The problem of closure for the traditional unstructured possible worlds model of attitudinal content is that it treats belief and other cognitive states as closed under entailment, despite apparent counterexamples showing that this is not a necessary property of such states. One solution to this problem, which has been proposed recently by several authors (Schaffer 2005; Yalcin 2018; Hoek forthcoming), is to restrict closure in an unstructured setting by treating propositional attitudes as question-sensitive. Here I argue that this line of (...) response is unsatisfying as it stands because the problem of closure is more general than is typically discussed. A version of the problem recurs for attitudes like wondering, entertaining, considering, and so on, which are directed at questions rather than propositions. For such questioning attitudes, the appeal to question-sensitivity is much less convincing as a solution to the problem of closure. (shrink)

I discuss a puzzle that arises as an apparent tension between plausible theories of good guessing and intuitive constraints on rational inquiry. Clearly, our best guess at a question should reflect the likelihoods we assign to its possible answers. Your best guess is the answer you judge most likely. Additionally, it seems like a requirement of rational inquiry that our guesses be coherent. Thus, our best guess to a constituent (wh-) questions should cohere with our best guess to a polar (...) (yes/no) question whenever answers to the former entail answers to the latter. I argue that these requirements are in conflict and that a familiar form of contextualism doesn’t resolve the issue. The puzzle stands as a challenge to existing accounts of rational inquiry and question directed attitudes like guessing. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between the questioning attitude of wondering and a class of attitudes I call 'epistemic desires'. Broadly, these are desires to improve one's epistemic position on some question. A common example is the attitude of wanting to know the answer to some question. I argue that one can have any kind of epistemic desire towards any question, Q, without necessarily wondering Q, but not conversely. That is, one cannot wonder Q without having at least some epistemic (...) desire directed towards Q. I defend this latter claim from apparent counterexamples due to Friedman (2013) and Drucker (2022), and finish with a proposal on which epistemic desires, particularly the desire for understanding, play an explanatory role in distinguishing wondering from other forms of question-directed thought. (shrink)

In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...) on one of the most common metaphysical interpretations of the explanatory distinction, talk of a distinction between personal and subpersonal states simply makes no sense. When people insist on applying the personal/subpersonal terminology to psychological states, I allow that they are often making a genuine distinction, but one that it is best understood in terms of Stich's (1978) distinction between doxastic and subdoxastic states. I end the paper by considering some other common misinterpretations of the personal/subpersonal distinction, such as those involving consciousness, normativity, or autonomy. (shrink)

Daniel Dennett's distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations was fundamental in establishing the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. Since it was first introduced in 1969, the personal/subpersonal distinction has been adapted to fit different approaches to the mind. In one example of this, the ‘Pittsburgh school’ of philosophers attempted to map Dennett's distinction onto their own distinction between the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘space of causes’. A second example can be found in much contemporary philosophy of psychology, where Dennett's (...) distinction has been presumed to be equivalent to Stephen Stich's distinction between doxastic and subdoxastic states. Both these interpretations of the personal/subpersonal distinction, and also Dennett's own philosophical views of the mind, go beyond the personal/subpersonal distinction itself. They each involve supplementing the distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations with metaphysical claims about the relationship between the two kinds of explanation and the entities they posit. (shrink)

Language provides rich social information about its speakers. For instance, adults and children make inferences about a speaker's social identity, geographic origins, and group membership based on her language and accent. Although infants prefer speakers of familiar languages, little is known about the developmental origins of humans’ sensitivity to language as marker of social identity. We investigated whether 9-month-olds use the language a person speaks as an indicator of that person's likely social relationships. Infants were familiarized with videos of two (...) people who spoke the same or different languages, and then viewed test videos of those two individuals affiliating or disengaging. Results suggest that infants expected two people who spoke the same language to be more likely to affiliate than two people who spoke different languages. Thus, infants view language as a meaningful social marker and use language to make inferences about third-party social relationships. (shrink)

was to test the role of both early and higher visual areas in the integration of local features into global shapes. To this end, we conducted functional magnetic resonance imaging studies. Although fMRI lacks the high spatial resolution of intracortical recordings, it allows simultaneous collection of responses to the same stimulus set from multiple visual areas that is not possible with standard recording techniques. We performed these studies in monkeys, where much is known about the properties of neurons in different (...) visual areas, and in humans, where recent fMRI.. (shrink)

