In his defense of innateness in New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Leibniz attributes innateness to concepts and principles which do not originate from the senses rather than to the ideas that we are born with. He argues that the innate concepts and principles can be known in two ways: through reason or natural light (necessary truths), and through instincts (other innate truths and principles). In this paper I will show how theoretical and moral reasoning differ from each other in (...) Leibniz, and compare moral reasoning and instincts as sources of knowledge in his practical philosophy. As the practical instincts are closely related to pleasure and passions, which are by nature cognitive, my emphasis will be on the affective character of instinctive moral action and especially deliberation which leads to moral action. I will argue that inclinations arising from moral instinct, which lead us to pleasure while avoiding sorrow, can direct our moral action and sometimes anticipate reasoning when conclusions are not readily available. Acting by will, which is related to moral reasoning, and acting by instincts can lead us to the same moral knowledge independently, but they can also complement each other. To illustrate the two alternative ways to reach moral knowledge, I will discuss the case of happiness, which is the goal of all human moral action for Leibniz. (shrink)

In this classic, the world's expert on language and mind lucidly explains everything you always wanted to know about language: how it works, how children learn it, how it changes, how the brain computes it, and how it evolved. With deft use of examples of humor and wordplay, Steven Pinker weaves our vast knowledge of language into a compelling story: language is a human instinct, wired into our brains by evolution. The Language Instinct received the William James (...) Book Prize from the American Psychological Association and the Public Interest Award from the Linguistics Society of America. This edition includes an update on advances in the science of language since The Language Instinct was first published. (shrink)

An exploration of the scientific mindset—such character virtues as curiosity, veracity, attentiveness, and humility to evidence—and its importance for science, democracy, and human flourishing. Exemplary scientists have a characteristic way of viewing the world and their work: their mindset and methods all aim at discovering truths about nature. In An Instinct for Truth, Robert Pennock explores this scientific mindset and argues that what Charles Darwin called “an instinct for truth, knowledge, and discovery” has a tacit moral structure—that (...) it is important not only for scientific excellence and integrity but also for democracy and human flourishing. In an era of “post-truth,” the scientific drive to discover empirical truths has a special value. Taking a virtue-theoretic perspective, Pennock explores curiosity, veracity, skepticism, humility to evidence, and other scientific virtues and vices. He explains that curiosity is the most distinctive element of the scientific character, by which other norms are shaped; discusses the passionate nature of scientific attentiveness; and calls for science education not only to teach scientific findings and methods but also to nurture the scientific mindset and its core values. Drawing on historical sources as well as a sociological study of more than a thousand scientists, Pennock's philosophical account is grounded in values that scientists themselves recognize they should aspire to. Pennock argues that epistemic and ethical values are normatively interconnected, and that for science and society to flourish, we need not just a philosophy of science, but a philosophy of the scientist. (shrink)

Teaching allows human culture to exist and to develop. Despite its significance, it has not been studied in depth by the cognitive neurosciences. Here we propose two hypotheses to boost the claim that teaching is a human instinct, and to expand our understanding of how teaching occurs as a dynamic bi-directional relation within the teacher-learner dyad. First, we explore how children naturally use ostensive communication when teaching; allowing them to be set in the emitter side of natural pedagogy. Then, (...) we hypothesize that the capacity to teach may precede to even have a mature metacognition and, we argue that a teacher will benefit from the interaction with her student, improving her understanding on both contents of knowledge: her own and her student’s. Thus, we propose that teaching may be the driving force of metacognitive development and may be occurring as an instinct from very early ages. (shrink)

