A working memory (WM) deficit is a reliable observation in people experiencing anxiety. Whether the level of anxiety is related to the severity of WM difficulties is still an open question. In the present experiment, we investigated this aspect by testing the WM performance of people with different levels of anxiety symptoms. Participants were grouped according to self-report anxiety into a control group with low anxiety scores and an experimental group with clinically relevant anxiety. The experimental group was then (...) divided into a high anxiety group and a severe anxiety group. Participants performed a battery of WM tasks tagging different WM processes. The results showed that, compared to participants with low anxiety, participants with clinically relevant anxiety scores had reduced accuracy in all the WM tasks. Interestingly, participants with high and severe anxiety did not present any significant difference. Anxious participants showed difficulties also in cognitive domains other than WM. Hence, these results supply reliable evidence that people with clinically relevant anxiety scores present WM difficulties, irrespective of symptoms severity. The observation that anxiety compromises performance also in cognitive domains other than WM suggests that the deficit might affect fluid cognition. (shrink)

Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith (T&K-S) claim that “Residual Normality” is a priori unlikely, that is, that specific cognitive deficits should not exist in developmental disorders. Here I review evidence that a specific cognitive deficit is at the core of developmental dyslexia and I provide a possible neurological account thereof.

Normals display selective deficits in morphology and syntax under adverse processing conditions. Digit loads do not impair processing of passives and object relatives but do impair processing of grammatical morphemes. Perceptual degradation and temporal compression selectively impair several aspects of grammar, including passives and object relatives. Hence we replicate Caplan & Waters's specific findings but reach opposite conclusions, based on wider evidence.

The cognitive impairments shown by brain-damaged patients emphasize the role of task difficulty as a major determinant for performance. We discuss the proposal of Kurzban et al. in light of our findings on right-hemisphere–damaged patients, who show increasing awareness deficits for the contralesional hemispace when engaged with resource-consuming dual tasks. This phenomenon is readily explained by the assumption of unspecific depletable resources.

The impact of COVID-19 on chronic pain in non-infected vulnerable South American subjects is unknown. Healthcare workers are at increased risk for CP. During the pandemic, many HCWs with CP kept working. Knowing how cognition is affected by CP in these subjects is an important subject for work safety. The attention domain has a pivotal role in cognition. Previously, the Continuous Visual Attention Test was applied to detect specific attention deficits in fibromyalgia patients. The present investigation described CP prevalence (...) in non-infected Brazilian HCWs during the pandemic and assessed HCWs’ attentional performance with the aid of the CVAT. This study was carried out at a reference University Hospital in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. HCWs of both sexes, aged 20 or older, were interviewed from August to December 2020. A 90-second version of the CVAT was performed. The average reaction time to correct responses and the respective intraindividual reaction time variability for correct responses to target was determined. Omission and commission errors were also calculated. Then, for each participant we calculated the Z-scores of the CVAT variables based on the distribution of CVAT performance of 211 healthy subjects. HCWs with Z-scores > 1.64 were classified as significantly impaired. From the 154 selected HCWs, 72 reported CP during the pandemic. Post hoc ANCOVAs showed that the average correct VRT was significantly higher in the CP group than in the non-CP group. The percentage of participants with impaired VRT performance was 30% in the CP group and 16% in the non-CP group. The difference between these two propositions reached significance. As VRT is associated with the sustained-attention subdomain, our data suggest that this subdomain is disrupted in the CP group. (shrink)

In this paper, two central questions will be addressed: ought we to implement medical AI technology in the medical domain? If yes, how ought we to implement this technology? I will critically engage with three options that exist with respect to these central questions: the Neo-Luddite option, the Assistive option, and the Substitutive option. I will first address key objections on behalf of the Neo-Luddite option: the Objection from Bias, the Objection from Artificial Autonomy, the Objection from Status Quo, (...) and the Objection from Inscrutability. I will thereafter present the Demographic Trends Argument and the Human Enhancement Argument in support of alternatives to the Neo-Luddite option. In the second half of the paper, I will argue against the Substitutive option and in favour of the Assistive option, given the existence of two chief formal deficits in medical AI technology: the causality deficit and the care deficit. (shrink)

Children with hearing impairment (HI) show disorders in morphology and syntax. The question is whether and how these disorders are connected to problems in the auditory domain. The aim of this paper is to examine whether moderate to severe hearing loss at a young age affects the ability of German-speaking orally trained children to understand and produce sentences. We focused on sentence structures that are derived by syntactic movement, which have been identified as a sensitive marker for syntactic impairment (...) in other languages and in other populations with syntactic impairment. Therefore, our study tested the repetition and/or comprehension of subject and object relatives, subject and object Wh-questions, passive sentences, and topicalized sentences, as well as sentences with verb movement to second sentential position. We tested 19 HI children aged 9;5-13;6 and compared their performance with hearing children using sentence-picture matching and sentence repetition tasks. For the comprehension tasks, we included HI children who passed an auditory discrimination task; for the sentence repetition tasks, we selected children who passed a screening task of simple sentence repetition without lip-reading; this made sure that they could perceive the words in the tests, so that we could test their grammatical abilities. The results clearly showed that most HI children had considerable difficulties in the comprehension and repetition of sentences with syntactic movement: they had significant difficulties understanding object relatives, Wh-questions, and topicalized sentences, and in the repetition of object who and which questions and subject relatives, as well as in sentences with verb movement to second sentential position. Repetition of passives was only problematic for some children. Object relatives were still difficult at this age for both HI and hearing children. An additional important outcome of the study is that not all sentence structures are impaired—passive structures did not pose a problem for the HI children in comprehension, and caused fewer problems in repetition than other structures. (shrink)

