Este artículo explora el contexto intelectual y las fuentes eruditas de un manuscrito clandestino, que ha pasado inadvertido hasta la fecha, que en 1701 pertenecía a Charles Hornby y que incluía una versión de la obra polémica de Henry Stubbe Account of the rise and progress of Mahometanism, además de una traducción de los siete primeros capítulos de la obra en castellano de Muḥammmad Alguazir Apología contra la ley Cristiana. El artículo propone examinar cómo las polémicas islámicas anticristianas fueron encontradas, (...) utilizadas y cuestionadas, tanto por personajes librepensadores, como Stubbe y Toland, como por los estudiosos más ortodoxos. Para tal fin establece los distintos hábitos en la citación y utilización de la erudición “orientalista” que se emplearon entre 1650 y 1720, prestando especial atención a las grandes obras de Hotttinger y Pococke. El artículo argumenta que los librepensadores fueron perfectamente capaces de apropiarse de aspectos tanto de la erudición cristiana como de la teología islámica para sus fines antireligiosos. (shrink)

This chapter examines philosophical issues surrounding the classification of mental disorders by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). In particular, the chapter focuses on issues concerning the relative merits of descriptive versus theoretical approaches to psychiatric classification and whether the DSM should classify natural kinds. These issues are presented with reference to the history of the DSM, which has been published regularly by the American Psychiatric Association since 1952 and is currently in its fifth edition. While the (...) first two editions of the DSM adopted a theoretical (psychoanalytic) and etiological approach to classification, subsequent editions of the DSM have adopted an atheoretical and purely descriptive (“neo-Kraepelinian”) approach. It is argued that largest problem with the DSM at present—viz., its failure to provide valid diagnostic categories—is directly related to the purely descriptive methodology championed by the DSM since the third edition of the DSM. In light of this problem, the chapter discusses the prospects of a theoretical and causal approach to psychiatric classification and critically examines the assumption that the DSM should classify natural kinds. (shrink)

Pour examiner la consistance des thèses de Fichte en matière de cosmopolitisme et de nationalisme, on prend en compte notamment un aspect peu connu de sa pensée politique, son engagement maçonnique, et on analyse les textes de la période berlinoise, au cours de laquelle le thème de la nation prend une importance croissante. Comment interpréter en particulier les Discours à la nation allemande? Fichte y opère-t‑il une rupture avec les idéaux universalistes des Lumières? Et quel statut accorder à l’idée d’une (...) richesse des patrimoines nationaux à préserver? On cherche à montrer que Fichte reste fidèle à ses vues républicaines et universalistes, tout en reconnaissant l’ambiguïté du recours, pour des raisons stratégiques et rhétoriques, à un registre nationaliste, qui lui est foncièrement étranger. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Il y a and the UngrundLevinas and the Russian Existentialists Berdyaev and ShestovJames McLachlan (bio)Western philosophy coincides with the disclosure of the other where the other, in manifesting itself as a being, loses its alterity. From its infancy philosophy has been struck with a horror of the other than remains other — with an insurmountable allergy. It is for this reason that it is essentially a philosophy of (...) being, that the comprehension of being is its last word, and the fundamental structure of man.... The God of the philosophers... is a god adequate to reason, a comprehended god who could not trouble the autonomy of consciousness, which finds itself again in all its adventures, returning home to itself like Ulysses, who through all his peregrinations is only on the way to his native island.— Emmanuel Levinas, “The Trace of the Other”Levinas is well known for his assault of the history of Western ontology and its allergy to otherness. In seeing all in terms of Being, philosophy subordinates ethics to ontology by reducing the other to an object of knowledge within Being. Recent work by Fiona Steinkamp, Joseph Lawrence, and Drew Dalton has called attention to a possible [End Page 213] dialogue between Schelling (especially the middle Schelling of Philosophical Investigation into the Essence of Human Freedom and The Ages of the World) and Levinas.1 Joseph Lawrence shows both Schelling and Levinas struggle with the difficulty of thinking the Good beyond being. Schelling thought that the very quest for reality forces us to philosophize from the point of view of practical rather than theoretical reason. He thought there is no adequate theoretical refutation of solipsism but there is a perfectly good practical refutation: to the extent that I treat others as real they reveal themselves as real to me. Lawrence points to Schelling’s claim in Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, “This is the secret of love, that it unites such beings as could each exist in itself, and nonetheless neither is nor can be without the other.”2The parallels between Schelling and Levinas are rooted in the latter’s appreciation of Franz Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption. In the introduction to Totality and Infinity, Levinas famously notes that Rosenzweig’s masterpiece was “too often present in this book to be cited” (TI 28). Rosenzweig’s debt to Schelling is well documented. He carried The Ages of the World to the front with him in World War One and refers to it in correspondence. He even wrote, “It’s a great book to the last, had it been completed nobody except the Jews would give two hoots for the Star.”3 This is, without doubt, the correct historical stream to follow in connection with the relation between Schelling and Levinas and the proper way to see the connections between such Levinasian notions as the “there is” and hypostasis and the Schellingian conceptions that reflect similar ideas as the Ungrund, the emergence of the personal from the impersonal ground, and, above all, the importance of the practical ethical move beyond ontology.But there were also contemporaries holding such philosophical views in the Paris of the 1930s, and they can be seen to reinforce such positions. What is more striking is they come from Levinas’s fellow émigrés: Lev Shestov, Nicolas Berdyaev, and Alexandre Koyré. In one way or another, each either championed positions that emphasized the emergence of the particular from the general, rejected ontology, [End Page 214] or attacked the entire Western metaphysical tradition stemming from Parmenides for reasons similar to those held by Levinas. Levinas’s appreciation of Dostoevsky is also an important in connection to some of the ideas shared by Levinas, his fellow émigrés, and Schelling.4The Russian émigrés Shestov and Berdyaev were both Dostoevsky disciples; each offered major and influential studies on Dostoevsky and each viewed the novelist in quite different ways through the lens of each one’s philosophical position that had, in part, been formed by each thinker’s reading of Dostoevsky.5 Levinas’s friend, a student of Edmund Husserl, the philosopher of science Alexandre Koyré’s 1929 dissertation later... (shrink)