Pour prouver que l'Instinct est une réalité scientifiquement établie, l'auteur procéde comme suit. Répondant à ceux qui prétendent qu'il n'a jamais été possible d'en donner une définition satisfaisante, il cite trois formules qui décrivent avec toute la clarté désirable les conditions observables de certains comportements nettement innés et spécifiques, instinctifs donc; Il réfute les raisonnements d'auteurs qui, dissimulant l'action de l'Instinct derriére le rôle rempli par des facultés auxiliaires, mémoire, intelligence, ont cru par cet artifice pouvoir prétendre que (...) „l'Instinct n'est rien“. Il analyse des raisonnements qui ont été élaborés pour démontrer que certains Instincts, considérés comme degrés inférieurs et transitoires, sont pratiquement aussi savants, aussi parfaits que ceux acceptés comme tels! Il cite des faits qui montrent que des Insectes vivant à l'état larvaire dans des troncs d'arbres, prévoient, au moment de se chrysalider, quelles seront leur forme et leurs aptitudes, et agissent en conséquence, bien que rien n'ait pu les éclairer à cet égard; Il montre que l'Instinct n'est pas un simple réflexe, qu'il ne dépend pas des sécrétions hormonales et, par l'exemple des Canaris et des Castors du Rhône; il fait voir qu'il est indélébilement inscrit dans la mentalité de l'espéce, et peut se réactiver aprés avoir été inutilisé par des centaines de générations. Il établit enfin que, pour agir comme ils le font, les Animaux doivent être dotés d'une science innée, que rien dans leur passé individuel ne leur enseigne et que l'Instinct est donc, dans sa nature intime, la connaissance héréditaire, virtuelle peut-être, d'un plan de vie spécifique.To prove that instinct is a scientifically established fact, the author proceeds as follows. Replying to the argument that it has never been possible to give a satisfactory definition of instinct, he quotes three formulae stating clearly the observable conditions of modes of behaviour which are incontestably innate and specific and therefore instinctive. He refutes the captious arguments of authors who, concealing the action of instinct behind the part played by auxiliary faculties , try to demonstrate by this artifice that “instinct is nothing” . He criticizes the arguments adduced to demonstrate that certain instincts, considered to be inferior and transitory stages of development are practically as adequate and as skilful as those considered perfect. He quotes facts showing that larvae living in trunks of trees at pupation, act in accordance with their future shape and aptitudes — as if they could foresee these — though nothing could have instructed them in this matter. He demonstrates that instinct is not a simple physiological reflex, that it does not depend on hormonal secretions and, by the example of the Canary-birds and the Beaver , he shows that instinct is ineffaceably stamped in the species mentality, and can reappear after a period of inactivity of several hundreds of generations. Finally he demonstrates that, to be able to act as they do, the animals must be endowed with an innate knowledge which nothing in their individual past can have taught them, and that instinct essentially is: the hereditary knowledge of a specific mode of life.Zum Beweis, dass der Instinkt ein wissenschaftlich begründeter Begriff ist, geht der Autor in folgender Weise vor. Antwortlich des Argumentes, dass es niemals gelungen ist eine befriedigende Definition des Instinktbegriffes anzugeben, gibt der Autor drei Zitate, woraus ganz deutlich die wahrnehmbaren Verhaltensumstände hervorgehen, welche unstreitig angeboren und spezifisch und deshalb instinktiv sind. Er lehnt die Auseinandersetzungen ab von Autoren, welche unter Zurücksetzung der Instinktsaktivität hinter der Funktion der nebensächlichen Aktivitäten wie Gedächtnis und Intelligenz, mittels dieser Manipulation zu beweisen versuchen dass der Instinkt nichts ist. . Er kritisiert die Argumente aufgeführt zum Beweis, dass gewisse Instinkte, betrachtet als subordinierte und vorübergehende Entwicklungstufen, genau so geeignet und fähig sind wie die als perfekt betrachteten Instinkte. Er führt Tatsachen auf, welche zeigen, dass Larven welche sich in Baumstrünken aufhalten sich bei der Verpuppung benehmen in Übereinstimmung mit ihrer künftigen Erscheinungsform und Lebensweise, alsob sie es vorhersehen könnten — obwohl gar keine Instruierung stattgefunden haben könnte. Er zeigt, dass der Instinkt nicht ein einfacher physiologischer Reflex ist, dass er unabhängig ist von Hormonalregulierungen, und mit den Kanarienvögeln und Bibern , als Beispiele zeigt er, dass der Instinkt unauslöschlich eingeprägt ist in der Mentalität der Art, und wieder erscheinen kann nach einer Periode von Inaktivierung von verschiedenen Hunderten von Generationen. Schliesslich konstatiert er, dass die Tiere, dank der Zielstrebigkeit der Handlungen, ausgestattet sind mit einer angeborenen Kenntnis, welche Kenntnis nicht in ihrem vorübergegangenen individuellen Leben angelehrt sein kann, und dass der Instinkt wesentlich ist: die erblich determinierte Kenntnis eines speziellen Lebensplants. (shrink)