Developmental dyslexia is considered to be most effectively addressed with preventive phonics-based interventions, including grapheme-phoneme coupling and blending exercises. These intervention types require intact speech perception abilities, given their large focus on exercises with auditorily presented phonemes. Yet some children with dyslexia experience problems in this domain due to a poorer sensitivity to rise times, i.e., rhythmic acoustic cues present in the speech envelope. As a result, the often subtle speech perception problems could potentially constrain an optimal response to (...) phonics-based interventions in at-risk children. The current study therefore aimed to extend existing research by examining the presence of potential speech perception deficits in pre-readers at cognitive risk for dyslexia when compared to typically developing peers and to explore the added value of a preventive auditory intervention for at-risk pre-readers, targeting rise time sensitivity, on speech perception and other reading-related skills. To obtain the first research objective, we longitudinally compared speech-in-noise perception between 28 5-year-old pre-readers with and 30 peers without a cognitive risk for dyslexia during the second half of the third year of kindergarten. The second research objective was addressed by exploring growth in speech perception and other reading-related skills in an independent sample of 62 at-risk 5-year-old pre-readers who all combined a 12-week preventive phonics-based intervention with an auditory story listening intervention. In half of the sample, story recordings contained artificially enhanced rise times, while in the other half, stories remained unprocessed. Results revealed a slower speech-in-noise perception growth in the at-risk compared to the non-at-risk group, due to an emerged deficit at the end of kindergarten. Concerning the auditory intervention effects, both intervention groups showed equal growth in speech-in-noise perception and other reading-related skills, suggesting no boost of envelope-enhanced story listening on top of the effect of combining GraphoGame-Flemish with listening to unprocessed stories. These findings thus provide evidence for a link between speech perception problems and dyslexia, yet do not support the potential of the auditory intervention in its current form. (shrink)

Argument“Deficit model” designates an outlook on the public understanding and communication of science that emphasizes scientific illiteracy and the need to educate the public. Though criticized, it is still widespread, especially among scientists. Its persistence is due not only to factors ranging from scientists’ training to policy design, but also to the continuance of realism as an aesthetic criterion. This article examines the link between realism and the deficit model through discussions of neurology and psychiatry in fiction film, (...) as well as through debates about historical movies and the cinematic adaptation of literature. It shows that different values and criteria tend to dominate the realist stance in different domains:accuracyfor movies concerning neurology and psychiatry,authenticityfor the historical film, andfidelityfor adaptations of literature. Finally, contrary to the deficit model, it argues that the cinema is better characterized by a surplus of meaning than by informational shortcomings. (shrink)

Recent studies claim to show that language delayed deaf subjects typically display longlingering deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM) development, despite suffering no known deficits in other cognitive domains. These claims are supported by experimental evidence indicating that such subjects fare poorly on False Belief (FB) tasks. This paper turns a critical eye on these claims. In particular, I argue that the reported results raise important questions about the status of FB tasks as evidence, and about how such evidence should (...) be weighted against naturalistic observations of subjects engaged in everyday activities requiring complex social coordination. I conclude that these studies give us no decisive reason to believe that language delayed deaf subjects suffer distinctively and symptomatically in the domain of social cognition. To the contrary, the attribution of significant socio-cognitive impairment is potentially stigmatizing and may not help us understand the unique challenges these subjects face or suggest remedial strategies to aid them in overcoming these challenges. (shrink)

This study describes a cost-effective screening protocol for parkinsonism based on combined objective and subjective monitoring of balance function. Objective evaluation of balance function was performed using a game industry balance board and an automated analyses of the dynamic of the center of pressure in time, frequency and non-linear domains collected during short series of stand up tests with different modalities and severity of sensorial deprivation. The subjective measurement of balance function was performed using the Dizziness Handicap Inventory questionnaire. Principal (...) component analyses on both objective and subjective measurements of balance function allowed to obtained a specificity and selectivity for parkinsonian patients (v.s. healthy subjects) of 0.67 and 0.71 respectively. The findings are discussed regarding the relevance of cost-effective balance-based screening system as strategy to meet the needs of broader and earlier screening for parkinsonism in communities with limited access to healthcare. (shrink)

This study explored how perceived control affects consumers' willingness to purchase self-improvement products under self-deficit situations. For this purpose, three experiments were conducted to examine the following sources of control: the controllability of self-deficits ; the locus of control ; and situational perceived control. According to the results, higher perceived control can reduce consumers' defensive reaction tendencies, thus increasing their willingness to purchase products that claim to improve their current deficits. Moreover, the aforementioned effect only occurs in within-domain (...) improvement products, rather than without-domain improvement products. (shrink)

Disturbances in social cognition are a core feature of schizophrenia. While most research in the field has focused on emotion perception, social knowledge, theory of mind, and attribution styles, the domain of social perception has received little specific attention. In this paper, we suggest that this issue can be explained by the lack of a precise and unitary definition of the concept, this leads to the existence of different competing uses of the concept and their conflation with other domains (...) of social cognition. Relying on resources coming from the ecological approach to psychology and the phenomenological tradition in psychiatry, we propose that the concept of Social Perception should be used to refer to low-level pre-reflective processes underlying the awareness of interpersonal interactions with and between others. Clinical data suggests that people with schizophrenia have problems perceiving social situations as opportunities for social engagement, so, in order to fulfil this explanatory need, we propose that the term should be used to capture this important—yet neglected—domain of social cognition. We conclude with the discussion of some future directions for research derived from our proposal. (shrink)

The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. Most involved in the debate about the explanation of the ToM deficit have failed to notice that autism’s status as a spectrum disorder has implications about which explanation is more plausible. In this paper, I argue that the shift from viewing autism as a unified syndrome to a spectrum disorder increases the plausibility of the explanation (...) of the ToM deficit that appeals to a domain-specific, higher-level ToM module. First, I discuss what it means to consider autism as a spectrum rather than as a unified disorder. Second, I argue for the plausibility of the modular explanation on the basis that autism is better considered as a spectrum disorder. Third, I respond to a potential challenge to my account from Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone’s recent work (Gerrans, Biol Philos 17:305–321, 2002; Stone and Gerrans, Trends Cogn Sci 10:3–4, 2006a; Soc Neurosci 1:309–319, 2006b; Gerrans and Stone, Br J Philos Sci 59:121–141, 2008). (shrink)

Social cognition differs from general cognition in its focus on understanding, perceiving, and interpreting social information. However, we argue that the significance of domain‐general processes for controlling cognition has been historically undervalued in social cognition and social neuroscience research. We suggest much of social cognition can be characterized as specialized feature representations supported by domain‐general cognitive control systems. To test this proposal, we develop a comprehensive working model, based on an interactive activation and competition architecture and applied to (...) the control of action. As such, we label the model “ICON” (interactive activation and competition model for the control of action). We used the ICON model to simulate human performance across various laboratory tasks. Our simulations emphasize that many laboratory‐based social tasks do not require socially specific control systems, such as those that are argued to rely on neural networks associated with theory‐of‐mind. Moreover, our model clarifies that perceived disruptions in social cognition, even in what appears to be disruption to the control of social cognition, can stem from deficits in social representation instead. We advocate for a “default stance” in social cognition, where control is usually general, but representation is specific. This study underscores the importance of integrating social cognition within the broader realm of domain‐general control processing, offering a unified perspective on task processing. (shrink)

Schizophrenia patients exhibit impairments across multiple clinical, cognitive, and functional domains. A fundamental abnormality of the timing and/or efficiency of neural processes across disparate brain regions (i.e., cortico-cortical communications) may underlie many of the deficits in schizophrenia. Because gamma synchrony is temporally correlated with many cognitive processes, probing patterns of gamma activation may shed light on the functional integrity of neural circuits in schizophrenia and related disorders.

