Karl Popper introduced the idea of verisimilitude to explicate the intuitive idea that a theory T2, even though it is strictly speaking false, may be closer to the truth than a competitor T1. However, as is now well known, the results of Pavel Tichý, John Harris and David Miller establish that on Popper’s qualitative theory of verisimilitude, a theory T2 could be closer to the truth than another theory T1 only if T2 contains no false sentences. This result has been (...) taken universally to show the inadequacy of Popper’s original account of verisimilitude, since the Miller-Tichý-Harris Theorem conflicts with the very basic intuition which first led Popper to formulate his theory.In this paper I shall first review the Miller-Tichý-Harris Theorem and examine a number of attempts to salvage the concept of verisimilitude. It will be argued that none of these attempts is successful. Finally an alternative, simple and intuitively satisfactory account of verisimilitude will be offered. This account will be along the lines first suggested by Popper, but it is not subject to any known limitation theorem. Further, the account is capable of giving verisimilitude orderings between not only scientific theories, but philosophical theories as well. This will be achieved without the use of the excessive formalism which dominates the contemporary verisimilitude research programs. (shrink)

Frankel has argued that the theory of causality developed by Rom Harré and his colleague Edward Madden is incoherent, since the proposal that causal claims are naturally necessary leads to a vicious infinite regression“which ends by requiring that for any causal claim to be accorded the status of natural necessity an infinite number of causal claims must be accorded the status of natural necessities.”.

Karl Popper introduced the idea of verisimilitude to explicate the intuitive idea that a theory T2, even though it is strictly speaking false, may be closer to the truth than a competitor T1. However, as is now well known, the results of Pavel Tichý, John Harris and David Miller establish that on Popper’s qualitative theory of verisimilitude, a theory T2 could be closer to the truth than another theory T1 only if T2 contains no false sentences. This result has been (...) taken universally to show the inadequacy of Popper’s original account of verisimilitude, since the Miller-Tichý-Harris Theorem conflicts with the very basic intuition which first led Popper to formulate his theory.In this paper I shall first review the Miller-Tichý-Harris Theorem and examine a number of attempts to salvage the concept of verisimilitude. It will be argued that none of these attempts is successful. Finally an alternative, simple and intuitively satisfactory account of verisimilitude will be offered. This account will be along the lines first suggested by Popper, but it is not subject to any known limitation theorem. Further, the account is capable of giving verisimilitude orderings between not only scientific theories, but philosophical theories as well. This will be achieved without the use of the excessive formalism which dominates the contemporary verisimilitude research programs. (shrink)

Thirteen (largely) thematically unconnected essays dealing with some ultimate, but not esoteric, questions in modern metaphysical epistemology.

(1983). RATIONALISM AND THE STRONG PROGRAMME OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEKE: RECONCILIATION WITHOUT TEARS. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 1-31.

Following the International Women's Year in 1975, a group of men and women met every month for a year at the home of psychoanalyst Edith Weigert to reflect on what was then called the "psychology of women." Recently, a few members of that original group, joined by several others, began a seminar on gender and psychoanalysis with the goal of reexamining old and new writings infeminism, psychoanalysis, and related fields. The nine essays in this book are a result of those (...) discussions. Written by distinguished and varied contributors, they explore the complex relationship between feminism and psychoanalysis and address broader questions of gender. Psychiatry and the Humanities, Volume 14. (shrink)

This work summarizes an already comprehensive field of criticisms of received economics and advanced new ones, particularly with respect to free trade and the industrialisation of economic systems. If global economic and ecological catastrophe is to be avoided, nations and communities must move towards greater self-reliance within the framework of a much less resource-wasteful existence. But to do this will require not merely a cosmetic change in the present socio-economic system, but a change of such magnitude that it dwarfs previous (...) social transformations in human history. This great transformation must occur by conscious human activity and it must occur quickly if human civilizations, and indeed human life itself, is to continue. (shrink)

This book provides a postmodernist critique of philosophy through ecological limitationism and common-sense realism. The authors demonstrate the reality of life, the world and the primacy of practice in relation to the failings of Anglo-American analytic philosophy to meet the challenges of the age.

This book attempts to give a comprehensive examination of the principal philosophical issues associated with the AIDS pandemic and in particular with the radical challenges that global diseases raise for modern society and political systems. The thesis of the book is that AIDS is but a part of a wider environmental and social crisis that not only challenges received opinion about the relationships between humantiy, technology and the environment, but challenges the ecological adaptability of modern social and political system. The (...) challenge posed by AIDS, and other diseases likely to appear in the next century, are explored in detail. (shrink)

Malcolm Acock attempts to show that three widely accepted “solutions” to the philosophical problem of theory choice between the ordinary account of the age of the universe, and “Russell's hypothesis” that the world sprang into existence five minutes ago, are unsatisfactory. In the following paper we shall attempt to show why “Russell's hypothesis” is defective as a cosmological explanation of the age of the universe.

