Le présent essai se propose d'appréhender la doctrine cartésienne selon laquelle ce qui existe ne saurait subsister sans que Dieu le soutienne dans l'être par une activité créatrice continuée. Comment Dieu soutient-il l'existence et pourquoi lui est-il nécessaire de le faire ? L'auteur analyse l'apparente contradiction, qui fait problème, entre la doctrine de la création continuée et l'affirmation par Descartes que le mouvement se poursuit à moins que n'intervienne quelque force extérieure. Il examine ensuite, pour la récuser, (...) la thèse (défendue par Gilson et par Gueroult) selon laquelle la doctrine de la création continuée impliquerait la discontinuité du temps. This essay seeks to understand Descartes's doctrine that what exists cannot continue to exist unless God sustains it by continuous creative activity. How does God sustain existence and why is it necessary for Him to do this ? The essay explores a puzzling apparent contrast between the doctrine of continuous creation and Descartes's claim that motion continues unless an external force interferes. Further, it considers and rejects the thesis (maintained by Gilson and Gueroult) that the doctrine of continuous creation entails that time is discontinuous. (shrink)

Le présent essai se propose d'appréhender la doctrine cartésienne selon laquelle ce qui existe ne saurait subsister sans que Dieu le soutienne dans l'être par une activité créatrice continuée. Comment Dieu soutient-il l'existence et pourquoi lui est-il nécessaire de le faire ? L'auteur analyse l'apparente contradiction, qui fait problème, entre la doctrine de la création continuée et l'affirmation par Descartes que le mouvement se poursuit à moins que n'intervienne quelque force extérieure. Il examine ensuite, pour la récuser, (...) la thèse selon laquelle la doctrine de la création continuée impliquerait la discontinuité du temps. This essay seeks to understand Descartes's doctrine that what exists cannot continue to exist unless God sustains it by continuous creative activity. How does God sustain existence and why is it necessary for Him to do this ? The essay explores a puzzling apparent contrast between the doctrine of continuous creation and Descartes's claim that motion continues unless an external force interferes. Further, it considers and rejects the thesis that the doctrine of continuous creation entails that time is discontinuous. (shrink)

Leibniz admet la thèse de la création continuée. Le but de cet article est de montrer les raisons pour lesquelles, à ses yeux, les tentatives de Descartes et de Weigel pour s’en servir comme preuve de l’existence de Dieu ont échoué et ce qui, dans sa propre métaphysique, empêche l’élaboration d’une démonstration pleinement satisfaisante sur son fondement. Il n’est pas sûr en effet que Leibniz soit parvenu à concilier parfaitement la nécessité de la dépendance permanente des créatures à (...) l’égard de leur créateur – qui requiert son action continuelle – et l’exigence de l’autonomie causale des substances finies. (shrink)

How to reconcile monadic simplicity with the successive plurality of the monadic states ? The doctrine of continued creation seems to entail the existence of independent temporal parts and thus lead to the thesis that the world contains only transitory things. I try to show how Leibniz has the resources to get out of this quandary. The analysis of the concept of extension shows that a plurality of states does not constitute a divisible aggregate. Then I examine the Leibnizian interpretation (...) of continued creation, by com- paring it to the scholastic and Cartesian Background. From thence I conclude that Leibniz’s final thesis is that monads are wholly present at each moment of their duration. (shrink)

René Descartes with his theory of continued creation occupies an exceptional place in the philosophy of Henri Bergson: Descartes is subjected to Bergson’s repeated criticism like no other philosopher. Yet, in L’évolution créatrice Bergson appears to oscillate in his criticism of Descartes. Bergson discovers in the theory of continued creation a thought of freedom, of an indeterminate future, which is not far from his own thought of duration. Bergson thus advances a thesis in accordance with which Descartes’ theory of continued (...) creation has two irreconcilable aspects: continued creation and continuous creation. The difference between these two aspects, however, is not just about the choice between a participle and an adjective. The aim of this article is to show how Descartes’ theory of continued creation lends itself to such a double interpretation. While the former aspect originates in Descartes’ project of mechanistic physics, the latter aspect is accessible but from the standpoint of human freedom, as well as Descartes’ critique of finalism. The article thus shows that Descartes’ theory of continued creation constitutes a point of convergence between the questions of mechanism and human freedom, where the latter is an exception to the former. However, the exceptional status of human freedom in Descartes’ philosophy renders Bergson’ thesis about Descartes’ oscillation between two aspects somewhat problematic. (shrink)

