For the purposes of conservation or suppression of species, gene drive technology has significant potential. Theoretically speaking, with the release of even relatively few animals with gene drive systems in an ecosystem, beneficial or harmful genes could be introduced into the entire wild-type population of that species. Given the profound impact that gene drives could have on species and ecosystems, their use is a highly contentious issue. Communities and groups have differing beliefs about nature and its conservation or preservation, (...) as well as concerns about the ecological safety of the eradication, replacement or enhancement of particular species of animals by means of genetic engineering. For all those reasons, the rigorous regulation of insects and other animals with gene drive systems is crucial. In this paper, we consider the question of whether the United States Food and Drug Administration is prepared to effectively regulate insects and other animals with gene drives. (shrink)

"This book is a sorely needed corrective. Animal Spirits is an important--maybe even a decisive--contribution at a difficult juncture in macroeconomic theory.

In recent years, CRISPR-Cas9 has become one of the simplest and most cost-effective genetic engineering techniques among scientists and researchers aiming to alter genes in organisms. As Zika came to the fore as a global health crisis, many suggested the use of CRISPR-Cas9 gene drives in mosquitoes as a possible means to prevent the transmission of the virus without the need to subject humans to risky experimental treatments. This paper suggests that using gene drives or other forms of (...) genome editing in nonhumans (like mosquitos) for the purposes of disease prevention raises important issues about informed consent. Additionally, it examines the consequences this line of inquiry could have for the use of gene drives as a tool in public health and suggests that the guidance offered by informed consent protocols could help the scientific community deploy gene drives in a way that ensures that ongoing research is consistent with our ethical priorities. (shrink)

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, philosophers including Kant and Hegel draw a sharp distinction between the human and the animal. The human is self-conscious, the animal is not; the human has moral worth, the animal does not. By the mid to late nineteenth century, these claims are widely rejected. As scientific and philosophical work on the cognitive and motivational capacities of animals increases in sophistication, many philosophers become suspicious of the idea that there is (...) any divide between human beings and other animals. This paper traces the transitions in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thought about animals. My focal point is the notion of drive or instinct (Trieb, Instinkt). Although in sporadic usage during earlier times, the drive concept explodes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It begins playing central roles in three distinct areas: embryology, ethology, and metaphysics. In embryology, drive describes a force, inaccessible in itself but whose results are visible and susceptible to scientific and philosophical study, governing organic development. In ethology, drives are the sources of seemingly deliberate, highly articulated, yet non-conscious activities, which are directed at ends of which the animal is ignorant. In metaphysics, drive describes the human essence. I focus on the way in which the emergence of the drive concept in each of these three domains undermines the idea that there is any sharp distinction between the human and the animal. I conclude by considering how, in light the collapse of the human/animal divide, ethical theories are reshaped. (shrink)

This article contends that the environmental release of genetically engineered (GE) animals with heritable traits that are patented will present a challenge to the efforts of nations and indigenous peoples to engage in self‐determination. The environmental release of such animals has been proposed on the grounds that they could function as public health tools or as solutions to the problem of agricultural insect pests. This article brings into focus two political‐economic‐legal problems that would arise with the environmental release of such (...) organisms. To address those challenges, it is proposed that nations considering the environmental release of GE animals must take into account the underlying circumstances and policy failures that motivate arguments for the use of the modified animals. Moreover, countries must recognize that the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights place on them an obligation to ensure that GE animals with patented heritable traits are not released without the substantive consent of the nations or indigenous peoples that could be affected. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s “drive theory”, as it is referred to in the secondary literature, is a rich, unique and fascinating articulation of the human condition. In broad brushstrokes, Nietzsche appears to contend that all human psychology is either directly reducible to animal drives (e.g. sex, aggression) or indirectly explicable to the historical transformations thereof (e.g. ressentiment). Moreover, Nietzsche’s initial elucidation of drive theory in On the Genealogy of Morals (and elsewhere) is well-complemented with a fecund, profound, and clear elucidation of (...) the concept in the secondary literature. -/- Yet, there remains a glaring lacuna for all the discussion of drive theory in the scholarship. The secondary literature is delinquent in explaining how animal drives became incorporated to form the human psyche. Nietzsche’s account to elucidate how drives became “digested” or in his words “inpsychated” is called the Internalization Hypothesis. However, as it appears in GM: II, 16, the hypothesis is grossly inchoate. The result of this undertheorization is manifold; its deleterious effects resonate along many axes of Nietzsche’s philosophy. -/- The present book, Internalized Valuation: A Genealogical Analysis of Nietzschean Drive Theory, offers an original and fruitful interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology. First, it clarifies what drives are. Second, it provides a new way of thinking about Nietzsche’s genealogical methods and then applies these insights to The Genealogy itself. What follows is a work that not only sheds much-needed light on Nietzsche’s philosophy of mind in general and his theory of emotions in particular, but also informs and illuminates problematic passages of Nietzsche’s Genealogy. (shrink)

