Meanings are felt and lived by the human organism before they are articulated. Following insights from pragmatism and embodied cognition, this paper suggests that there is an ‘appropriate’ relationship between what is meant and was is expressed in words and actions that can be formulated as a hitherto neglected yet crucial validity claim, namely congruity. Congruity is what connects the meaningfulness implicit in living a life with the articulated meanings of symbolic communication. We distinguish between the intertwined aspects (...) of semiotic congruity, the fusion between sensual patterns and semiotic meanings, performative congruity, the freedom and ability to articulate qualitatively experienced meaningfulness, and hermeneutic congruity, the capability of achieving congruence between situational meanings and one’s entire being-in-the-world. The latter presupposes a synthesis of horizontal and vertical congruity. (shrink)

Neodarwinian ethology, today above all represented by sociobiology, is conceived of by responsible exponents as a descriptive and explanatory theory that cannot include any normative declarations. Still other, indeed notable, authors belonging to the discipline in question, either underhand or frankly employ prescriptive or evaluative judgments, — or they claim (what is not an insight of natural science) that it is impossible to provide a rational foundation for prescriptive or evaluative judgments. (Michael Ruse and Edward O. Wilson even assert (...) the latter without relinquishing the former.) — Several functional explanations of normative validity claims advanced by Michael Ruse, Edward O. Wilson, Donald T. Campbell, Florian von Schilcher and Neil Tennant are designed to show that prescriptive or evaluative judgments cannot be justified. The reasonableness of this move is, however, dubious, because it implies strategies of raising oneself into a privileged status or of rendering the position of oneself immune from criticism by shifting it among the objects of the theory. Then Wilson's concept of 'evolutionary ethics' is thoroughly — and critically — analyzed. The suspicion that Wilson's fallacies in the transition from biological facts to moral norms are of exemplary nature is finally examined on the basis of tenets advanced by Herbert Spencer, Wolfgang Wickler, and Hans Mohr. (shrink)

Soweit Engels' Position zum Geltungsanspruch der Naturwissenschaften seiner Zeit aus diesen Texten hervorgeht, kann man sie kaum als konsistent bezeichnen. Erkenntnisse, an deren Gewissheit in der Naturforschung der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts nicht ernsthaft gezweifelt wurde, werden von ihm teils umstandslos übernommen, teils aber auch einer geltungskrltischen Analyse unterzogen. In weitgehender Unahängigkeit von seinen weltanschaulichen Ambitionen kommt Engels über die Untersuchung der Struktur naturwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisprozesse zu einer bisher erst wenig beachteten und seiner Zeit vorauseilenden Einsicht in die relativen (...) Geltungsbedingungen des experimentell erzeugten Wissens. Die widersprüchliche Form,in der er seine heute noch sehr aktuelle Kritik am Wahrheitsanspruch der Naturwissenschaften vorträgt, ist der damaligen Umbruchssituation dieser Disziplinen geschuldet und gibt seinem Werk ein hohes Mass an Authentizität. In Anlehnung an Engels' Klassifizierung der Wissenschaften sollen hier die wichtigsten geltungskritischen Ansätze rekonstruiert werden. In dieser Perspektive, die seine Skepsis gegenüber den naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisleistungen hervortreten lässt, erscheint die von ihm behauptete ausgezeichnete Geltung der Dialektik in einem neuen Licht: Sie ist nicht mehr die immer schon vorausgesetzte Grundannahme seiner wissenschafts- und naturtheoretischen Auffassungen, sondern Reaktion auf einen Relativismus, der aus der Reflexion über die Entwicklung der Naturforschung unabweisbar zu folgen scheint und jedes Streben nach einem wissenschaftlich fundierten, einheitlichen Naturbild zunichte macht. (shrink)

With his influence on the development of physiology, physics and geometry, Hermann von Helmholtz – like few scientists of the second half of the 19th century – is representative of the research in natural science in Germany. The development of his understanding of science is not less representative. Until the late sixties, he emphatically claimed the truth of science; later on, he began to see the conditions for the validity of scientific knowledge in relative terms, and this can, in (...) summary, be referred to as hypothesizing. Already in the past century, HeImholtz made first approaches to an understanding of science, which were incompatible with his own former position and which pointed to the modern age to an astonishingly large extent. A comparison with Karl R. Popper's logic of research will illustrate how closely he nevertheless approached modern understanding of science. In Popper's logic of research, hypothesizing of scientific knowledge is definitely much more advanced than in Helmholtz's theory of science. What begins vaguely to emerge with Helmholtz has already become an explicitly formulated programme with Popper. Although HeImholtz and Popper are not on a direct line of epistemological development and Popper refers to HeImholtz only rarely and casually, there are in fact surprising points of contact which have not been taken notice of so far and which appear above all if one looks at Helmholtz's understanding of science against the background of Popper's logic of research. (shrink)

Im ersten Teil verorte ich den historischen Kontext des Umbruchprozesses der Wissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts im Hinblick auf die Physik. Vom Beginn der Neuzeit bis weit ins 20. Jahrhundert hinein war die Physik die Leitwissenschaft in den Naturwissenschaften. Der Wandlungsprozess der auf sie bezogenen Wissenschaftsauffassungen setzt im 19. Jahrhundert bislang unangetastete, von der Antike herrührende Geltungsansprüche außer Kraft. Im zweiten Teil vergleiche ich Nietzsches Charakterisierung der Wissenschaften exemplarisch mit der von Hermann von Helmholtz. Helmholtz kann als ein herausragender Vertreter der (...) Naturforschung des 19. Jahrhunderts angesehen werden. Er entwickelte seine erste bahnbrechende wissenschaftliche Leistung noch ganz im Rahmen einer auf Wahrheit und Einheit fokussierten Wissenschaftsauffassung. Im Verlauf seiner weiteren Arbeiten relativierten sich seine Geltungsansprüche zunehmend. In systematischer Hinsicht näherte sich Helmholtz damit nicht nur der Position an, die Nietzsche immer schon eingenommen hat, sondern er übertraf sie sogar in bestimmter Hinsicht. -/- Im dritten Teil setze ich mich kritisch mit einem Aspekt der Rezeption des historischen Verhältnisses von Nietzsche und Helmholtz auseinander. Helmholtz gehörte zu den wenigen repräsentativen Naturwissenschaftlern, von denen man annimmt, dass ihre Forschungen auf das Denken Nietzsches Einfluss hatten. Bemerkenswerterweise stammen die betreffenden Arbeiten aus der ersten Phase von Helmholtz’ Wissenschaftsauffassung. Während Helmholtz mit seinen Forschungen einen traditionellen Wahrheitsanspruch bestätigt sah, bezog sich Nietzsche auf sie, um sie umgekehrt zur Destruktion dieses Anspruches einzusetzen. Wo der Rezeption diese Konstellation entgangen ist, hat sie dazu beigetragen, die Aktualität von Nietzsches Wissenschaftskritik zu überschätzen. (shrink)

