Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious (...) example is normative practical reasoning of the form 'I ought to φ, so I'll φ', where 'I ought to φ' expresses a normative belief and 'I'll φ' an intention. This has at least some characteristics of reasoning, but there are also grounds for doubting that it is genuine reasoning. One objection is that it seems inappropriate to derive an intention to φ from a belief that you ought to φ, rather than a belief that you ought to intend to φ. Another is that you may not be able to go through this putative process of reasoning, and this inability might disqualify it from being reasoning. A third objection is that it violates the Humean doctrine that reason alone cannot motivate any action of the will. This paper investigates these objections. (shrink)
In the first section of this paper I draw, on a purely conceptual level, a distinction between two kinds of reasons: content-related and attitude-related reasons. The established view is that, in the case of the attitude of believing something, there are no attitude-related reasons. I look at some arguments intended to establish this claim in the second section with an eye to whether these argument could be generalized to cover the case of preferences as well. In the third section I (...) argue against such generalizations and present a case in favour of accepting attitude-related reasons for preferences. In the fourth section I present an objection to which I react in the fifth section where I try to strengthen my case for attitude-related reasons for preferences. Finally, I discuss and reject criticisms raised by two opponents of the view defended here. (shrink)
It has been argued by Clayton Littlejohn that cases of insufficient evidence provide an argument against evidentialism. He distinguishes between evidential reasons and norm-reasons, but this distinction can be accepted by evidentialists, as we argue. Furthermore, evidentialists can acknowledge the existence of norm-reasons stemming from an epistemic norm, like the norm that one should not believe a proposition if one has only insufficient evidence for it. An alternative interpretation of evidentialism according to which it rejects the existence of norm-reasons is (...) also presented. Therefore, no reason to reject evidentialism arises in this context. (shrink)
If our mental attitudes were reasons, we could bootstrap anything into rationality simply by acquiring these mental attitudes. This, it has been argued, shows that mental attitudes cannot be reasons. In this paper, I focus on John Broome’s development of the bootstrapping objection. I distinguish various versions of this objection and I argue that the bootstrapping objection to mind-based accounts of reasons fails in all its versions.
After sketching my own solution to the Value of Knowledge Problem, which argues for a deontological understanding of justification and understands the value of knowing interesting propositions by the value we place on believing as we ought to believe, I discuss Alvin Goldman's and Erik Olsson's recent attempts to explain the value of knowledge within the framework of their reliabilist epistemology.
The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism, not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest (...) in justification depends on our interest in truth, we value believing with justification on non-instrumental grounds. A deontological understanding of justification, thus, solves the Value of Knowledge Problem. (shrink)
Two plausible claims seem to be inconsistent with each other. One is the idea that if one reasonably believes that one ought to fi, then indeed, on pain of acting irrationally, one ought to fi. The other is the view that we are fallible with respect to our beliefs about what we ought to do. Ewing’s Problem is how to react to this apparent inconsistency. I reject two easy ways out. One is Ewing’s own solution to his problem, which is (...) to introduce two different notions of ought. The other is the view that Ewing’s Problem rests on a simple confusion regarding the scope of the ought-operator. Then, I discuss two hard ways out, which I label objectivism and subjectivism, and for which G.E. Moore and Bishop Butler are introduced as historical witnesses. These are hard ways out because both of these views have strong counterintuitive consequences. After explaining why Ewing’s Problem is so difficult, I show that there is conceptual room in-between Moore and Butler, but I remain sceptical whether Ewing’s Problem is solvable within a realist framework of normative facts. (shrink)
I start by explaining what attitude-related reasons are and why it is plausible to assume that, at least in the domain of practical reason, there are such reasons. Then I turn to Raz’s idea that the practice of practical reasoning commits us to what he calls exclusionary reasons. Being excluded would be a third way, additional to being outweighed and being undermined, in which a reason can be defeated. I try to show that attitude-related reasons can explain the phenomena Raz (...) appeals to equally well. Attitude-related reasons, however, are weighted against other reasons and, thus, don’t determine a third relation of defeat. On this basis, I voice some doubts about Raz’s conception of exclusionary reasons. (shrink)