RESUMEN Este artículo presenta una reconstrucción argumentativa del primer capítulo de la tercera sección de la Doctrina de la Esencia de la Ciencia de la Lógica de Hegel, el cual lleva como título "Lo Absoluto". Su hipótesis es que la critica de la metafísica contenida en este capítulo no solo aboga por una ontología relacional del proceso, sino que también establece implícitamente una distinción entre una teoría de lo absoluto de primer orden y una de segundo orden. La teoría de (...) lo absoluto de primer orden tiene como objetivo una exposición de lo absoluto libre de contradicciones analíticas. Por su parte, la teoría de lo absoluto de segundo orden no solo expone en qué consiste lo absoluto, sino que pretende también incluir el pensamiento y la teoría de lo absoluto en lo absoluto mismo. ABSTRACT This paper aims to reconstruct the arguments of the first chapter within the third section of the Doctrine of Essence, namely "The Absolute". Its hypothesis is that the critic of metaphysics within this chapter not only champions a relational process-ontology, but also states an implicit distinction between first and second order theories of the Absolute. The first-order theory of the Absolute purports to present a definition of the Absolute without analytic contradictions. The second-order theory of the Absolute not only sets out the nature of the Absolute, but also seeks to include the thought and the theory of the Absolute within the Absolute itself. (shrink)

Millán-Puelles and Maritain suitably delimited the fields of ethics and art, doing what justice; self-determination of art and dignity of man demanded. Nevertheless, our reverence for the autonomy of art and dignity of man should neither lead us to declare the latter innocent nor to free it from all responsibility. This is what George Steiner strongly states. The followers of absolute freedom seem not to realize the deep impact the work of art exercises upon the reader. Censorship is far more (...) complex and intricate than champions of absolute freedom believe. At any rate, such a responsibility is no concern of the State but rather of the social community, specially the family and what has been called "the tribe". The art critic must assume his responsibility not only on what refers to aesthetic aspects; he must do so on what refers to the concept of man that springs from the work of art he analizes. (shrink)

Jonathan Y. Tsou examines and defends positions on central issues in philosophy of psychiatry. The positions defended assume a naturalistic and realist perspective and are framed against skeptical perspectives on biological psychiatry. Issues addressed include the reality of mental disorders; mechanistic and disease explanations of abnormal behavior; definitions of mental disorder; natural and artificial kinds in psychiatry; biological essentialism and the projectability of psychiatric categories; looping effects and the stability of mental disorders; psychiatric classification; and the validity of the DSM's (...) diagnostic categories. The main argument defended by Tsou is that genuine mental disorders are biological kinds with harmful effects. This argument opposes the dogma that mental disorders are necessarily diseases that result from biological dysfunction. Tsou contends that the broader ideal of biological kinds offers a more promising and empirically ascertainable naturalistic standard for assessing the reality of mental disorders and the validity of psychiatric categories. (shrink)

The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to “mental privacy.” In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are—at least for now—no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection (...) technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum’s “contextual integrity” theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts—healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy. (shrink)

In this text presented here, it has been tried to Show the difference between Heidegger’s first and second era understanding of language. In his first era, to manifest Heidegger’s understanding of language, outlines of Being and Time has been discussed and concerned chapter is read carefully. To manifest his understanding of language in second era, the work of On the Way to the Language has been taken as a base. With this comparative study, it has been tried to shown the (...) change that “language” has undergone in Heidegger philosophy. (shrink)

Using William Shakespeare’s Hamlet and the play-within-the play, The Murder of Gonzago, as a case study, this essay argues that theatrical utterances constitute a special case of language usage not previously elucidated: the utterance of a statement with propositional content in theatre functions as an event. In short, the propositional content of a particular p (e.g. p1, p2, p3 …), whether or not it is true, is only understood—and understood to be true—if p1 is uttered in a particular time, place, (...) and situation (i.e. during a theatrical event); otherwise, the propositional content in those theatrical utterances can either be false or contingently true. (shrink)