In his last great philosophical essay, 'Of Power', Reid makes the plausible claim that 'our first exertions are instinctive' and made 'without any distinct conception of the event that is to follow'. According to Reid, these instinctive exertions allow us to form beliefs about correlations between exertions and consequential events. Such instinctive exertions also explain the origin of our conception of power. In this paper, I argue that we can use the notion of instinctive exertions to address several objections that (...) have been raised concerning Reid's rejection of the claim that sensations possess spatial content. (shrink)

O conceito freudiano de "impulso", ou "instinto" (Trieb), é reconhecidamente um dos conceitos mais fundamentais da psicanálise. No entanto, seu sentido ainda é objeto de controvérsia. Originalmente definido por Freud em um sentido biológico ou quase biológico, sua recepção em muitas das diversas tradições pós-freudianas tendeu, frequentemente, a recusar essa filiação epistemológica inicial. Um dos sinais dessa reorientação doutrinária é a recusa da tradução de "Trieb" por "instinto" e a preferência pelo neologismo "pulsão", de origem francesa e comum na literatura (...) psicanalítica escrita em várias das línguas neolatinas, inclusive em português. O objetivo deste artigo é criticar essa tendência. Para tanto, são examinados os principais argumentos normalmente apresentados contra uma visão biológica do Trieb freudiano, a saber, 1) a alternativa terminológica entre os termos alemães "Trieb" e "Instinkt" e o modo como estes são utilizados por Freud; 2) a crítica freudiana de uma redução da sexualidade humana à função reprodutiva; 3) o conceito de "Todestrieb" ("instinto de morte" ou "pulsão de morte") formulado por Freud por volta de 1920 e central na etapa final de seu pensamento. Procura-se argumentar que essas formulações não impedem uma interpretação biológica do conceito de "Trieb". Essa interpretação, por sua vez, abre uma via de diálogo entre a psicanálise e a biologia, a qual é também enfática e explicitamente defendida por Freud. Esta primeira parte do trabalho introduz a questão e também aborda o problema da relação entre sexualidade e reprodução na psicanálise e na biologia. Uma segunda parte, a ser publicada em uma próxima edição de Scientiae Studia, será dedicada ao problema da agressividade e da autodestrutividade nessas duas áreas do conhecimento. Freud's concept of "drive" or "instinct" ("Trieb") has been widely acknowledged as one of the most fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis. However, its meaning is still a matter of controversy. It was originally defined by Freud in a biological or quasi-biological sense, but its reception in many different post-Freudian traditions has often tended to reject this early epistemological affiliation. One sign of this theoretical reorientation has been to refuse the translation of "Trieb" as "instinct" and to favor instead the neologism "pulsion" ("drive"), which has French origins and became common in the psychoanalytic literature written in many neo-Latin languages, including Portuguese. The objective of this paper is to criticize this trend. For that, the main arguments usually presented against a biological view of Freud's "Trieb" are discussed, namely: (1) the terminological alternative between the German words "Trieb" and "Instinkt" and how these terms are employed by Freud; (2) Freud's critique of the reduction of human sexuality to the reproductive function; (3) the concept of "Todestrieb" ("death instinct" or "death drive"), formulated by Freud around 1920 and central in the last stage of his thought. It is argued that these formulations do not preclude a biological interpretation of the concept of "Trieb". Such interpretation, in turn, opens the way for dialogue between psychoanalysis and biology, a dialogue which was also emphatically and explicitly supported by Freud. This first part of the paper is an introduction to this issue, and approaches the problem of the relationship between sexuality and reproduction in psychoanalysis and biology. A second part will be published in a forthcoming issue of Scientiae Studia; it will be dedicated to the problem of aggression and self-destructiveness in these two fields of knowledge. (shrink)