The noisy computation hypothesis of developmental dyslexia (DD) is particularly appealing because it can explain deficits across a variety of domains, such as temporal, auditory, phonological, visual and attentional processes. A key prediction is that noisy computations lead to more variable and less stable word representations. A way to test this hypothesis is through repetition of words, that is, when there is noise in the system, the neural signature of repeated stimuli should be more variable. The hypothesis was tested in (...) an functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment with dyslexic and typical readers by repeating words twelve times. Variability measures were computed both at the behavioral and neural levels. At the behavioral level, we compared the standard deviation of reaction time distributions of repeated words. At the neural level, in addition to standard univariate analyses and measures of intra-item variability, we also used multivariate pattern analyses (representational similarity and classification) to find out whether there was evidence for noisier representations in dyslexic readers compared to typical readers. Results showed that there were no significant differences between the two groups in any of the analyses despite robust results within each group (i.e., high representational similarity between repeated words, good classification of words vs. non-words). In summary, there was no evidence in favor of the idea that dyslexic readers would have noisier neural representations than typical readers. (shrink)

This study characterizes a large sample of adults with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and healthy controls regarding their task performance and neurophysiology; cross-sectionally and longitudinally. Self-reported symptoms, behavioral measures, and event-related potentials from a classical cued Go/NoGo task were used to outline the symptom burden, executive function deficits and neurophysiological features, and the associations between these domains. The study participants were assessed five or three times over two years. We describe cross-sectional and longitudinal group differences, and associations between symptom burden, and (...) behavioral and event-related potential components variables by latent growth curve models, including random slopes and intercepts. The ADHD group showed increased reaction time variability, increased commission and omission errors, and attenuated cueP3, CNV, N2d, and P3d amplitudes. We observed a decrease in self-reported symptoms in the ADHD group over the two years. The behavioral measures did not change over time, whereas the cueP3, P3d, and N2d amplitude attenuated in both groups. There was no evidence for a robust association between symptom burden and behavioral or ERP measures. The changes in the ERP components with stable task performance, potentially indicate more efficient neuronal processing over the two years. Whether the lack of association between symptom burden and behavioral or ERP measures might be due to the low reliability of the ADHD assessment criteria, or the inappropriateness of the objective measures cannot be inferred. (shrink)

Sensory deficits are a feature of autism and schizophrenia, as well as the upper end of their non-clinical spectra. The mismatch negativity, an index of pre-attentive auditory processing, is particularly sensitive in detecting such deficits; however, little is known about the relationship between the visual MMN to facial emotions and autism and schizophrenia spectrum symptom domains. We probed the vMMN to happy, sad, and neutral faces in 61 healthy adults, and evaluated their degree of autism and schizophrenia spectrum traits using (...) the Autism Spectrum Quotient and Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire. The vMMN to happy faces was significantly larger than the vMMNs to sad and neutral faces. The vMMN to happy faces was associated with interpersonal difficulties as indexed by AQ Communication and Attention to Detail subscales, and SPQ associated with more interpersonal difficulties. These data suggest that pre-attentive processing of positive affect might be more specific to the interpersonal features associated with autism and schizophrenia. These findings add valuable insights into the growing body of literature investigating symptom-specific neurobiological markers of autism and schizophrenia spectrum conditions. (shrink)

In a discussion about human enhancement it is common to make a distinction between medical treatment and enhancement. The treatment‐enhancement (TE) distinction may work as long as we are faced with extreme and evident examples of treatments and enhancements, but it leaves us with unanswered questions if we are confronted with the borderlines cases in the muddy gray area between obvious treatment and obvious enhancement. This chapter focuses on this gray area, shows its complexities, and asks how we can answer (...) questions regarding the medical domain, or regarding the moral obligation for reimbursement if we cannot depend on the TE distinction. The example of adult attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is used to show how difficult it is to distinguish between treatment of disease and enhancement of normal function, especially given the phenomena of medicalization, disease mongering, and expanding disease definitions. (shrink)

Emerging evidence supports the role for the intracellular domains of amyloid precursor protein (APP) in the physiology and function of APP. In this short report, I discuss the hypothesis that mutation of Tyr682 on the Y682ENPTY687 C‐terminal motif of APP may be directly or indirectly associated with alterations in APP functioning and activity, leading to neuronal defects and deficits. Mutation of Tyr682 induces an early and progressive age‐dependent cognitive and locomotor decline that is associated with a loss of synaptic connections, (...) a decrease in cholinergic tone, and defects in NGF signaling. These findings support a model in which APP‐C‐terminal domain exerts a pathogenic function in neuronal development and decline, and suggest that Tyr682 potentially could modulate the properties of APP metabolites in humans. (shrink)

The concept of agency is of crucial importance in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, and it is often used as an intuitive and rather uncontroversial term, in contrast to more abstract and theoretically heavy-weighted terms like “intentionality”, “rationality” or “mind”. However, most of the available definitions of agency are either too loose or unspecific to allow for a progressive scientific program. They implicitly and unproblematically assume the features that characterize agents, thus obscuring the full potential and challenge of modeling (...) agency. We identify three conditions that a system must meet in order to be considered as a genuine agent: a) a system must define its own individuality, b) it must be the active source of activity in its environment (interactionalasymmetry) and c) it must regulate this activity in relation to certain norms (normativity). We find that even minimal forms of proto-celular systems can already provide a paradigmatic example of genuine agency. By abstracting away some specific details of minimal models of living agency we define the kind of organization that is capable to meet the required conditions for agency (which is not restricted to living organisms). On this basis, we define agency as an autonomous organization that adaptively regulates its coupling with its environment and contributes to sustaining itself as a consequence. We find that spatiality and temporality are the two fundamental domains in which agency spans at different scales. We conclude by giving an outlook to the road that lies ahead in the pursuit to understand, model and synthesis agents. (shrink)

In the haptic domain, a double dissociation can be proposed on the basis of neurological deficits between tactile information for action, represented by tactile apraxia, and tactile information for perception, represented by tactile agnosia. We suggest that this dissociation comes from different networks, both involving the anterior intraparietal area of the posterior parietal cortex.

