Results for 'Moral Realism'

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  1.  13
    Postscript: Materialism and realism in metaethics.Moral Realist - 1995 - In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. Routledge. pp. 343.
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  2. Quentin Smith.Moral Realism, Infinite Spacetime & Imply Moral Nihilism - 2003 - In Heather Dyke (ed.), Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
     
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  3.  20
    (Hard ernst) corrigendum Van Brakel, J., philosophy of chemistry (u. klein).Hallvard Lillehammer, Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, Rational Intelligibility, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Does Practical Deliberation, Crowd Out Self-Prediction & Peter McLaughlin - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):91-122.
    It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on the offered (...)
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  4. Not Easily Available 109–114.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Are Question–Begging, Amy Kind, Qualia Realism, Patricia Marino, Moral Dilemmas & Moral Progress - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104:337-338.
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  5.  21
    Aladjem, Terry K. 2008. The Culture of Vengeance and the Fate of American Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. xx+ 246 pp. Alexander, J. McKenzie. 2007. The Structural Evolution of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ix+ 300 pp. Altman, Matthew C. 2008. A Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. [REVIEW]Practical Realism - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4).
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  6.  7
    Undecidable Literary Interpretations and Aesthetic Literary Value.Washington Morales Maciel - 2022 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 22 (65):249-266.
    Literature has been philosophically understood as a practice in the last thirty years, which involves “modes of utterance” and stances, not intrinsic textual properties. Thus, the place for semantics in philosophical inquiry has clearly diminished. Literary aesthetic appreciation has shifted its focus from aesthetic realism, based on the study of textual features, to ways of reading. Peter Lamarque’s concept of narrative opacity is a clear example of this shift. According to the philosophy of literature, literature, like any other art (...)
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  7. Adams, David M." Objectivity, Moral Truth, and Constitutional Doctrine: A Comment on R. George Wright's' Is Natural Law Theory of Any Use in Constitutional Interpretation?'" Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 4 (1995): 489-500. Alexander, Larry, and Ken Kress." Against Legal Principles," in A. Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. [REVIEW]Robert L. Arrington & Realism Rationalism - 2001 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals. Cambridge University Press. pp. 4--331.
  8. Review of John Searle's book: Seeing Things as They Are. [REVIEW]R. Ros Morales - 2017 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (2):128-133.
    John Searle challenges two main stances about the nature of visual experience: The Traditional View and Disjunctivism. He aims to remove the mistakes of these two stances and to present an alternative view which supports Direct Realism. The first part of this review presents the main theses and arguments of Searle's stance. In the second part, it is argued that Searle's analysis of Disjunctivism is not accurate enough.
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  9.  15
    Recognizing Personality Traits Using Consumer Behavior Patterns in a Virtual Retail Store.Jaikishan Khatri, Javier Marín-Morales, Masoud Moghaddasi, Jaime Guixeres, Irene Alice Chicchi Giglioli & Mariano Alcañiz - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Virtual reality is a useful tool to study consumer behavior while they are immersed in a realistic scenario. Among several other factors, personality traits have been shown to have a substantial influence on purchasing behavior. The primary objective of this study was to classify consumers based on the Big Five personality domains using their behavior while performing different tasks in a virtual shop. The personality recognition was ascertained using behavioral measures received from VR hardware, including eye-tracking, navigation, posture and interaction. (...)
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  10. Moral Realism, Moral Disagreement, and Moral Psychology.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (2):161-190.
    This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying (...)
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  11. Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.
  12. Prospects for a Quietist Moral Realism.Mark Warren & Amie Thomasson - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 526-53.
    Quietist Moral Realists accept that there are moral facts and properties, while aiming to avoid many of the explanatory burdens thought to fall on traditional moral realists. This chapter examines the forms that Quietist Moral Realism has taken and the challenges it has faced, in order to better assess its prospects. The best hope, this chapter argues, lies in a pragmatist approach that distinguishes the different functions of diverse areas of discourse. This paves the way (...)