Longtemps éclipsée, la question de la compatibilité de la (pre)science divine avec la liberté a été exhumée dans les débats de philosophie analytique. Les promoteurs de la logique temporelle ont proposé un argument d’incompatibilité qui continue d’exercer la sagacité des commentateurs. L’objet de cet article est de suggérer que la conception atemporaliste de Dieu, dont on explique pourquoi elle est si peu en vogue aujourd’hui, est à même, sinon de résoudre complètement, au moins d’atténuer considérablement ces problèmes de compatibilité, qui (...) rejoignent le problème de l’articulation de la souveraineté absolue de Dieu avec la contribution authentique des causes secondes. (shrink)

La conception malebranchiste de la liberté est originale. Malebranche ne croit pas en une liberté d’indifférence absolue, c'est-à-dire en une capacité d’opérer un choix indépendamment de toute motivation. Il ne croit pas non plus que nous puissions indifféremment choisir entre deux motivations de force inégale : au moment où on se détermine, le bien le plus grand (du moins selon l’apparence) l’emporte. La liberté réside seulement dans le fait que l’on n’est pas obligé de se déterminer : nous pouvons toujours (...) suspendre notre consentement. Cette conception est exposée à des objections que Pierre Bayle a formulées et qui tentent de la mettre en contradiction avec d’autres thèses de Malebranche : son occasionalisme, sa théorie de la création continuée, l’obscurité de l’âme à elle-même, sa théologie des voies de l’action divine. Nous discuterons ces objections et verrons si Malebranche est en mesure de leur résister. (shrink)

La philosophie critique de Kant, en posant la question de la possibilité, mise en oeuvre architectoniquement, du pouvoir de penser, s'institue comme "ontologie" existentielle. L'architectonique des pouvoirs de l'esprit, en sa destination "morale", constitue, en effet, l'"Etre" même de l'homme, soit la fondation (transcendantale) de toute manière d'exister proprement "humaine", les troubles existentiels se révélant être, par hypothèse, autant de déconstitutions de cette architectonique. Le problème du surgissement de l'Idée architectonique et de sa mise en oeuvre temporelle peut donc être (...) interprété comme problème d'une anthropologie transcendantale. Il s'agit de penser par là le "temps" même de l'existence. Si le "temps" n'est rien en dehors de l'esprit, son surgissement ne peut être que celui d'une "liberté". Ainsi, le problème de l'architectonique permet de concevoir le "temps" comme création continuée, oeuvre de la "liberté". Le problème du "temps" ne se limite donc pas chez Kant à l'"exposition" d'une Esthétique transcendantale ni, comme le montre l'architectonique des temporalités, au seul "schématisme" de l'entendement pur. Mais si le "temps" surgit comme "liberté", son essence est nécessairement "pratique". L'existence de l'homme, saisie à ce niveau d'une cooriginarité transcendantale de la "liberté" et du "temps", peut alors être comprise en sa dimension "morale" : l'homme s'assignerait de lui-même la tâche transcendantale de produire le "temps", ce "devoir" étant reconnu ici au fondement de l'effectivité de tout pouvoir de l'esprit. (shrink)

Dans l’Epître aux Méditations, Descartes affirme que toute l’utilité de sa philosophie réside dans la « solidité » des preuves de l’existence de Dieu qu’elle propose. C’est par un effort de détachement de l’esprit des sens et par un retour sur soi, sur des raisons tout « intérieures », que ces démonstrations s’élaborent et acquièrent évidence et certitude. Cette méthode n’est-elle pas la reprise, en philosophie moderne, de l’itinéraire augustinien de l’âme vers Dieu?

Creation Ethics illuminates an array of issues in "reprogenetics" through the lens of moral philosophy. With novel frameworks for understanding prenatal moral status and human identity, David DeGrazia tackles the ethics of abortion and embryo research, genetic enhancement and prenatal genetic interventions, procreation and parenting, and obligations to future generations.