Werner Heisenberg made an important – and as yet insufficiently researched – contribution to the transformation of the modern conception of science. This transformation involved a reassessment of the status of scientific knowledge from certain to merely hypothetical – an assessment that is widely recognized today. I examine Heisenberg’s contribution in particular by taking his conception of “closed theories” as an example according to which the established physical theories have no universal and exclusive, but only a restricted validity. Firstly, (...) I characterize the historical process of hypothetization of claims to validity. Then, secondly, I reconstruct Heisenberg’s conception, as far as it can be derived from his popular writings, relating it to the process of hypothetization. Finally, I touch on the history of its reception and compare it with conceptions of science that emphasize the significance of the hypothetical for the modern theories of natural sciences. Compared to these conceptions, Heisenberg’s contribution turns out to be rather independent. (shrink)

Naturbegriffe beschreiben naturphilosophische Gegenstandsbereiche und fassen Resultate naturphilosophischer Diskurse zusammen. Gehört ihre Bestimmung zu den grundlegenden Aufgaben der Naturphilosophie, so stellt ihre gegenwärtige Vielfalt für die Naturphilosophie eine Herausforderung dar, Von kaum einer wirkungsgeschichtlich bedeutsamen Definition von Natur ist in den letzten Jahrzehnten behauptet worden, ihr komme keine Relevanz für den Diskurs zu. Der Beitrag zeigt Ordnungsstrukturen in der Pluralität der Verwendungsweisen auf und begründet den aktuellen Geltungsanspruch traditioneller Begriffe im Bezug auf spezifische Erfahrungsweisen. Nach einer Einführung beginne ich (...) mit der Unterscheidung von wissenschaftlicher und nichtwissenschaftlicher Naturerfahrung, beziehe auf diese Differenz die Aufgaben der Naturphilosophie und gehe dann mit einer Klassifikation von Naturbegriffen zum exemplarischen Teil über. In diesem diskutiere ich am Beispiel bestimmter Aspekte der Naturbegriffe von Aristoteles und Descartes ihre für die Gegenwart typischen Bedingungen der Verwendung in nichtwissenschaftlicher Erfahrung sowie darüber hinaus vorkommender Verwendungen. (shrink)

Die Entwicklung von HeImholtz' Mechanismus ist durch einen Wandel im Geltungsanspruch gekennzeichnet und läßt sich in einer noch sehr groben Übersicht in zwei Perioden einteilen. Auf die erste Periode bis etwa zum Ende der 60er Jahre werde ich im ersten Teil meines Beitrages eingehen. Hier rekonstruiere ich umrißhaft die empiristische Begründung, die Helmholtz für den Wahrheitsanspruch seiner Naturauffassung gegeben hat. Im zweiten Teil werde ich dann die wichtigsten Merkmale der im Verlauf der 70er Jahre hervortretenden Hypothetisierungstendenz charakterisieren. Abschliessend will (...) ich in einem dritten Teil zeigen, wie Helmholtz auf der Grundlage seines gewandelten Wissenschaftsverständnisses das Programm einer mechanistischen Naturerklärung mit großem wirkungsgeschichtlichen Einfluß weiter verfolgt hat. (shrink)

Mit seinem Einfluß auf die Entwicklung der Physiologie, Physik und Geometrie ist Hermann von Helmholtz wie kaum ein anderer Wissenschaftler der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts repräsentativ für die Naturforschung in Deutschland. Nicht weniger repräsentativ nimmt sich die Entwicklung seiner Wissenschaftsauffassung aus. Während er bis in die späten 60er Jahre einen emphatischen Wahrheitsanspruch der Wissenschaft vertrat, begann er in der nachfolgenden Zeit, die Geltungsbedingungen der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis einer Relativierung zu unterwerfen, die zusammenfassend als Hypothetisierung bezeichnet werden kann. Helmholtz entwickelte damit (...) schon im vergangenen Jahrhundert Ansätze einer Wissenschaftsauffassung , die in erstaunlichem Umfang in die Richtung der Moderne weisen. Wie nah er späteren Wissenschaftsauffassungen bereits gekommen ist, kann ein Vergleich mit Karl R. Poppers Forschungslogik illustrieren. In seiner Forschungslogik ist die Hypothetisierung der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis entschieden weiter vorangeschritten als in Heimholtz' Wissenschaftstheorie. Was sich bei Helmholtz erst vage abzuzeichnen beginnt, ist bei ihm bereits explizit formuliertes Programm geworden. Obwohl HeImholtz und Popper in keiner direkten wissenschaftstheoretischen Entwicklungslinie stehen und Popper sich in seinen Schriften auch nur sehr selten und beiläufig auf Helmholtz bezieht, finden sich dennoch überraschende und bisher nicht beachtete Berührungspunkte, die insbesondere dann hervortreten, wenn man Heimholtz' Wissenschaftsauffassung vor dem Hintergrund von Poppers Forschungslogik betrachtet. (shrink)

