Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430 (2019)
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Abstract |
In this paper, I defend an account of the reasons for which we act, believe, and so on for any Ф such that there can be reasons for which we Ф. Such reasons are standardly called motivating reasons. I argue that three dominant views of motivating reasons all fail to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. I show this by drawing out three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and demonstrating how each view fails to satisfy at least one of these constraints. I then propose and defend my own account of motivating reasons, which I call the Guise of Normative Reasons Account. On the account I defend, motivating reasons are propositions. A proposition is the reason for which someone Ф-s when she represents that proposition as a normative reason to Ф, and her representation explains, in the right way, her Ф-ing. As I argue, the Guise of Normative Reasons Account satisfies all three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and weathers several objections that might be leveled against propositionalist views.
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Keywords | motivating reasons normative reasons guise of the good reasons for which |
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DOI | 10.1111/phpr.12497 |
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References found in this work BETA
Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.
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Citations of this work BETA
Group Action Without Group Minds.Kenneth Silver - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Acting and Believing on the Basis of Reasons.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (1):e12797.
View all 6 citations / Add more citations
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