Introduction : points of departure -- A genealogy of the Christian colonial mindset : ex nihilo from disputed beginnings to orthodox origins -- Ex nihilo and the origin of an empire -- Ex nihilo, erasure and discovery? -- The cogito, ex nihilo, and the legacy of John Locke -- The creation ex nihilo of terra nullius lands : omnipotent nations and the logic of global-colonization -- From epistemologies of domination to grounded thinking -- Opening words about God onto creatio continua (...) -- Creatio continua "all the way down": a post-colonial, planetary understanding of continuing creation -- Conclusion : a brief thought after. (shrink)

Although creativity, from Plato onwards, has been recognized as a topic in philosophy, it has been overshadowed by investigations of the meanings and values of works of art. In this collection of essays a distinguished roster of philosophers of art redress this trend. The subjects discussed include the nature of creativity and the process of artistic creation; the role that creative making should play in our understanding and evaluation of art; relations between concepts of creation and creativity; and ideas of (...) tradition, metaphor, genius, imagination and genre. This is an important collection that will be eagerly sought by philosophers of art as well as theorists in art history, cinema studies and literary criticism. (shrink)

Returning to the Greek understanding of art to rethink its capacities, Creation and the Function of Art focuses on the relationship between techné and phusis (nature). Moving away from the theoretical Platonism which dominates contemporary understandings of art, this book instead reinvigorates Aristotelian causation. Beginning with the Greek topos and turning to insights from philosophy, pure mathematics, psychoanalysis and biology, Jason Tuckwell re-problematises techné in functional terms. This book examines the deviations at play within logical forms, the subject, and upon (...) phusis to better situate the role of the function in poiesis (art). In so doing, Tuckwell argues that art concerns a genuinely creative labour that cannot be resolved via an ontological or epistemological problem, but which instead constitutes an encounter with the problematic. As such, techné is shown to be a property of the living, of intelligence coupled to action, that not only enacts poiesis or art, but indicates a broader role for creative deviation in nature. (shrink)

This article endeavours to prove that there were creation myths of human beings or certain things, but there were seldom creation myths of ontological cosmology in ancient China. This will be warranted through the distinction between the concepts of ‘to create’ and ‘to beget’, the distinction between ‘Cosmology I of creationism’ and ‘Cosmology II of begetting’, and the relationship between the One and Many. The only exception is the myth of Nüwa 女娲 as the creator of human beings, but not (...) the creator of the cosmos. Therefore, in ancient Chinese tradition, there were mainly myths of begetting rather than myths of complete creation in the sense similar to creatio ex nihilo.Contribution: Previous research frequently underscores the profound differences between ‘Cosmology I of creationism’ and ‘Cosmology II of begetting’. Based on the discussion of concepts of ‘to create’ [zao 造] and ‘to beget’ [sheng 生], this article argues that, there were mainly myths of begetting rather than myths of complete creation in the sense similar to creatio ex nihilo. (shrink)

This research uses a survey to analyze types of benefits sought by partners in cross-sector collaborations in Spain and to test and build upon theories that indicate prior collaboration experience and partner alignment will positively affect value creation through the collaboration. Using exploratory factor analysis to operationalize a broad range of potential benefits into more specific concepts, the results of this study identify distinct factors that characterize the types of benefits sought by non-profit organizations and businesses engaged in cross-sector collaborations. (...) Findings show that prior experience and alignment positively affect each factor for value creation. Prior experience is also found to influence the type of benefits sought from cross-sector collaborations and to positively affect alignment in terms of mission and strategy. Unexpectedly, the study also finds that prior experience moderates the effect of alignment on value creation. (shrink)

This article critically considers Castoriadis’ central concept of creation ex nihilo. It does so in two ways. It first draws on recent research to suggest that the historical inauguration of the project of autonomy in ancient Greece - in both its political and philosophical aspects - was more complex and contextually anchored than Castoriadis acknowledges: it did not surge forth out of nothing. Second, it considers the idea of creation from a theoretical perspective. Here the idea of creation as contextual (...) rather than absolute is offered. Within this suggested qualification, two lines of discussion - drawn from the hermeneutical and phenomenological traditions - are broached. (shrink)

The overarching aim of this book is to illuminate a broad array of issues connected with reproduction and ethics through the lens of moral philosophy. With novel frameworks for understanding prenatal moral status and human identity, DeGrazia sheds new light on the ethics of abortion and embryo research, genetic enhancement and prenatal genetic interventions, procreation and parenting, and decisions that affect the quality of life of future generations.