A novel problem or task may seem difficult at first, but with enough practice, it can become easy and routine. Practice and the process of learning is often accompanied by some mild cognitive uneas...

This paper goes beyond critiques of western philosophical notions of space as passive, feminine, and unintelligent by reconfiguring containment as an active process. The author draws on work in the history of technology, on a cybernetic epistemology that emphasizes the interdependence of organism and environment, and on intersubjectivist psychoanalytic theories of the maternal provision. A more unexpected ally is found in Heidegger, whose writings on holding and supply are read in ways that contribute to the development of an urgently required (...) philosophy of container technologies. (shrink)

This paper investigates the relationship between economic theory and theories of justice in the design of public policy. In particular, it focuses on the role of mechanism design in policy contexts beset with issues of social, racial and distributive justice. Economists’ involvement in redesigning Boston’s algorithm for allocating K-12 students to public schools serves as an instructive case study. The paper draws on the distinction betweenideal theoryandnon-ideal theoryin political philosophy and the concept ofperformativityin economic sociology to argue that mechanism design (...) can enact elaborate ideal theories of justice. Anormative gapthus emerges between the goals of the policymakers and the objectives of economic designs. As a result, mechanism design may obstruct stakeholders’ avenues for normative criticism of public policies, and serve as a technology of depoliticization. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between several ideas about the mind and cognition. The hypothesis of extended cognition claims that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head, that elements of the world around us can actually become parts of our cognitive systems. It has recently been suggested that the hypothesis of extended cognition is entailed by one of the foremost philosophical positions on the nature of the mind: functionalism, the thesis that mental states are defined by their functional (...) relations rather than by their physical constituents. Furthermore, it has been claimed that functionalism entails a version of extended cognition which is sufficiently radical as to be obviously false. I survey the debate and propose several ways of avoiding this conclusion, emphasizing the importance of distinguishing the hypothesis of extended cognition from the related notion of the extended mind. (shrink)

Perception provides us with access to the external world, but that access is shaped by our own experiential histories. Through perceptual learning, we can enhance our capacities for perceptual discrimination, categorization, and attention to salient properties. We can also encode harmful biases and stereotypes. This article reviews interdisciplinary research on perceptual learning, with an emphasis on the implications for our rational and normative theorizing. Perceptual learning raises the possibility that our inquiries into topics such as epistemic justification, aesthetic criticism, and (...) moral knowledge should include not only an examination of cognition but also of perception. (shrink)

Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.

The past twenty years have seen an increase in the importance of the body in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. This 'embodied' trend challenges the orthodox view in cognitive science in several ways: it downplays the traditional 'mind-as-computer' approach and emphasizes the role of interactions between the brain, body, and environment. In this article, I review recent work in the area of embodied cognitive science and explore the approaches each takes to the ideas of consciousness, computation and representation. Finally, (...) I look at the current relationship between orthodox cognitive science and the study of mental disorder, and consider the implications that the embodied trend could have for issues in psychopathology. (shrink)

Testimonial accounts of mathematical problem choice typically rely on intrinsic constraints. They focus on the worth of the problem and feelings of beauty. These are often developed as both descriptive and normative constraints on problem choice. In this paper, I aim to add an extrinsic constraint of no less importance: the assurance of contact of minds with a desired audience. A number of elements for the relationship between mathematician and his audience make up this contact. This constraint stems from the (...) mathematician’s role as an arguer, as one of the pre-requisites to argumentation is contact of minds. I examine two exceptional cases which fail to be explained by intrinsic constraints on motivation and posit how this contact could influence usual cases. While not the only constraint or drive in problem choice, establishing contact of minds plays an important role worth further examination. (shrink)