RésuméL'ouvrage galéniqueSur les Éléments selon Hippocrateest une importante source d'information concernant les théories physiques de l'antiquité tardive. Les diverses doctrines atomistes discutées par Galien ainsi que les arguments employés par lui pour les réfuter ont été étudiés de près par les premiersMutakallimūn.Les abrégés de cet ouvrage, qui semblent avoir été écrits plusieurs siècles après Galien, et dont certains remontent aux débuts de la culture islamique, présentent un intérêt particulier. Dans cet article, nous donnons une édition, une traduction et une étude (...) d'un abrégé inconnu jusqu'ici, conservé dans un unique manuscrit, qui l'attribue à Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq. Comme les autres abrégés, il s'agit en fait d'une doxographie de théories physiques qui ne reproduit pas toujours précisément ce que Galien a dit, mais qui reflète le discours de l'époque où elle a été rédigée. (shrink)

Consider any choice that affects some social policy. A decision that considers evidence will, at its heart, contain some kind of explicit or implicit “because” statement: “We are doing X because the evidence says Y.” But can evidence ever truly speak for itself, in the sense of being reducible to objective utterances that are either correct or in need of correction? Before answering, consider what you'd prefer. Would you rather receive evidence that was free of any value judgments imposed by (...) human actors, that was laden with value judgments that you agree with, or laden with value judgments that you disagree with? The central assertion of this essay is that, throughout policy analysis but especially in assessments of the costs and benefits of regulating versus encouraging new technologies (cost‐benefit analysis, or CBA), the first possibility above is a mirage, and the second and third are self‐contradictory. Instead, we are overwhelmingly confronted with a fourth possibility: we receive evidence that appears to be (or is deliberately touted as) value neutral but is suffused with hidden value judgments.In the second part of this essay, entitled “A Guided Tour through Inevitable Value Judgments,” I identify in a systematic way approximately sixty‐five value judgments that are routinely (in some cases, invariably) made in CBA, but that are kept hidden. For each judgment, I discuss its genesis as it is most commonly invoked in CBA, explain how it is hidden in plain sight, and offer one or more value judgments that could be made instead of or in addition to the conventional one. The alternative judgments highlight the width of the spectrum of reasonable conclusions an analyst could reach merely by substituting other judgments for the ones currently embedded.Bringing hidden value judgments to light is doubly valuable. First, it allows discussion to ensue on a level playing field; instead of conclusory statements about what the evidence says, transparency permits statements taking the form of “when channeled through these value judgments, the evidence says this.” Perhaps more importantly, transparency about value judgments permits participants in the discussions to offer interpretations of evidence contingent on there being different value judgments chosen at one or more points in the analysis, interpretations that may suggest that alternative course(s) of action are preferable to the one being championed. (shrink)

There are two popular views regarding the origin of critical thinking: (1) The concept of critical thinking began with Socrates and his Socratic method of questioning. (2) The term ‘critical thinking’ was first introduced by John Dewey in 1910 in his book How We Think. This paper argues that both claims are incorrect. Firstly, critical reflection was a distinguishing characteristic of the Presocratic philosophers, setting them apart from earlier traditions. Therefore, they should be recognized as even earlier pioneers of critical (...) thinking. Secondly, John Dewey not only used the term ‘critical thinking’ before 1910, but there were also other authors who used it before him. The meaning of ‘critical thinking’ at the turn of the twentieth century was shaped by various traditions of linguistic usage, including literary criticism, science and medicine, and Kantian philosophy. (shrink)