O conceito freudiano de impulso ou instinto é reconhecidamente um dos conceitos mais fundamentais da psicanálise. No entanto, seu sentido ainda é objeto de controvérsia. Originalmente definido por Freud num sentido biológico ou quase biológico, sua recepção em muitas das diversas tradições pós-freudianas tendeu, frequentemente, a recusar essa filiação epistemológica inicial. Um dos sinais dessa reorientação doutrinária é a recusa da tradução de Trieb por "instinto" e a preferência pelo neologismo "pulsão", de origem francesa e comum na literatura psicanalítica escrita (...) em várias das línguas neolatinas, inclusive em português. O objetivo deste artigo é criticar essa tendência. Para tanto, são examinados os principais argumentos normalmente apresentados contra uma visão biológica do Trieb freudiano, a saber: 1) a alternativa terminológica entre os termos alemães Trieb e Instinkt e o modo como estes são utilizados por Freud; 2) a crítica freudiana de uma redução da sexualidade humana à função reprodutiva; 3) o conceito de Todestrieb formulado por Freud por volta de 1920 e central na etapa final de seu pensamento. Procura-se argumentar que essas formulações não impedem uma interpretação biológica do conceito de Trieb. Essa interpretação, por sua vez, abre uma via de diálogo entre a psicanálise e a biologia, a qual é também enfática e explicitamente defendida por Freud. Uma série de formulações - oriundas, sobretudo, do campo da biologia evolucionária de orientação neodarwinista e da sociobiologia - são discutidas, com o intuito de argumentar pela sua compatibilidade, se não pela sua convergência, com as teses freudianas. A primeira parte deste trabalho introduziu a questão e também abordou o problema da relação entre sexualidade e reprodução na psicanálise e na biologia. Esta segunda parte está dedicada ao problema da agressividade e da autodestrutividade nessas duas áreas do conhecimento. Freud's concept of drive or instinct has been widely acknowledged as one of psychoanalysis' most fundamental concepts. However, its meaning is still a matter of controversy. It was originally defined by Freud in a biological or quasi-biological sense, but its reception in many different post-Freudian traditions has often tended to reject this early epistemological affiliation. One sign of this theoretical reorientation has been to refuse the translation of Trieb as "instinct" and to favor instead the neologism "pulsion", which has French origins and became common in the psychoanalytic literature written in many neo-Latin languages, including Portuguese. The objective of this paper is to criticize this trend. For that, the main arguments usually presented against a biological view of Freud's Trieb are discussed, namely: 1) the terminological alternative between the German words Trieb and Instinkt and how these terms are employed by Freud; 2) Freud's critique of the reduction of human sexuality to the reproductive function; 3) the concept of Todestrieb , formulated by Freud around 1920 and central in the last stage of his thought. It is argued that these formulations do not preclude a biological interpretation of the concept of Trieb. Such interpretation, in turn, opens the way for dialogue between psychoanalysis and biology, a dialogue which was also emphatically and explicitly supported by Freud. Some hypotheses in the field of neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology and sociobiology are discussed and it is argued that they are compatible, if not convergent, with Freud's views. The first part of the paper was an introduction to this issue and also approached the problem of the relationship between sexuality and reproduction in psychoanalysis and biology. This second part is dedicated to the problem of aggression and self-destructiveness in these two fields of knowledge. (shrink)

A different picture of learning is suggested by Karl Popper's account of knowledge growing through 'conjectures and refutations'. The facts of human language are best explained by taking language acquisition to be a case of Popperian learning.

This paper is concerned with Thomas Reid's account of the role of instinctive exertions in the development of one's conception of power. I consider whether such exertions can shed any light on the matter of how certain sensations can appear to us to possess spatial content. Reid denies that sensations have such content; I argue that the introduction of instinctive exertions into his account might allow Reid to avoid some of the less palatable consequences of denying spatial content to sensations.