Church has contributed a lot to the safeguard of G. Frege's theory of meaning after the discovery of antinomies in it. To achieve this he has adapted it by keeping parts, discarding others and adding new ones, most of which are clearly exposed in an informal way in the introduction to his Introduction to Mathematical Logic. As for any modification of a theory by another person, it is interesting to understand how the thoughts of the former survive in the new (...) theory even though radical changes have occurred, or on the contrary how it retains only the appearance of the initial theory. We shall therefore go through the basic concepts of logic he introduces in this introduction and assess their relation to Frege's original theory. (shrink)

Individuals with chronic pain often experience co-existing sleep problems and depression-related states. Chronic pain, sleep problems, and depression interrelate, and have been shown to exacerbate one another, which negatively impacts quality of life. This study explored the relationships between pain severity, pain interference, sleep quality, and depression among individuals with chronic pain. Secondly, we tested whether sleep quality may moderate the relationship between pain and depression. A cross-sectional survey was completed by 1,059 adults with non-malignant chronic pain conditions and collected (...) measures related to pain severity, pain interference, sleep quality, and depression. Multiple regression analyses found that pain severity, pain interference, and sleep quality are all significantly associated with depression. Secondly, moderated regression analyses revealed that sleep quality moderates the relationship between pain interference and depression among individuals with chronic pain such that good sleep quality attenuates the effect of pain interference on depression, and poor sleep quality amplifies the effect of pain interference on depression. These findings suggest that sleep quality may be a relevant therapeutic target for individuals with chronic pain and co-existing depression. (shrink)

The use of genetically modified organisms in agriculture makes great promises of better seeds, but also raises many controversies about ownership of seeds and about potential hazards. I suggest that owners of these seeds bear the responsibility to do no harm in using these seeds. After defining the nature of this responsibility, this paper asks, if ownership entails moral responsibility, and ownership can be transferred, then how is moral responsibility transferred? Building on the literature on use plans, I suggest five (...) conditions for a good transfer of moral responsibility for genetically modified seeds. I also look at the Monsanto Technology Use Guide and Technology/Stewardship Agreement, as an examplar of a use plan, to explore the extent to which these conditions are present. I conclude that use plans can play a role in the distribution and transfer of moral responsibility for technologies with high benefits and potential harmful uncertainties. (shrink)

Perceptual experiences are not immediately responsive to reasons. You see a stick submerged in a glass of water as bent no matter how much you know about light refraction. Due to this isolation from reasons, perception is traditionally considered outside the scope of epistemic evaluability as justified or unjustified. Is perception really as independent from reasons as visual illusions make it out to be? I argue no, drawing on psychological evidence from perceptual learning. The flexibility of perceptual learning is a (...) way of responding to new epistemic reasons. The resulting perceptual experiences are epistemically evaluable as justified or unjustified. (shrink)

Testimonial accounts of mathematical problem choice typically rely on intrinsic constraints. They focus on the worth of the problem and feelings of beauty. These are often developed as both descriptive and normative constraints on problem choice. In this paper, I aim to add an extrinsic constraint of no less importance: the assurance of contact of minds with a desired audience. A number of elements for the relationship between mathematician and his audience make up this contact. This constraint stems from the (...) mathematician’s role as an arguer, as one of the pre-requisites to argumentation is contact of minds. I examine two exceptional cases which fail to be explained by intrinsic constraints on motivation and posit how this contact could influence usual cases. While not the only constraint or drive in problem choice, establishing contact of minds plays an important role worth further examination. (shrink)