Two decades ago, the introduction of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) sparked enthusiastic reactions. With implicit measures like the IAT, researchers hoped to finally be able to bridge the gap between self-reported attitudes on one hand and behavior on the other. Twenty years of research and several meta-analyses later, however, we have to conclude that neither the IAT nor its derivatives have fulfilled these expectations. Their predictive value for behavioral criteria is weak and their incremental validity over and above self-report (...) measures is negligible. In our review, we present an overview of explanations for these unsatisfactory findings and delineate promising ways forward. Over the years, several reasons for the IAT’s weak predictive validity have been proposed. They point to four potentially problematic features: First, the IAT is by no means a pure measure of individual differences in associations but suffers from extraneous influences like recoding. Hence, the predictive validity of IAT-scores should not be confused with the predictive validity of associations. Second, with the IAT, we usually aim to measure evaluation (“liking”) instead of motivation (“wanting”). Yet, behavior might be determined much more often by the latter than the former. Third, the IAT focuses on measuring associations instead of propositional beliefs and thus taps into a construct that might be too unspecific to account for behavior. Finally, studies on predictive validity are often characterized by a mismatch between predictor and criterion (e.g., while behavior is highly context-specific, the IAT usually takes into account neither situation nor domain). Recent research, however, also revealed advances addressing each of these problems, namely (1) procedural and analytical advances to control for recoding in the IAT, (2) measurement procedures to assess implicit wanting, (3) measurement procedures to assess implicit beliefs, and (4) approaches to increase the fit between implicit measures and behavioral criteria (e.g., by incorporating contextual information). Implicit measures like the IAT hold an enormous potential. In order to allow them to fulfill this potential, however, we have to refine our understanding of these measures, and we should incorporate recent conceptual and methodological advancements. This review provides specific recommendations on how to do so. (shrink)

We argue that thought insertion primarily involves a disruption of the sense of ownership for thoughts and that the lack of a sense of agency is but a consequence of this disruption. We defend the hypothesis that this disruption of the sense of ownership stems from a fail- ure in the online integration of the contextual information related to a thought, in partic- ular contextual information concerning the different causal factors that may be implicated in their production. Loss of unity (...) of consciousness, manifested by incoherent subjective experiences is a general phenomenal characteristic of schizophrenia. This loss of coherence has been hypothesized to reflect a generalized deficit of contextual information integration not conveyed by, but related to, a target event. This deficit is manifested across many cog- nitive domains. We argue that it is also manifested in the process of thinking itself, result- ing in causally decontextualized thoughts that are experienced as inserted thoughts. (shrink)

This paper concerns virtue-based ethical principles that bear upon agricultural uses of technologies, such as GM crops and CRISPR crops. It does three things. First, it argues for a new type of virtue ethics approach to such cases. Typical virtue ethics principles are vague and unspecific. These are sometimes useful, but we show how to supplement them with more specific virtue ethics principles that are useful to people working in specific applied domains, where morally relevant domain-specific conditions recur. (...) We do this while still fulfilling the need for principles and associated practical reasoning to flexibly respect variation between cases. Second, with our more detailed approach we criticize and improve upon a commonly discussed principle about ecosystemic external goods that are crucial for human flourishing. We show this principle is far more conservative than appreciated, as it would prohibit many technology uses that are uncontroversially acceptable. We then replace this principle with two more specific ones. One identifies specific conditions in which ecosystem considerations are against a technology use, the other identifies favorable conditions. Third, we uncover a humility-based principle that operates within an influential “hubris argument” against uses of several biotechnologies in agriculture. These arguments lack a substantive theory of the nature of humility. We clarify such a theory, and then use it to replace the uncovered humility-based principle with our own more specific one that shifts focus from past moral failings, to current epistemic limits when deciding whether to support new technologies. (shrink)

This paper concerns virtue-based ethical principles that bear upon agricultural uses of technologies, such as GM crops and CRISPR crops. It does three things. First, it argues for a new type of virtue ethics approach to such cases. Typical virtue ethics principles are vague and unspecific. These are sometimes useful, but we show how to supplement them with more specific virtue ethics principles that are useful to people working in specific applied domains, where morally relevant domain-specific conditions recur. (...) We do this while still fulfilling the need for principles and associated practical reasoning to flexibly respect variation between cases. Second, with our more detailed approach we criticize and improve upon a commonly discussed principle about ecosystemic external goods that are crucial for human flourishing. We show this principle is far more conservative than appreciated, as it would prohibit many technology uses that are uncontroversially acceptable. We then replace this principle with two more specific ones. One identifies specific conditions in which ecosystem considerations are against a technology use, the other identifies favorable conditions. Third, we uncover a humility-based principle that operates within an influential “hubris argument” against uses of several biotechnologies in agriculture. These arguments lack a substantive theory of the nature of humility. We clarify such a theory, and then use it to replace the uncovered humility-based principle with our own more specific one that shifts focus from past moral failings, to current epistemic limits when deciding whether to support new technologies. (shrink)

We critically address current theories of figurative language, focusing on the role of literal or compositional meaning in the interpretation of non-literal expressions, including idioms and metaphors. Specifically, we formulate and discuss the processing hypothesis that compositional meaning may either facilitate or impede the recovery or construction of the intended figurative meaning depending on multiple factors, and in particular, on the expression’s decomposability and on the “strength” of semantic relations between the compositional and figurative meanings. As a case study, we (...) consider research on processing and acquisition of figurative expressions in highly verbal individuals with autism spectrum disorder in comparison to neuro-typical individuals, and examine the factors that may account for the observed comprehension deficits in the ASD group. Based on this evidence, we discuss some of the strategies employed by language users in processing non-compositional or non-literal expressions, and we highlight implications for research on natural language comprehension and processing systems in the domain of figurative meaning. (shrink)