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  13. Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Matthew H. Kramer - 2009 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    In this major new work, Matthew Kramer seeks to establish two main conclusions. On the one hand, moral requirements are strongly objective. On the other hand, the objectivity of ethics is itself an ethical matter that rests primarily on ethical considerations. Moral realism - the doctrine that morality is indeed objective - is a moral doctrine. Major new volume in our new series _New Directions in Ethics_ Takes on the big picture - defending the objectivity of (...)
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  14. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David Owen Brink - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundation of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalistic world view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational life plan. In striking contrast to many traditional authors and to other recent writers in the field, David Brink offers an (...)
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  15. Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
  16.  63
    Moral realism as moral motivation: The impact of meta-ethics on everyday decision-making.Liane Young & A. J. Durwin - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49 (2):302-306.
    People disagree about whether “moral facts” are objective facts like mathematical truths (moral realism) or simply products of the human mind (moral antirealism). What is the impact of different meta-ethical views on actual behavior? In Experiment 1, a street canvasser, soliciting donations for a charitable organization dedicated to helping impoverished children, primed passersby with realism or antirealism. Participants primed with realism were twice as likely to be donors, compared to control participants and participants primed (...)
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  17. Transcendent Moral Realism in Charles Taylor and Classical Confucianism.Andrew Tsz Wan Hung - 2022 - In Qingsong Shen, João Vila-Chã & Yeping Hu (eds.), Thinking with/for many others: in memory of Vincent Shen (1949-2018). [Washington]: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
     
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  18. Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim.Louise Hanson - 2018 - Ethics 129 (1):39-69.
    Many people accept, at least implicitly, what I call the asymmetry claim: the view that moral realism is more defensible than aesthetic realism. This article challenges the asymmetry claim. I argue that it is surprisingly hard to find points of contrast between the two domains that could justify their very different treatment with respect to realism. I consider five potentially promising ways to do this, and I argue that all of them fail. If I am right, (...)
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  19. Moral Realism and the Search for Ideological Truth: A Philosophical-Psychological Collaboration.John T. Jost & Lawrence Jost - 2023 - In Robin Celikates, Sally Haslanger & Jason Stanley (eds.), Analyzing Ideology. Oxford University Press.
    Scholars of ideology in social-scientific disciplines, including psychology, sociology, and political science, stand to benefit from taking seriously the philosophical contributions of Professor Peter Railton. This is because Railton provides much-needed conceptual precision—and a rare sense of epistemological and moral clarity—to a topic that is notoriously slippery and prone to relativistic musing and the drawing of false equivalences. In an essay entitled “Morality, Ideology, and Reflection: Or, the Duck Sits Yet,” Railton (2000/2003) aptly identified the purpose of ideological analysis (...)
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  20. Naturalism and Moral Realism.Michael C. Rea - 2006 - In Thomas M. Crisp, Matthew Davidson & David Vander Laan (eds.), Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 215-242.
    My goal in this paper is to show that naturalists cannot reasonably endorse moral realism. My argument will come in two parts. The first part aims to show that any plausible and naturalistically acceptable argument in favor of belief in objective moral properties will appeal in part to simplicity considerations (broadly construed)—and this regardless of whether moral properties are reducible to non-moral properties. The second part argues for the conclusion that appeals to simplicity justify belief (...)
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  21. Can Moral Realists Deflect Defeat Due to Evolutionary Explanations of Morality?Michael Klenk - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):227-248.
    I address Andrew Moon's recent discussion (2016, this journal) of the question whether third-factor accounts are valid responses to debunking arguments against moral realism. Moon argues that third-factor responses are valid under certain conditions but leaves open whether moral realists can use his interpretation of the third-factor response to defuse the evolutionary debunking challenge. I rebut Moon's claim and answer his question. Moon's third-factor reply is valid only if we accept externalism about epistemic defeaters. However, even if (...)
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  22. Naturalistic Moral Realism, Moral Rationalism, and Non-Fundamental Epistemology.Tristram McPherson - 2018 - In Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. New York: Oxford Univerisity Press. pp. 187-209.