In this dissertation I propose a new reading of the philosophical itinerary of Hilary Putnam on the matter of realism. In essence, my purpose is to argue that there is much more continuity than is normally understood, and even a degree of permanence, in the way in which Putnam has viewed the question of realism throughout his career. To arrive at this interpretation of Putnam I essentially followed two veins in his work. First, in a volume published in the early (...) 2000s entitled Ethics without Ontology (2004), Putnam establishes a parallel between his conception of objectivity in the philosophy of mathematics and in ethics. The second vein comes from a comment he made in the introduction to the first volume of his Philosophical Papers (1975) to the effect that the kind of realism he presupposed in his work of the 1960s and 70s was the same that he upheld in the philosophy of mathematics and wished to argue for at a later date in ethics. Following the first vein makes it possible to better grasp Putnam’s general conception of objectivity, but in order to understand how such a conception of objectivity is not unique to mathematics but is instead a general conception of objectivity one must follow the second vein. There, in the 1960s and 70s, Putnam adopted the same kind of realism in the philosophy of science and in ethics as he had in the philosophy of mathematics. Following this path, one realises that there exists a very strong structural similarity between Putnam’s first realism and his internal realism. After establishing this connection between Putnam’s first and second realism, I draw on Putnam’s remarks and compare the internal realism discourse to his current realism (the natural realism of ordinary people) to demonstrate, contrary to the prevalent interpretation, that there has been a great deal of consistency in his conception of realism from the 1960s to the present day. I conclude the dissertation by demonstrating how my new interpretation of Putnam’s philosophical itinerary makes it possible to shed light on the kind of realism he wishes to champion in ethics./Dans cette thèse, je propose une lecture renouvelée de l’itinéraire philosophique d’Hilary Putnam concernant la problématique du réalisme. Mon propos consiste essentiellement à défendre l’idée selon laquelle il y aurait beaucoup plus de continuité, voir une certaine permanence, dans la manière dont Putnam a envisagé la question du réalisme tout au long de sa carrière. Pour arriver à une telle interprétation de son oeuvre, j’ai essentiellement suivi deux filons. D’abord, dans un ouvrage du début des années 2000, Ethics without Ontology (2004), Putnam établit un parallèle entre sa conception de l’objectivité en philosophie des mathématiques et en éthique. Le deuxième filon vient d’une remarque qu’il fait, dans l’introduction du premier volume de ses Philosophical Papers (1975), affirmant que la forme de réalisme qu’il présupposait dans ses travaux des années 1960-1970 était la même que celle qu’il défendait en philosophie des mathématiques et qu’il souhaitait défendre ultérieurement en éthique. En suivant le premier filon, il est possible de mieux cerner la conception générale que se fait Putnam de l’objectivité, mais pour comprendre en quel sens une telle conception de l’objectivité n’est pas propre aux mathématiques, mais constitue en réalité une conception générale de l’objectivité, il faut suivre le second filon, selon lequel Putnam aurait endossé, durant les années 1960-1970, le même type de réalisme en philosophie des sciences et en éthique qu’en philosophie des mathématiques. Suivant cette voie, on se rend compte qu’il existe une similarité structurelle très forte entre le premier réalisme de Putnam et son réalisme interne. Après avoir établi la parenté entre le premier et le second réalisme de Putnam, je montre, en m’inspirant de commentaires du philosophe ainsi qu’en comparant le discours du réalisme interne au discours de son réalisme actuel (le réalisme naturel du commun des mortels), que, contrairement à l’interprétation répandue, il existe une grande unité au sein de sa conception du réalisme depuis les années 1960 à nos jours. Je termine la thèse en montrant comment mon interprétation renouvelée de l’itinéraire philosophique de Putnam permet de jeter un certain éclairage sur la forme de réalisme que Putnam souhaite défendre en éthique. (shrink)

Cet article étudie ce que l’on peut entendre par « ce qui dépend de nous » dans la tradition aristotélicienne. L’auteur interroge les tenants de l’apparition d’un Self chez les Stoïciens et remet vivement en question certaines conceptions de l’histoire de la philosophie. Il soutient qu’il n’y a pas de raison, et même moins, de voir en Épictète l’inventeur du « libre arbitre », pas plus qu’il n’y en a de voir chez les Stoïciens une quelconque naissance de la subjectivité (...) en raison de l’innovation qu’aurait été la notion d’assentiment. L’argumentation repose sur la conception « libertarienne » du « ce qui dépend de nous » par Alexandre d’Aphrodise.De « ce qui dépend de nous »This paper examines that what is the meaning of « what depends on us » in the Aristotelian tradition. The Author adresses all those who think that the Self was originated by the Stoics. He criticizes in a provocative way some manners in the history of philosophy. He champions that there is no cause, or even less, to understand Epictetus as any creator of the liberum arbitrium, no more than to understand the Stoics as the origine of our modern conception of the subjectivity because of their notion of assent. The argument rests on the « libertarian » conception of « what depends on us » by Alexander of Aphrodisias. (shrink)

José Ortega y Gasset publicó en 1939, en la colección Austral, este ensayo filosófico que obtuvo una gran repercusión internacional en su día y sigue siendo en la actualidad una de las obras clave del pensamiento orteguiano. Esta edición conmemora los setenta años transcurridos desde entonces y ofrece la única edición autorizada y revisada personalmente por el autor.

Dans son Esthétique, Benedetto Croce présente Descartes comme la figure emblématique d’un courant rationaliste qui exclut l’imagination poétique de la pensée philosophique et empêche de reconnaître l’intuition comme mode de connaissance esthétique spécifique. Pour lui, les conséquences néfastes de l’esprit mathématique diffusé en France par le cartésianisme se retrouvent chez Locke, Leibniz, Wolff et Baumgarten, et il n’y a guère à la même époque que chez « l’italiano Giambattista Vico » que l’on peut parler d’une véritable science esthétique. Au cours (...) des années où prend corps sa Philosophie de l’esprit, Croce est amené à plusieurs reprises à stigmatiser l’intellectualisme de Descartes, le caractère abstrait de sa science et de sa morale ainsi que son ignorance de l’histoire. Si sa lecture est dépourvue d’originalité et dénote l’influence sur lui du climat culturel de son temps, elle s’appuie néanmoins sur une conception de l’art fortement novatrice et dont l’influence sera décisive dans la première moitié du XXe siècle. Un examen plus détaillé de l’œuvre vaste et complexe de Croce montre que sa lecture de Descartes révèle une connaissance profonde de l’histoire de la philosophie : Croce est capable à la fois de corriger les interprétations simplificatrices de certains aspects de la pensée cartésienne de la part de Vico, Hegel ou Valéry, et de reconnaître sa dette à l’égard de la théorie cartésienne de l’erreur. Certes, ses schématisations excessives donnent parfois lieu à quelque malentendu, par exemple sur le thème des passions de l’âme. Dans les écrits de Croce postérieurs à la Première guerre mondiale, la figure de Descartes commence à jouer un rôle différent. Le philosophe napolitain éprouve alors le besoin de réagir aux irrationalismes, aux vitalismes et aux nationalismes qui ont conduit au conflit, à la décadence de la culture européenne et mèneront à la seconde guerre mondiale. Il importe désormais de défendre la raison, dont Descartes reste le champion. Le philosophe français redevient pour lui le chef de file de la tendance fondamentale de la philosophie moderne. Loin de signifier un changement dans sa conception des axes primaires de la philosophie de l’esprit, ce déplacement d’accent reflète au contraire l’aptitude de la pensée de Croce à intégrer les exigences toujours nouvelles que l’histoire fait apparaître dans son développement. (shrink)