This article develops a Hegelian account of self-consciousness by grounding it in being animal. It draws on contemporary naturalist and rationalist philosophy to support a transformative picture of the relationship between self-consciousness and animal purposes, setting work by Danielle Macbeth, Terry Pinkard, Michael Thompson, and Matthew Boyle into dialogue with two passages from Hegel’s Aesthetics. Because we are conscious of them as such, the article argues, our ends are never simply given to us and must be determined, which (...) means working them out collectively. But this makes dependency a structural feature of human life, as attaining the right relation to our ends means finding ourselves through the eyes of others instantiating our lifeform. Grounding these Hegelian insights in a naturalistic understanding of organic norms, we see that we should not oppose the self-transparency afforded by rationality to the opacity of animal drives. The article concludes that the mark of rationality is not the capacity to transcend or control animal instinct but that we can be problems to ourselves. Spiritual life is just natural life: natural life finding itself problematic. (shrink)

1. Traditional conservation biology has focused on two goals: preserving and protecting biodiversity and ecosystem integrity (e.g., Noss, 2001; Soulé, 1985). When species go extinct, this reduces b...

This paper tries to characterize the factors determining human relations with its environment and to identify the drives of those behavioral patterns and “praxis”. One scrutinizes the physiological and psychological factors that influence those drives, and tries to determine ways of overriding instinctive drives in favor of rational, sustainable ones. It focuses its attention on the way the different ecosystemic, economic and socio-cultural systems work, and pin-points the critical issues in view of the development of sustainable behavioral (...) patterns. Also the values that must build the new behavioral paradigm, as well as the ways to ensure the evolutionary quantum-leap necessary to ensure this sustainable condition, and the fulfilment, at every level, the different needs of humans and human societies, are analyzed. In conclusion, it stresses the fact that any reliable and long lasting change towards a sustainable behavior must start at the individual and the close social groups levels, and of the development of new factors of self-fulfillment and gratification, able to support and foster that change. The proposed epistemological approach is particularly innovative, precisely because of this emphasis on the individual drives and the way they determine the global patterns of environmental use, as well as the way they can evolve into a more rational character. In short, the paper focuses itself in the way man can evolve from its natural animal instincts and drives toward more rational ones, humanizing its behavior and turning, therefore, into an able actor of the process of sustainability building. (shrink)

This article takes up the processual account of drive and its derivations in relation to desire and emotion with an aim to explore the continuity of feeling from internal drive to value in the world. A mental state or act of cognition begins with an impulse and the category of instinctual drive. Drive partitions to desire, which is shaped by value. The combined concept/feeling can remain internal as emotion or distribute into action in vocalization or display. The transition in the (...) mental state from drive through desire is constrained by intrinsic value, which accompanies the object outward as extrinsic value. The partly intrapersonal nature of action prevents feeling from externalizing. Feeling drives concepts to completion. Concepts propelled by feeling undergo specification to images and/or objects. The feeling in the action gives intensity to emotion; the concept in the perception gives the quality of emotion. Feeling empowers concepts to finality, as emotions, ideas, or act/objects. In the animal mind, feeling empowers drive categories. In the human mind, feeling distributes as emotion into a diversity of ideas. Feeling unfelt in lower organisms is felt in a human mind according to the degree of individuation. (shrink)

Peña-Guzmán (2017) argues that empirical evidence and evolutionary theory compel us to treat the phenomenon of suicide as continuous in the animal kingdom. He defends a “continuist” account in which suicide is a multiply-realizable phenomenon characterized by self-injurious and self-annihilative behaviors. This view is problematic for several reasons. First, it appears to mischaracterize the Darwinian view that mind is continuous in nature. Second, by focusing only on surface-level features of behavior, it groups causally and etiologically disparate phenomena under a (...) single conceptual umbrella, thereby reducing the account’s explanatory power. Third, it obscures existing analyses of suicide in biomedical ethics and animal welfare literatures. A more promising naturalistic approach might seek a theoretical understanding of the social/ecological circumstances that drive humans and perhaps other animals to self-destruction. (shrink)