    This paper takes up an important epistemological challenge to the naturalistic moral realist: that her metaphysical commitments are difficult to square with a plausible rationalist view about the epistemology of morality. The paper begins by clarifying and generalizing this challenge. It then illustrates how the generalized challenge can be answered by a form of naturalistic moral realism that I dub joint-carving moral realism. Both my framing of this challenge and my answer advertise the methodological significance (...)
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  23. Compassionate Moral Realism.Colin Marshall - 2018 - Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
    This book offers a ground-up defense of objective morality, drawing inspiration from a wide range of philosophers, including John Locke, Arthur Schopenhauer, Iris Murdoch, Nel Noddings, and David Lewis. The core claim is compassion is our capacity to perceive other creatures' pains, pleasures, and desires. Non-compassionate people are therefore perceptually lacking, regardless of how much factual knowledge they might have. Marshall argues that people who do have this form of compassion thereby fit a familiar paradigm of moral goodness. His (...)
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  24. Moral Progress Without Moral Realism.Catherine Wilson - 2010 - Philosophical Papers 39 (1):97-116.
    This paper argues that we can acknowledge the existence of moral truths and moral progress without being committed to moral realism. Rather than defending this claim through the more familiar route of the attempted analysis of the ontological commitments of moral claims, I show how moral belief change for the better shares certain features with theoretical progress in the natural sciences. Proponents of the better theory are able to convince their peers that it is (...)
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  25. From Moral Realism to Axiarchism.Brian Cutter - 2023 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47:73-101.
    Moral realism faces a well known genealogical debunking challenge. I argue that the moral realist’s best response may involve abandoning metaphysical naturalism in favor of some form of axiarchism—the view, very roughly, that the natural world is “ordered to the good.” Axiarchism comes in both theistic and non-theistic forms, but all forms agree that the natural world exists and has certain basic features because it is good for it to exist and have those features. I argue that (...)
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  26. Moral realism, face-values and presumptions.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):158-179.
    Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three steps. (1) Moral practice has a certain face-value, (2) only realism can vindicate this face value, and (3) the face-value needs vindicating. Two potential problems with such arguments are discussed. The first is taking the relevant face-value to involve explicitly realist commitments; the second is underestimating the power of non-realist strategies to vindicate that (...)
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  27. Moral realism and semantic accounts of moral vagueness.Ali Abasnezhad - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):381-393.
    Miriam Schoenfield argues that moral realism and moral vagueness imply ontic vagueness. In particular, she argues that neither shifty nor rigid semantic accounts of vagueness can provide a satisfactory explanation of moral vagueness for moral realists. This paper constitutes a response. I argue that Schoenfield's argument against the shifty semantic account presupposes that moral indeterminacies can, in fact, be resolved determinately by crunching through linguistic data. I provide different reasons for rejecting this assumption. Furthermore, (...)
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  28. Robust moral realism: an excellent religion.David Killoren - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (3):223-237.
    According to robust moral realism, there exist objective, non-natural moral facts. Moral facts of this sort do not fit easily into the world as illuminated by natural science. Further, if such facts exist at all, it is hard to see how we could know of their existence by any familiar means. Yet robust realists are not moral skeptics; they believe that we do know the moral facts. Thus robust moral realism comes with (...)
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  29. Reductionist Moral Realism and the Contingency of Moral Evolution.Max Barkhausen - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):662-689.
    Reductionist forms of moral realism, such as naturalist realism, are often thought immune to epistemological objections that have been raised against nonnaturalist realism in the form of reliability worries or evolutionary debunking arguments. This article establishes that reductionist realist views can only explain the reliability of our moral beliefs at the cost of incurring repugnant first-order conclusions.
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  30. Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Marcia Baron & Michael Slote (eds.) - 2009-04-10 - Wiley‐Blackwell.
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  31. Externalist moral realism.David O. Brink - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):23-41.
    SOME THINK THAT MORAL REALISTS CANNOT RECOGNIZE THE PRACTICAL OR ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY AND SO REJECT MORAL REALISM. THIS FORM OF ANTI-REALISM DEPENDS UPON AN INTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY. BUT AN EXTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY IS MORE PLAUSIBLE AND ALLOWS THE REALIST A SENSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY. CONSIDERATION OF THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF MORALITY, THEREFORE, DOES NOT UNDERMINE AND, INDEED, SUPPORTS MORAL REALISM.