Dans son Esthétique (1902-1908), Benedetto Croce présente Descartes comme la figure emblématique d’un courant rationaliste qui exclut l’imagination poétique de la pensée philosophique et empêche de reconnaître l’intuition comme mode de connaissance esthétique spécifique. Pour lui, les conséquences néfastes de l’esprit mathématique diffusé en France par le cartésianisme se retrouvent chez Locke, Leibniz, Wolff et Baumgarten, et il n’y a guère à la même époque que chez « l’italiano Giambattista Vico » que l’on peut parler d’une véritable science esthétique. Au (...) cours des années où prend corps sa Philosophie de l’esprit, Croce est amené à plusieurs reprises à stigmatiser l’intellectualisme de Descartes, le caractère abstrait de sa science et de sa morale ainsi que son ignorance de l’histoire. Si sa lecture est dépourvue d’originalité et dénote l’influence sur lui du climat culturel de son temps (l’idéalisme ; Francesco De Sanctis), elle s’appuie néanmoins sur une conception de l’art fortement novatrice et dont l’influence sera décisive dans la première moitié du XXe siècle. Un examen plus détaillé de l’œuvre vaste et complexe de Croce montre que sa lecture de Descartes révèle une connaissance profonde de l’histoire de la philosophie : Croce est capable à la fois de corriger les interprétations simplificatrices de certains aspects de la pensée cartésienne de la part de Vico, Hegel ou Valéry, et de reconnaître sa dette à l’égard de la théorie cartésienne de l’erreur. Certes, ses schématisations excessives donnent parfois lieu à quelque malentendu, par exemple sur le thème des passions de l’âme. Dans les écrits de Croce postérieurs à la Première guerre mondiale, la figure de Descartes commence à jouer un rôle différent. Le philosophe napolitain éprouve alors le besoin de réagir aux irrationalismes, aux vitalismes et aux nationalismes qui ont conduit au conflit, à la décadence de la culture européenne (allemande in primis) et mèneront à la seconde guerre mondiale. Il importe désormais de défendre la raison, dont Descartes reste le champion. Le philosophe français redevient pour lui le chef de file de la tendance fondamentale de la philosophie moderne. Loin de signifier un changement dans sa conception des axes primaires de la philosophie de l’esprit, ce déplacement d’accent reflète au contraire l’aptitude de la pensée de Croce à intégrer les exigences toujours nouvelles que l’histoire fait apparaître dans son développement. (shrink)

L’article examine la reprise que le « prince des Averroïstes » Jean de Jandun fait de cette phrase délicate d’Averroès, tirée de son Grand Commentaire du De anima d’Aristote : « forte igitur philosophia invenitur in maiori parte subiecti in omni tempore ». On cherche à montrer par l’analyse des textes que l’interprétation du maître ès arts s’écarte radicalement de la pensée du Cordouan qu’il prétend suivre. Tandis qu’Averroès suppose l’existence continue d’au moins un philosophe dans le monde, Jean de (...) Jandun, rejetant comme irréaliste l’idée d’un homme parfait en qui s’incarnerait tout le savoir, et tributaire d’une erreur de traduction arabo-latine qui donne « sujet » pour « lieu », soutient qu’il n’y a chaque fois de perfection que si l’on totalise tous les savoirs particuliers des différents penseurs en activité sur la terre. Autrement dit, la philosophie est parfaite, certes, mais il n’y a pas de philosophe parfait. C’est coniunctim que la science est achevée, et non pas divisim. Un tel constat, qui rapproche l’analyse de Jean de celle menée par Dante au début de sa Monarchia, permet deux révisions : d’une part, l’idée d’un « averroïsme » latin réactionnaire, se contentant de répéter les paroles du maître, est à revoir ; d’autre part, cela signifie qu’il n’y a pas chez Jean les bases théoriques de l’idéal éthico-intellectualiste dont l’historiographie moderne assure qu’il en fut le champion parisien. (shrink)