ExtractThe idea that all the entities in the world may be, for legal and moral purposes, divided into the two categories of ‘persons’ and ‘things’ comes down to us from the tradition of Roman law. In the law, a ‘person’ is essentially the subject of rights and obligations, while a thing may be owned as property. In ethics, a person is an object of respect, to be valued for her own sake, and never to be used as a mere means (...) to an end, while a thing has only a derivative value, and may be used as a means to some person's ends. This bifurcation is unfortunate because it seems to leave us with no alternative but to categorize everything as either a person or a thing. Yet some of the entities that give rise to the most vexing ethical problems are exactly the ones that do not seem to fit comfortably into either category. For various, different, kinds of reasons, it seems inappropriate to categorize a fetus, a non-human animal, the environment, or an object of great beauty, as a person, but neither does it seem right to say of such things that they are to be valued only as means.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.PERSONHOOD, ANIMALS, AND THE LAWVolume 12, Issue 34Christine M. KorsgaardDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175613000018Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. PERSONHOOD, ANIMALS, AND THE LAWVolume 12, Issue 34Christine M. KorsgaardDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175613000018Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. PERSONHOOD, ANIMALS, AND THE LAWVolume 12, Issue 34Christine M. KorsgaardDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175613000018Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation. (shrink)

Which and how much of our current drives –individually and as a global community– are driven by ancestral, inherited traits or imprinted on our animal condition? An attempt to approximate this intriguing query is explored here. It pertains to our identity, social constructions, and our ecological interaction. The origin of our species has its roots in ancestral habits, behaviors and a survival drive, transformed from changing environmental conditions. We were not born in a mother-of-pearl cradle nor were protected (...) by magical agents. We grew on the thread of time within the complex nature of bio-ecological interactions. They carved our identity, our genetic expression and the possible origin of our beliefs, resulting in an arch of various behaviors and cultural phenotypes. The biological nature of our construction dragged through millennia through species trials with variable rates of survival times provided traces of inconstant and multiple evolutive chains. Our modern cultural contexts –norms, priorities, values– appear as newly born. Yet, socio-cultural ecology upon which our brain organization and behavioral constructs derive include shared basic behavioral drives with non-human primates. The emergence of humans with a sophisticated language allowed the development of complex virtual constructs based on symbolism and the instruments of culture. This has enhanced cognitive capacity and emotional interaction supported by processes anchored in neural networks distributed within cortical and subcortical levels. Basic, essential neural connectivities were preserved during the evolutionary development of the species. The biological matrix and inheritance are usually segregated from the social and cultural construction. Sophistication of our cultural development tends to set up a divisive fault from primitive foundations of non-human animal behavior (survival, territory, reproduction, prevalence, access to nutrients). These are basic templates and underlie essential individual and group basic drives, and cultural constructs. Humans have not ceased from being territorial (whether applied to virtual or material dimensions). Various forms of social inequities have been expressed in our time and through human history. On evolutive terms, the notion of individual social status within the social structure of a gregarious community generated the probability of an individual ascending or descending that hierarchy. Thus, becoming a potential figure of leadership, or the subordinate or the marginalized. Is there an evolutive antecedent for human social inequities? How do we construct a different future? Post-industrial societies became increasingly dependent on material consumerism and technological cultures, to the point of embraining them; conceptually becoming technological hybrids. Are these a developmental must, or an uncontrolled spin-off of human inventiveness affecting our future? Construction of supernatural agents played a significant role in the socialization/domestication processes. Agents’ intentionality flourished through altered states of conscience, or under fear of natural phenomena attributed to supposed inhabitants of the Natural Kingdom or virtual beings. This imaginary universe, reinforced by ritual behaviors, contributed to control personal/collective distress of various possible origins and conditioned our degrees of emotional and cognitive freedom. (shrink)

Animal personality refers to the consistency of variation in behavior among individuals which may be the driving force behind variations in complex behaviors as well. Individual personality could predict how well an organism would perform in behavior and cognition related tasks, as well as survive and thrive in its environment. Therefore, we would expect inter-individual variations in many behaviors, which would persist even if habituation to the experimental setup occurs, which generally results in convergence of behavior. Our study used (...) wild-caught zebrafish from three natural habitats with differing ecological regimes, to understand how consistency and repeatability in specific traits such as boldness, exploration, and spatial ability varies across and within populations even when habituation causes change in behavior. We found that the extent of individual variation differs between populations, with dynamic habitats showing similar repeatability. This indicates that habitat conditions are important drivers of individual variation in addition to other factors, such as sex or size of individuals within populations. Although we found that sex and size played an important role within some populations for some behaviors, in others, the variation was likely caused by other factors, for which we have not accounted. This study underlines the importance of studying inter-individual differences as the phenomenon that underpins multiple behavioral traits and explains the possible role of environmental and inherent factors that drive these differences. (shrink)