We cannot perceive the minds or experiences of other people, but only their bodies and behaviour. The 'inner' therefore appears to be hidden behind the 'outer' and to be inferred from perceptible behaviour by analogy. Our knowledge of the experiences of others, in comparison with what philosophers think of as self‐knowledge, seems distinctly shaky. Wittgenstein conceived of the 'constitutional uncertainty' of the inner not as a consequence of defective evidence, but as a reflection in the rules of evidence (...) of disagreement in human attitudes and responses that antecede our language‐games. The non‐uniformity in our instinctive reactions of trust and mistrust towards each other is one source of the constitutional uncertainty of psychological concepts. There is no such uncertainty in numerous other language‐games, and that too is determined by the character of our reactions. Indeed, it is tempting to misconstrue the constitutional uncertainty of the mental as confirmation of the idea that the 'inner' is hidden. (shrink)

An argument that nativism is true and important but mysterious, examining the particular case of ideas of sensible qualities. In this book, Colin McGinn presents a concise, clear, and compelling argument that the origins of knowledge are innate—that nativism, not empiricism, is correct in its theory of how concepts are acquired. McGinn considers the particular case of sensible qualities—ideas of color, shape, taste, and so on. He argues that these, which he once regarded as the strongest case for the (...) empiricist position, are in fact not well explained by the empiricist account that they derive from interactions with external objects. Rather, he contends, ideas of sensible qualities offer the strongest case for the nativist position—that a large range of our knowledge is inborn, not acquired through the senses. Yet, McGinn cautions, how this can be is deeply problematic; we have no good theories about how innate knowledge is possible. Innate knowledge is a mystery, though a fact. McGinn describes the traditional debate between empiricism and nativism; offers an array of arguments against empiricism; constructs an argument in favor of nativism; and considers the philosophical consequences of adopting the nativist position, discussing perception, the mind–body problem, the unconscious, metaphysics, and epistemology. (shrink)

A Teaching Memoir That Crosses the Barriers Between Worlds A shaman is one who has learned to move between two worlds: our physical reality and the realm of spirits. For John Lockley, shamanic training also meant learning to cross the immense divide of race and culture in South Africa. As a medic drafted into the South African military in 1990, John Lockley had a powerful dream. "Even though I am a white man of Irish and English descent, I knew in (...) my bones that I had received my calling to become a sangoma, a traditional South African shaman," John writes. "I felt blessed by the ancient spirit of Africa, and I knew that I had started on a journey filled with magic and danger." His path took him from the hills of South Korea, where he trained as a student under Zen Master Su Bong, to the rural African landscape of the Eastern Cape and the world of the sangoma mystic healers, where he found his teacher in the medicine woman called MaMngwevu. In Leopard Warrior, John shares a gripping account of his experiences and the wisdom he learned over years of training. Here he invites you to discover: • Powerful insights into the spiritual tradition of the Xhosa lineage of South Africa—the tribe of Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu • Ubuntu—a core concept for recognizing and embracing our deep interconnection with all living things • Ancestor medicine—how we can learn to honor the blood in our veins, the heritage of our soul, and our shared humanity • Recovering our forgotten knowledge about the wisdom of our dreams, the spirits of plants and animals, and the power of the unseen world In traditional African healing circles, the leopard represents intuition, instinct, and harmony with nature and the spirit world. As John Lockley writes, "A leopard warrior is a spiritual soldier who mirrors the natural world and directs their gaze inward to answer the call of their spirit." With Leopard Warrior, he brings us an inspiring call to action—showing how we can bridge the barriers that divide us, embrace the gifts of our ancestors, and reclaim our rightful place as compassionate caretakers of our world. (shrink)

Condillac's Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, first published in French in 1746 and offered here in a new translation, represented in its time a radical departure from the dominant conception of the mind as a reservoir of innately given ideas. Descartes had held that knowledge must rest on ideas; Condillac turned this upside down by arguing that speech and words are the origin of mental life and knowledge. He argued, further, that language has its origin (...) in human interaction and in our natural capacity to react spontaneously and instinctively to the expression of emotions and states of mind in others. The importance of this pointedly anti-Cartesian view, and its relevance to both aesthetics and epistemology, were quickly understood, and Condillac's work influenced many later philosophers including Herder, Rousseau, and Adam Smith. His conception also anticipated Wittgenstein's view of language, its usage, and its relation to mind and thought. (shrink)