This 1945 “Preface” is intended to answer the question “What is phenomenology?” and to justify it as the methodology of the long work of philosophical psychology to follow. Merleau-Ponty approaches this task by first setting out the apparent paradoxes and contradictory claims that have been advanced by phenomenology, in a long and eloquent survey section that is built on a series of “X, but also Y” rhetorical devices. He then surveys four prominent themes of phenomenology. Just as he does in (...) the introductory section of the essay “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” Merleau-Ponty here presents himself as the chief interpreter and champion of Husserl's later philosophy. The first major theme considered is that phenomenology is a matter of describing the field of perception. This sets it in contrast to the prevalent explanatory methodologies of a) scientific empiricism and b) metaphysical idealism. Empirical science (such as mathematical physics) begins with observation, but then abstracts entirely from lived experience to consider idealized schematic cases (such as motion across a frictionless surface) that may reveal universal laws. Such a methodology is obviously fruitful in important respects, but is nonetheless naïve and dishonest in its renunciation of the specifics of observed events. The metaphysical idealism of Kant or Descartes likewise abstracts from the experienced particularity of perception to posit an “inner man” that constitutes the world according to 2 internal, transcendental principles. Merleau-Ponty's criticism is the same, whether these principles are “reason” of Rationalism, “the categories of understanding” of Critical Rationalism, or the rules governing the “association of ideas” posited by Empiricism. Phenomenology indicates that perception is not an act but a fact; the world is not an object but rather the unified setting of perception; and the inner man is a myth, along with his allegedly privileged access to univocal truth. The second theme is the technique of “phenomenological reduction,” the suspension of belief in the assemblage of everyday assumptions known as the “natural attitude.” Husserl's understanding of the reduction long led him to an idealist position: that all particular consciousnesses are united in a transcendental ego.. (shrink)

The first section of the chapter will address the philosophy of modality among Spinoza’s medieval Jewish predecessors, and, primarily, in Hasdai Crescas (1340-1410/11), a bold and original, anti-Aristotelian philosopher. This section should both complement the discussion of modality in medieval Christian and Islamic philosophy in the previous chapters of this volume and provide some lesser-known historical background to Spinoza’s own engagement with modal philosophy. Following a section on Spinoza’s definitions of his main modal concepts and his understanding of contingency, I (...) will turn, in the third section, to discuss the extent of Spinoza’s commitment to necessitarianism. The recent debate about whether Spinoza was a strict necessitarian has resulted in quite a few insights about Spinoza’s modal philosophy, but it has also detracted attention from some basic questions about Spinoza’s modal philosophy, and in the fourth and last section of the chapter, I will attempt to chart the foundational questions that still have been barely explored. The primary aim of this chapter it to provide a survey and outline of the chief elements of Spinoza’s modal philosophy. Still, beyond the mere overview of Spinoza’s arguments (and some major scholarly debates), I will also advance two original theses. First, I will show that Spinoza makes a distinction between two notions of contingency, and that once this important distinction is observed, Spinoza’s various assertions about contingency turn out to be consistent. Secondly, I will discuss the text (E2a1) which is commonly taken to be the strongest and most stubborn proof against the reading of Spinoza as strict necessitarianism; I will show that the basic meaning of this text has been widely misunderstood, and that E2a1 is perfectly compatible with strict necessitarianism. (shrink)

Pourquoi a-t-on souvent eu tendance a etudier chez Voltaire les notions de tolerance et de justice comme si c'etaient des entites distanciees ou parfois meme separables? Pourquoi n'a-t-on pas juge bon d'etudier le cheminement de sa pensee simultanement dans ces deux domaines qui etaient non seulement conjugues dans son esprit, mais aussi et surtout dont le contenu etait en perpetuel devenir? Pourquoi a-t-on privilegie l'etude de son action en faveur de certaines causes celebres au detriment, parfois total, de celles - (...) evidemment beaucoup moins illustres - qu'on n'evoque que peu souvent, sinon jamais? Pourquoi enfin, dans le contexte global de la carriere de ce champion de la tolerance et de la justice, le lecteur doit-il se contenter d'une mosaique incomplete, peu apte a faire apprecier la complexite de sa philosophie? La reponse a ces questions est sans doute simple: c'est que le canon litteraire accessible, plutot limite, ne faisait constamment favoriser, jusqu'il y a une vingtaine d'annees, que des vues d'ensemble partielles et guere changeantes. C'est la parution progressive, depuis 1970, et l'essor vigoureux, depuis 1988, de la grande edition scientifique des OEuvres Completes, procuree par la Voltaire Foundation, qui invite au contraire a decouvrir un nombre considerable de textes meconnus ou carrement inconnus, qui sont desormais devenus incontournables si l'on veut redefinir l'action de Voltaire en tant que champion des opprimes. Ce volume donne un apercu des contours d'une future etude d'ensemble actuellement en cours d'elaboration. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to clarify the nature of the shift in Feyerabend’s philosophical thinking in the 1970s, focusing on issues of realism, relativism, and pluralism. Contra-Preston, I argue that realism-relativism is a misleading variable for characterizing Feyerabend’s shift in the 1970s. Rather, I characterize this shift as Feyerabend’s expansion of pluralism and suggest that this shift appears in Feyerabend’s publications starting in the late-1960s (e.g., Feyerabend 1968b, 1969b, 1970a, 1970c). Adopting the terminology of Brown and Kidd (2016), (...) this shift is characterized by a move from arguments for pluralism within science to broader arguments for pluralism in society. I argue that this shift was largely due to: (1) Feyerabend’s rejection of an empiricist demarcation criterion for science in the mid-1960s, and (2) Feyerabend’s incorporation of Mill’s arguments for pluralism into his own publications starting in 1970. This shift can be characterized as a broadening or expanding the scope of Feyerabend’s arguments for pluralism from contexts of scientific knowledge to the broader context of social or cultural (including ethical) knowledge. I articulate this argument with reference to the framework for classifying Feyerabend’s works formulated by Brown and Kidd (2016). Against Brown and Kidd (and Preston), I argue that realism-relativism is a red-herring as a variable for distinguishing Feyerabend’s early and middle works. Brown and Kidd’s distinction between pluralism within science and pluralism in society is a more useful variable for characterizing Feyerabend’s shift in thinking in the 1970s. Whereas Preston (1997) and Brown and Kidd (2016) identify the beginning of Feyerabend’s pluralism in society phase in 1978 with the publication of Science in a Free Society (Feyerabend 1978), I suggest that the relevant shift occurs much earlier, and it appears in Feyerabend’s publications starting in 1970 (Feyerabend 1970a, 1970b). On this understanding, Feyerabend’s philosophical shift (c. 1970) should be viewed as an expansion (or broadening) of the scope of application of his pluralist arguments, inspired by Mill’s ethical arguments for pluralism in society (Mill 1859/1977). (shrink)