A long-standing puzzle for moral philosophers and psychologists alike is the concept of psychopathy, a personality disorder marked by tendencies to defy moral norms despite cognitive knowledge about right and wrong. Previously, discussions of the moral deficits of psychopathy have focused on willingness to harm and cheat others as well as reasoning about rule-based transgressions. Yet recent research in moral psychology has begun to more clearly define the domains of morality, en- compassing issues of harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and spiritual (...) purity. Clinical descriptions and theories of psychopathy suggest that deficits may exist primarily in the areas of harm and fairness, although quantitative evidence is scarce. Within a broad sample of participants, we found that scores on a measure of psychopathy predicted sharply lower scores on the harm and fairness subscales of a measure of moral concern, but showed no relationship with authority, and very small relationships with ingroup and purity. On a measure of willingness to violate moral standards for money, psychopathy scores predicted greater willingness to violate moral concerns of any type. Results are further explored via potential mediators and analyses of the two factors of psychopathy. (shrink)

Harcourt argues that in clinical contexts, children and young people with mental health illness can experience epistemic, specifically testimonial, injustice when their perspectives are unjustifiably discounted by health service providers.1 Our goal in this commentary was to illustrate how caregivers, a critical component of CYP treatment triad, can also engage in testimonial injustice towards CYP patients. Testimonial injustice occurs when one suffers a credibility deficit and that credibility deficit is based on prejudice.2 Harcourt expands Fricker’s account of testimonial (...) injustice by arguing that for CYPs, the credibility deficits attributed to them by clinicians, for example, may result from epistemic arrogance in that CYPs are viewed as having unreliable knowledge about their condition. Harcourt writes: ‘Being a CYP is treated as a heuristic for epistemic unreliability across a wide range of domains’, including clinical settings. Harcourt’s expansion of Fricker’s account thus includes epistemic arrogance as an alternative necessary condition, in addition to prejudice, to apply the concept of testimonial injustice. We think Harcourt’s argument can also be extended to caregivers, who are central to the CYP treatment triad. We illustrate how this may be the case by drawing from research we conducted to understand the perspectives of clinicians and prospective families, both caregivers and paediatric patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder about the possibility of …. (shrink)

It is frequently claimed that nursing is vital to the safe, humane provision of health care and health service to our populations. It is also recognized however, that nursing is a costly health care resource that must be used effectively and efficiently. There is a growing recognition, from within the nursing profession, health care policy makers and society, of the need to analyse the contribution of nursing to health care and its costs. This becomes increasingly pertinent and urgent in a (...) situation, such as that existing in Ireland, where the current financial crisis has lead to public sector employment moratoria, staff cuts and staffing deficits, combined with increased patient expectation, escalating health care costs, and a health care system restructuring and reform agenda. Such factors, increasingly common internationally, make the identification and effective use of the nursing contribution to health care an issue of international importance. This paper seeks to explore the nature of nursing and the function of the nurse within a 21st century health care system, with a focus on the Irish context. However, this analysis fits into and is relevant to the international context and discussion regarding the nursing workforce. This paper uses recent empirical studies exploring the domains of activity and focus of nursing, together with nurses perceptions of their role and work environment, in order to connect those findings with core conceptual questions about the nature and function of nursing. (shrink)

The paper outlines why and how political institutions, especially constitutional ones, matter for what decisions are made in the political process and thereby for how the economy functions. The main part contains a survey of empirical studies in this area. Among the things covered: the effects of political and economic freedom, not least property rights, on economic growth; how stricter budgetprocess rules affect tendencies for deficits; the role of electoral systems for shaping policies and affecting fiscal deficits; and the effects (...) of separation of powers – e.g., federalism and referenda – on government size.Ce papier retrace dans les grandes lignes pourquoi et comment les institutions politiques, notamment celles de nature constitutionnelle, importent pour les décisions prises au niveau politique et en conséquence sur la manière dont fonctionne l’économie. La majeure partie du papier consiste en un examen des études empiriques dans ce domaine. Parmi les choses analysées : les effets de la liberté politique et économique, en particulier les droits de propriété, sur la croissance économique ; comment des règles plus strictes lors de l’élaboration du budget influent sur la tendance au déficit ; le rôle des systèmes électoraux dans l’élaboration des politiques et dans la taille des déficits ; et les effets de la séparation des pouvoirs – par exemple fédéralisme et referenda – sur la taille du gouvernement. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Psychiatric Comorbidity:More Than a Kuhnian AnomalyPeter Zachar (bio)Keywordscomorbidity, classification, epidemiology, differential diagnosis, personality disorderDr. Aragona's article in this issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology makes some important points regarding the relationship between comorbidity rates and the classification system currently used in psychiatry. Particularly persuasive is his claim that observed patterns of comorbidity are, in important respects, consequences of the structure of the classification system. I am not convinced, however, (...) that comorbidity is best conceptualized as an artifact of the taxonic structure of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). Instead, I suggest that the use of dichotomies such as true versus artifactual should be used with caution when psychiatric classification is being discussed.In contrast with the artifact hypothesis, I argue that the phenomena covered by the term "comorbidity" are real, expectable features of the psychiatric domain. They are not the phlogiston and luminiferous ether of psychiatry. I am skeptical of the notion that high comorbidity rates as a whole can be understood as Kuhnian anomalies, or that there is a crisis, or that after a period of revolutionary science a new paradigm would eliminate these 'anomalies.' In short, high rates of comorbidity in psychiatry will not simply disappear once scientists develop a better nosological paradigm. High levels of comorbidity can, however, be both lowered and provided a better, evidence-based conceptual framework.Many Conditions, One OrganIn general medicine, comorbidity conventionally refers to the simultaneous occurrence of two independent disease processes or distinct clinical entities, such as heart disease and liver cancer (Feinstein, 1970; Jablensky 2004). The presence of one disease is supposed to affect the other in such a way that the co-occurrence of the two has implications for prognosis and treatment.Comorbidity in psychiatry is a broader concept, referring to a variety of conditions that overlap in multiple ways. The different kinds of overlap are amenable to detailed empirical analysis (e. g., Klein and Riso 1993; Neale and Kendler 1995). Depressive reactions to primary disorders, attention deficit symptoms associated with mania, panic attacks in the context of severe borderline personality disorder, substance abuse disorders among psychopaths, histrionic dynamics combined [End Page 13] with narcissistic personality traits, and emergent conditions such as schizoaffective disorder are all distinct types of comorbidity. The kinds of overlapping conditions just listed are sometimes termed psychiatric comorbidity. Also important is comorbidity between psychiatric disorders and general medical conditions as is studied in behavioral medicine and health psychology. The crisis, if there is one, is a crisis of comorbidities.The heart disease and liver cancer type of comorbidity as independent organ systems being affected is ruled out a priori in psychiatric comorbidity proper. In psychiatry, "psychopathological disease processes" can all be expected to affect a single organ, namely the brain or, more likely, affect the different systems that are tightly integrated in the brain. The tight integration can make putative comorbid psychiatric disorders difficult to disentangle.It is a widely held consensus that causes, not organ systems, are what matter in comorbidity. In this tradition, Dr. Aragona claims that in general medicine shared symptoms between two diseases (such as fever and fatigue) are not a problem because the diseases are differentiated with respect to etiology; in psychiatry, however, where syndromes are differentiated by a description of symptoms only, symptomatic overlap is a problem.Is descriptive psychopathology, therefore, a root cause of the "crisis of comorbidity" and should it be abandoned in favor of etiological classification? Unfortunately, forcing psychiatric nosology to conform to an etiological paradigm is unlikely to resolve the problem of psychiatric comorbidity. As noted, the problem is one of distinguishing between the different etiological disease processes that are affecting tightly integrated systems in the brain. The brain as a whole is a multilevel, dynamic, and open system, which has an ecology (Zachar 2000). As argued by Kendler (2005) and Schaffner (2002, 2008), it has not thus far, and may never be fully possible to segregate causes and their associated psychiatric disorders into parsimonious etiological packages. In the ecology of neuroscience, causes and effects tend to merge in a continuous series of common pathways.It would be foolish... (shrink)