Chapter 8 argues against the view that the moral rightness of an act is not a reason to perform it, and our reasons are instead the features that make the act right. Philosophers typically defend this view by noting that it seems redundant to take rightness to be an additional reason, once it has been acknowledged that the right-making features are already reasons. The author shows that this argument dramatically overgeneralizes, ruling out all cases in which two or more reasons (...) are arranged in relationships of metaphysical constitution. She then proposes an alternative way of thinking about these metaphysical hierarchies: Rather than assuming that at most one of the facts in each hierarchy is the “real” reason, bearing all the normative weight, it should be accepted that these facts can all be genuine reasons, whose normative weight is shared in virtue of the metaphysical relationships between them. Some tests are offered that can be used to determine which facts occur in metaphysical hierarchies with shared weight, and it is argued that the fact that an act is morally right passes the tests. The author then explains what she takes to be some kernels of truth underlying the redundancy argument, arguing that these phenomena are pragmatic, not metaphysical. (shrink)

Our perceptual systems are not stagnant but can learn from experience. Why is this so? That is, what is the function of perceptual learning? I consider two answers to this question: The Offloading View, which says that the function of perceptual learning is to offload tasks from cognition onto perception, thereby freeing up cognitive resources (Connolly, 2019) and the Perceptual View, which says that the function of perceptual learning is to improve the functioning of perception. I argue that the Perceptual (...) View better explains data from infants and animals, and better accounts for learned tasks that only perception could perform. (shrink)

According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast, perceptions are “unjustified justifiers.” Core cognition is a set of mental systems that stand at the border of perception and belief, and has been extensively studied in developmental psychology. Core cognition's borderline states do not fit neatly into the traditional epistemic picture. What is the epistemic role of these states? (...) Focusing on the core object system, the author argues that core object representations have epistemic statuses like beliefs do, despite their many prototypically perceptual features. First, the author argues that it is a sufficient condition on a mental state's having an epistemic status as justified or unjustified that the state is based on reasons. Then the author argues that core object representations are based on reasons, through an examination of both experimental results and key markers of the basing relation. The scope of mental states that are subject to epistemic evaluation as justified or unjustified is not restricted to beliefs. (shrink)

Safe-by-design aims at addressing safety issues already during the R&D and design phases of new technologies. SbD has increasingly become popular in the last few years for addressing the risks of emerging technologies like nanotechnology and synthetic biology. We ask to what extent SbD approaches can deal with uncertainty, in particular with indeterminacy, i.e., the fact that the actual safety of a technology depends on the behavior of actors in the value chain like users and operators. We argue that while (...) indeterminacy may be approached by designing out users as much as possible in attaining safety, this is often not a good strategy. It will not only make it more difficult to deal with unexpected risks; it also misses out on the resources that users can bring for achieving safety, and it is undemocratic. We argue that rather than directly designing for safety, it is better to design for the responsibility for safety, i.e., designers should think where the responsibility for safety is best situated and design technologies accordingly. We propose some heuristics that can be used in deciding how to share and distribute responsibility for safety through design. (shrink)

This paper introduces a general logical framework for reasoning about diffusion processes within social networks. The new “Logic for Diffusion in Social Networks” is a dynamic extension of standard hybrid logic, allowing to model complex phenomena involving several properties of agents. We provide a complete axiomatization and a terminating and complete tableau system for this logic and show how to apply the framework to diffusion phenomena documented in social networks analysis.