Although psychologists study both the objective (behavior) and the subjective (phenomenology) components of cognition, we argue that an overemphasis on the subjective drives a wedge between psychology and other closely related scientific disciplines, such as comparative studies of cognition and artificial intelligence. This wedge is particularly apparent in contemporary studies of episodic recollection and future planning, two related abilities that many have assumed to be unique to humans. We shall challenge this doctrine. To do so, we shall adopt an (...) ethological approach to comparative cognition and this necessitates two requirements. The first is that memory and planning need to be characterized in terms of objectively defined properties as opposed to purely phenomenological ones; the ability to remember what happened, where, and how long ago is a critical behavioral criterion for episodic memory. The second requirement is the identification of an ethological context in which these memories would confer a selective advantage. As a consequence, we turn this debate into an empirical evaluation in nonlinguistic animals and one embodied in synthetic creatures. Indeed, our behavioral conception of flexibly deployable information about “what, where, and when” has so far supported a comparative cognition in animals as diverse as corvids and primates. We argue that this approach may clarify and challenge ideas that have been based solely on research with human subjects, without the need to be constrained by phenomenological assumptions based on human‐centric ways of thinking. (shrink)

Mosquito-borne diseases represent a significant global disease burden, and recent outbreaks of such diseases have led to calls to reduce mosquito populations. Furthermore, advances in ‘gene-drive’ technology have raised the prospect of eradicating certain species of mosquito via genetic modification. This technology has attracted a great deal of media attention, and the idea of using gene-drive technology to eradicate mosquitoes has been met with criticism in the public domain. In this paper, I shall dispel two moral objections that have been (...) raised in the public domain against the use of gene-drive technologies to eradicate mosquitoes. The first objection invokes the concept of the ‘sanctity of life’ in order to claim that we should not drive an animal to extinction. In response, I follow Peter Singer in raising doubts about general appeals to the sanctity of life, and argue that neither individual mosquitoes nor mosquitoes species considered holistically are appropriately described as bearing a significant degree of moral status. The second objection claims that seeking to eradicate mosquitoes amounts to displaying unacceptable degrees of hubris. Although I argue that this objection also fails, I conclude by claiming that it raises the important point that we need to acquire more empirical data about, inter alia, the likely effects of mosquito eradication on the ecosystem, and the likelihood of gene-drive technology successfully eradicating the intended mosquito species, in order to adequately inform our moral analysis of gene-drive technologies in this context. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Question Mind and Brain What It Does Global Availability The Grey Area What It's Like.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Animals in the World: Five Essays on Aristotle’s Biology by Pierre PellegrinChristopher LutzPELLEGRIN, Pierre. Animals in the World: Five Essays on Aristotle’s Biology. Translated by Anthony Preus. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2023. vi + 324 pp. Cloth, $95.00; paper, $35.95This book explores two broad questions that have for decades been driving Pierre Pellegrin’s contributions to the so-called biological turn in Aristotle studies: whether and in (...) what sense Aristotle actually has a biology; the degree to which Aristotle’s teleological commitments lead him to characterize living things and the world that they inhabit as perfect. By analyzing various interplays that the zoological treatises posit between, on the one hand, the form and end of each species and, on the other hand, its material and efficient causes, Pellegrin reveals the astounding depth of Aristotle’s affinity with modern biology.In consideration of the millennia-spanning distance between Aristotle and the emergence of modern biology in the nineteenth century, Pellegrin first of all seeks to establish that he may call Aristotle a biologist without committing anachronism. Chapter 1 identifies two teleological notions that connect Parts of Animals and Generation of Animals to nineteenth-century conceptions of biology: Using organic function as the primary organizational principle in comparative anatomy relates Aristotle to Cuvier, and the concept of adaptation relates Aristotle to Darwin. Citing the profound influence of History of Animals on Cuvier (and thus on nineteenth-century biology), Pellegrin argues that its chief biological [End Page 357] innovation lies in the suggestion that observation is epistemically useful even when we are unable to explain that which we have observed.Chapter 2 emphasizes the role that mechanistic (that is, material and efficient) causality plays within the teleological explanations in Aristotle’s studies of animals. After a lengthy discussion of hypothetical necessity, Pellegrin uses PA 1.1’s distinction between formal nature and material nature to suggest that Aristotle recognizes an “ontological autonomy” of material nature, by which he seems to mean that matter has certain properties independent of any form. Linking Aristotle to Darwin, he argues that for Aristotle the perfection of each species consists in its fitness for (everlasting) survival. The end-directed formal nature of the species must negotiate with its autonomous material nature in order to secure for it an advantageous condition that guarantees its permanence but inevitably comes at the expense of certain disadvantages. For example, birds have no ears because they need extra matter for feathers (see PA 2.12).Shifting the focus to a crucial difference between Aristotle and modern biology, chapter 3 investigates the unity of Aristotelian natural science and biology’s place within it. Pellegrin finds analogies between Aristotle’s explanations of sexual reproduction, spontaneous generation, and Meteorology ’s account of the formation of inanimate homoiomerous matter (for example, metals, minerals). Sexual reproduction (clearly involving a material, formal, efficient, and final cause) is more causally complex than spontaneous generation (which according to Pellegrin has no preexisting final cause and only a quasi-formal cause), yet we understand spontaneous generation only by analogy with sexual reproduction, which is for Aristotle explanatorily prior. Spontaneous generation, in turn, is marginally more complex than the formation of homoiomerous matter (which also has only a quasi-formal cause and, further, no final cause at all), yet we understand the latter only by analogy with spontaneous generation and sexual reproduction. Pellegrin concludes that all natural science is united insofar as “material-efficient causality concerns all natural realities,” living and nonliving alike; however, because Aristotle in each case explains the less complex by analogy with the more complex, the teleological study of fully developed living things is explanatorily primary within his natural science. In this way, Aristotle stands in stark contrast to modern natural science, in which biology is explanatorily posterior to chemistry and physics.Chapter 4 qualifies the explanatory priority of complex organisms by challenging any notion of an Aristotelian scala naturae. Pellegrin works to show that the recognition of irreducible diversity is present in Aristotle’s very definition of an animal, arguing that in animals the nutritive faculty is neither ontologically nor developmentally prior to the sensitive and motive... (shrink)