Troeltschs Auseinandersetzung mit naturwissenschaftlichen Weltbildern in "Der Historismus und seine Probleme" bietet grundlegende, noch heute aktuelle Einsichten in die Erkenntnisbedingungen der Naturwissenschaften. Der Begriff des Naturalismus erhält in diesem Zusammenhang eine ähnliche Mehrdeutigkeit wie der Begriff des Historismus (1). Troeltschs Position zu naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen und ihren Verallgemeinerungen zu Weltbildern findet einen öffentlichen Ausdruck in seiner ambivalenten Haltung gegenüber der nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg aufkommenden Naturwissenschaftskritik. Man kann vermuten, daß diese lebensphilosophisch ausgerichtete Nachkriegsströmung auf die Herausbildung des heutigen Begriffs von Naturwissenschaft (...) beträchtlichen Einfluß ausgeübt hat. Ohne sich das Programm der wiedererstarkten Lebensphilosophie zu eigen zu machen, teilt Troeltsch ihre entschiedene Ablehnung naturwissenschaftlich orientierter Generalisierungsbemühungen (2). In den letzten beiden Teilen möchte ich exemplarisch zeigen, daß sich die soweit rekonstruierte wissenschaftstheoretische Position auch auf Troeltschs frühere Analysen stützen kann. Eine 1901 verfaßte Besprechung von Haeckels Buch „Die Welträthsel“, dem herausragenden Beispiel öffentlichkeitswirksamer Sinnstiftung aus den biologischen Wissenschaften, illustriert seine schon früh differenzierte Geltungskritik naturwissenschaftlicher Weltbilder (3). Schließlich können die im Spätwerk enthaltenen Einsichten in den größeren Kontext seiner schon zu Anfang des Jahrhunderts erschienenen Analysen des Modernisierungsprozesses, in denen er den Naturwissenschaften eine zentrale Rolle zumißt, eingeordnet werden (4). (shrink)

Werner Heisenberg hat einen wichtigen, noch nicht hinreichend untersuchten Beitrag zum Wandel des neuzeitlichen Wissenschaftsverständnisses geleistet. Der Wandel führte von der Charakterisierung des wissenschaftlichen Wissens als sichere Erkenntnis zu seiner - heute weithin anerkannten - Charakterisierung als bloß hypothetische Erkenntnis. Anfänge dieses Wandlungsprozesses lassen sich im 19. Jahrhundert nachweisen (z.B. bei John Hersehel, William Whewell oder Hermann von Helmholtz). Ich möchte am Beispiel von Heisenberg der Frage nachgehen, welchen Einfluss die Begründung der Quantenmechanik, die seine Wissenschaftsauffassung prägte, auf den Prozess (...) der Relativierung von Geltungsansprüchen hatte. Meine Vermutung ist, dass eine entscheidende Rolle hierbei weniger dem Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriff als vielmehr dem Wahrheits- und Realitätsbegriff zukam. Ich werde als erstes den historischen Prozess der Hypothetisierung von Geltungsansprüchen, zu dem ich Heisenbergs Konzeption ins Verhältnis setzen möchte, charakterisieren. Anschließend rekonstruiere ich Heisenbergs Konzeption, soweit sie sich seinen populären Reden und Aufsätzen entnehmen lässt. Als drittes werde ich ihre Wirkungsgeschichte kurz ansprechen und sie mit Wissenschaftsauffassungen vergleichen, die die Bedeutung des Hypothetischen für die modernen Theorien der Naturwissenschaften betonen. Ihnen gegenüber erweist sich Heisenbergs Beitrag als durchaus eigenständig. (shrink)

Die Zeiten, in denen Kausalität das Charakteristikum von Wissenschaftlichkeit war, scheinen sich ihrem Ende zu nähern. Seit dem Beginn unseres Jahrhunderts ist eine seit langem schwelende Krise des herkömmlichen Kausalitätsverständnisses in den Naturwissenschaften unübersehbar zum Ausdruck gekommen. Dessen ungeachtet halten jedoch viele Wissenschaftstheoretiker an Kausalitätsvorstellungen als vermeintlich unverzichtbarem Analyseinstrument fest. In Kritik dieser Tendenz zur Verkennung eines grundlegenden Bedeutungsverlustes wird der historische Verdrängungsprozess von Kausalitätsvorstellungen unter den Stichworten der Entfinalisierung und Entsubstantialisierung nachgezeichnet. Aus der Perspektive geschichtlicher Rekonstruktion handelt es sich (...) bei den gegenwärtigen Vorstellungen um den letzten Rest einer unvergleichlich reichhaltigeren ursprünglichen kausalen Begrifflichkeit. Am Beispiel der heute wohl weitverbreitetsten, auf C. G. Hempel zurückgehenden Vorstellung werden die wichtigsten Merkmale der kausalen Relation diskutiert. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass für das naturwissenschaftliche Kausalitätsverständnis, soweit es sich auf einen Begriff bringen lässt, in der Tat ein reduzierter Sinngehalt der Kategorie der Verursachung in kausalen Erklärungen, eine begrenzte Anwendbarkeit sowie ein reduzierter Geltunganspruch typisch sind. Die Grenzen naturwisseschaftlicher Kausalitätsvorstellungen betreffen deren' strenge begriffliche Fassung, nicht jedoch ihre Brauchbarkeit als heuristische Forschungsmaxime in Situationen, in denen unerwartete Phänomene auftreten oder Phänomene ausbleiben, mit denen man zuvor fest gerechnet hat. Für diese Situationen ist die Überlegung, was der Fall gewesen wäre, wenn eine Ursache nicht eingetreten wäre, in besonderer Weise bezeichnend. Welche Relevanz dieser Kausalitätsvorstellung zukünftig zukommen wird, hängt wesentlich vom Charakter der weiteren Wissenschaftsentwicklung ab. (shrink)