Several theories propose that one of the core functions of inner speech (IS) is to support subjects in the completion of cognitively effortful tasks, especially those involving executive functions (EF). In this paper we focus on two populations who notoriously encounter difficulties in performing EF tasks, namely, people diagnosed with schizophrenia who experience auditory verbal hallucinations (Sz-AVH) and people within the Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC). We focus on these two populations because they represent two different ways in which IS can (...) fail to help in EF tasks, which can be illustrative for other mental conditions. First, we review the main components of EF (Section 1). Then we explain the functions that IS is taken to perform in the domain of EF (Section 2) and review the evidence concerning problems about EF in the two populations of our study: Sz-AVH (Section 3) and ASC (Section 4). After this we further detail our account about what a properly functioning IS can do for both populations and how different IS profiles may impact EF performance: in the case of Sz-AVH, the uncontrolled and intrusive character of IS negatively affects EF performance, whereas in ASC, EF is not sufficiently supported by IS, given the tendency in this population to present a diminished use of IS (Section 5). We finally briefly discuss Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and Developmental Language Disorders (DLD). (shrink)

Is autism a condition internal to the person that causes problems in social interaction? Or should we conceive of autism primarily at the level of interaction, as a “two-way” phenomenon that develops in the relation between the person with autism and her social-material environment? Over the last decade or so, this issue has increasingly gained interest, not only in academia, but also in the field of mental health care and in the wider public domain.Much is at stake here. Framing (...) autism as an internal deficit or rather as an interaction phenomenon has far-reaching implications for scientific research and clinical practice. It steers the focus of autism research by determining the kind of... (shrink)

Here we explore whether mental training in the form of meditation can help to overcome age-related attentional decline. We compared performance on the attentional blink task between three populations: A group of long-term meditation practitioners within an older population, a control group of age-matched participants and a control group of young participants. Members of both control groups had never practiced meditation. Our results show that long-term meditation practice leads to a reduction of the attentional blink. Meditation practitioners taken from an (...) older population showed a reduction in blink as compared to a control group taken from a younger population, whereas, the control group age-matched to the meditators’ group revealed a blink that was comparatively larger and broader. Our results support the hypothesis that meditation practice can: alter the efficiency with which attentional resources are distributed and help to overcome age-related attentional deficits in the temporal domain. (shrink)

Congenital amusia in its most common form is a disorder characterized by a musical pitch processing deficit. Although pitch is involved in conveying emotion in music, the implications for pitch deficits on musical emotion judgements is still under debate. Relatedly, both limited and spared musical emotion recognition was reported in amusia in conditions where emotion cues were not determined by musical mode or dissonance. Additionally, assumed links between musical abilities and visuo-spatial attention processes need further investigation in congenital amusics. (...) Hence, we here test to what extent musical emotions can influence attentional performance. Fifteen congenital amusic adults and fifteen healthy controls matched for age and education were assessed in three attentional conditions: executive control, alerting, and orienting while music expressing either joy, tenderness, sadness, or tension was presented. Visual target detection was in the normal range for both accuracy and response times in the amusic relative to the control participants. Moreover, in both groups, music exposure produced facilitating effects on selective attention that appeared to be driven by the arousal dimension of musical emotional content, with faster correct target detection during joyful compared to sad music. These findings corroborate the idea that pitch processing deficits related to congenital amusia do not impede other cognitive domains, particularly visual attention. Furthermore, our study uncovers an intact influence of music and its emotional content on the attentional abilities of amusic individuals. The results highlight the domain-selectivity of the pitch disorder in congenital amusia, which largely spares the development of visual attention and affective systems. (shrink)

It is often assumed that similar domain-specific behavioural impairments found in cases of adult brain damage and developmental disorders correspond to similar underlying causes, and can serve as convergent evidence for the modular structure of the normal adult cognitive system. We argue that this correspondence is contingent on an unsupported assumption that atypical development can produce selective deficits while the rest of the system develops normally (Residual Normality), and that this assumption tends to bias data collection in the field. (...) Based on a review of connectionist models of acquired and developmental disorders in the domains of reading and past tense, as well as on new simulations, we explore the computational viability of Residual Normality and the potential role of development in producing behavioural deficits. Simulations demonstrate that damage to a developmental model can produce very different effects depending on whether it occurs prior to or following the training process. Because developmental disorders typically involve damage prior to learning, we conclude that the developmental process is a key component of the explanation of endstate impairments in such disorders. Further simulations demonstrate that in simple connectionist learning systems, the assumption of Residual Normality is undermined by processes of compensation or alteration elsewhere in the system. We outline the precise computational conditions required for Residual Normality to hold in development, and suggest that in many cases it is an unlikely hypothesis. We conclude that in developmental disorders, inferences from behavioural deficits to underlying structure crucially depend on developmental conditions, and that the process of ontogenetic development cannot be ignored in constructing models of developmental disorders. Key Words: Acquired and developmental disorders; connectionist models; modularity; past tense; reading. (shrink)

