Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):281-287 (2021)

Seyyed Mohsen Eslami
Tarbiat Modares University
The possibility of acting for normative reasons calls for explanation, considering that such reasons are facts. Facing this issue, some argue that to act for a normative reason, the normative reason and the reason we act for (i.e. the motivating reason) need to be identical. Others reject the idea that normative reasons are facts in the first place. A conciliatory proposal is that by appealing to dispositions we can simultaneously accept that normative reasons are facts and that we can act for them, without accepting the identity of the normative reasons and the motivating reason. After sketching an example of such a view, I mention an obstacle on its way. This view relies heavily on the correspondence relation, to make the action connected to the normative reason via a descriptive belief. It is argued that this is challenging since the correspondence relation might not be suitable to play the metaphysical role needed.
Keywords Normative reasons  acting for reasons  correspondence relation  motivating reasons  theory of action  dispositions
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2021.1908579
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References found in this work BETA

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Philosophy 78 (305):414-425.

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Correspondence and Dispositional Relations.Susanne Mantel - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):288-293.

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