Im ersten Teil verorte ich den historischen Kontext des Umbruchprozesses der Wissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts im Hinblick auf die Physik. Vom Beginn der Neuzeit bis weit ins 20. Jahrhundert hinein war die Physik die Leitwissenschaft in den Naturwissenschaften. Der Wandlungsprozess der auf sie bezogenen Wissenschaftsauffassungen setzt im 19. Jahrhundert bislang unangetastete, von der Antike herrührende Geltungsansprüche außer Kraft. Im zweiten Teil vergleiche ich Nietzsches Charakterisierung der Wissenschaften exemplarisch mit der von Hermann von Helmholtz. Helmholtz kann als ein herausragender Vertreter der (...) Naturforschung des 19. Jahrhunderts angesehen werden. Er entwickelte seine erste bahnbrechende wissenschaftliche Leistung noch ganz im Rahmen einer auf Wahrheit und Einheit fokussierten Wissenschaftsauffassung. Im Verlauf seiner weiteren Arbeiten relativierten sich seine Geltungsansprüche zunehmend. In systematischer Hinsicht näherte sich Helmholtz damit nicht nur der Position an, die Nietzsche immer schon eingenommen hat, sondern er übertraf sie sogar in bestimmter Hinsicht. -/- Im dritten Teil setze ich mich kritisch mit einem Aspekt der Rezeption des historischen Verhältnisses von Nietzsche und Helmholtz auseinander. Helmholtz gehörte zu den wenigen repräsentativen Naturwissenschaftlern, von denen man annimmt, dass ihre Forschungen auf das Denken Nietzsches Einfluss hatten. Bemerkenswerterweise stammen die betreffenden Arbeiten aus der ersten Phase von Helmholtz’ Wissenschaftsauffassung. Während Helmholtz mit seinen Forschungen einen traditionellen Wahrheitsanspruch bestätigt sah, bezog sich Nietzsche auf sie, um sie umgekehrt zur Destruktion dieses Anspruches einzusetzen. Wo der Rezeption diese Konstellation entgangen ist, hat sie dazu beigetragen, die Aktualität von Nietzsches Wissenschaftskritik zu überschätzen. (shrink)

Inwieweit vermag sich der ehemalige explanative Erfolg nicht mehr anerkannter Theorien auf die Geltung derjenigen Teilaussagen, die Nachfolgetheorien übernommen haben, zu stützen? Zur Klärung dieser Fragestellung können die Ergebnisse von Machs Untersuchung zur mechanistischen Auffassung des Energieerhaltungssatzes herangezogen werden. Indem er sich in seiner Kritik an den ontologischen Annahmen des Mechanismus auf die Wissenschaftsgeschichte beruft, steht er einer heutigen realismuskritischen Argumentation nahe. Andererseits mißt er den hypothesenfreien Theoriebestandteilen einen Geltungscharakter zu, der in seinem Wahrheitsanspruch durchaus mit einer heutigen realistischen Behauptung (...) theorieübergreifender Bestände der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis vergleichbar ist. Daß Mach mit einer quer zur gegenwärtigen Terminologie liegenden Analyse einen Beitrag zur Entschärfung gegenwärtiger Kontroversen leistet, läßt eine erneute Vergegenwärtigung der Schrift von 1872 und den sich daran anschließenden Überlegungen Machs lohnenswert erscheinen. (shrink)

At the heart of Jürgen Habermas's explication of communicative rationality is the contention that all speech acts oriented to understanding raise three different kinds of validity claims simultaneously: claims to truth, truthfulness, and normative rightness. This paper argues that Habermas presents exactly three distinct, logically independent arguments for his simultaneity thesis: an argument from structure; an argument from criticizability/rejectability; and an argument from understanding/reaching understanding. It is further maintained that the simultaneity thesis receives cogent support only from the Argument (...) from understanding/reaching understanding, and only if the notion of 'understanding' is expanded to that of 'agreement'. (shrink)

Even though the concept of a 'validity claim' is central to Habermas's theory of communicative action, he has never given a precise definition of the term. He has stated only that truth is a type of validity claim, and that rightness and sincerity are analogous to truth. This paper explores the basis of this analogy, arguing that rightness and sincerity must share at least two characteristics with the truth predicate: each must be the designated value in (...) an appropriate system of logic, and each must serve as the 'central notion' in a theory of meaning for some corresponding class of speech acts. It is these two characteristics that establish the internal connec tion between understanding and justification that Habermas's more general project requires. However, there is an unnoticed tension between these two characteristics, since the relative autonomy of linguistic meaning from specific contexts of use appears to require that speech acts be governed by a uniform logic, and thus by a single validity claim. Key Words: communicative action • - Habermas • - pragmatics • - speech act theory • - truth • - validity claim. (shrink)

English summary: Friedrich Schleiermacher's work as a theologian and Plato scholar marked the start of a new epoch: as a system-forming philosopher, he claimed independent validity, and as church politician, educational policy-maker, and academic theorist, he was one of the most important figures during the Prussian reforms, whose contributions to pedagogy remain influential to this day. This volume provides a clear-sighted overview of the various stages in Schleiermacher's life (1768-1834), with each contribution portraying his fields of work and their (...) contexts, placing his literary work and conceptions in the framework of the respective contemporary debates. Important stages in Schleiermacher reception and impact history are likewise considered. The authors' diverse approaches to interpreting and understanding his output mean that the Guide to Schleiermacher offers concentrated insight into the consensus on and controversies in current Schleiermacher research. German description: Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) hat als Theologe, aber auch als Plato-Forscher Epoche gemacht; als systembildender Philosoph erhob er selbstandigen Geltungsanspruch, als Kirchen- und Bildungspolitiker sowie als Theoretiker der Universitat gehorte er zu den wichtigsten Akteuren der preussischen Reformen, und seine Beitrage zur Padagogik wirken bis heute nach. Die Gliederung des Handbuchs folgt grob Schleiermachers Lebensstationen. Die einzelnen Beitrage schildern seine Arbeitsfelder und -kontexte und stellen seine literarischen Arbeiten und Entwurfe in den jeweiligen zeitgeschichtlichen Debattenlagen dar. Auch wichtige Stationen seiner Wirkungs- und Rezeptionsgeschichte werden thematisiert.Die Autorinnen und Autoren der Beitrage verfolgen ganz unterschiedliche Interpretations- und Deutungsansatze. Deshalb bietet das Handbuch auch einen konzentrierten Einblick in den gegenwartigen Stand der Schleiermacher-Forschung mit ihren Konsensen und ihren Kontroversen. Mit Beitragen von: Christian Albrecht, Andreas Arndt, Bernd Auerochs, Ulrich Barth, Albrecht Beutel, Georg Eckert, Hermann Fischer+, Ursula Frost, Albrecht Geck, Simon Gerber, Wilhelm Grab, Peter Grove, Matthias Heesch, Eilert Herms, Kirsten Huxel, Walter Jaeschke, Lutz Kappel, Hans-Martin Kirn, Dietz Lange, Inken Madler, Helmut Merkel, Martin Ohst, Claus-Dieter Osthovener, Hermann Patsch, Reiner Preul, Andreas Reich, Joachim Ringleben, Jan Rohls, Martin Rossler, Dirk Schmid, Friedemann Voigt, Folkart Wittekind, Matthias Wolfes. (shrink)