This book presents the case for belief in both creation and evolution at the same time as rejecting creationism. Issues of meaning supply the context of inquiry; the book defends the meaningfulness of language about God, and also relates belief in both creation and evolution to the meaning of life. Meaning, it claims, can be found in consciously adopting the role of steward of the planetary biosphere, and thus of the fruits of creation. Distinctive features include a sustained case for (...) a realist understanding of language about God; a contemporary defence of some of the arguments for belief in God and in creation; a sifting of different versions of Darwinism and their implications for religious belief; a Darwinian account of the relation of predation and other apparent evils to creation; a new presentation of the argument, from the world's value to the purposiveness of evolution; and discussions of whether or not meaning itself evolves, and of religious and secular bases for belief in stewardship. (shrink)

AbstractThe Belmont Report continues to be held in high regard, and most bioethical analyses conducted in recent years have presumed that it affects United States federal regulations. However, the assessments of the report’s creators are sharply divided. Understanding the historic reputation of this monumental report is thus crucial. We first recount the historical context surrounding the creation of this report. Subsequently, we review the process involved in developing ethical guidelines and describe the report’s features. Additionally, we analyze the effect of (...) unfolding events on the subsequent creation of federal regulations, especially on gene therapy clinical trials. Moreover, throughout this paper we evaluate the ethical principles outlined in this report and describe how they overlap with the issue of protecting socially vulnerable groups. Based on the analysis, we conclude that the features of the Belmont Report cannot be considered as having affected the basic sections of the federal regulations for ethical reviews that were made uniform in 1981. Nevertheless, regarding the regulations on gene therapy clinical trials—which were at first expected to be applicable to research involving children—in addition to implementing policies regarding the public review of protocols that passed ethical review, this report’s principles are clearly reflected in the key notes that should have been referred to when the report was created. (shrink)

"The texts published here reproduce, with some variation, those of five lectures held at the Mendrisio Academy of Architecture between October 2012 and April 2013.".

The relationship between being and goodness is one of the most engaging philosophical questions, particularly in light of the new science, which pointsto the interconnectedness of the physical world. The relationship between being and goodness is examined here in the thought of Bonaventure, who maintainsa primacy of the good. Bonaventure’s integration of philosophy and theology provides an understanding of being as goodness and hence an understandingof being as relational and generative. Because being is good, created reality is intrinsically good and (...) bears within it an inner dynamic toward the pleroma oflove. The implications of Bonaventure’s metaphysics of the good for ecology and epistemology are explored. (shrink)

The meaning of the noun 'creation', and the verb 'to create', range from the traditional theological idea of God creating ex nihilo to a more recent sense of the process of artistic conception. This collection of thirteen essays, written by scholars of music, literature, the visual arts, and theology, explores the complicated relationship between medieval rituals and theology, and the development of an idea of human artistic creation, which came to the fore in the sixteenth century. The volume concentrates on (...) the period from the Carolingians to the Counter-Reformation but also includes some twentieth-century musicians. Each essay is dedicated to a particular topic concerned with ritual or artistic beginnings, inventions, harmony and disharmony, as well as representations or celebrations of creation. Central themes include the interplay of the ideas of God as creator, of God acting and recreating in medieval liturgy, of God as artist - the deus artifex of the Pythagorean cosmology, which was occasionally referred to as recently as the early nineteenth century -and, finally, of the homo creator, a concept in which man reflected (and eventually replaced) God in his artistic creativity. This book therefore features new, significant, individual contributions from a range of scholarly disciplines, but, taken as a whole, it also constitutes a complex interdisciplinary study, with large-scale historical constructions. (shrink)

Creation and the Sovereignty of God brings fresh insight to a defense of God.

"We have no more beginnings", George Steiner begins in this radical book. A far-reaching exploration of the idea of creation in Western thought, literature, religion, and history, he reflects on the different ways people have of talking about beginnings, on the "coretiredness" that pervades end-of-the-millennium spirit, and on the changing grammar of discussions about the end of Western art and culture.

