82 found
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  1. The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.
    After a long period of neglect, the phenomenology of action has recently regained its place in the agenda of philosophers and scientists alike. The recent explosion of interest in the topic highlights its complexity. The purpose of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework allowing for a more precise characterization of the many facets of the phenomenology of agency, of how they are related and of their possible sources. The key assumption guiding this attempt is that the processes through (...)
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  2. Intentions and Motor Representations: the Interface Challenge.Myrto Mylopoulos & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):317-336.
    A full account of purposive action must appeal not only to propositional attitude states like beliefs, desires, and intentions, but also to motor representations, i.e., non-propositional states that are thought to represent, among other things, action outcomes as well as detailed kinematic features of bodily movements. This raises the puzzle of how it is that these two distinct types of state successfully coordinate. We examine this so-called “Interface Problem”. First, we clarify and expand on the nature and role of motor (...)
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  3. Beyond Automaticity: The Psychological Complexity of Skill.Elisabeth Pacherie & Myrto Mylopoulos - 2020 - Topoi 40 (3):649-662.
    The objective of this paper is to characterize the rich interplay between automatic and cognitive control processes that we propose is the hallmark of skill, in contrast to habit, and what accounts for its flexibility. We argue that this interplay isn't entirely hierarchical and static, but rather heterarchical and dynamic. We further argue that it crucially depends on the acquisition of detailed and well-structured action representations and internal models, as well as the concomitant development of metacontrol processes that can be (...)
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  4. Intentions: The Dynamic Hierarchical Model Revisited.Elisabeth Pacherie & Myrto Mylopoulos - 2019 - WIREs Cognitive Science 10 (2):e1481.
    Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and global dynamics, and the ways in which they interact. (...)
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  5. Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of framing, (...)
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  6. Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients.E. Daprati, N. Franck, N. Georgieff, Joëlle Proust, Elisabeth Pacherie, J. Dalery & Marc Jeannerod - 1997 - Cognition 65 (1):71-86.
    The abilities to attribute an action to its proper agent and to understand its meaning when it is produced by someone else are basic aspects of human social communication. Several psychiatric syndromes, such as schizophrenia, seem to lead to a dysfunction of the awareness of one’s own action as well as of recognition of actions performed by other. Such syndromes offer a framework for studying the determinants of agency, the ability to correctly attribute actions to their veridical source. Thirty normal (...)
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  7. In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions.Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of (...)
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  8. How does it feel to act together?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):25-46.
    This paper on the phenomenology of joint agency proposes a foray into a little explored territory at the intersection of two very active domains of research: joint action and sense of agency. I explore two ways in which our experience of joint agency may differ from our experience of individual agency. First, the mechanisms of action specification and control involved in joint action are typically more complex than those present in individual actions, since it is crucial for joint action that (...)
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  9. Agency, simulation and self-identification.Marc Jeannerod & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.
    This paper is concerned with the problem of selfidentification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in selfidentification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated (...)
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  10. The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency vs. Joint-Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - In Axel Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments. MIT Press.
    This chapter aims at investigating the phenomenology of joint action and at gaining a better understanding of (1) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs from the sense of agency one has for individual actions and (2) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs according to the type of joint action and to the role one plays in it.
     
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  11. Framing Joint Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
    Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint actions intentionally joint. I first discuss two leading accounts of shared intentions, proposed by Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. I argue that Gilbert’s account imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is strictly needed and that Bratman’s account requires too much cognitive sophistication on the part of agents. I then turn to the team-agency theory developed by economists that I see as offering an alternative route to (...)
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  12.  80
    Toward a dynamic theory of intentions.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - In Susan Pockett (ed.), Does consciousness cause behaviour? Mit Press.
    In this paper, I shall offer a sketch of a dynamic theory of intentions. I shall argue that several categories or forms of intentions should be distinguished based on their different (and complementary) functional roles and on the different contents or types of contents they involve. I shall further argue that an adequate account of the distinctive nature of actions and of their various grades of intentionality depends on a large part on a proper understanding of the dynamic transitions among (...)
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  13. The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13:1 - 30.
    The now growing literature on the content and sources of the phenomenology of first-person agency highlights the multi-faceted character of the phenomenology of agency and makes it clear that the experience of agency includes many other experiences as components. This paper examines the possible relations between these components of our experience of acting and the processes involved in action specification and action control. After a brief discussion of our awareness of our goals and means of action, it will focus on (...)
     