Since the early seventies, when English translations of Jürgen Habermas’ principal works became available to English-speaking scholars, there has been a virtual “Habermas explosion” of research papers, dissertations and books. Informative and penetrating discussions already exist discussing Habermas’ encounter with positivism and his relationship to the “Frankfurt school.” There are however few detailed discussions of the theoretical relationships between Habermas’ project of a critical theory of society and Hegel’s system. We attempt to correct this previous omission in the following paper.The (...) central thesis of Jürgen Habermas’ Knowledge and Human Interests is that theoretical discourse is fundamentally tied to human experience. Habermas wishes to show that all theoretical statements about the world have their genesis in the experience of everyday life and practices. His particular understanding of this approach to the question of the possibility of knowledge has its origins in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. The Phenomenology defines the development of knowledge in terms of a science of experience and must therefore constitute the main text in locating the philosophical parameters of Habermas’ thought. Our paper is an exercise in hermeneutics addressed to this task.In rejecting both Hegel’s philosophy of identity and Marx’s ontology of nature, Habermas has forced himself into a position where he must elaborate exactly how knowledge is possible at all. That is, the question which he confronts concerns the underlying basis of human experience. Hegel and Marx in Habermas’ opinion, were both unsuccessful in developing an adequate account of human life precisely because they tended to give an absolute basis to the the structure of the world. Knowledge itself, was considered as knowledge of something which existed beyond the scope of human control. Habermas attempts to overcome these difficulties by developing an explicitly ontological account of man through his theory of cognitive interests. Thus the process of reflection is ‘guided’ by certain cognitive interests. These interests perform the same function in Habermas’ system as does the notion of Geist in Hegel’s or Nature in Marx’s. They determine the conditions by which ‘knowledge’ can be generated and thus constitute the grounds upon which our world-view is constituted. (shrink)

Since the early seventies, when English translations of Jürgen Habermas’ principal works became available to English-speaking scholars, there has been a virtual “Habermas explosion” of research papers, dissertations and books. Informative and penetrating discussions already exist discussing Habermas’ encounter with positivism and his relationship to the “Frankfurt school.” There are however few detailed discussions of the theoretical relationships between Habermas’ project of a critical theory of society and Hegel’s system. We attempt to correct this previous omission in the following paper.The (...) central thesis of Jürgen Habermas’ Knowledge and Human Interests is that theoretical discourse is fundamentally tied to human experience. Habermas wishes to show that all theoretical statements about the world have their genesis in the experience of everyday life and practices. His particular understanding of this approach to the question of the possibility of knowledge has its origins in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. The Phenomenology defines the development of knowledge in terms of a science of experience and must therefore constitute the main text in locating the philosophical parameters of Habermas’ thought. Our paper is an exercise in hermeneutics addressed to this task.In rejecting both Hegel’s philosophy of identity and Marx’s ontology of nature, Habermas has forced himself into a position where he must elaborate exactly how knowledge is possible at all. That is, the question which he confronts concerns the underlying basis of human experience. Hegel and Marx in Habermas’ opinion, were both unsuccessful in developing an adequate account of human life precisely because they tended to give an absolute basis to the the structure of the world. Knowledge itself, was considered as knowledge of something which existed beyond the scope of human control. Habermas attempts to overcome these difficulties by developing an explicitly ontological account of man through his theory of cognitive interests. Thus the process of reflection is ‘guided’ by certain cognitive interests. These interests perform the same function in Habermas’ system as does the notion of Geist in Hegel’s or Nature in Marx’s. They determine the conditions by which ‘knowledge’ can be generated and thus constitute the grounds upon which our world-view is constituted. (shrink)

The claim that nature is self-consistent has recently been contested by a number of paraconsistent logicians. In this paper I will survey the arguments which paraconsistent logicians have presented for the thesis that nature is actually inconsistent. My conclusion is that these arguments all fail.The paraconsistency programme has to date been concerned primarily with outlining the philosophical inadequacy of classical logic, and detailed discussions of issues bearing upon the philosophical adequacy of the paraconsistency position itself are not to be found (...) as yet in the literature. This inadequacy will be illustrated here with respect to the question of the self-consistency of nature. (shrink)

In this paper I shall attempt to perform two tasks; first, to defend James Jordan's recent self-referential arguments for the inconsistency of Protagorean relativism from the criticisms of Jack Meiland, and second, to contribute towards the cause of undermining Protagorean and conceptual relativism by criticizing Meiland's own explication of the notion of relative truth.

Is a simple refinement of the way we are living sufficient to address the environmental crisis? Is a wise use stance in which we produce and consume 'smarter' enough? This work not only answers no to the above question, but argues that a new way of life is already emerging---an ecological way of life. The ecological way of life is centered conceptually upon the ethical ideas first formulated in various policy documents, namely, that we are responsible to future generations in (...) terms of sharing this planet. The obligation to future generations follows from the formation of a new kind of transgenerational community that differs significantly from both immediate descendants and the posterity models for such communities. The reference to future generations undercuts the traditional US-THEM distinction and opens up a future-to-come in opposition to a future-present. The 'otherness' of future generations is emphasized with the result that our task is one of living within a disciplined not-knowing. This transgenerational community formed around future generations provides a framework for the ecological way of life by providing the ethical context for such environmental obligations as the precautionary principle. ;Given that the reference to future generations undercuts the traditional motivation provided by an US-THEM distinction, the experiential dimension of the environmental movement comes to the fore. How can people be motivated to sacrifice for those that come after, especially as they are not immediately identified with an Us? I examine an existential arena I labeled as 'living in the woods'. This space is an over-determined space of exile from the dominate culture that not only allows for social critique, but through the rediscovery of 'natural' rhythms and the experience of the beauty of a particular, provides an embodied experience of biophilia and of the earth as the fragile and vulnerable home of future generations. Not everyone has to 'life in the woods', but these experiences and reflections do provide, much as religious life in the monastery, an intense and articulated paradigm of a way of life for others. ;Finally, this dissertation was written for an intelligent, lay audience. The interconnections among environmental policies, political dynamics, and ethical concerns are all examined. (shrink)