In this review, we summarize studies investigating comprehension of three core grammatical structures (Subject-Verb-Object word order, grammatical aspect and wh-questions) in diverse samples of Mandarin-acquiring preschoolers with ASD, all utilizing the Intermodal Preferential Looking (IPL) paradigm. Results showed that children with ASD, though they were delayed in chronological age and expressive language (including significantly lower vocabulary production scores), acquired various grammatical constructions similarly to their typically developing peers. Moreover, Mandarin-acquiring preschoolers with ASD demonstrated similar acquisition patterns of these three core (...) grammatical structures, as has been reported in previous IPL studies among English-acquiring children with ASD (Naigles & Fein, 2017). Thus, the results testify that universal underlying mechanisms are playing vital roles in grammatical acquisition of children with ASD across languages (e.g., the setting of word order parameters, the preservation of functional morphemes, the universal operation of WH-Movement), despite their pervasive social cognition impairments. These findings suggest that core grammatical knowledge may be preserved in children with ASD, even in the face of radical differences in language environment and social/communicative deficits, supporting the contribution of the language faculty in autistic language acquisition. The results shed light on the sharp contrast between linguistic competence (governed by the internal computational system of the language faculty) vs. linguistic performance (affected by loci of impairment in the sensory-motor and the conceptual-intentional interfaces) in ASD. Furthermore, the results highlight the dissociation between the lexical vs. the grammatical modules in ASD, supporting a modular view of the diverse language domains in the language faculty. (shrink)

Creativity is commonly thought of as a positive advance for society that transcends the status quo knowledge. Humans display an inordinate capacity for it in a broad range of activities, with art being only one. Most work on creativity’s neural substrates measures general creativity, and that is done with laboratory tasks, whereas specific creativity in art is gleaned from acquired brain damage, largely in observing established visual artists, and some in visual de novo artists (became artists after the damage). The (...) verb “to create” has been erroneously equated with creativity; creativity, in the classic sense, does not appear to be enhanced following brain damage, regardless of etiology. The turning to communication through art in lieu of language deficits reflects a biological survival strategy. Creativity in art, and in other domains, is most likely dependent on intact and healthy knowledge and semantic conceptual systems, which are represented in several pathways in the cortex. It is adversely affected when these systems are dysfunctional, for congenital reasons (savant autism) or because of acquired brain damage (stroke, dementia, Parkinson’s), whereas inherent artistic talent and skill appear less affected. Clues to the neural substrates of general creativity and specific art creativity can be gleaned from considering that art is produced spontaneously mainly by humans, that there are unique neuroanatomical and neurofunctional organizations in the human brain, and that there are biological antecedents of innovation in animals. (shrink)

The ambiguity regarding whether a given intervention is perceived as enhancement or as therapy might contribute to the angst that the public expresses with respect to endorsement of enhancement. We set out to develop empirical data that explored this. We used Amazon Mechanical Turk to recruit participants from Canada and the United States. Each individual was randomly assigned to read one vignette describing the use of a pill to enhance one of 12 cognitive, affective or social domains. The vignettes described (...) a situation in which an individual was using a pill to enhance the relevant domain under one of two possible enhancement conditions, one perceived as enhancing above the norm, what most people recognize as a clear case of enhancement, whereas the other perceived as enhancing towards the norm, with the individual using the enhancement having a modest, but subclinical deficit. Participants were asked how comfortable they were with the individual using the enhancement and about the impact the enhancement might have had in the individuals’ success in life. We found that irrespective of the domain to be enhanced, participants felt significantly more comfortable with ETN than with EAN, and they regarded the enhancement intervention as contributing to greater success in life with ETN rather than EAN. These data demonstrate that the therapy enhancement distinction is morally salient to the public, and that this distinction contributes to the angst that people feel when considering the propriety of CAS enhancement. (shrink)