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  32. Moral Realism and the Incompletability of Morality.Melis Erdur - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (2):227-237.
    If what we want from moral inquiry were the obtainment of objective moral truths, as moral realism claims it is, then there would be nothing morally unsatisfactory or lacking in a situation, in which we somehow had access to all moral truths, and were fundamentally finished with morality. In fact, that seems to be the realists’ conception of moral heaven. In this essay, however, I argue that some sort of moral wakefulness – that (...)
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  33. Meaning, moral realism, and the importance of morality.Michael Zhao - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):653-666.
    Many philosophers have suspected that the normative importance of morality depends on moral realism. In this paper, I defend a version of this suspicion: I argue that if teleological forms of moral realism, those that posit an objective purpose to human life, are true, then we gain a distinctive kind of reason to do what is morally required. I argue for this by showing that if these forms of realism are true, then doing what is (...)
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  34. Moral Realism without Convergence.Sarah McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):59-90.
    It is sometimes claimed that if moral realism is true, then rational and informed individuals would not disagree about morality. According to this line of thought, the moral realist is committed to an extremely substantive convergence thesis, one that might very well turn out to be false. Although this idea has been accepted by prominent moral realists as well as by antirealists, I argue that we have no reason to think that it is true, and that (...)
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  35. Moral Realism and Semantic Plasticity.David Manley - manuscript
    Are moral terms semantically plastic—that is, would very slight changes in our patterns of use have shifted their meanings? This is a delicate question for moral realists. A 'yes' answer seems to conflict with the sorts of intuitions that support realism; but a 'no' answer seems to require a semantics that involves hefty metaphysical commitments. This tension can be illustrated by thinking about how standard accounts of vagueness can be applied to the case of moral terms, (...)
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  36. Moral Realism by Other Means: The Hybrid Nature of Kant’s Practical Rationalism.Stefano Bacin - 2017 - In Elke Elisabeth Schmidt & Robinson dos Santos (eds.), Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 155-178.
    After qualifying in which sense ‘realism’ can be applied to eighteenth-century views about morality, I argue that while Kant shares with traditional moral realists several fundamental claims about morality, he holds that those claims must be argued for in a radically different way. Drawing on his diagnosis of the serious weaknesses of traditional moral realism, Kant proposes a novel approach that revolves around a hybrid view about moral obligation. Since his solution to that central issue (...)
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  37. Moral Realism and Twin Earth.Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis & Angus Dawson - 1999 - Facta Philosophica 1 (1):135-165.
    Hilary Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment has come to have an enormous impact on contemporary philosophical thought. But while most of the discussion has taken place within the context of the philosophy of mind and language, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons (H8cT) have defended the intriguing suggestion that a variation on the original thought experiment has important consequences for ethics.' In a series of papers, they' ve developed the idea of a Moral Twin Earth and have argued that its (...)
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  38. Revisiting Folk Moral Realism.Thomas Pölzler - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):455-476.
    Moral realists believe that there are objective moral truths. According to one of the most prominent arguments in favour of this view, ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming, and we have therefore prima facie reason to believe that realism is true. Some proponents of this argument have claimed that the hypothesis that ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming is supported by psychological research on folk metaethics. While most recent research has been thought to contradict this claim, four (...)
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  39.  5
    Heidegger and moral realism.Anoop Gupta - 2015 - Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications.
    Is it possible to found a Heideggerian ethic around the notion of a relationship to being (Bezug zum Seyn)? Going against much of the Western tradition, Gupta considers if the being-relationship could result in a feeling or mystical experience that is the basis of ethics. Along the way, such an affective and embodied approach to ethics brings us into dialogue with a range of thinkers, such as Kant and Schweitzer. Further, it is suggested that an environmental philosophy is consistent with (...)
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  40.  39
    Plato's Moral Realism.Lloyd P. Gerson - 2023 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Plato's moral realism rests on the Idea of the Good, the unhypothetical first principle of all. It is this, as Plato says, that makes just things useful and beneficial. That Plato makes the first principle of all the Idea of the Good sets his approach apart from that of virtually every other philosopher. This fact has been occluded by later Christian Platonists who tried to identify the Good with the God of scripture. But for Plato, theology, though important, (...)