There is a strong claim that the world’s createdness, if true, cannot be known but through revelation. In this paper we try to dismiss this claim by arguing that creation cannot be merely a revealed truth (revelabile tantum), since it is on the contrary the very preamble to any genuine revelation. Ontologically, no revelation can happen in a self-existent world. No creation, no revelation. Epistemically, no revelation is to be admitted but on the assumption that the world depends, for its (...) existence and operation, on a supernatural agent. No admittance of creative power, no justified identification of any revelatory activity. (shrink)

This paper summarizes the current state of the debates in biblical criticism concerning the nature of Genesis, the genre and setting in life of Genesis l:l–2:4a, and the reasons for the continuing significance of creation motifs in the biblical period. In identifying creation as a vital part of the traditions associated variously with the cult, with wisdom, and with prophecy (even in its later scribal and eschatological forms), Genesis 1: l–2:4a is seen to be the necessary description of how the (...) particularity of Israel is dependent on God, of how humanity is privileged, and of how hope is tinged with judgment. (shrink)

One might naturally suppose that philosophers of art would take a strong interest in the idea of creation in the context of art. In fact, this has often not been the case. In analytic aesthetics, the issue tends to dwell on the sidelines and in continental aesthetics a shadow has sometimes been cast over the topic by the notion of the “death of the author” and by the claim, as Roland Barthes put it, that the author is only ever able (...) to “imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original”. This paper explains the understanding of artistic creation developed by the French art theorist André Malraux in his well-known book The Voices of Silence. Malraux argues that the true artist is involved in a creative act in the full sense of the term – creation ex nihilo – despite the debt he or she often owes to other artists. The paper also comments briefly on possible reasons why traditional post-Enlightenment aesthetics has said so little about the topic in question. (shrink)

Corporations wield power in today’s economies, and political theories of the corporation argue about the legitimacy conditions of corporate power. This paper argues in favour of a double-fiduciary theory for corporations. Based on a concession theory of markets, it sees all markets as authorized by states (in the name of society), for the purpose of creating economic value, or wealth. Hence corporations, as much as non-incorporated firms, have a fiduciary duty to the state/society to create wealth, in the competitive structure (...) of the market. However, their pursuit of wealth often creates unbalanced relations of power between corporations and their stakeholders, which can at some point be classified as instances of domination. Therefore, corporations need to be subjected to a second fiduciary duty, i.e. not to dominate others in the economy. This duty is also, in the final instance, owed to the state/society. In an era when everyone can incorporate their business, states/societies can be interpreted as having, through corporate law, mandated shareholders as ‘proximate beneficiaries’, to incentivize corporations to create wealth. Now states/societies need to think about how to prevent corporations from dominating others. New mechanisms of accountability towards stakeholders and/or citizens as proximate beneficiaries are needed. Only in this way can corporations be effectively held to account for both of the fiduciary duties which characterize their normative status. (shrink)

Being all-good and gracious, God cannot be so envious as not to allow anything else besides him to exist. The necessitarian view thus limits God in His choice of creation and argues that God had to create in the first place out of His infinite ...

In this paper I argue that the hoary theological doctrine of divine concurrence poses no deep threat to Leibniz’s views on theodicy and creaturely activity even as those views have been traditionally understood. The first three sections examine respectively Leibniz’s views on creation, conservation and concurrence, with an eye towards showing their sys­tematic compatibility with Leibniz’s theodicy and metaphysics. The fourth section takes up remaining worries arising from the bridging principle that conservation is a continued or continuous creation, and argues (...) that they can be allayed once two readings of the prin­ciple are distinguished. What emerges from the discussion as a whole is, I hope, a clearer picture of Leibniz’s views on the nature of monadic causation, his understanding of the relationship between divine and creaturely activity, and his position with respect to later medieval and early modern debates over secondary causation. (shrink)

What is the purpose of art? What drives us to make it? Why do we value it? Nick Zangwill argues that the function of art is to have certain aesthetic properties in virtue of its non-aesthetic properties, and this function arises because of the artist's insight into the nature of these dependence relations and her intention to bring them about.

