Augmentation, agency, and the spreading of the mental state

Abstract

This unpublished article was written around 2009 for a journal special issue of a journal which never materialized. In 2018, the article was rewritten and published in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. It can be found on PhilPapers as Drayson and Clark (2018), 'Cognitive Disability and the Embodied, Extended Mind'.

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Author Profiles

Zoe Drayson
University of California, Davis
Andy Clark
University of Sussex