This book (edited by Jonathan Y. Tsou, Jamie Shaw, and Carla Fehr) offers eighteen original historical and philosophical essays focused on values in science, scientific pluralism, and pragmatism. These themes have been central in the work of Matthew J. Brown, and the book frames these topics through an engagement with Brown’s broadly ranging work on values in science. The themes of this book are integrated and unified in the pragmatic and value-laden ideal of science defended by Professor Brown in his (...) fascinating 2020 book, Science and Moral Imagination. Brown's ideal of moral imagination prescribes that scientists should recognize the contingencies in their work as unforced choices, examine morally salient aspects of these decisions, recognize the various interests of relevant stakeholders, explore and construct alternative options, and exercise fair and warranted value judgments to guide those decisions. The interdisciplinary essays in this volume engage with different aspects of Brown's philosophical research on scientific values as well as his historical research on figures such as John Dewey and Paul K. Feyerabend. The international contributors to this volume include distinguished and familiar voices from the values in science literature (e.g., Kevin Elliott, Janet Kourany, and Don Howard) as well as newer voices. The resulting book showcases some of the latest innovative research being done on values, pluralism, and pragmatism, and it will be an important resource for researchers working on values in science. Specific topics addressed in the book include: moral imagination, inductive risk, epistemic priority, the value free ideal of science, values in the contexts of artificial intelligence and medicine, varieties of pluralism (e.g., epistemic, ethical, and cultural), and the structure of scientific communities. The book also features novel historical research on important figures in the traditions of pragmatism, pluralism, and values in science, such as John Dewey, John Stuart Mill, Paul Feyerabend, W. V. O. Quine, Ludwig Fleck, among others. The contributions to the volume represent a broad range of contemporary history and philosophy of science perspectives, which have guided Brown's own work, including socially relevant philosophy of science (SRPoiSE), history of philosophy of science (HOPOS), feminist philosophy of science, and philosophy of science in practice (SPSP). The book will be of interest to a broad audience of researchers working in philosophy of science, philosophy of medicine, history and philosophy of science, and science and technology studies. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article will examine the ways in which de-personalization of consciousness constitutes an unavoidable reading clue in order to understand the existential phenomenological conception of human freedom championed by Jean-Paul Sartre. Thus, the study of The Transcendence of the Ego, and of Being and Nothingness, among a few other of Sartre's writings from the thirties, will allow the reader to discover that the consciousness as an impersonal transcendental field is built as an onto-phenomenological foundation for the full assertion of (...) human freedom. Man is only free, by definition, when he is capable of exiling the ego from consciousness. RESUMEN En este artículo se examina cómo la despersonalización de la conciencia constituye una pista de lectura ineludible a efectos de comprender la concepción fenomenológico-existencial de la libertad humana defendida por Jean-Paul Sartre. Así, el estudio de La trascendencia del Ego, de El ser y la nada, entre otros escritos sartrianos del treinta, nos permitirá descubrir que la construcción de la conciencia como campo trascendental impersonal se erige a manera de fundamento onto-fenomenológico para la afirmación plena de la libertad humana. Exilando al yo de la conciencia, el hombre es, por definición, libre. (shrink)

Bilim ve felsefe, gerçekliğin doğasını anlamlandırma araştırması olarak betimlenebilir. Hatta bazen bu iki alan karşı karşıya getirilerek, bilimin başarısının felsefenin geçerliliğini baltaladığını öne sürerler. Ancak aranılan türden bir anlayış veya açıklama ile ilgilenmek farklı bir tablo sunar: Uygulandığı şekliyle çağdaş fizik bazen dünyanın net bir fiziksel açıklamasını sağlamakta başarısız olur. Einstein, Schrödinger ve John Bell tarafından ifade edilen standart kuantum teorisine yönelik memnuniyetsizliğin temelinde bu yatmaktadır. Bir örnek olarak, Schrödinger’in ünlü kedi örneğinin yakından incelenmesi fizikçilerin genellikle onun asıl amacını kaçırdığını (...) göstermektedir. Felsefi bir eğilimin katkıda bulunabileceği şey, alternatif fizik değil, matematiksel bir biçimcilikten fiziksel bir resim çıkarmak için gerekli olan argümana gösterilen özendir. (shrink)

