Artūrs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2019 - Ethics 130 (2):208-210.
    According to the good reasoning view of normative reasons, p is a reason to F, just in case p is a premise of a good pattern of reasoning. This article presents two counterexamples to the most promising version of the good reasoning view.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15.  98
    Normative reasons: response-dependence and the problem of idealization.Marko Jurjako - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):261-275.
    David Enoch, in his paper “Why Idealize?”, argues that theories of normative reasons that hold that normative facts are subject or response-dependent and include an idealization condition might have a problem in justifying the need for idealization. I argue that at least some response-dependence conceptions of normative reasons can justify idealization. I explore two ways of responding to Enoch’s challenge. One way involves a revisionary stance on the ontological commitments of the normative discourse about (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16.  3
    Assisted normative reasoning with Aristotelian diagrams.Kathrin Hanauer, Tereza Novotná & Matteo Pascucci - 2023 - In Giovanni Sileno, Jerry Spanakis & Gijs van Dijck (eds.), Legal Knowledge and Information Systems. Proceedings of JURIX 2023. Amsterdam: IOS Press. pp. 89-94.
    We design a framework for assisted normative reasoning based on Aristotelian diagrams and algorithmic graph theory which can be employed to address heterogeneous tasks of deductive reasoning. Here we focus on two problems of normative determination: we show that the algorithms used to address these problems are computationally efficient and their operations are traceable by humans. Finally, we discuss an application of our framework to a scenario regulated by the GDPR.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Varieties of Normativity: Reasons, Expectations, Wide-scope oughts, and Ought-to-be’s.Arto Laitinen - 2020 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez, Rachael Mellin & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 133-158.
    This chapter distinguishes between several senses of “normativity”. For example, that we ought to abstain from causing unnecessary suffering is a normative, not descriptive, claim. And so is the claim that we have good reason, and ought to drive on the right, or left, side of the road because the law requires us to do that. Reasons and oughts are normative, by definition. Indeed, it may be that “[t]he normativity of all that is normative consists in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18.  18
    Introduction: Normativity, reasons, rationality.Simon Robertson - 2009 - In Spheres of Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-28.
  19.  87
    Normative Reasons Qua Facts and the Agent-Neutral/relative Dichotomy: a Response to Rønnow-Rasmussen.Jamie Buckland - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):207-225.
    This paper offers a defence of the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons for action from scepticism aired by Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. In response it is argued that the Nagelian notion of an agent-neutral reason is not incomprehensible, and that agent-neutral reasons can indeed be understood as obtaining states of affairs that count in favour of anyone and everyone performing the action they favour. Furthermore, I argue that a distinction drawn between agent-neutral and agent-relative reason-statements that express the salient (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  20. Introduction: Normativity, Reasons, Rationality.Simon Robertson - 2009 - In Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford University Press.
  21.  27
    Defeasible normative reasoning.Wolfgang Spohn - 2019 - Synthese:1-38.
    The paper is motivated by the need of accounting for the practical syllogism as a piece of defeasible reasoning. To meet the need, the paper first refers to ranking theory as an account of defeasible descriptive reasoning. It then argues that two kinds of ought need to be distinguished, purely normative and fact-regarding obligations. It continues arguing that both kinds of ought can be iteratively revised and should hence be represented by ranking functions, too, just as iteratively revisable beliefs. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  22. Norms, reasons and the law.Andrei Marmor - 2018 - In Kenneth Einar Himma, Miodrag A. Jovanović & Bojan Spaić (eds.), Unpacking Normativity - Conceptual, Normative and Descriptive Issues. Hart Publishing.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  52
    Norm-reasons and evidentialism.Frank Hofmann & Christian Piller - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):202-206.
    It has been argued by Clayton Littlejohn that cases of insufficient evidence provide an argument against evidentialism. He distinguishes between evidential reasons and norm-reasons, but this distinction can be accepted by evidentialists, as we argue. Furthermore, evidentialists can acknowledge the existence of norm-reasons stemming from an epistemic norm, like the norm that one should not believe a proposition if one has only insufficient evidence for it. An alternative interpretation of evidentialism according to which it rejects the existence (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  24. Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking Reviewed by.Norm Gall - 1995 - Philosophy in Review 15 (2):127-128.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  11
    Defeasible normative reasoning.Wolfgang Spohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1391-1428.
    The paper is motivated by the need of accounting for the practical syllogism as a piece of defeasible reasoning. To meet the need, the paper first refers to ranking theory as an account of defeasible descriptive reasoning. It then argues that two kinds of ought need to be distinguished, purely normative and fact-regarding obligations (in analogy to intrinsic and extrinsic utilities). It continues arguing that both kinds of ought can be iteratively revised and should hence be represented by ranking (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  26. Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons.Nathan Howard - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (2):97-111.
