Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness

Noûs 57 (2):481-508 (2022)
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Abstract

Perceptual experiences are not immediately responsive to reasons. You see a stick submerged in a glass of water as bent no matter how much you know about light refraction. Due to this isolation from reasons, perception is traditionally considered outside the scope of epistemic evaluability as justified or unjustified. Is perception really as independent from reasons as visual illusions make it out to be? I argue no, drawing on psychological evidence from perceptual learning. The flexibility of perceptual learning is a way of responding to new epistemic reasons. The resulting perceptual experiences are epistemically evaluable as justified or unjustified.

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Zoe Jenkin
Rutgers - New Brunswick

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.Noam Chomsky - 1965 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The moral problem.Michael R. Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.

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