Most of us have certain intuitions about moral rights, at least partially captured by the ideas that: (A) rights carry special weight in moral argument; (B) persons retain their rights even when they are legitimately infringed; although (C) rights undoubtedly do conflict with one another, and are sometimes overridden as well by nonrights considerations. I show that Dworkin's remarks about rights allow us to affirm (A), (B), and (C), yet those remarks are extremely vague. I then argue that Feinberg's more (...) comprehensive and precise theory, designed to do justice to all three theses, cannot assure us of (A), that rights are not merely one consideration to be weighed in the balance with heterogeneous others. I show how Feinberg accepts (C) despite being drawn toward an alternative absolutist theory of rights and commits himself to (B) through his rejection of prima facie rights. But his promising distinction between recognition and enforcement of a right, which helps give some sense to (B) despite its tension with (C), undermines the force of rights in moral argument apparently intended by (A). We thus learn that Feinberg's and Dworkin's accounts of rights are incompatible, though each is correct in important ways. Contrasting their views allows us to clarify the implications and consistency of alternative theses about rights, one step toward meeting the challenge of developing a theory which shows more adequately how respect for rights is to be combined with other intuitions about rights and their relation to other values. (shrink)

Negotiation is mainly treated as a process through which counterparts try to satisfy their conflicting interests. This traditional, subjective approach focuses on the interests-based relation between subjects and the resources which are on the bargaining table; negotiation is viewed as a series of joint decisions regarding the relation of each subject to the negotiated resources. In this paper, we will attempt to outline an intersubjective perspective that focuses on the communication-based relation among subjects, a relation that is founded upon communicative (...) rationality mechanisms which are inherent in social activity. Much in contrast to the concept of interests which describe the relationship of each subject alone to the resources, we will use the concept of ?claim-rights? which are properly formed and validated only vis-à-vis negotiating partners and on the basis of the communication that develops among them. We will offer a step-by-step account of the creation of claim-rights and argue that their validation does not necessarily lie in the parties? interests, but in the communication mechanisms that induce consensus and result in mutually acceptable outcomes. (shrink)

Interdisciplinarity has seemingly become a paradigm for modern and meaningful research. Clearly, the interdisciplinary modus of deliberation enables to unfold relevant but quite different disciplinary perspectives to the reflection of broader scientific questions or societal problems. However, whether the comprehensive results of interdisciplinary reflection prove to be valid or to be acceptable in trans-disciplinary terms depends upon certain preconditions, which have to be fulfilled for securing scientific quality and social trust in advisory contexts. The present book is written by experts (...) and practitioners of interdisciplinary research and policy advice. It analyses topical and methodological approaches towards interdisciplinarity, starting with the current role of scientific research in society. The volume continues with contributions to the issues of knowledge and acting and to trans-disciplinary deliberation. The final conclusions address the scientific system as substantial actor itself as well as the relevant research and education politics. (shrink)

In this paper, the author shows how one can independently prove, within the theory of abstract objects, some of the most significant claims, hypotheses, and background assumptions found in Kripke's logical and philosophical work. Moreover, many of the semantic features of theory of abstract objects are consistent with Kripke's views — the successful representation, in the system, of the truth conditions and entailments of philosophically puzzling sentences of natural language validates certain Kripkean semantic claims about natural language.

Catchy acronyms such as are good mnemonics. However, they carry the danger of distracting us from deeper issues: how to sample populations, the validity of measuring instruments, the levels of processing involved. These need to be considered when assessing claims of universality regarding how the mind works – a dominant and highly rewarded drive in the behavioral and brain sciences.

What is a valid measuring instrument? Recent philosophy has attended to logic of justification of measures, such as construct validation, but not to the question of what it means for an instrument to be a valid measure of a construct. A prominent approach grounds validity in the existence of a causal link between the attribute and its detectable manifestations. Some of its proponents claim that, therefore, validity does not depend on pragmatics and research context. In this paper, (...) I cast doubt on the possibility of a context-independent causal account of validity. I assess several versions, arguing that all of them fail to judge the validity of measuring instruments correctly. Because different research purposes require different properties from measuring instruments, no account of validity succeeds without referring to the specific research purpose that creates the need for measurement in the first place. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that classical logic is trivialized in the presence of a transparent truth-predicate. In this paper, we will explain why this point of view must be given up. The hierarchy of metainferential logics defined in Barrio et al. and Pailos recovers classical logic, either in the sense that every classical inferential validity is valid at some point in the hierarchy ), or because a logic of a transfinite level defined in terms of the hierarchy shares its (...) validities with classical logic. Each of these logics is consistent with transparent truth—as is shown in Pailos —, and this suggests that, contrary to standard opinions, transparent truth is after all consistent with classical logic. However, Scambler presents a major challenge to this approach. He argues that this hierarchy cannot be identified with classical logic in any way, because it recovers no classical antivalidities. We embrace Scambler’s challenge and develop a new logic based on these hierarchies. This logic recovers both every classical validity and every classical antivalidity. Moreover, we will follow the same strategy and show that contingencies need also be taken into account, and that none of the logics so far presented is enough to capture classical contingencies. Then, we will develop a multi-standard approach to elaborate a new logic that captures not only every classical validity, but also every classical antivalidity and contingency. As a€truth-predicate can be added to this logic, this result can be interpreted as showing that, despite the claims that are extremely widely accepted, classical logic does not trivialize in the context of transparent truth. (shrink)