Testimonial accounts of mathematical problem choice typically rely on intrinsic constraints. They focus on the worth of the problem and feelings of beauty. These are often developed as both descriptive and normative constraints on problem choice. In this paper, I aim to add an extrinsic constraint of no less importance: the assurance of contact of minds with a desired audience. A number of elements for the relationship between mathematician and his audience make up this contact. This constraint stems from the (...) mathematician’s role as an arguer, as one of the pre-requisites to argumentation is contact of minds. I examine two exceptional cases which fail to be explained by intrinsic constraints on motivation and posit how this contact could influence usual cases. While not the only constraint or drive in problem choice, establishing contact of minds plays an important role worth further examination. (shrink)

This study investigated whether some Japanese intransitive verbs, called agent-implying intransitive verbs, are processed differently from other ordinary intransitive verbs. These verbs are special in that they denote agentive events, but they are intransitive verbs, which only allow the patient/theme to be the only nominatively marked argument. The priming experiment was designed based on the situation model theory, assuming that verbs with an agentive semantic structure (e.g., ordinary transitive verbs) has a shorter causal inferential distance than those with a non-agentive (...) semantic structure (e.g., ordinary intransitive verb). In the experiment, participants were instructed to read two sentences that formed a story, of which the second sentence was either a transitive or intransitive sentence. The participants then answered a related question about general knowledge, and their response times were measured. The results show that, whereas the mean response time in the ordinary intransitive condition was significantly longer than that in the ordinary transitive condition, the mean response time in the agent-implying intransitive condition was not significantly different from that of the corresponding transitive condition, suggesting that agent-implying intransitive verbs are interpreted as agentive. The findings suggest that agent-implying intransitive verbs instantly evoke agentivity, whereas ordinary intransitive verbs do not. The theoretical implications of the findings are discussed. (shrink)

BackgroundOver the last decades there has been a change in the way schooling is perceived recognizing that children’s learning is closely linked to children’s health. Children spend most of their time at school, which is often the place where problems are identified and interventions are offered, not only for treatment but also prevention. Embedding arts therapies into the educational system may help address children’s emerging needs and have a positive impact on their wellbeing.MethodsA pilot cross-over randomized controlled design was employed (...) to investigate the effectiveness of an arts therapies intervention on a series of child- and teacher-reported outcome measures, specifically, health related quality of life, wellbeing and life functioning, emotional and behavioral difficulties, as well as duration of sleep. Sample size calculations for future large-scale studies were also performed, and the sustained impact of the intervention was evaluated at 3, 6, and 12 months follow-up. The pluralistic theoretical and therapeutic framework of this intervention was informed by a systematic review on school-based arts therapies interventions and is presented in detail in the study protocol. Participants were 62 children with mild emotional and behavioral difficulties.ResultsImprovements in HRQOL and CORS were greater in those engaged in the arts therapies intervention than the control groups and were maintained at the follow-up stages. Significant improvements were only found for duration of sleep and SDQ. Minimal clinically important differences as defined in the published protocol were found for CORS, SDQ and duration of sleep, but not HRQOL.DiscussionFindings indicate that the arts therapies interventions were having a clinically significant effect on life functioning, duration of sleep, emotional and behavioral difficulties. Findings also indicate a small effect size for health related quality of life, suggesting the intervention was having a small positive effect on this outcome measure. The study indicates that all outcome measures assessed here would be suitable for inclusion in a larger randomized controlled study utilizing these arts therapies interventions, and that a sample size of 225 participants would be required if these outcome measures were used. (shrink)