Major neurocognitive changes occur during adolescence, making this phase as one of the most critical developmental period of life. Furthermore, this phase in life is also the time in youth substance use has its onset. Several studies demonstrated the differential associations of alcohol and cannabis use concerning the neurocognitive functioning of both males and females. Past and contemporary literature on gender-specific effects in neuroscience of addiction is predominantly based on cross-sectional datasets and data that is limited in terms of measurement (...) variability. Given the importance of gender-specific effects in addiction studies, and in order to address the two above-mentioned gaps in the literature, the present study aimed to compare neurocognitive functioning of male and female adolescents in the context of cannabis and alcohol use, while employing a longitudinal design with multiple repeated measurements. Participants were 3,826 high school students (47% female; mean age, 12.7), which were recruited from 31 high schools in the greater Montreal area. Participants were requested to complete annual surveys for five consequent years, from 7th to 11th grade, assessing their alcohol/cannabis use and neurocognitive functioning (working memory, delayed recall memory, perceptual reasoning, and inhibition control). The analytical strategy was focused on the longitudinal association between each predictor (female, male) and each of the outcomes (domains of neurocognitive functioning). Multilevel linear models assessed the association of alcohol and cannabis consumption and the four domains of neurocognitive functioning. Results revealed a gender by within-subject interaction, suggesting a weaker effect of yearly fluctuation of cannabis use on working memory among males compared to females. Our findings suggest a different pattern of neurocognitive impairment of female and male working memory after using cannabis over the course of adolescence. Early initiation of cannabis use potentially results in more spatial working memory deficits in female adolescents. This may negatively influence young females’ capacity in academic settings and lead to significant impairment in adulthood, which critically decreases the individual’s quality of life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 55-59 [Access article in PDF] One Stage Is Not Enough Andrew W. Young and Karel W. de Pauw Keywords: delusions, Cotard delusion, Capgras delusion, cognitive neuropsychiatry. WE WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY to offer our reflections on Philip Gerrans' interesting paper. Our opinion is that on fundamental issues we agree quite a bit—but there are clear differences when it comes to details.The most basic issue (...) concerns the nature of the enterprise. Like Gerrans, we think that it is possible to create testable accounts of the formation and maintenance of what would otherwise seem bizarre and inexplicable delusions, and that these accounts should be grounded in theoretical models of factors that underpin our everyday perception and reasoning. This general approach certainly forms part of what has been called cognitive neuropsychiatry. However, we disagree with Gerrans in that we see cognitive neuropsychiatry as an attempt to draw on the underlying logic of cognitive neuropsychology, rather than (as Gerrans implies) its current methods. The underlying logic of cognitive neuropsychological approaches has been to try to understand the effects of brain injury in terms of disruption of different components of theoretical models of normal abilities. In this approach, a model of normal performance is tested by its ability to account for the effects of brain injury. Where the model of normal performance also provides a convincing account of brain injury it is retained, and when it fails to account for effects of brain injury, it is revised or abandoned. In cognitive neuropsychiatry, the key theoretical move has been to argue that an adequate model of normal performance should be able to account for any disordered pattern (Ellis and Young 1990). The same logic of seeking to explain disordered performance by reference to models of normal function is then attempted, but for disorders that would usually fall within the province of psychiatry.In our opinion, however, cognitive neuropsychiatry will not simply involve importing the methods of cognitive neuropsychology into the new domain; they will need to be developed and adapted to fit the new agenda (Young 2000).In cognitive neuropsychology, progress has often come from the careful investigation of people with stable, selective deficits of fundamental cognitive functions involved in sensory analysis, memory, and verbal or motor output. In contrast, delusional beliefs can be relatively unstable; often they are only held for a few weeks or even days. When the delusions change, patients may modify or abandon them as suddenly as they seemed to form them, or they may give them up much more slowly and reluctantly. At the very least, this creates difficulties in the timing of investigations and in interpreting the relation of deficits and symptoms, which may be recorded on separate dates. These methodological problems [End Page 55] are exacerbated by the fact that deficits linked to complex abnormal experiences such as delusions may be multifaceted and diffuse, even when the delusions themselves have a specific content or theme. Such complications do not invalidate cognitive neuropsychiatry, but they do mean it will need to develop its own methods for dealing with them and making appropriate inferences.One of the key complexities that has surfaced already involves the idea that delusional beliefs might reflect the interaction of two or more contributory factors. Gerrans discusses a particular variant of this idea, which had been suggested by Young and Leafhead (1996) as an approach to understanding the Cotard delusion: The Cotard delusion represents a depressed person's attempt to account for abnormal perceptual experiences. It follows that the delusion is based on an unfortunate interaction between different contributory factors. One set of factors creates the abnormal perceptual experiences, which are characterised by lack of emotional responses and feelings of emptiness, depersonalisation and derealisation. The other factors result in a misinterpretation of these perceptual changes, in which the patients' depressed moods lead them correctly to attribute the changes to themselves, but to exaggerate their consequences. (Young and Leafhead, 1996, 166) Gerrans describes this as a two-stage account, but argues that a one-stage account based only on abnormal perceptual... (shrink)

Faced with current urgent calls for more trust in experts, especially in high impact and politically sensitive domains, such as climate science and COVID-19, the complex and problematic nature of public trust in experts and the need for a more critical approach to the topic are easy to overlook. Scepticism – at least in its Humean mitigated form that encourages independent, questioning attitudes – can prove valuable to democratic governance, but stands in opposition to the cognitive dependency entailed by epistemic (...) trust. In this paper, we investigate the tension between the value of mitigated scepticism – understood as the exercise of reason-based doubt in a particular domain – and the need for trust in experts. We offer four arguments in favour of mitigated scepticism: the argument from loss of intellectual autonomy; the argument from democratic deficit; the argument from the normative failures of science; and the argument from past and current injustices. These arguments highlight the tension between the requirements for trust and justified scepticism about the role of experts. One solution, which we reject, is the idea that reliance, rather than trust, is sufficient for the purposes of accommodating experts in policy matters. The solution we endorse is to create a ‘climate of trust’, where questioning experts and expertise is welcomed, but the epistemic trust necessary for action upon information which the public cannot obtain first-hand is enabled and encouraged through structural, institutional, and justice-based measures. (shrink)

Both unipolar and bipolar depression have been linked with impairments in executive functioning. In particular, mood symptom severity is associated with differences in common EF, a latent measure of general EF abilities. The relationship between mood disorders and EF is particularly salient in adolescence and young adulthood when the ongoing development of EF intersects with a higher risk of mood disorder onset. However, it remains unclear if common EF impairments have associations with specific symptom dimensions of mood pathology such as (...) blunted positive affect, mood instability, or physiological arousal, or if differences in common EF more broadly relate to what is shared across various symptom domains, such as general negative affect or distress. To address this question, bifactor models can be applied to simultaneously examine the shared and unique contributions of particular mood symptom dimensions. However, no studies to our knowledge have examined bifactor models of mood symptoms in relation to measures of common EF. This study examined associations between common EF and general vs. specific symptom dimensions using structural equation modeling in adolescents and young adults with varying severity of mood symptoms. A General Depression factor capturing shared variance across symptoms statistically predicted lower Common EF. Additionally, a factor specific to physiological arousal was associated with lower Common EF. Anhedonia-specific and Mania-specific factors were not significantly related to Common EF. Altogether, these results indicate that deficits in common EF are driven by, or reflect, general features of mood pathology that are shared across symptom dimensions but are also specifically associated with physiological arousal. (shrink)

Theory of mind” consists in the ability to use concepts of intentional mental states, such as beliefs, emotions, intentions, goals, and perceptual states, in order to predict and interpret behavior. Functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have revealed a distinctive network of neural regions that is active during theory-of-mind tasks, including the temporal-parietal junction, the posterior superior temporal sulcus, the medial prefrontal cortex, the precuneus, and the temporal poles (Van Overwalle 2009). Deficits in theory-of-mind abilities, which are common in autism spectrum (...) disorder (Tager-Flusberg 2007), typically correlate with broader difficulties in social understanding. -/- Many scholars have suggested that theory of mind is an innate adaptation for social cognition, emerging very early in development and playing a crucial role in social learning and the acquisition of language (Baron-Cohen 1997). However, others have argued that theory of mind is the product of largely domain-general learning processes and is acquired gradually over the course development through social experience (Wellman 2014). A third view argues that humans possess two systems for theory of mind: an innate, domain-specific “implicit” system and a learned, domain-general “explicit” system (Apperly and Butterfill 2009). (shrink)