    I argue that Davidson's conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model of normative reasons for action that is superior to the orthodox conception according to which normative reasons are propositions, facts, or the truth-makers of such facts.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  27. Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?J. J. Cunningham - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3889-3910.
    Here is a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that p in response to a normative reason for them to believe that p? On one style of answer, believing for the normative reason that q factors into believing that p in the light of the apparent reason that q, where one can be in that kind of state even if q is false, in conjunction with further independent conditions such as (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  28.  77
    Normative reasons and full rationality: Reply to Swanton.Michael Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (3):160–168.
  29.  65
    Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason.Susanne Mantel - 2018 - New York, USA: Routledge.
    This book offers a new account of what it is to act for a normative reason. The first part of the book examines the problems of causal accounts of acting for reasons and suggests to solve them by a dispositional approach. The author argues for a dispositional account which unites epistemic, volitional, and executional dispositions in a complex normative competence. This ‘Normative Competence Account’ allows for more and less reflective ways of acting for normative (...). The second part of the book clarifies the relation between the normative reason that an agent acts for and his or her motivating reasons. It refutes the widely held ‘identity view’ that acting for a normative reason requires the normative reason to be identical with a motivating reason. The author describes how normative reasons are related to motivating reasons by a relation of correspondence, and proposes a new understanding of how normative reasons explain those actions that are performed for them. Determined by Reasons engages with current debates from a wide range of different philosophical areas, including action theory, metaethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and ontology, to develop a new account of acting for normative reasons. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  30. Normative reasoning from a point of view.W. J. Waluchow - 2018 - In Kenneth Einar Himma, Miodrag A. Jovanović & Bojan Spaić (eds.), Unpacking Normativity - Conceptual, Normative and Descriptive Issues. Hart Publishing.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Normative reasoning in Spinoza: two interpretations.Jon Wetlesen - 1974 - In der Bend & G. J. (eds.), Spinoza on Knowing, Being and Freedom. Assen, van Gorcum. pp. 162--171.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  23
    Normative reasons and full rationality: reply to Swanton.M. Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (3):160-168.
  33.  45
    Normative reasons and the possibility of motivation.Andrés Carlos Luco - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):47-63.
    This article defends a claim about the conditions under which agents possess normative reasons for action. According to this claim, an agent has a normative reason to φ only if it’s psychologically possible for that reason to motivate the agent to φ. The claim is called‘Williams’s explanatory constraint,’since it’s drawn from Bernard Williams’s work on the topic of practical reason. A two-premise‘master argument’ for Williams’s explanatory constraint is put forward. First, an agent has a normative reason (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  26
    Normative Reasons are not Good Bases: a Reply to Gregory.Euan K. H. Metz - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):723-731.
    In a recent paper, Gregory defends the claim that a normative reason is a good basis for Φ-ing. He claims that a “basis” is what is commonly known as a motivating reason. By “good” Gregory means good in its attributive sense, as something which is good as a kind. In this paper I argue that it is not plausible that normative reasons are motivating reasons that are good as an instance of their kind. I argue that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  31
    Normative Reasons and Moral Reasoning in the Mengzi and the Xunzi.Philippe Brunozzi - 2017 - Journal of Chinese Philosophy 44 (1-2):33-52.
    Given that moral reasoning is directed towards providing well-supported answers to moral questions, our understanding of what it means to be a normative reason that speaks in favor or against a line of conduct largely informs our conception of moral reasoning. This article focuses on this relationship between moral reasoning and normative reasons and tries to clarify how the early Confucian conceptions of moral reasoning we find in the Mengzi and the Xunzi are conditioned by their underlying (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  5
    Normative Reason, Primitiveness, and the Argument for Semantic Normativism.Joanna Klimczyk - 2015 - Etyka 50:73-90.
    This paper sketches a particular line of criticism targeted at Scanlon’s account of a normative reason, which is purported to kill two birds with one stone: to raise doubts about the plausibility of Scanlon’s account of a normative reason and, next, to dismiss Scanlon’s conception of what a normative reason is in the role of an argument for semantic normativism. Following Whiting I take semantic normativism to be the view, according to which linguistic meaning is intrinsically (...). The key argument for semantic normativism is that a word or expression has conditions for its correct use which count, or speak in favour of using it in certain ways and not in others. Specifically, it has immediate implications for how a subject should or may employ that expression. I shall argue that if the favouring format of analysis of a normative reason is not a particularly happy proposal in itself, then it supplies a superficial support for semantic normativism. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Acting for normative reasons and the correspondence relation.Seyyed Mohsen Eslami - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):281-287.