Today, many pregnancy guides mention a nesting instinct. According to this, pregnant women would be seized by an urge to create the right environment for their child, for example to buy baby equipment or clean the apartment. The concept of the nesting instinct forms a specific configuration of knowledge: While it is widespread in the popular field, it occupies a marginal position in the scientific field. In this paper, I will investigate the historical epistemology of this form (...) of knowledge. In so doing, the following questions are addressed: How did the knowledge about a nesting instinct during pregnancy form? How was the nest as a specific natural-anthropogenic environment constructed? And to what extent do notions of gender and environment interact here? To answer these questions, the study takes the perspective of a history of knowledge in transit, in the longue durée from the nineteenth century to the present. The investigation reveals a gradual feminization of the concept of environment in the knowledge of the nesting instinct. Whereas in the nineteenth century it was often considered a male behavioral pattern and the nest was an analogy to the house, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the instinct transformed into a primarily female characteristic, with the nest representing the interior of the home. A decisive condition for this circulation of knowledge was that the nest became a ‘metaphorical thing’. As such, the nest did not simply lead to naturalization, but denoted a natural-social in-between space that increasingly became the goal of female care work. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between sexual science and evolutionary models of human development and progress. It examines the ways in which late 19th- and early 20th-century Western European sexual scientists constructed the sexual instinct as an evolutionary force that not only served a reproductive purpose, but was also pivotal to the social, moral, and cultural development of human societies. Sexual scientists challenged the idea that non-reproductive sexualities were necessarily perverse, pathological, or degenerative by linking sexual desire to the (...) evolution of sociality, often focusing on forms of relationality and care that exceeded biological kinship. As a result, non-reproductive sexual expressions, including homosexual and non-reproductive heterosexual behaviours, were interpreted as manifestations of a sexual instinct operating in the service of human development. These claims were reliant on cross-cultural and historical comparisons of sexual values, behaviours, and customs that rehearsed and reinforced imperial narratives of development premised on racialized, gendered, and classed hierarchies. Sexual scientists mapped diverse sexual behaviours in terms of their perceived evolutionary benefits, contributing to colonial narratives that distinguished between different cultures according to imagined trajectories of development. These contestations around the sexual instinct and its developmental functions played a vital role in allowing sexual science to authorize itself as a field of knowledge that promised to provide expertise required to manage sexual life and secure the global development of human civilization. (shrink)

Bringing together evolutionary biology, psychology, and philosophy, Henry Plotkin presents a new science of knowledge, one that traces an unbreakable link between instinct and our ability to know.

Condillac's Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, first published in French in 1746 and offered here in a new translation, represented in its time a radical departure from the dominant conception of the mind as a reservoir of innately given ideas. Descartes had held that knowledge must rest on ideas; Condillac turned this upside down by arguing that speech and words are the origin of mental life and knowledge. He argued, further, that language has its origin (...) in human interaction and in our natural capacity to react spontaneously and instinctively to the expression of emotions and states of mind in others. The importance of this pointedly anti-Cartesian view, and its relevance to both aesthetics and epistemology, were quickly understood, and Condillac's work influenced many later philosophers including Herder, Rousseau, and Adam Smith. His conception also anticipated Wittgenstein's view of language, its usage, and its relation to mind and thought. (shrink)

Philip Ball brings a cognitive-scientific perspective to the breadth of music theory in his work The Music Instinct. Whether or not music is a universal language, it is a cultural phenomenon found universally in the human population. In the debate as to whether humans evolved this tendency to make music as an essential adaptation or as non-adaptive “spandrel,” Ball maintains that music is crucial to what it means to be human. Without definitively explaining just how humans developed music, delimiting (...) that “instinct” or saying such instinct dictates what kind of music answers to it, he explains how the many different aspects of musical structure—and indeed much music theory, Western or Eastern—may have correlates in cognitive structures. The predominant step and half-step tonal progression in melodies, the role of the octave, underlying rhythm, all such appear to have cognitive explanation. The problem, Ball brings out, is that whatever the cognitive musical structures may be are far from clear. Perhaps many kinds of music do appeal to these cognitive structures, but must all music meet even a certain minimum of them? Based on current cognitive knowledge, cases against modernist Western music are hard to make soundly. (shrink)