This paper explores Thomas Hobbes’s account of animal life and mind. After a critical examination of Hobbes’s mechanistic explanation of operations of the mind such as perception and memory, I argue that his theory derives its strength from his idea of the dynamic interaction of the body with its surroundings. This dynamic interaction allows Hobbes to maintain that the purposive disposition of the animal is not merely an upshot of its material configuration, but an expression of its distinctive (...) bodily history. In support of Hobbes, I show how this is complemented by his account of the unity and continuity of the animal body in terms of a unification through the self-preserving drive that originates in perception. Nonetheless, I argue that Hobbes’s philosophy of animal life and mental faculties is hindered by a kind of epiphenomenalist perspective that is embedded in his materialist framework, and this perspective leaves the status of ideas and mental content unclear. I explain why Hobbes’s dynamic theory, founded upon the reciprocal determination of moving bodies, supports his idea of animal development and habituation while failing to account for the reflexivity of the mind. (shrink)

In this volume, we suggest new perspectives with which critical animal studies (CAS) can contribute to the development of knowledge and praxis in two fields-dehumanization and critical border studies, both concerned with human migration, refuge, and territorial or other borders. CAS is an interdisciplinary field that reflects on the ethics of humans' relationships with other animals, how the oppression of nonhuman animals intersects with other forms of oppression, and how economic interests drive oppression. CAS scholars reject disinterested analysis to (...) champion liberation for human animals, nonhuman animals, and the Earth. (shrink)

Can the age-old practices of animal selection and breeding and the more recent biotechnological interventions on animals, far more intrusive and systematic than any present form of human enhancement, enlighten us as to the future of enhancement practices? This book explores issues raised by past and present practices of animal enhancement in terms of their means and their goals, clarifies conceptual issues and identifies lessons that can be learned about enhancement practices, as they concern both animals and humans. (...) The extreme ambiguity of the claim that animals are being enhanced, the driving goals and strategies of third-party interests, but also the similarity of the substances and techniques used on humans and animals, suggest that human enhancement practices may be just as tainted by equivocal goals and strategies as equivalent practices with animals. (shrink)

Activists’ investigations of animal cruelty expose the public to suffering that they may otherwise be unaware of, via an increasingly broad-ranging media. This may result in ethical dilemmas and a wide range of emotions and reactions. Our hypothesis was that media broadcasts of cruelty to cattle in Indonesian abattoirs would result in an emotional response by the public that would drive their actions towards live animal export. A survey of the public in Australia was undertaken to investigate their (...) reactions and responses to. The most common immediate reaction was feeling pity for the cattle. Women were more likely than men to feel sad or angry. Most people discussed the media coverage with others afterwards but fewer than 10 % contacted politicians or wrote to newspapers. We conclude that the public were emotionally affected by the media coverage of cruelty to cattle but that this did not translate into significant behavioral change. We recommend that future broadcasts of animal cruelty should advise the public of contact details for counseling and that mental health support contacts, and information should be included on the websites of animal advocacy groups to acknowledge the disturbing effect animal cruelty exposes can have on the public. (shrink)

The ‘Animal Question’ has occupied Western philosophy for more than a decade now. Whether inspired by the rising urgency of the problem of violence towards and exploitation of nonhuman animals perpetuated by science, technology and culture broadly speaking, or by an enthralment with otherness, an increasing number of theorists engage with the concepts of the animal and human–nonhuman relations. These notions become an incessant impetus for creative and critical inquiry and the exploration of philosophical, political, ethical and artistic (...) thinking. What, however, needs to be asked in the first place is: how can we, as humans, relate to the nonhuman, and more specifically, to nonhuman animals ethically? Is it possible at all? The question of ethics is one of the main driving forces behind The Animal Catalyst: Towards Ahuman Theory, edited by Patricia MacCormack. (shrink)