    The possibility of acting for normative reasons calls for explanation, considering that such reasons are facts. Facing this issue, some argue that to act for a normative reason, the normative reason and the reason we act for (i.e. the motivating reason) need to be identical. Others reject the idea that normative reasons are facts in the first place. A conciliatory proposal is that by appealing to dispositions we can simultaneously accept that normative (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38. Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17-26.
    This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  39. The Idea of a Normative Reason.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2003 - In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik. pp. 41--65.
    Recent work in English speaking moral philosophy has seen the rise to prominence of the idea of a normative reason1. By ‘normative reasons’ I mean the reasons agents appeal to in making rational claims on each other. Normative reasons are good reasons on which agents ought to act, even if they are not actually motivated accordingly2. To this extent, normative reasons are distinguishable from the motivating reasons agents appeal to in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  40.  18
    A Theory of Normative Reasoning Schemes.J. Anthony Blair - unknown
    Even with Kientpointer's and Walton's valuable work, we do not yet have a complete theory of argument schemes. A complete theory of argument schemes should contain at least the following: its theoretical motivation, the denotation of "argument" or "ar gumentation" used in the theory, an analysis of the concept of an argument scheme, a theory of classification of argument schemes, a solution to the problem of identifying which scheme is correct, and an account of the grounds of the normativity or (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  41.  30
    Normative Reasoning and Moral Argumentation in Theory and Practice.Ryan Gillespie - 2016 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 49 (1):49-73.
    “Morality is relative to culture” is a descriptive claim; many people in many different cultures have different moral beliefs. When one adopts moral relativism, however, the claim accrues a normative dimension, in that what follows from relativity is the flattening out of rightness, of one moral belief being better than another regardless of culture. But in practice, humans rarely, if ever, actually behave as if certain things or beliefs are not better than others, as evidenced in everything from foreign (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42.  45
    Norms, Reasons, and Anthropological Naturalism.Hans-Johann Https://Orcidorg909X Glock - 2022 - Philosophical Topics 50 (1):9-32.
    This article addresses the two most important areas of potential conflict between inferentialism and naturalism, namely normativity and rationality. Concerning the first, it sides with inferentialism, while at the same time developing a normativist position less vulnerable to naturalistic objections. There is nothing problematic or mysterious about semantic normativity or normativity in general. But one needs to distinguish different types of normativity and recognize that statements of norms can be perfectly truth-apt. Concerning the second area of conflict, my verdict is (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Acting Without Reasons.Josep L. Pradesspecial Issue On Normativity & Edited by Teresa Marques Rationality - 2007 - Special Issue on Normativity and Rationality, Edited by Teresa Marques 2 (23).
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. On the Connection between Normative Reasons and the Possibility of Acting for those Reasons.Neil Sinclair - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1211-1223.
    According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to Φ then it must be possible that A should Φ for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-called ‘internalist’ theories of reasons. In this paper I rebut an apparent counterexamples to Williams’ claim: Schroeder’s example of Nate. I (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  45. Moral realism, normative reasons, and rational intelligibility.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):47-69.
    This paper concerns a prima facie tension between the claims that (a) agents have normative reasons obtaining in virtue of the nature of the options that confront them, and (b) there is a non-trivial connection between the grounds of normative reasons and the upshots of sound practical reasoning. Joint commitment to these claims is shown to give rise to a dilemma. I argue that the dilemma is avoidable on a response dependent account of normative (...) accommodating both (a) and (b) by yielding (a) as a substantial constraint on sound practical reasoning. This fact is shown to have significance for the contemporary dialectic between moral realists and their opponents. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  46. title:• To explain the expressive role that distinguishes specifically normative vocabulary. That is, to say what it is the job of such vocabulary to make explicit. Doing this is saying what'ought'means.• To introduce a non-Humean way of thinking about practical reasoning. [REVIEW]Practical Reasoning - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:127.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Might Desires Be Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Alex Gregory - 2017 - In Julien Deonna & Federico Lauria (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-217.
    This paper examines the view that desires are beliefs about normative reasons for action. It describes the view, and briefly sketches three arguments for it. But the focus of the paper is defending the view from objections. The paper argues that the view is consistent with the distinction between the direction of fit of beliefs and desires, that it is consistent with the existence of appetites such as hunger, that it can account for counterexamples that aim to show (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  48. Are Desires Beliefs about Normative Reasons?Avery Archer - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (3):236-251.
  49. Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.
    In this paper, I defend an account of the reasons for which we act, believe, and so on for any Ф such that there can be reasons for which we Ф. Such reasons are standardly called motivating reasons. I argue that three dominant views of motivating reasons (psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism) all fail to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. I show this by drawing out three constraints on what motivating reasons must (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  50. The limits of progress : normative reasoning in the English school.James Mayall - 2009 - In Cornelia Navari (ed.), Theorising International Society: English School Methods. Palgrave-Macmillan.
1 — 50 / 988