Condillac's Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, first published in French in 1746 and offered here in a new translation, represented in its time a radical departure from the dominant conception of the mind as a reservoir of innately given ideas. Descartes had held that knowledge must rest on ideas; Condillac turned this upside down by arguing that speech and words are the origin of mental life and knowledge. He argued, further, that language has its origin (...) in human interaction and in our natural capacity to react spontaneously and instinctively to the expression of emotions and states of mind in others. The importance of this pointedly anti-Cartesian view, and its relevance to both aesthetics and epistemology, were quickly understood, and Condillac's work influenced many later philosophers including Herder, Rousseau, and Adam Smith. His conception also anticipated Wittgenstein's view of language, its usage, and its relation to mind and thought. (shrink)

No romance de W.G. Sebald, Os anéis de Saturno (Die Ringe des Saturn: Eine englische Wallfahrt, 1995), o narrador, a partir da descrição de certos lugares de Suffolk, reconstrói acontecimentos históricos e biografias, relata entrevistas, apresenta e menciona obras e lugares, correlacionando tempos e espaços que várias vezes estão muito distantes uns dos outros. Essas aparentes digressões labirínticas ligam-se à história principal de uma forma ou de outra. A nossa hipótese é a de que Os anéis de Saturno possui uma (...) estrutura altamente labiríntica e enciclopédica, característica, por outro lado, de toda a obra sebaldiana, através da qual o autor manifesta seu conhecimento trágico do mundo.Palavras-chave: Sebald. Romance enciclopédico. Enciclopédia. Labirinto. AbstractIn W.G Sebald's novel The Rings of Saturn (Die Ringe des Saturn: Eine englische Wallfahrt, 1995), the narrator, from the description of certain places in Suffolk, reconstructs historical events and biographies, reports interviews, describes and mentions works and places correlating times and spaces that are often very far apart. These apparent labyrinthian digressions tie into the main story in one way or another. Our hypothesis is that The Rings of Saturn have a highly labyrinthian and encyclopedic structure, characteristic, on the other hand, of the entire Sebaldian work, through which the author manifests his tragic knowledge of the world.Keywords: Sebald. Encyclopedic Novel. Encyclopedia. Labyrinth.ORCIDhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-9333-4461. (shrink)

Condillac's Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, first published in French in 1746 and offered here in a new translation, represented in its time a radical departure from the dominant conception of the mind as a reservoir of innately given ideas. Descartes had held that knowledge must rest on ideas; Condillac turned this upside down by arguing that speech and words are the origin of mental life and knowledge. He argued, further, that language has its origin (...) in human interaction and in our natural capacity to react spontaneously and instinctively to the expression of emotions and states of mind in others. The importance of this pointedly anti-Cartesian view, and its relevance to both aesthetics and epistemology, were quickly understood, and Condillac's work influenced many later philosophers including Herder, Rousseau, and Adam Smith. His conception also anticipated Wittgenstein's view of language, its usage, and its relation to mind and thought. (shrink)

ABSTRACT McCabe [2021: 137–40] identifies a crucial ambiguity in the terms ‘learns’ and ‘knows’. Such terms can be read as either ‘perfective’ or ‘imperfective’. This is an aspect difference. The former indicates a settled state, the latter a directed process. McCabe uses this insight to show how Socrates can rebut the sophists’ view of meaning, render compelling Socrates’ self-refutation arguments, and explain the Socratic connections between learning, knowledge, and how one should live. In the final section of the Euthydemus, (...) Euthydemus offers the ‘Omniscience Sophism’, and the related, rather cheeky, ‘Father Sophisms’. McCabe [ibid.: 140–2] suggests that the Omniscience Sophism might be addressed by identifying an aspect ambiguity, but does not follow up her point in detail. In this response, I argue that McCabe’s instinct is good and that a relative term, such as ‘knowledgeable’, can be understood as having two senses. That distinction is between what I call ‘fine-grained’ and ‘coarse-grained’ senses of ‘knowledgeable’. I suggest that this distinction that tracks McCabe’s aspect distinction between senses of ‘learns’ and best explains the fallacy committed in the Omniscience Sophism. (shrink)