In this study some typical aspects of human behavior are reconsidered in a new evolutionary perspective. Firstly, a theoretical paradigm is introduced, according to which animals show a natural propensity to maintain behavior far beyond the time when the triggering motivation has been removed;, these drifting conducts are defined as Vestigial Drifting Drives or. Such a paradigm is then applied to those human attitudes that once conferred an adaptive advantage on our species but have now become dysfunctional within the (...) framework of the current ecological crisis. In this context, human beings are considered the repository of VDDs that may play out as evolutionary threats. This thesis is supported by many examples and references that, hopefully, could stimulate scientific debate and further research in evolutionary anthropology, psychology, and related disciplines. (shrink)

Citizen attitudes and opinions form an important driving force for improvements in the ethical status of farm animals in society. Hence, it is important to understand how attitudes to farm animals vary in society and what factors, mechanisms and social processes influence the development of these attitudes. In this study we examine the relative importance of socio-demographic background, animal related experiences and social-equality attitudes in the formation of attitudes to farm animals in Finland. The research is based on a (...) nationwide survey. Our research findings suggest that female gender, young age, urban residency, a non-farming background and social-equality attitudes are linked to greater concern for farm animals. A farming background, valuing social equality, and gender have the strongest connections to farm animal attitudes, followed by age and place of residence. Having a companion animal and education level have a relatively modest connection to attitudes to farm animals. In order to accumulate comparative evidence of social-group differences in attitudes to farm animals, further research should continue to develop improved indicators for attitudes to farm animal welfare and rights. Moreover, explanations for social-group differences in citizen attitudes to farm animals should be subjected to further empirical testing. (shrink)

The detection and categorization of animate motions is a crucial task underlying social interaction and perceptual decision making. Neural representations of perceived animate objects are partially located in the primate cortical region STS, which is a region that receives convergent input from intermediate-level form and motion representations. Populations of STS cells exist which are selectively responsive to specific animated motion sequences, such as walkers. It is still unclear how and to what extent form and motion information contribute to the generation (...) of such representations and what kind of mechanisms are involved in the learning processes. The article develops a cortical model architecture for the unsupervised learning of animated motion sequence representations. We demonstrate how the model automatically selects significant motion patterns as well as meaningful static form prototypes characterized by a high degree of articulation. Such key poses are selectively reinforced during learning through a cross talk between the motion and form processing streams. Furthermore, we show how sequence-selective representations are learned in STS by fusing static form and motion input from the segregated bottom-up driving input streams. Cells in STS, in turn, feed their activities recurrently to their input sites along top-down signal pathways. We show how such learned feedback connections enable predictions about future input as anticipation generated by sequence-selective STS cells. Network simulations demonstrate the computational capacity of the proposed model by reproducing several experimental findings from neurosciences and by accounting for recent behavioral data. (shrink)

Leibniz’s metaphysics has been cited as a source of the dynamic and organic worldview of romantic Naturphilosophie. This chapter evaluates that claim by examining two distinct lineages of Leibniz’s metaphysical conception of dynamic appetition. On one hand, by demonstrating the existence of a “vis viva” in inanimate objects and by ascribing two distinct powers—perception and appetition—to all plants and animals as well as to his incorporeal “monads,” Leibniz seemed to restore force to physics and experience and intentionality to animals. On (...) the other hand, on account of the publication history of his writings, Leibniz’s pre-established harmony and preformation theory were seen by most philosophers before Herder and Schelling as reducing humans as well as animals to machines without free-will and their development to a mechanically predetermined succession of states. While appreciation of Leibniz’s views on activity and creativity in nature did increase towards the end of the century, other philosophical antecedents for the “drive” motif in German philosophy should be considered. (shrink)

In his lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger discusses three different forms of poverty and deprivation. First of all, the poverty in world of the non-human animal, second, the poverty in the being of contemporary Dasein, and, third, the deprivation of world in the fundamental attunement of profound boredom. This essay discusses these three forms of poverty or deprivation, with the goal to offer a preliminary analysis of Heidegger’s distinction between the human and the non-human animal.

This book is the first comprehensive study of Rousseau's rich and complex theory of the type of self-love (amour proper) that, for him, marks the central difference between humans and the beasts. Amour proper is the passion that drives human individuals to seek the esteem, approval, admiration, or love--the recognition--of their fellow beings. Neuhouser reconstructs Rousseau's understanding of what the drive for recognition is, why it is so problematic, and how its presence opens up far-reaching developmental possibilities for creatures (...) that possess it. One of Rousseau's central theses is that amour proper in its corrupted, manifestations--pride or vanity--is the principal source of an array of evils so widespread that they can easily appear to be necessary features of the human condition: enslavement, conflict, vice, misery, and self-estrangement. Yet Rousseau also argues that solving these problems depends not on suppressing or overcoming the drive for recognition but on cultivating it so that it contributes positively to the achievement of freedom, peace, virtue, happiness, and unalienated selfhood. Indeed, Rousseau goes so far as to claim that, despite its many dangers, the need for recognition is a condition of nearly everything that makes human life valuable and that elevates it above mere animal existence: rationality, morality, freedom--subjectivity itself--would be impossible for humans if it were not for amour proper and the relations to others it impels us to establish. (shrink)