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  14. Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions.Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):1-11.
    A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. In place of empiricism Campbell offers a rationalist account of monothematic delusions, according to which delusional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian framework propositions. We argue that neither Campbell's attack on empiricism nor his rationalist (...)
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  15. Nonconceptual representations for action and the limits of intentional control.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - Social Psychology 42 (1):67-73.
    In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relation- ships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of these movements, thus (...)
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  16. Out of nowhere: Thought insertion, ownership and context-integration.Jean-Remy Martin & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):111-122.
    We argue that thought insertion primarily involves a disruption of the sense of ownership for thoughts and that the lack of a sense of agency is but a consequence of this disruption. We defend the hypothesis that this disruption of the sense of ownership stems from a fail- ure in the online integration of the contextual information related to a thought, in partic- ular contextual information concerning the different causal factors that may be implicated in their production. Loss of unity (...)
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  17.  25
    Agents' pivotality and reward fairness modulate sense of agency in cooperative joint action.Solène Le Bars, Alexandre Devaux, Tena Nevidal, Valérian Chambon & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2020 - Cognition 195 (C):104117.
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  18. What are intentions?Elisabeth Pacherie & Patrick Haggard - 2010 - In L. Nadel & W. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. A tribute to Benjamin Libet. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 70--84.
    The concept of intention can do useful work in psychological theory. Many authors have insisted on a qualitative difference between prospective and intentions regarding their type of content, with prospective intentions generally being more abstract than immediate intentions. However, we suggest that the main basis of this distinction is temporal: prospective intentions necessarily occur before immediate intention and before action itself, and often long before them. In contrast, immediate intentions occur in the specific context of the action itself. Yet both (...)
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  19.  27
    Addressing joint action challenges in HRI: Insights from psychology and philosophy.Victor Fernandez Castro, Kathleen Belhassein, Amandine Mayima, Aurélie Clodic, Elisabeth Pacherie, Michèle Guidetti, Rachid Alami & Hélène Cochet - 2022 - Acta Psychologica 222 (103476):103476.
    The vast expansion of research in human-robot interactions (HRI) these last decades has been accompanied by the design of increasingly skilled robots for engaging in joint actions with humans. However, these advances have encountered significant challenges to ensure fluent interactions and sustain human motivation through the different steps of joint action. After exploring current literature on joint action in HRI, leading to a more precise definition of these challenges, the present article proposes some perspectives borrowed from psychology and philosophy showing (...)
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  20.  51
    Action co-representation and the sense of agency during a joint Simon task: Comparing human and machine co-agents.Aïsha Sahaï, Andrea Desantis, Ouriel Grynszpan, Elisabeth Pacherie & Bruno Berberian - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 67:44-55.
  21.  41
    The phenomenology of controlling a moving object with another person.John A. Dewey, Elisabeth Pacherie & Guenther Knoblich - 2014 - Cognition 132 (3):383-397.
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  22.  38
    Collective Emotion: A Framework for Experimental Research.Victor Chung, Julie Grèzes & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2024 - Emotion Review 16 (1):28-45.
    Research on collective emotion spans social sciences, psychology and philosophy. There are detailed case studies and diverse theories of collective emotion. However, experimental evidence regarding the universal characteristics, antecedents and consequences of collective emotion remains sparse. Moreover, current research mainly relies on emotion self-reports, accounting for the subjective experience of collective emotion and ignoring their cognitive and physiological bases. In response to these challenges, we argue for experimental research on collective emotion. We start with an overview of theoretical frameworks to (...)
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  23. From mirror neurons to joint actions.Elisabeth Pacherie & Jérôme Dokic - unknown
    The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with speculations on their potential role in the evolution of specifically human capacities. Thus, mirror neurons have been thought to ground many aspects of human social cognition, including the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions and to understand them. We propose an evaluation of this latter claim. On the one hand, we will argue that mirror neurons do not by themselves provide a (...)
     