Creations of the Mind presents sixteen original essays by theorists from a wide variety of disciplines who have a shared interest in the nature of artifacts and their implications for the human mind. All the papers are written specially for this volume, and they cover a broad range of topics concerned with the metaphysics of artifacts, our concepts of artifacts and the categories that they represent, the emergence of an understanding of artifacts in infants' cognitive development, as well as the (...) evolution of artifacts and the use of tools by non-human animals. This volume will be a fascinating resource for philosophers, cognitive scientists, and psychologists, and the starting point for future research in the study of artifacts and their role in human understanding, development, and behaviour.Contributors: John R. Searle, Richard E. Grandy, Crawford L. Elder, Amie L. Thomasson, Jerrold Levinson, Barbara C. Malt, Steven A. Sloman, Dan Sperber, Hilary Kornblith, Paul Bloom, Bradford Z. Mahon, Alfonso Caramazza, Jean M. Mandler, Deborah Kelemen, Susan Carey, Frank C. Keil, Marissa L. Greif, Rebekkah S. Kerner, James L. Gould, Marc D. Hauser, Laurie R. Santos, Steven Mithen. (shrink)

A history of western civilization as reflected in creation myths from the past two millennia also evaluates the debate about whether God created man or vice versa as it has been expressed by artists in a variety of disciplines, in a lavishly illustrated chronicle that traces a range of tales from Genesis to Ovid.

Over the last decade, businesses, policymakers, and researchers alike have advocated the need for value creation through inter-organizational collaboration. Researchers have widely argued that organizations that are engaged in collaborative processes create value. Because researchers have tended to focus on the identification of organizational motivations and on key success factors for collaboration, however, both the nature and processes of value creation in inter-organizational collaboration have yet to be examined. A recent theory by Austin and Seitanidi :726–758, 2012a; Nonprofit Volunt Sect (...) Q 41:929–968, 2012b) has proposed an analytical framework for analyzing value creation in inter-organizational collaboration, based on four types of value. The purpose of this current study is to empirically test this framework, and to provide key pointers for analyzing the nature of value, particularly in relation to learning. Our detailed empirical research is based on a 6-year retrospective case study of an inter-organizational partnership within an international development project for local economic development in Guatemala. The study’s contributions are twofold. First, it provides evidence of the critical path of the creation of diverse types of values in a collaborative process; second, it links the different types of value creation with the types of learning that occur in an inter-organizational process. (shrink)

The starting point of this article is the observation that the emergence of the Anthropocene rehabilitates the need for philosophical reflections on the ontology of technology. In particular, if technological innovations on an ontic level of beings in the world are created, but these innovations at the same time create the Anthropocene World at an ontological level, this raises the question how World creation has to be understood. We first identify four problems with the traditional concept of creation: the anthropocentric, (...) ontic and outcome orientation of traditional concepts of creation, as well as its orientation of material fabrication. We subsequently develop a progressive concept of World creation with four characteristics that move beyond the traditional conceptuality: a materialistic concept of creation that accounts for the ontogenetic process and the ontic and ontological nature of creation, and is conceptualized as semantic creation of the World in which we live and act. (shrink)

Refugee crises are one of the grand challenges of the 21st century. Despite the theoretical importance attached to value created for beneficiaries in the partnership literature, research tends to focus on internal processes and value created for partners and partnerships, leading to widespread calls to further specify the value created by partnerships for beneficiaries. Applying an analytical framework from the value creation and social impact literatures, we report on a study of multiple social partnerships of a nongovernmental organization in the (...) refugee issue field. Our results demonstrate that frames of refugees held by partners and in partnerships’ implementation contexts shape the value creation activities undertaken for beneficiaries, and determine whether value is created and what types of value. The dual contribution of this article comprises a rare empirical study of value creation activities for beneficiaries (here, refugees) and theorization of how and when implementation context affects value creation by partnerships. (shrink)

Creation and conservation are defined and distinguished; providence based on divine middle knowledge is defended; and miracles as naturally impossible events are defended.

Artistic Creation and Ethical Criticism investigates an idea that underpins the ethical criticism of art but is rarely acknowledged and poorly understood - namely, that the ethical criticism of art involves judgments not only of the attitudes a work endorses or solicits, but of what artists do to create the work. The book pioneers an innovative production-oriented approach to the study of the ethical criticism of art, one that will provide a refined philosophical account of this important topic as well (...) as conceptual tools that can guide future philosophizing and criticism. (shrink)