Argues that information, in the animal behaviour or evolutionary context, is correlation/covariation. The alternation of red and green traffic lights is information because it is (quite strictly) correlated with the times when it is safe to drive through the intersection; thus driving in accordance with the lights is adaptive (causative of survival). Daylength is usefully, though less strictly, correlated with the optimal time to breed. Information in the sense of covariance implies what is adaptive; if an animal can (...) infer what the information implies, it increases its chances of survival. (shrink)

Based on three years' ethnographic research with animal sanctuary workers, this paper argues that a level of moral certainty drives and justifies many of the workers' actions and beliefs. Similar to the "missionary zeal" of nonhuman animal rights activists, this moral certainty divides the world into two neat categories: good for the animals and bad for the animals. This overriding certainty takes precedence over other concerns and pervades all aspects of sanctuary life, resulting in the breakdown of (...) different facets of that life into good and bad homes, good and bad animals, and good and bad workers. The paper, therefore, argues that animal welfare workers may be as "radical" as animal rights activists in one respect—their adherence to the overriding principle of being "in it for the animals.". (shrink)

It is indeed important to identify the rich variety of systems for the adaptive control of behaviour, rather than squeezing this richness into a few boxes. We need to recognise both the variety of systems for the cognitive control of adaptive behaviour and to chart the relationships between such systems. But I shall argue that these projects are not best pursued by asking about the extent of animal rationality. The argument develops in three stages. The first outlines a picture (...) of the selective regimes that drive the evolution of the sophisticated use of information by animal agents. The second argues that hominid cognition has evolved in response to a somewhat different set of " 3 " challenges and that the transmission of social information and skill has come to be both a critical and an unusual feature of hominid selective and developmental environments. The third draws upon the ideas of Dan Sperber and others in arguing that the social transmission of information introduces a vetting problem. I shall suggest that we see rationality as an evolved response to this vetting problem. (shrink)

This papers intends to show that Aristotle's theory on the political nature of man implies a specific difference in relation to other animals and that this does not arise from his understanding of human beings as naturally vulnerable animals that would seek in political life an artifice to redress their insufficiency or individual vulnerability to live. The qualitative difference of human beings in relation to other animals - including political species, such as bees or ants - drives them to (...) an equally specific type of life, whose foundation obeys values that ca be universalized. The political application of these values does not correspond to what is done in the domestic sphere, nor does it correspond to the mere transposition to a quantitatively superior community, because the universality of political values is extracted from what is understood by human beings as necessary for the realization of man as man, not man as an element of nature. (shrink)

Exploratory behavior is considered under the following categories: (1) extrinsic exploration in which the animal seeks information about conventional reinforcers such as food, (2) intrinsic exploration which is directed toward stimuli which may have no biological significance, further divided into inspective and inquisitive exploration. In the former the animal inspects a particular object; in the latter, the animal performs behavior to make a change in its environment, rather than merely responding to a change. Extrinsic exploration is synonymous (...) with the ethological term, appetitive behavior. It is shown that much of the behavior indicative of frustration reported in intensively housed animals occurs when the appetitive component of a drive rather than the consummatory component, is prevented. Consideration of inspective exploration is necessary for good husbandry practice, for fear is an important competing response. Inquisitive exploration has not been widely investigated in infraprimate species, but the authors present several possible examples in the species of common agricultural animals. However, they suggest that the propensity to show this type of exploration may vary between closely related species. In environments barren to the extent of stifling exploration, animals may develop apathy, and its relevance to animal welfare is discussed. (shrink)

This paper examines the challenges that climate change raises for animal agriculture and discusses the contributions that may come from a virtue ethics based approach. Two scenarios of the future role of animals in farming are set forth and discussed in terms of their ethical implications. The paper argues that when trying to tackle both climate and animal welfare issues in farming, proposals that call for a reorientation of our ethics and technology must first and foremost consider the (...) values that drive current livestock production. This paper sets forth and discusses the broader societal values implicit in livestock production. We suggest that a virtues approach would improve our thinking and practice regarding animal agriculture, facilitating a move from livestock production to animal husbandry. This change in animal agriculture in a time of climate change would stress virtues such as attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness as central elements in any mitigation or adaptation program. (shrink)