Foundational issues in statistical mechanics and the more general question of how probability is to be understood in the context of physical theories are both areas that have been neglected by philosophers of physics. This book fills an important gap in the literature by providing a most systematic study of how to interpret probabilistic assertions in the context of statistical mechanics. The book explores both subjectivist and objectivist accounts of probability, and takes full measure of work in the foundations of (...) probability theory, in statistical mechanics, and in mathematical theory. It will be of particular interest to philosophers of science, physicists and mathematicians interested in foundational issues, and also to historians of science. (shrink)

The second of Lorca's great trilogy of rural dramas, "Yerma" is a concentrated blend of contrasting moods through which Lorca charts the increasingly destructive obsession of a childless young country wife, and probes the darker zones of human fears and desires. The play's rich mode of expression--a powerful combination of verbal, visual and auditory images and rhythms--is also geared to celebrating sexual attraction and fertility, creation and procreation.

Excerpt from Personas, Obras, Cosas Un cenobita con sayal del color de la tierra abre un portón; entramos. Dos hileras de cipre ses ensimismados con su follaje recio, de un verde casi negro, conducen a la íglesuca y al apo sento del capellán. En la sacristía se ven dos cua dros que figuran una antítesis dolorosa: es uno la imagen horrenda de una pobre ánima del purga torió ardiendo en llamas de ocre; en un rincón del lienzo está escrito: Alma (...) en pena. En el otro cuadro se lee: Alma en gracia; representa una mujer tan bella, con unos ojos tan azules, unos cabellos tan augustos y dorados y unos labios tan deleitosos, que a no hallamos tamaña altura so bre el nivel del mar y de los instintos, alguna in quietud nos sobrecogería. Luego conviene dejarse ir, lasa la voluntad, por el campo austero que se abre en derredor. Las ermitas están desparramadas en la cima, ocul tas en la espesura. Cada una tiene su huerto, largo de algunos pasos, ceñido por blanca tapia que se recala entre las chaparras y las higueras. Cada una tiene un ciprés y una espadaña. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

We develop and apply a multi-dimensional conception of explanatory depth towards a comparative analysis of inflationary and bouncing paradigms in primordial cosmology. Our analysis builds on earlier work due to Azhar and Loeb (2021) that establishes initial condition fine-tuning as a dimension of explanatory depth relevant to debates in contemporary cosmology. We propose dynamical fine-tuning and autonomy as two further dimensions of depth in the context of problems with instability and trans-Planckian modes that afflict bouncing and inflationary approaches respectively. In (...) the context of the latter issue, we argue that the recently formulated trans-Planckian censorship conjecture leads to a trade-off for inflationary models between dynamical fine-tuning and autonomy. We conclude with the suggestion that explanatory preference with regard to the different dimensions of depth is best understood in terms of differing attitudes towards heuristics for future model building. (shrink)

This paper offers a brief historical survey of the development of analytic philosophy in Hong Kong from 1911 to the present day. At first, Western philosophy was a minor subject taught mainly by part-time staff. After the Second World War, research and teaching in analytic philosophy in Hong Kong began to grow and consolidate with the expansion of higher-education and the establishment of new universities. Analytic philosophy has been a significant influence on comparative and Chinese philosophy and played a crucial (...) role in the teaching and promotion of critical thinking. Analytic philosophers in Hong Kong are now active participants in the global philosophical community. We review the development of analytic philosophy across the major tertiary institutions in Hong Kong and discuss some of the future challenges faced by the discipline. (shrink)

The `problem of time' is a cluster of interpretational and formal issues in the foundations of general relativity relating to both the representation of time in the classical canonical formalism, and to the quantization of the theory. The purpose of this short chapter is to provide an accessible introduction to the problem.

Friends of Wright-entitlement cannot appeal to direct epistemic consequentialism (believe or accept what maximizes expected epistemic value) in order to account for the epistemic rationality of accepting Wright-entitled propositions. The tenability of direct consequentialism is undermined by the “Truth Fairy”: a powerful being who offers you great epistemic reward (in terms of true beliefs) if you accept a proposition p for which you have evidence neither for nor against. However, this chapter argues that a form of indirect epistemic consequentialism seems (...) promising as a way to deal with the Truth Fairy problem. The relevant form of indirect consequentialism accommodates evidentialism but allows for exceptions in the case of anti-sceptical hypotheses. Since these are the kind of propositions to which Wright-entitlement is supposed to apply—i.e. cornerstone propositions—indirect consequentialism is entitlement-friendly. (shrink)

I discuss whether "sentience" (i.e., phenomenal consciousness) comes in degrees.

Maran ha-g. R. A. Y. L. Shṭinman z. ts. ṿe-ḳ.l. -- Rabotenu meʼore ha-dor -- Ḳiyum ha-ʻolam ʻa. y. Torah be-mishnat rabotenu -- Maran Rabi Gedalyah Aizman z. ts. ṿe-ḳ.l.