Does the act of creation show itself anywhere within the creation? A common contemporary ontology tends to see two possibilities for those who want to defend a notion of creation. The first is to argue that an original set of materials was brought into existence out of nothing by divine action a long time ago. The second, in the tradition of Paley, posits a specific divine action that oversees the development of some of the materials into entities with an end-directedness. (...) Much contemporary energy focuses on the second possibility. The argument of the paper is that the ontology behind both of these possibilities, which limits itself to the notions of a creation of materials and the building of some of the materials into end-directed entities, conceals rather than reveals the idea of creation. The paper tries to show how an Aristotelian sense of nature, with its recognition of internal teleology and original spontaneity, offers a better starting point for coming up against the mystery of divine creative activity. (shrink)

Appearing in English for the first time, Jean-Luc Nancy’s 2002 book reflects on globalization and its impact on our being-in-the-world. Developing a contrast in the French language between two terms that are usually synonymous, or that are used interchangeably, namely globalisation (globalization) and mondialisation (world-forming), Nancy undertakes a rethinking of what “world-forming” might mean. At stake in this distinction is for him nothing less than two possible destinies of our humanity, and of our time. On the one hand, with globalization, (...) there is the uniformity produced by a global economical and technological logic leading to the contrary of an inhabitable world, “the un-world” (l’im-monde)—as Nancy refers to it—an un-world that entails social disintegration, misery, and injustice. And, on the other hand, there is the possibility of an authentic world-forming, that is, of a making of the world and of a making sense that Nancy calls a “creation” of the world. Nancy understands such world-forming in terms of an inexhaustible struggle for justice. This book is an important contribution by Nancy to a philosophical reflection on the phenomenon of globalization and a further development on his earlier works on our being-in-common, justice, and a-theological existence. (shrink)

À l’instar d’Humpty Dumpty, le personnage de Lewis Carroll qui fête son non-anniversaire 364 jours par an, Bergson semble inscrire la discontinuité de l’événement dans la continuité de la durée. Il invite son lecteur à concevoir la nouveauté comme la trame du réel. Rien ne se répète jamais à l’identique, chaque événement est singulier et s’inscrit dans un temps irréversible. Pourtant, l’intelligence ne perçoit pas toujours cette « création continue d’imprévisible nouveauté » car elle immobilise et spatialise le réel (...) en le rendant homogène. Mais dès lors que l’esprit retrouve le caractère temporel de la réalité, le présent apparaît comme toujours inédit. Vu sous cet angle, la définition bergsonienne de l’événement semble donner au banal les caractéristiques de l’exceptionnel. Les non-anniversaires possèderaient la même consistance ontologique que les anniversaires sans pour autant disparaître dans l’homogénéité de la répétition quotidienne. L’événement serait à la fois une aspérité surgissant dans le flux de la durée et en même temps l’expression de la plus pure continuité. Pour résoudre cette apparente contradiction il faut alors se demander : comment Bergson réussit-il à concilier la nouveauté de l’événement avec la continuité de la durée? Pour répondre à cette question, nous montrerons comment Bergson introduit des différences qualitatives au sein de la continuité du devenir. Ces différences s’expriment à travers plusieurs niveaux de réalité que l’article étudie successivement. Nous partons de la métaphysique bergsonienne de la durée, capable de donner à l’événement un contenu réel et pas seulement représentatif. Grâce à l’épaisseur du devenir, l’événement se relie à la continuité spirituelle de la durée tout en conservant son caractère inédit et imprévisible. Son hétérogénéité le distingue de la pure discontinuité du fiat lux et de l’homogénéité mécaniste. La causalité des événements se révèle différente du simple mécanisme. Dans la seconde partie de l’article nous tirons les conséquences de cette métaphysique pour les appliquer à l’événement étudié sous l’angle de l’histoire. Partant d’un réexamen des apories du possible, nous examinons la valeur de l’uchronie pour ensuite décrire la manière dont Bergson théorise la connaissance historique et l’action des grands hommes. (shrink)

What are we to make of works of art whose apparent point is to convince us of the meaninglessness and absurdity of human existence? I examine, in this paper, the attempt of Albert Camus to provide philosophical justification of art in the face of the supposed fact of absurdity and note its failure as such with specific reference to Sartre’s criticism. Despite other superficial similarities, I contrast Camus’s concept of the absurd with that of his ‘existentialist’ colleagues, including Sartre, and (...) suggest that the latter concept is more philosophically viable. I conclude that existential phenomenology consequently provides a more promising philosophical justification for artistic creation in the light of the more viable conception of absurdity. (shrink)