From the leader of the nation's most powerful animal-protection organization comes a frontline account of how conscience and creativity are driving a revolution in American business that is changing forever how we treat animals and create wealth. Wayne Pacelle of the Humane Society of the United States reveals how entrepreneurs, Fortune 500 CEOs, world-class scientists, philanthropists, and a new class of political leaders are driving the burgeoning, unstoppable growth of the "humane economy." Every business grounded on animal exploitation, (...) Pacelle argues, is ripe for disruption. Indeed each one of us is, and will be, touched by this far-reaching transformation in food and agriculture; in the pharmaceutical, chemical, and cosmetics industries; in film, television, and live entertainment; in tourism and wildlife management; in the pet trade for dogs and cats and exotic wildlife; and in fur and leather fashions. Collectively it promises to relieve or end the suffering of billions of creatures, while allowing businesses aligned with the best instincts and values of their customers to flourish. Pacelle shows, for instance, how the cruelties of industrial chicken farming are quickly becoming obsolete with a visit to Hampton Creek, the makers of a plant-based egg substitute and the world's fastest-growing food startup ever. Pacelle also recounts the stories of how established companies are joining in this economic transformation: from Petco and PetSmart, which have turned the conventional pet store model on its head by forswearing puppy mill suppliers in favor of shelter dogs; to John Paul Mitchell Systems, the Body Shop, and Lush, which use safe ingredients instead of animal tests for their cosmetics; to major food retailers like Whole Foods, Chipotle, and even Costco and Walmart, which are embracing animal welfare standards that are one by one unwinding the horrors of the factory farm. The Humane Economy is a clarion call to business leaders and to the world's growing animal protection movement; it is equally a warning to the static thinking of animal-use industries and their apologists: "Here, in this humane economy," Pacelle argues, "human ingenuity meets human virtue, and we discover at last that we can have it both ways--a better world for us and for animals, too. (shrink)

Mechanisms occurring at the atomic level are now known to drive processes essential for life, as revealed by quantum effects on biochemical reactions. Some macroscopic characteristics of organisms may thus show an atomic imprint, which may be transferred across organisms and affect their evolution. This possibility is considered here for the first time, with the aim of elucidating the appearance of an animal innovation with an unclear evolutionary origin: migratory behaviour. This trait may be mediated by a radical pair (...) (RP) mechanism in the retinal flavoprotein cryptochrome, providing essential magnetic orientation for migration. Isotopes may affect the performance of quantum processes through their nuclear spin. Here, we consider a simple model and then apply the standard open quantum system approach to the spin dynamics of cryptochrome RP. We changed the spin quantum number (I) and g‐factor of hydrogen and nitrogen isotopes to investigate their effect on RP's yield and magnetic sensitivity. Strong differences arose between isotopes with I = 1 and I = 1/2 in their contribution to cryptochrome magnetic sensitivity, particularly regarding Earth's magnetic field strengths (25–65 µT). In most cases, isotopic substitution improved RP's magnetic sensitivity. Migratory behaviour may thus have been favoured in animals with certain isotopic compositions of cryptochrome. (shrink)

When it comes to humans, ‘homosexuality’ refers to a variety of characteristics, ranging from sexual behaviours, desires, preferences, and orientations, to sexual identities. The question driving this paper is whether, and to what extent, it is justified to also ascribe such characteristics to nonhuman animals. Scientific opinions are divided on this issue, ranging from militantly positive to cautiously positive to markedly negative, with many in between suggesting we should at least change the vocabulary.

When it comes to humans, ‘homosexuality’ refers to a variety of characteristics, ranging from sexual behaviours, desires, preferences, and orientations, to sexual identities. The question driving this paper is whether, and to what extent, it is justified to also ascribe such characteristics to nonhuman animals. Scientific opinions are divided on this issue, ranging from militantly positive to cautiously positive to markedly negative, with many in between suggesting we should at least change the vocabulary.

INTRODUCTIONThe contemporary debate over the moral status of animals reflects a mixture of traditions. Utilitarianism, which measures moral standing in terms of the ability to suffer, has been used to defend the widening-circle conception of morality. The difference between humans and other animals vis-à-vis moral standing diminishes in its light. Focusing on questions of agency, conscience, and reflective powers, the differences between humans and nonhumans seem greater. Darwinism has been invoked to bridge the gaps between the intellectual and moral capacities (...) of humans and those of other animals. This has led some to argue either that differences in agency, conscience, and the power to reflect are overrated or that they may not be absolute indicators of moral consideration.Debates over the moral status of nonhuman animals have had a long and stormy history. The considerations that drive the current debate – questions of the intellectual capacities of animals, questions about their moral sensibilities, and questions about their sensitive capacities – are ancient. Nonetheless, they first began to assume their modern form in the writings of the eighteenth-century British moral philosophers. Those individuals were struggling with the moral implications of discoveries in the natural sciences and an increasingly secularized approach to philosophical issues. Vivisection experiments and rudimentary anatomical studies not only showed that the bodies of animals were remarkably similar to the bodies of human beings but also showed that the brutes were capable of experiencing pain and suffering. (shrink)