One of the guiding ideas of virtue epistemology is to look at epistemological issue through the lens of practical philosophy. The Gettier Problem is a case in point. Virtue epistemologists, like Sosa and Greco, see the shortcoming in a Gettier scenario as a shortcoming from which performances in general can suffer. In this paper I raise some doubts about the success of this project. Looking more closely at practical philosophy, will, I argue, show that virtue epistemology misconceives the significance of (...) Gettier structures in the practical domain. (shrink)
The aim of this paper is to look at Søren Kierkegaard's defence of an ethical way of life in the light of Harry Frankfurt's work. There are salient general similarities connecting Kierkegaard and Frankfurt: Both are sceptical towards the Kantian idea of founding morality in the laws of practical reason. They both deny that the concerns, which shape our lives, could simply be validated by subject-independent values. Furthermore, and most importantly, they both emphasize the importance of reflective endorsement of one's (...) way of life. This endorsement is understood by both not as an exercise of reason but as an exercise of our will without which boredom, anxiety and, ultimately, the dissolution of the self threatens. We can, the author of the paper argues, directly impose Frankfurt's hierarchical account of psychological attitudes on Kierkegaard in the sense that Frankfurt clearly helps us to elucidate Kierkegaard. This interpretation, however, also shows the limitations of any attempt, inspired by Kierkegaard, to justify moral rules without appealing to a religious foundation of morality. /// O propósito do presente artigo é, antes de mais, proceder, à luz da obra de Harry Frankfurt, a uma análise da defesa que Søren Kierkegaard faz do modo ético de conceber a existência humana. Com efeito, segundo o autor do artigo, são várias as similitudes existentes entre Kierkegaard e Frankfurt: ambos se mostram cépticos em relação ao projecto kantiano de fundar a moralidade nas leis da razão prática; ambos negam que as nossas preocupações existenciais possam simplesmente ser validadas por valores independentes do sujeito; acima de tudo, tanto Kierkegaard como Frankfurt enfatizam a importância de uma validação reflexiva do próprio modo de vida. Tanto um como o outro compreendem esta validação não como um exercício da razão, mas sobretudo como um exercício da vontade, sem o qual, na verdade, o sujeito se expõe não só ao tédio e à angústia, mas também, em última análise, ao perigo da auto-dissolução. Neste sentido, o artigo defende a possibilidade de se impor a Kierkegaard a narrativa de Frankfurt sobre as atitudes psicológicas, de modo que, conclui o autor, Frankfurt decididamente nos pode ajudar a elucidar Kierkegaard. Ao mesmo tempo, porém, esta interpretação mostra igualmente os limites de toda e qualquer tentativa, inspirada por Kierkegaard, de justificar as normas morais sem apelar aos fundamentos religiosos da moralidade. (shrink)
Safety, as discussed in contemporary epistemology, is a feature of true beliefs. Safe beliefs, when formed by the same method, remain true in close-by possible worlds. I argue that our beliefs being safely true serves no recognisable epistemic interest and, thus, that this notion of safety should play no role in epistemology. Epistemologists have been misled by failing to distinguish between a feature of beliefs — being safely true — and a feature of believers, namely being safe from error. The (...) latter is central to our epistemic endeavours: we want to be able to get right answers, whatever they are, to questions of interest. I argue that we are sufficiently safe from error (in some relevant domain) by being sufficiently sensitive (to relevant distinctions). (shrink)
I argue that particularism (or holism) about reasons, i.e., the view that a feature that is a reason in one case need not be a reason in another case, is true, but uninterestingly so. Its truth is best explained by principles that govern a weaker notion than that of being a reason: one thing can be ‘normatively connected’ to something else without its being a reason for what it is normatively connected to. Thus, even though true, particularism about reasons does (...) not support the particularist’s general idea that the normative domain is not governed by principles. (shrink)
Keith Lehrer's notion of acceptance and its relation to the notion of belief is analyzed in a way that a person only accepts some proposition p if she decides to believe it in order to reach the epistemic aim. This view of acceptance turns out to be untenable: Under the empirical claim that we don't have the power to decide what to beheve it follows that we cannot accept anything. If reaching the truth is the epistemic aim acceptance proves ill-formed, (...) it is impossible to pursue the aim of truth by believing or accepting something because belief itself is a truth-directed attitude. If the epistemic aim is formulated in a weaker sense, combined with other aims, the danger lurks that accepting a proposition p is in the end loosing any connection with the truth of p. (shrink)
Keith Lehrer's notion of acceptance and its relation to the notion of belief is analyzed in a way that a person only accepts some proposition p if she decides to believe it in order to reach the epistemic aim. This view of acceptance turns out to be untenable: Under the empirical claim that we don't have the power to decide what to beheve it follows that we cannot accept anything. If reaching the truth is the epistemic aim acceptance proves ill-formed, (...) it is impossible to pursue the aim of truth by believing or accepting something because belief itself is a truth-directed attitude. If the epistemic aim is formulated in a weaker sense, combined with other aims, the danger lurks that accepting a proposition p is in the end loosing any connection with the truth of p. (shrink)