By demonstrating the uniformity and universality of the principles of valid interpretation of verbal texts of any sort, this closely reasoned examination provides a theoretical foundation for a discipline that is fundamental to virtually all humanistic studies. It defines the grounds on which textual interpretation can claim to establish objective knowledge, defends that claim against such skeptical attitudes as historicism and psychologism, and shows that many confusions can be avoided if the distinctions between meaning and significance, interpretation and (...) criticism are correctly understood. It provides perhaps the first genuinely comprehensive account of hermeneutic theory to appear in English and the first systematic presentation of the principles of valid interpretation in any language. Mr. Hirsch, associate professor of English at the University of Virginia, is the author of _Wordsworth and Schelling _and _Innocence and Experience: An Introduction to Blake._ “Here is a book that brings logic to the most unruly of disciplines, literary interpretation. Viewing this subject within the tradition of hermeneutics, Mr. Hirsch is able to trace its origins and development with brilliant insight. The result is a lucidly systemic and authoritative account of the premises and procedures applicable to the interpretation of a literary text. Mr. Hirsch has performed a monumental service thereby that of reinstating the credentials of objectivism and defining the limits of the aesthetics of truth. This study is a necessary took for anyone who wants to talk sense about literature.”—_Virginia Quarterly Review_ “Professor Hirsch demonstrates convincingly that objectivity is attainable in humane studies, and that it is not identified with the subject but with the evidence. A valid interpretation is not necessarily a correct one, but one which is more probably than any other on the basis of existing evidence. He makes a subtle and important distinction between a text’s ‘meaning’ and its ‘significance’, and brilliantly relates meaning to understanding and interpretation to explanation…” In short, this is a work which future students of literary theory cannot afford to neglect.”—_Notes and Queries_ E.D. Hirsch, Jr., is professor of English at the University of Virginia. (shrink)

Can judging that an agent blamelessly broke a rule lead us to claim, paradoxically, that no rule was broken at all? Surprisingly, it can. Across seven experiments, we document and explain the phenomenon of excuse validation. We found when an agent blamelessly breaks a rule, it significantly distorts people’s description of the agent’s conduct. Roughly half of people deny that a rule was broken. The results suggest that people engage in excuse validation in order to avoid indirectly blaming others (...) for blameless transgressions. Excuse validation has implications for recent debates in normative ethics, epistemology and the philosophy of language. These debates have featured thought experiments perfectly designed to trigger excuse validation, inhibiting progress in these areas. (shrink)

Thomas Hofweber takes the semantic paradoxes to motivate a radical reconceptualization of logical validity, rejecting the idea that an inference rule is valid just in case every instance thereof is necessarily truth-preserving. Rather than this “strict validity”, we should identify validity with “generic validity”, where a rule is generically valid just in case its instances are truth preserving, and where this last sentence is a generic, like “Bears are dangerous”. While sympathetic to Hofweber’s view that strict (...) validity should be replaced by something allowing for exceptions, I argue that this should instead be truth-conduciveness, a matter of a large majority of instances being truth-preserving. The fact that inference rules have uncountably many instances, I argue, can be handled by defining truth-conduciveness as relative to finite sets of instances. Moreover, I argue that Hofweber’s position, while seemingly radical, may be less so under closer scrutiny. For the mere claim that classical rules and unrestricted truth rules are generically valid (or truth-conducive) is not in itself controversial. Also, if there is an answer to the question of which of these are also strictly valid, then the claim that generic validity is the central notion in logic is at most an interest-relative matter, since there is then also a fact of the matter as to which inference rules are (not) strictly valid. If no solution operating with strict validity to the paradoxes can be had, however, then the claim that validity should be identified with a weaker notion is better motivated. I argue that it is reasonable, in view of past failures, to conjecture that no ordinary solution will score high enough relative to standard (uncontroversial) desiderata to merit justified belief. Hence, it is unknowable which solution is correct. I further argue that this is best explained by its being metaphysically indeterminate which solution is correct. If this conjecture is true, then we ought instead to think of validity as allowing exceptions, and then take the “true logic” to be one that takes both the classical rules and the truth rules to be valid, i.e., truth-conducive. This logic scores very high on the desiderata on logics, and is therefore preferable to any logic operating with strict validity. (shrink)

The interplay of philosophical ambitions and technical reality have given birth to rich and interesting approaches to explain the oft-claimed special character of mathematical and logical knowledge. Two projects stand out both for their audacity and their innovativeness. These are logicism and proof-theoretic semantics. This dissertation contains three chapters exploring the limits of these two projects. In both cases I find the formal results offer a mixed blessing to the philosophical projects. Chapter 1. Is a logicist bound to the (...) class='Hi'>claim that as a matter of analytic truth there is an actual infinity of objects? If Hume’s Principle is analytic then in the standard setting the answer appears to be yes. Hodes’s work pointed to a way out by offering a modal picture in which only a potential infinity was posited. However, this project was abandoned due to apparent failures of cross-world predication. I re-explore this idea and discover that in the setting of the potential infinite one can interpret first-order Peano arithmetic, but not second-order Peano arithmetic. I conclude that in order for the logicist to weaken the metaphysically loaded claim of necessary actual infinities, they must also weaken the mathematics they recover. Chapter 2. There have been several recent results bringing into focus the super-intuitionistic nature of most notions of proof-theoretic validity. But there has been very little work evaluating the consequences of these results. In this chapter, I explore the question of whether these results undermine the claim that proof-theoretic validity shows us which inferences follow from the meaning of the connectives when defined by their introduction rules. It is argued that the super-intuitionistic inferences are valid due to the correspondence between the treatment of the atomic formulas and more complex formulas. And so the goals of proof-theoretic validity are not undermined. Chapter 3. Prawitz (1971) conjectured that proof-theoretic validity offers a semantics for intuitionistic logic. This conjecture has recently been proven false by Piecha and Schroeder-Heister (2019). This chapter resolves one of the questions left open by this recent result by showing the extensional alignment of proof-theoretic validity and general inquisitive logic. General inquisitive logic is a generalisation of inquisitive semantics, a uniform semantics for questions and assertions. The chapter further defines a notion of quasi-proof-theoretic validity by restricting proof-theoretic validity to allow double negation elimination for atomic formulas and proves the extensional alignment of quasi-proof-theoretic validity and inquisitive logic.Abstract prepared by Will Stafford extracted partially from the dissertation. (shrink)