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  24.  38
    Joint actions, commitments and the need to belong.Víctor Fernández Castro & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7597-7626.
    This paper concerns the credibility problem for commitments. Commitments play an important role in cooperative human interactions and can dramatically improve the performance of joint actions by stabilizing expectations, reducing the uncertainty of the interaction, providing reasons to cooperate or improving action coordination. However, commitments can only serve these functions if they are credible in the first place. What is it then that insures the credibility of commitments? To answer this question, we need to provide an account of what motivates (...)
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  25. Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the 'alien' in alien control?Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Tim Bayne - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.
    Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). (...)
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  26.  54
    On Commitments and Other Uncertainty Reduction Tools in Joint Action.John Michael & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):89–120.
    In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightforward. Second, there are many other ways in which uncertainty (...)
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  27. Self‐Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    We are perceivers, we are thinkers, and we are also agents, bringing about physical events, such as bodily movements and their consequences. What we do tells us, and others, a lot about who we are. On the one hand, who we are determines what we do. On the other hand, acting is also a process of self-discovery and self-shaping. Pivotal to this mutual shaping of self and agency is the sense of agency, or agentive self-awareness, i.e., the sense that one (...)
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  28.  35
    Agency, Simulation and Self‐identification.Marc Jeannerod & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.
    This paper is concerned with the problem of self‐identification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in self‐identification and in agency‐ascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated (...)
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  29.  66
    Experience, belief, and the interpretive fold.Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):81-86.
    Elisabeth Pacherie is a research fellow in philosophy at Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. Her main research and publications are in the areas of philosophy of mind, psychopathology and action theory. Her publications include a book on intentionality (_Naturaliser_ _l'intentionnalité_, Paris, PUF, 1993) and she is currently preparing a book on action and agency.
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  30. Self-control as hybrid skill.Myrto Mylopoulos & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2020 - In Alfred Mele (ed.), Surrounding Self-Control. Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 81-100.
    One of the main obstacles to the realization of intentions for future actions and to the successful pursuit of long-term goals is lack of self-control. But, what does it mean to engage in self-controlled behaviour? On a motivational construal of self-control, self-control involves resisting our competing temptations, impulses, and urges in order to do what we deem to be best. The conflict we face is between our better judgments or intentions and “hot” motivational forces that drive or compel us to (...)
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  31.  35
    The sense of agency in human-human vs human-robot joint action.Ouriel Grynszpan, Aïsha Sahaï, Nasmeh Hamidi, Elisabeth Pacherie, Bruno Berberian, Lucas Roche & Ludovic Saint-Bauzel - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 75:102820.
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  32. Perceiving intentions.Élisabeth Pacherie - unknown
    I will concentrate on the 'executive' conception of intentions and intentional actions. I will argue that intentional bodily movements have distinctive observable characteristics that set them apart from non-intentional bodily motions. I will also argue that that when we observe an action performed by someone else, the perceptual representations we form contain information about the dynamics of movements and their relations to objects in the scene that can be exploited in order to identify at least the more basic intentions of (...)
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  33. Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2012 - In Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 92--111.
    In recent years, the integration of philosophical with scientific theorizing has started to yield new insights. This chapter surveys some recent philosophical and empirical work on the nature and structure of action, on conscious agency, and on our knowledge of actions.
     
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  34.  51
    Alterations of agency in hypnosis: A new predictive coding model.Jean-Rémy Martin & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2019 - Psychological Review 126 (1):133-152.
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  35. The Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Utilization Behavior: A Window onto Agentive Self-Awareness.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - Functional Neurology 22 (4):211 - 217.
    Two main approaches can be discerned in the literature on agentive self-awareness: a top-down approach, according to which agentive self-awareness is fundamentally holistic in nature and involves the operations of a central-systems narrator, and a bottom-up approach that sees agentive self-awareness as produced by lowlevel processes grounded in the very machinery responsible for motor production and control. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory if taken in isolation; however, the question of whether their combination would yield a full account of agentive self-awareness (...)
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  36. The role of emotions in the explanation of action.Élisabeth Pacherie - 2002 - European Review of Philosophy 5:53-92.
  37. Agency Lost and Found: A Commentary on Spence.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):173-176.
  38. Can Conscious Agency Be Saved?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):33-45.
    This paper is concerned with the role of conscious agency in human action. On a folk-psychological view of the structure of agency, intentions, conceived as conscious mental states, are the causes of actions. In the last decades, the development of new psychological and neuroscientific methods has made conscious agency an object of empirical investigation and yielded results that challenge the received wisdom. Most famously, the results of Libet’s studies on the ‘readiness potential’ have been interpreted by many as evidence in (...)
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  39.  50
    Commitments and the sense of joint agency.Elisabeth Pacherie & Victor Fernández Castro - 2022 - Mind and Language (3):889-906.
    The purpose of this article is to explore the role commitments may play in shaping our sense of joint agency. First, we propose that commitments may contribute to the generation of the sense of joint agency by stabilizing expectations and improving predictability. Second, we argue that commitments have a normative element that may bolster an agent's sense of control over the joint action and help counterbalance the potentially disruptive effects of asymmetries among agents. Finally, we discuss how commitments may contribute (...)
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  40. Editorial: “Skilled Action Control”.Myrto Mylopoulos & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):469-480.
  41. Perception, Emotions and Delusions: The Case of the Capgras Delusion.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2008 - In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernández (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press. pp. 107-125.
    The paper discusses the role affective factors may play in explaining why, in Capgras'delusion, the delusional belief once formed is maintained and argues that there is an important link between the modularity of the relevant emotional system and the persistence of the delusional belief.
     