BackgroundThe time that children and young people spend in nature and outdoor spaces has decreased significantly over the past 30 years. This was exacerbated with a further 60% decline post-COVID-19. Research demonstrating that natural environments have a positive impact on health and wellbeing has led to prescription of nature-based health interventions and green prescribing, although evidence for its use is predominantly limited to adults. Growing evidence also shows the impact of arts on all aspects of health and wellbeing. However, what (...) has received scant attention in literature is the interconnection between the two: arts and nature.AimsThis review synthesizes the literature surrounding the interconnectedness between arts and nature, and their impact on the health and wellbeing of children and young people.MethodsEight major electronic databases were systematically searched, while hand-searching included 20 journals, six books, and contact with experts. The review was conducted using the Cochrane handbook for systematic reviews, PRISMA guidelines and TIDieR template. All stages were conducted independently by two researchers and the protocol was published on PROSPERO.ResultsAlthough 9,314 records were identified, only 11 records were included as most studies focused either on arts or nature, but not both. Studies were conducted in United Kingdom, United States, Ireland, Australia, and Hong Kong, in a range of spaces such as forests, woodlands, beaches, parks, fields, gardens, and school playgrounds. The review encompasses data from 602 participants in total.DiscussionArts-in-nature offered an inclusive medium to engage all children and young people, especially those who might otherwise remain disinterested about environmental issues and disengaged with educational programs. Further, arts-in-nature provided stimuli to increase nature connectivity, understand environmental issues and explore ways to prevent environmental disasters. This led to higher environmental awareness and pro-environmental behaviors, and potential decrease in eco-anxiety.ConclusionAlthough the quality of qualitative studies was high, the quality of quantitative studies was low or unclear, thus quantitative evidence is still at its infancy. Implications for research, policy, and practice are discussed, such as methods and activities to strengthen future interventions. Scaling-up existing interventions may lead to wider recognition and inclusion of arts-in-nature in future health guidelines, including green prescribing. (shrink)

To practise ‘fairly and justly’ a clinician must balance the needs of both the many and the few: the individual patient in front of them, and the many unseen patients in the waiting room, and in the county. They must consider the immediate clinical needs of those in the present, and how their actions will impact on future patients. The good medical practice guidance ‘Make the care of your patient your first concern’ provides no guidance on how doctors should act (...) when they care for multiple patients with conflicting needs. Moreover, conflicting needs extend far past simply those between different patients. At an organisational level, financial obligations must be balanced with clinical ones; the system must support those who work within it in a variety of roles; and, finally, in order for a healthcare service to be sustainable, the demands of current and future generations must be balanced.The central problem, we propose, is that there is no shared philosophical framework on which the provision of care or the development of health policy is based, nor is there a practical, fair and transparent process to ensure that the service is equipped to deal justly with new challenges as they emerge. Many philosophers have grappled with constructing a set of principles which would lead to a ‘good’ society which is just to different users; prominent among them is Rawls.Four important principles can be derived using a Rawlsian approach: equity of access, distributive justice, sustainability and openness. However, Rawls’ approach is sometimes considered too abstract to be applied readily to policymaking; it does not provide clear guidance for how individuals working within existing institutions can enact the principles of justice. We therefore combine the principles derived from Rawls with Scanlonian contractualism: by demanding that decisions are made in a way which cannot be ‘reasonably rejected’ by different stakeholders, we ensure that conflicting needs are considered robustly.We demonstrate how embedding this framework would ensure just policies and fair practice. We illustrate this by using examples of how it would help prevent injustice among different socioeconomic groups, prevent intergenerational injustice and prevent injustice in a crisis, for example, as we respond to new challenges such as COVID-19.Attempts to help individual doctors practise fairly and justly throughout their professional lives are best focused at an institutional or systemic level. We propose a practical framework: combining Scanlonian contractualism with a Rawlsian approach. Adopting this framework would equip the workforce and population to contribute to fair policymaking, and would ultimately result in a healthcare system whose practice and policies—at their core—were just. (shrink)

What kinds of mental states can be based on epistemic reasons? The standard answer is only beliefs. I argue that perceptual states can also be based on reasons, as the result of crossmodal interactions. A perceptual state from one modality can provide a reason on which an experience in another modality is based. My argument identifies key markers of the basing relation and locates them in the crossmodal Marimba Illusion (Schutz & Kubovy 2009). The subject’s auditory experience of musical tone (...) duration is based on the reason provided by her visual representation of the length of the musician’s gesture and other stored perceptual principles. (shrink)