The quest for what constitutes knowledge and the authentic means of attaining it have been a subject of intense philosophical speculations from time immemorial. This is to say that the discourse about theory of knowledge had stated from the ancient era in philosophical parlance. Knowledge, in turn, is a co-efficient of social order, democratic ideology and development, which implies that for there to be any form of tranquility and peace in any society at all; its leaders must (...) necessarily have the right sort of intelligence and ability. And that is why leadership problem is the deadliest monster a state and its people can suffer from. Plato’s understanding of knowledge is apt and germane in the discourse of social orderliness essentially as it relates to and with the training of the guardians for the growth, progress and development of human society. In Plato’s view, the guardians must be courageous with instinctive love for wisdom and understanding, which by so doing will make a really noble guardian of commonwealth to be swift, strong, spirited and philosophic. But an attempt to understand the impact of knowledge on leaders of societies among societies of the Global South especially in Africa had become a phenomenal mirage as many of the leaders are not properly ‘schooled’ and are also bereft of ideas to lead human societies.The thrust of this paper will be to examine the impact of knowledge on the kind of leaders societies supposed to have through the prism of Plato’s training of the guardians in the quest for democratic ideology and setting in the Global South. The intent will be to engender political harmony, trust and ‘normalcy’ between the state and society, that is, between the leaders and the led. (shrink)

Abstract.There is ample evidence that humans (and other primates) possess a knowledge instinct—a biologically driven impulse to make coherent sense of the world at the highest level possible. Yet behavioral decision‐making data suggest a contrary biological drive to minimize cognitive effort by solving problems using simplifying heuristics. Individuals differ, and the same person varies over time, in the strength of the knowledge instinct. Neuroimaging studies suggest which brain regions might mediate the balance between knowledge expansion (...) and heuristic simplification. One region implicated in primary emotional experience is more activated in individuals who use primitive heuristics, whereas two areas of the cortex are more activated in individuals with a strong knowledge drive: one region implicated in detecting risk or conflict and another implicated in generating creative ideas. Knowledge maximization and effort minimization are both evolutionary adaptations, and both are valuable in different contexts. Effort minimization helps us make minor and routine decisions efficiently, whereas knowledge maximization connects us to the beautiful, to the sublime, and to our highest aspirations. We relate the opposition between the knowledge instinct and heuristics to the biblical story of the fall, and argue that the causal scientific worldview is mathematically equivalent to teleological arguments from final causes. Elements of a scientific program are formulated to address unresolved issues. (shrink)

There is ample evidence that humans (and other primates) possess a knowledge instinct—a biologically driven impulse to make coherent sense of the world at the highest level possible. Yet behavioral decision-making data suggest a contrary biological drive to minimize cognitive effort by solving problems using simplifying heuristics. Individuals differ, and the same person varies over time, in the strength of the knowledge instinct. Neuroimaging studies suggest which brain regions might mediate the balance between knowledge expansion (...) and heuristic simplification. One region implicated in primary emotional experience is more activated in individuals who use primitive heuristics, whereas two areas of the cortex are more activated in individuals with a strong knowledge drive: one region implicated in detecting risk or conflict and another implicated in generating creative ideas. Knowledge maximization and effort minimization are both evolutionary adaptations, and both are valuable in different contexts. Effort minimization helps us make minor and routine decisions efficiently, whereas knowledge maximization connects us to the beautiful, to the sublime, and to our highest aspirations. We relate the opposition between the knowledge instinct and heuristics to the biblical story of the fall, and argue that the causal scientific worldview is mathematically equivalent to teleological arguments from final causes. Elements of a scientific program are formulated to address unresolved issues. (shrink)

The idea of dignity seems indissociable from that of humanity, whether in its universal dimension of ‘human dignity’, or in the individual ‘dignity of the person’. This paper provides an outlook on the ethics governing the sciences and technology, in particular the biological sciences and biotechnology, and recalls the notion of ‘glory’, both human and divine, as it infuses a great part of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance cultures, just before the scientific revolution in Europe.