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  42. Is collective intentionality really primitive?Elisabeth Pacherie - unknown
    This paper offers a critical discussion of Searle's account of collective intentionality. It argues Bratman's alternative account avoids some of the shortcomings of Searle's account, over-intellectualizes collective intentionality and imposes an excessive cognitive burden on participating agents.Tthe capacities needed to sustain collective intentionality are examined in an attempt to show that we can preserve the gist of Bratman's account in a cognitively more parsimonious way.
     
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  43.  20
    Reduced sensitivity to social priors during action prediction in adults with autism spectrum disorders.Valerian Chambon, Chlöé Farrer, Elisabeth Pacherie, Pierre O. Jacquet, Marion Leboyer & Tiziana Zalla - 2017 - Cognition 160 (C):17-26.
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  44.  44
    Solution Thinking and Team Reasoning: How Different Are They?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2018 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (6):585-593.
    In his book, Understanding Institutions, Francesco Guala discusses two solutions to the problem of mindreading for coordination, the solution thinking approach proposed by Adam Morton and the team reasoning approach developed by Michael Bacharach, Robert Sugden, and Natalie Gold. I argue that the family resemblance between the two approaches is even stronger than Guala thinks.
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  45.  50
    Toward a dynamic theory of intentions.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - In Susan Pockett (ed.), Does consciousness cause behaviour? Mit Press.
    In this paper, I shall offer a sketch of a dynamic theory of intentions. I shall argue that several categories or forms of intentions should be distinguished based on their different (and complementary) functional roles and on the different contents or types of contents they involve. I shall further argue that an adequate account of the distinctive nature of actions and of their various grades of intentionality depends on a large part on a proper understanding of the dynamic transitions among (...)
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  46. Robots and Resentment: Commitments, Recognition and Social Motivation in HRI.Víctor Fernandez Castro & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2023 - In Catrin Misselhorn, Tom Poljanšek, Tobias Störzinger & Maike Klein (eds.), Emotional Machines: Perspectives from Affective Computing and Emotional Human-Machine Interaction. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. pp. 183-216.
    To advance the task of designing robots capable of performing collective tasks with humans, studies in human–robot interaction often turn to psychology, philosophy of mind and neuroscience for inspiration. In the same vein, this chapter explores how the notion of recognition and commitment can help confront some of the current problems in addressing robot-human interaction in joint tasks. First, we argue that joint actions require mutual recognition, which cannot be established without the attribution and maintenance of commitments. Second, we argue (...)
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  47. Emotion and Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2002 - European Review of Philosophy 5:55-90.
    The purpose of this paper is to explore the question whether and in what sense emotions might be said to provide reasons for actions or to rationalize them. This requires that one have a picture of the causal structure of actions that is sufficiently detailed for one to see how emotions can impinge on the proc-ess of action production. I present a two-tiered model of action explanation and try to exploit this model in a tentative account of the modes of (...)
     
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  48.  68
    La dynamique des intentions.Élisabeth Pacherie - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (3):447-.
    I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, (...)
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  49. Time to Act.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2015 - In Patrick Haggard & Baruch Eitam (eds.), The Sense of Agency. New York: Oxford University Press USA.
    Actions unfold in time, and so do experiences of agency. Yet, despite the recent surge of interest in the sense of agency among both philosophers and cognitive scientists, the import of the fact that agentive experiences unfold in time remains to this day largely underappreciated. This chapter argues that agentive experiences should be conceptualized as continuants, whose contents evolve as actions unfold. It attempts to characterize these content shifts, distinguishing two main dimensions of change—changes in scale, or fine-grainedness, and changes (...)
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  50.  25
    La dynamique des intentions.Élisabeth Pacherie - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (3):447-480.
    I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary not just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions, and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, (...)
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