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Are Desires Beliefs about Normative Reasons?

Analytic Philosophy 61 (3):236-251 (2020) Copy BIBT_EX

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Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.

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George Washington University

Categories

Epistemic Normativity in Epistemology

Moral Reasoning and Motivation in Meta-Ethics

Motivation in Philosophy of Action

Practical Reason, Misc in Philosophy of Action

Reasons in Philosophy of Action

Keywords

Guise of Reasons Guise of the Good Desire Belief Normative Reasons Practical Reason

DOI

10.1111/phib.12169

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Author's Profile

George Washington University

Citations of this work

Desire, Disagreement, and Corporate Mental States.Olof Leffler - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

The Guise of Reasons.Alex Gregory - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):63-72.

Internalism and agency.Stephen L. Darwall - 1992 - Philosophical Perspectives 6:155-174.

The "Guise of the Ought to Be": A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 352.

Accidie, Evaluation, and Motivatlon.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2003 - In Christine Tappolet & Sarah Stroud (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 147.

Do desires provide reasons? An argument against the cognitivist strategy.Avery Archer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2011-2027.

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