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  41. Moral Realism and Philosophical Angst.Joshua Blanchard - 2020 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15.
    This paper defends pro-realism, the view that it is better if moral realism is true rather than any of its rivals. After offering an account of philosophical angst, I make three general arguments. The first targets nihilism: in securing the possibility of moral justification and vindication in objecting to certain harms, moral realism secures something that is non-morally valuable and even essential to the meaning and intelligibility of our lives. The second argument targets antirealism: (...)
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  42.  75
    The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism.Terence Cuneo - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Many philosophers hold antirealist views about morality, according to which moral facts or truths do not exist. Does this imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic facts, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. By means of an analogy between moral and epistemic facts, Terence Cuneo presents a compelling defence of robust realism in ethics. In so doing, he engages with a range of antirealist positions in epistemology such (...)
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  43. Evolutionary Moral Realism.John Collier & Michael Stingl - 2013 - Biological Theory 7 (3):218-226.
    Evolutionary moral realism is the view that there are moral values with roots in evolution that are both specifically moral and exist independently of human belief systems. In beginning to sketch the outlines of such a view, we examine moral goods like fairness and empathetic caring as valuable and real aspects of the environments of species that are intelligent and social, or at least developing along an evolutionary trajectory that could lead to a level of (...)
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  44.  59
    Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.Robert Shaver - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):458.
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  45. Five Kinds of Epistemic Arguments Against Robust Moral Realism.Joshua Schechter - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 345-369.
    This chapter discusses epistemic objections to non-naturalist moral realism. The goal of the chapter is to determine which objections are pressing and which objections can safely be dismissed. The chapter examines five families of objections: (i) one involving necessary conditions on knowledge, (ii) one involving the idea that the causal history of our moral beliefs reflects the significant impact of irrelevant influences, (iii) one relying on the idea that moral truths do not play a role in (...)
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  46. Moral Realism and Arbitrariness.Jason Kawall - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):109-129.
    In this paper I argue (i) that choosing to abide by realist moral norms would be as arbitrary as choosing to abide by the mere preferences of a God (a difficulty akin to the Euthyphro dilemma raised for divine command theorists); in both cases we would lack reason to prefer these standards to alternative codes of conduct. I further develop this general line of thought by arguing in particular (ii) that we would lack any noncircular justification to concern ourselves (...)
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  47.  45
    Moral Realism without Moral Metaphysics.Andrew Sepielli - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11.
    This chapter explores the possibility of a metaphysically deflationist, explanatorily robust version of moral realism. The view has no truck with inquiries into the naturalness, constitution, or reducibility of moral properties, and purports to dissolve, rather than solve, the “placement problem.” But it offers a general explanation from outside the ethical domain of how we can accurately represent the world in moral thought and talk; this distinguishes it from some versions of expressivism and constitutivism, and from (...)
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  48.  77
    Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson.Alexander Miller - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):337-341.
    In chapter 8 of Miller 2003, I argued against the idea that Jackson and Pettit's notion of program explanation might help Sturgeon's non-reductive naturalist version of moral realism respond to the explanatory challenge posed by Harman. In a recent paper in the AJP[Nelson 2006, Mark Nelson has attempted to defend the idea that program explanation might prove useful to Sturgeon in replying to Harman. In this note, I suggest that Nelson's argument fails.
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  49. Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness.David O. Brink - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):111 – 125.
  50. Moral Realism and Two-Dimensional Semantics.Tim Henning - 2011 - Ethics 121 (4):717-748.
    Moral realists can, and should, allow that the truth-conditional content of moral judgments is in part attitudinal. I develop a two-dimensional semantics that embraces attitudinal content while preserving realist convictions about the independence of moral facts from our attitudes. Relative to worlds “considered as counterfactual,” moral terms rigidly track objective, response-independent properties. But relative to different ways the actual world turns out to be, they nonrigidly track whatever properties turn out to be the objects of our (...)
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