Author's summary: I discuss the lessons that scientific realism, understood as a thesis about the metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic interpretation of scientific theories, has to learn from the philosophy of scientific practice. The standard arguments for scientific realism are shown to be incompatible with a practice-based understanding of theories, as they fail short of offering operationally sound concepts of "truth" and "reality. " I propose Hasok Chang's Active Realism (AR) as a solution to this compatibility problem and defend it against (...) common anti-realist arguments. Finally, I hold that AR offers important lessons for discussing the epistemic authority of scientific theories in public discourse: instead of the claims of scientific theories to truth, these discussions should focus on correct and incorrect domains of theory application. (shrink)

What makes a measure of well-being valid? The dominant approach today, construct validation, uses psychometrics to ensure that questionnaires behave in accordance with background knowledge. Our first claim is interpretive—construct validation obeys a coherentist logic that seeks to balance diverse sources of evidence about the construct in question. Our second claim is critical—while in theory this logic is defensible, in practice it does not secure valid measures. We argue that the practice of construct validation in well-being research is (...) theory avoidant, favoring a narrow focus on statistical tests while largely ignoring relevant philosophical considerations. (shrink)

I raise three related objections to aspects of Katharina Kraus’s interpretation in Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation. First, I reject her claim that representations count as merely subjectively valid for Kant if they represent objects from the contingent perspective of a particular subject. I argue that Kant in fact describes consciousness of subjectively valid representations as consciousness of one’s own perceptions rather than of the objects perceived, and therefore that it plays a bigger role in his account of self-consciousness (...) than Kraus allows. Second, whereas Kraus argues that the transcendental unity of apperception structures the content of any consciousness that is possible for a subject, I note that Kant also allows for a merely empirical unity of apperception, which he describes as in principle different from transcendental unity. Finally, I raise some worries for Kraus’s suggestion that we can be aware of the activity of thinking through inner sense. (shrink)

Over fifteen years after first reporting to the State of New York, the Harvard Medical Practice Study continues to have a significant impact in medical malpractice policy debates. In those debates the HMPS has come to stand for four main propositions. First, “medical injury… accounts for more deaths than all other kinds of accidents combined” and “more than a quarter of those were caused by substandard care.” Second, the vast majority of people who are injured as result of substandard care (...) do not file a claim. Third, “a substantial majority of malpractice claims filed are not based on provider carelessness or even iatrogenic injury.” Fourth, “whether negligence or a medical injury had occurred… bore little relation to the outcome of the claims.”Medical malpractice researchers have long known that the HMPS provides far stronger support for the first two of these propositions than for the last two; the HMPS was not designed or powered to reach strong conclusions about the validity of medical malpractice claims. (shrink)

Over fifteen years after first reporting to the State of New York, the Harvard Medical Practice Study continues to have a significant impact in medical malpractice policy debates. In those debates the HMPS has come to stand for four main propositions. First, “medical injury… accounts for more deaths than all other kinds of accidents combined” and “more than a quarter of those were caused by substandard care.” Second, the vast majority of people who are injured as result of substandard care (...) do not file a claim. Third, “a substantial majority of malpractice claims filed are not based on provider carelessness or even iatrogenic injury.” Fourth, “whether negligence or a medical injury had occurred… bore little relation to the outcome of the claims.”Medical malpractice researchers have long known that the HMPS provides far stronger support for the first two of these propositions than for the last two; the HMPS was not designed or powered to reach strong conclusions about the validity of medical malpractice claims. (shrink)

The validity of psychological measurement is crucially connected to a peculiar form of epistemic circularity. This circularity can be a threat when there are no independent ways to assess whether a certain procedure is actually measuring the intended target of measurement. This paper focuses on how Gustav Theodor Fechner addressed the measurement circularity that emerged in his psychophysical research. First, I show that Fechner's approach to the problem of circular measurement involved a core idealizing assumption of a shared human (...) physiology. Second, I assess Fechner's approach to this issue against the backdrop of his own epistemology of measurement and the measurement context of his time. Third, I claim that, from a coherentist and historicallysituated perspective, Fechner's quantification can be regarded as a first successful step of a longer-term quantification process. To conclude, I draw from these insights some general epistemological reflections that are relevant to current quantitative psychology. (shrink)

By demonstrating the uniformity and universality of the principles of valid interpretation of verbal texts of any sort, this closely reasoned examination provides a theoretical foundation for a discipline that is fundamental to virtually all humanistic studies. It defines the grounds on which textual interpretation can claim to establish objective knowledge, defends that claim against such skeptical attitudes as historicism and psychologism, and shows that many confusions can be avoided if the distinctions between meaning and significance, interpretation and (...) criticism are correctly understood. It provides perhaps the first genuinely comprehensive account of hermeneutic theory to appear in English and the first systematic presentation of the principles of valid interpretation in any language. Mr. Hirsch, associate professor of English at the University of Virginia, is the author of _Wordsworth and Schelling _and _Innocence and Experience: An Introduction to Blake._ “Here is a book that brings logic to the most unruly of disciplines, literary interpretation. Viewing this subject within the tradition of hermeneutics, Mr. Hirsch is able to trace its origins and development with brilliant insight. The result is a lucidly systemic and authoritative account of the premises and procedures applicable to the interpretation of a literary text. Mr. Hirsch has performed a monumental service thereby that of reinstating the credentials of objectivism and defining the limits of the aesthetics of truth. This study is a necessary took for anyone who wants to talk sense about literature.”—_Virginia Quarterly Review_ “Professor Hirsch demonstrates convincingly that objectivity is attainable in humane studies, and that it is not identified with the subject but with the evidence. A valid interpretation is not necessarily a correct one, but one which is more probably than any other on the basis of existing evidence. He makes a subtle and important distinction between a text’s ‘meaning’ and its ‘significance’, and brilliantly relates meaning to understanding and interpretation to explanation…” In short, this is a work which future students of literary theory cannot afford to neglect.”—_Notes and Queries_ E.D. Hirsch, Jr., is professor of English at the University of Virginia. (shrink)