Keith Lehrer's notion of acceptance and its relation to the notion of belief is analyzed in a way that a person only accepts some proposition p if she decides to believe it in order to reach the epistemic aim. This view of acceptance turns out to be untenable: Under the empirical claim that we don't have the power to decide what to beheve it follows that we cannot accept anything. If reaching the truth is the epistemic aim acceptance proves ill-formed, (...) it is impossible to pursue the aim of truth by believing or accepting something because belief itself is a truth-directed attitude. If the epistemic aim is formulated in a weaker sense, combined with other aims, the danger lurks that accepting a proposition p is in the end loosing any connection with the truth of p. (shrink)
Keith Lehrer's notion of acceptance and its relation to the notion of belief is analyzed in a way that a person only accepts some proposition p if she decides to believe it in order to reach the epistemic aim. This view of acceptance turns out to be untenable: Under the empirical claim that we don't have the power to decide what to beheve it follows that we cannot accept anything. If reaching the truth is the epistemic aim acceptance proves ill-formed, (...) it is impossible to pursue the aim of truth by believing or accepting something because belief itself is a truth-directed attitude. If the epistemic aim is formulated in a weaker sense, combined with other aims, the danger lurks that accepting a proposition p is in the end loosing any connection with the truth of p. (shrink)
GE Moore vehemently defended the view that what actually happens and not what we, even reasonably, expect to happen, determines what we ought to do. ‘The only possible reason that can justify any action’, Moore writes, ‘is that by it the greatest possible amount of what is good absolutely should be realized’. Moore is an objectivist about reasons and duties: The world and not our view of it gives us reasons to act; the way the world is, and not the (...) way we think it is, determines what we ought to do. In his new book Jonathan Dancy agrees: the world itself has normative significance, reality, as Dancy puts it, is practical. On this, most general level Dancy and Moore agree. But unlike Moore’s, Dancy’s objectivism is not embedded in any particular normative theory. And whereas Moore strikes me as hard-nosed, and his position as sharp-edged, Dancy’s position looks, in comparison, softer and subtler. Contrasting the two positions will help to bring out these features of Dancy’s view. But it will also help to explain the worry that Dancy’s view might have departed too far from its origin. (shrink)
GE Moore vehemently defended the view that what actually happens and not what we, even reasonably, expect to happen, determines what we ought to do. ‘The only possible reason that can justify any action’, Moore writes, ‘is that by it the greatest possible amount of what is good absolutely should be realized’. Moore is an objectivist about reasons and duties: The world and not our view of it gives us reasons to act; the way the world is, and not the (...) way we think it is, determines what we ought to do. In his new book Jonathan Dancy agrees: the world itself has normative significance, reality, as Dancy puts it, is practical. On this, most general level Dancy and Moore agree. But unlike Moore’s, Dancy’s objectivism is not embedded in any particular normative theory. And whereas Moore strikes me as hard-nosed, and his position as sharp-edged, Dancy’s position looks, in comparison, softer and subtler. Contrasting the two positions will help to bring out these features of Dancy’s view. But it will also help to explain the worry that Dancy’s view might have departed too far from its origin. (shrink)
Es wird versucht, die Stellung des Vindizierungsarguments im Gesamtzusammenhang des Induktionsproblems genauer festzulegen, und eine neue Sichtweise dieses Arguments als entscheidungstheoretisches Dominanzargument wird vorgeschlagen. Diese neue Interpretation bewährt sich in der Konfrontation mit alten Einwänden, doch zeigt sich schließlich, daß sich auch gegen diese Form des Vindizierungsarguments ein erfolgreicher Widerlegungsversuch führen läßt. Eine allgemeine Formulierung des vorgebrachten Einwandes erweist sich als stark genug, um auch die dem Vindizierungsargument analogen Rechtfertigungsversuche in anderen Bereichen zurückweisen zu können.
Es wird versucht, die Stellung des Vindizierungsarguments im Gesamtzusammenhang des Induktionsproblems genauer festzulegen, und eine neue Sichtweise dieses Arguments als entscheidungstheoretisches Dominanzargument wird vorgeschlagen. Diese neue Interpretation bewährt sich in der Konfrontation mit alten Einwänden, doch zeigt sich schließlich, daß sich auch gegen diese Form des Vindizierungsarguments ein erfolgreicher Widerlegungsversuch führen läßt. Eine allgemeine Formulierung des vorgebrachten Einwandes erweist sich als stark genug, um auch die dem Vindizierungsargument analogen Rechtfertigungsversuche in anderen Bereichen zurückweisen zu können.
