Are Desires Beliefs about Normative Reasons?

Analytic Philosophy 61 (3):236-251 (2019)
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Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.

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Avery Archer
George Washington University

Citations of this work

Desire, Disagreement, and Corporate Mental States.Olof Leffler - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

The Guise of Reasons.Alex Gregory - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):63-72.
Internalism and agency.Stephen L. Darwall - 1992 - Philosophical Perspectives 6:155-174.
The "Guise of the Ought to Be": A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 352.
Introduction. Reconsidering Some Dogmas About Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York: Oxford University Press.
Accidie, Evaluation, and Motivatlon.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 147.

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