This article builds on existing feminist literature on obstetric violence in the context of childbirth to argue that there is a continuum of obstetric violence that also includes that perpetuated in relation to pregnancy prevention and termination, as well as antenatal healthcare and birth. This structural violence is highlighted in relation to conscientious objection, the reporting of people suspected of illegal abortions by their healthcare providers, and contraceptive coercion. Recognizing the limitations of criminal and human rights approaches to obstetric violence, (...) this article takes Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory as the foundation for the transformative structural change of healthcare institutions. (shrink)

In many social contexts, social influence seems to be inescapable: the behavior of others influences us to modify ours, and vice-versa. However, social psychology is full of examples of phenomena where individuals experience a discrepancy between their public behavior and their private opinion. This raises two central questions. First, how does an individual reason about the behavior of others and their private opinions in situations of social influence? And second, what are the laws of the resulting information dynamics? In this (...) paper, we address these questions by introducing a formal framework for representing reasoning about an individual’s private opinions and public behavior under the dynamics of social influence in social networks. Moreover, we dig deeper into the involved information dynamics by modeling how individuals can learn about each other based on this reasoning. This compels us to introduce a new formal notion of reflective social influence. Finally, we initialize the work on proof theory and automated reasoning for our framework by introducing a sound and complete tableaux system for a fragment of our logic. Furthermore, this constitutes the first tableau system for the “Facebook logic” of J. Seligman, F. Liu, and P. Girard. (shrink)

The “received wisdom” in contemporary analytic philosophy is that intuition talk is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back to the 1960s. In this paper, we set out to test two interpretations of this “received wisdom.” The first is that intuition talk is just talk, without any methodological significance. The second is that intuition talk is methodologically significant; it shows that analytic philosophers appeal to intuition. We present empirical and contextual evidence, systematically mined from the JSTOR corpus and HathiTrust’s Digital Library, (...) which provide some empirical support for the second rather than the first hypothesis. Our data also suggest that appealing to intuition is a much older philosophical methodology than the “received wisdom” alleges. We then discuss the implications of our findings for the contemporary debate over philosophical methodology. (shrink)

Zoé Chatzidakis , David Marker , Amador Martin-Pizarro , Rahim Moosa , Sergei Starchenko Source: Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 54, Number 3-4, 277--277.

Many philosophers subscribe to the view that philosophy is a priori and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair. This paper sets out to empirically test this picture. If this were the case, we would expect to see this reflected in philosophical practice. In particular, we would expect philosophers to advance mostly deductive, rather than inductive, arguments. The paper shows that the percentage of philosophy articles advancing deductive arguments is higher than those advancing inductive arguments, which is (...) what we would expect from the vantage point of the armchair philosophy picture. The results also show, however, that the percentages of articles advancing deductive arguments and those advancing inductive arguments are converging over time and that the difference between inductive and deductive ratios is declining over time. This trend suggests that deductive arguments are gradually losing their status as the dominant form of argumentation in philosophy. (shrink)

Is there a parallel between climate change and our body’s temperature or non-compliance and failure to act on global warming? This paper proposes a model which describes the human body as part of N...

This unpublished article was written around 2009 for a journal special issue of a journal which never materialized. In 2018, the article was rewritten and published in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. It can be found on PhilPapers as Drayson and Clark (2018), 'Cognitive Disability and the Embodied, Extended Mind'.

El presente trabajo tuvo por objetivo, conocer el peso que los adolescentes confieren a las habilidades emocionales para su desempeño personal.Los resultados mostraron que los adolescentes privilegian las capacidades emocionales y sociomorales. Se presentan también experiencias de incorporación de acciones de educación emocional en el currículo docente.

Partant d’une toile rassemblant une série d’esquisses peintes montrant un lionceau, cette étude propose d’aborder la production de Rosa Bonheur sous l’angle des biographies animales. L’article se focalise sur les modèles lion·ne·s cotoyés par l’artiste au cours de sa carrière. Il s’agit de mettre au jour la complexité de ces rapports à partir de l’étude de l’œuvre et de l’apport des données et des témoignages que les quelques biographies anciennes de l’artiste consacrent à ces animaux.