Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and Ethics

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):531-545 (2015)
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Abstract

Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.

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Author Profiles

Zoe Jenkin
Washington University in St. Louis
Susanna Siegel
Harvard University

Citations of this work

New directions in predictive processing.Jakob Hohwy - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (2):209-223.
Literal Perceptual Inference.Alex Kiefer - 2017 - In Thomas Metzinger & Wanja Wiese (eds.), Philosophy and predictive processing. Frankfurt, Germany:
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XV—Epistemic Charge.Susanna Siegel - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):277-306.
Comments on Annalisa Coliva, Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Maria Baghramian - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):272-280.

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References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
The Predictive Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
The Origin of Concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - Oxford University Press.

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