Gigerenzer’s ‘external validity argument’ plays a pivotal role in his critique of the heuristics and biases research program (HB). The basic idea is that (a) the experimental contexts deployed by HB are not representative of the real environment and that (b) the differences between the setting and the real environment are causally relevant, because they result in different performances by the subjects. However, by considering Gigerenzer’s work on frequencies in probability judgments, this essay attempts to show that there are (...) fatal flaws in the argument. Specifically, each of the claims is controversial: whereas (b) is not adequately empirically justified, (a) is inconsistent with the ‘debiasing’ program of Gigerenzer’s ABC group. Therefore, whatever reason we might have for believing that the experimental findings of HB lack experimental validity, this should not be based on Gigerenzer’s version of the argument. (shrink)

Havstad (2022) argues that the argument from inductive risk for the claim that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role to play in the internal stages of science is deductively valid. She also defends its premises and thus soundness. This is, as far as we are aware, the best reconstruction of the argument from inductive risk in the existing literature. However, there is a small flaw in this reconstruction of the argument from inductive risk which appears to render the argument (...) invalid. This flaw is superficial, and a small amendment to it rescues the claim of validity. (shrink)

This is a critical examination of Johnstone's thesis that all valid philosophical arguments are ad hominem. I clarify his notions of valid, philosophical, and ad hominem. I illustrate the thesis with his refutation ofthe claim that only ordinary language is correct. r discuss his three supporting arguments (historical, theoretical, and intermediate). And r criticize the thesis with the objections that if an ad hominem argument is valid, it is really ad rem; that it's unclear how his own theoretical argument (...) can be ad hominem; that if an ad hominem argument is really valid, it would have to be based on the proponent's own assumptions; and that the thesis is not true of philosophical arguments that are constructive rather than critical. (shrink)

Post‐Marxist critical sociology of education has influenced the development of indigenous (‘kaupapa’) Maori educational theory and research. Its effects are examined in four claims made for Maori education by indigenous theorists. The claims are: indigenous kaupapa Maori education is a revolutionary initiative; it is a cultural solution to Maori educational under‐achievement; it has reversed the decline of the Maori language; it provides a valid educational alternative for an ethnically and culturally distinctive population. The analysis suggests that the indigenous theory approach (...) is representative of the position‐taking strategy that characterises post‐Marxist critical sociology of education, concluding that claims made in kaupapa Maori voice discourse are not supported by the empirical evidence which indicates a more complex social reality. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on two contrasting concepts of deduction and induction that have appeared in introductory (formal) logic texts over the past 75 years or so. According to the one, deductive and inductive arguments are defined solely by reference to what arguers claim about the relation between the premises and the conclusions. According to the other, they are defined solely by reference to that relation itself. Arguing that these definitions have defects that are due to their simplicity, (...) I develop definitions that remove these defects by assigning a combination of roles to both arguers’ claims concerning the premises/conclusion relation and the relation itself. Along the way I also present and briefly defend definitions of both deductive and inductive validity that are significantly different from the norm. (shrink)

Richard Rorty challenges Jurgen Habermas's belief that validity-claims raised within context-bound discussions contain a moment of universality validity. Rorty argues that immersion within contingent languages prohibits any neutral, context-independent ground, that one cannot predict the defense of one's assertions before any audience, and that philosophy can no more escape its contextual limitations than strategic counterparts. Alfred Schutz's phenomenological account of motivation, the reciprocity of perspectives, and the theoretical province of meaning can articulate Habermas's intuitions.Since any claim can (...) be analyzed from an observer's perspective for its because-motives, it can always be shown to be context-related; but to the participant involved in the in-order-to project of establishing a claim's validity, the claim appears objectively valid until counter-evidence surfaces. Rorty, even when explaining what it is to make a truth claim, resorts to the observer perspective and omits reference to the in-order-to perspective, within which alone unconditional validity becomes visible. Furthermore, the expectation that one's claim is universally valid depends not on an empirical prediction that one''s claim can survive hypothesized future possible audiences. Rather, because of the reciprocity of perspectives, making possible communication and a common life, theoreticians assume that others will recognize what they take to be objective or valid, independently of diverse biographical circumstances. Finally, within the theoretical province requiring relevances different from those of everyday life, philosophy articulates claims with a greater potential to arrive at universal validity than projects that aim less universally, in spite of the fact that its theoretical context is always susceptible to because motive analysis. (shrink)

I first propose to distinguish between two kinds of external validity inferences, predictive and explanatory. I then argue that we have a satisfactory answer to the question of the conditions under which predictive external validity inferences are good. If this claim is correct, then it has two immediate consequences: First, some external validity inferences are deductive, contrary to what is commonly assumed. Second, Steel’s requirement that an account of external validity inference break what he calls (...) the ‘Extrapolator’s Circle’ is misplaced, at least when it comes to predictive external validity inferences. (shrink)

Subliminal perception occurs when prime stimuli that participants claim not to be aware of nevertheless influence subsequent processing of a target. This claim, however, critically depends on correct methods to assess prime awareness. Typically, d9 (‘‘d prime’’) tasks administered after a priming task are used to establish that people are unable to discriminate between different primes. Here, we show that such d9 tasks are influenced by the nature of the target, by attentional factors, and by the delay between (...) stimulus presentation and response. Our results suggest that the standard d9 task is not a straightforward measure of prime visibility. We discuss the implications of our findings for subliminal perception research. (shrink)

This paper claims that there is a plausible sense in which validity is a matter of truth preservation relative to interpretations of the sentences that occur in an argument, although it is not the sense one might have in mind. §1 outlines three independent problems: the first is the paradox of the sorites, the second concerns the fallacy of equivocation, and the third arises in connection with the standard treatment of indexicals. §2 elucidates the claim about validity, (...) while §§3-5 show how the three problems outlined can be handled in accordance with it. §6 explains how the claim squares with the traditional idea that validity is related to formality, and in particular with a broadly accepted definition based on that idea, the model-theoretic definition of logical consequence. Unlike other works on the subject, this paper does not focus on necessity. It is not its intention to provide a characterization of necessity that conforms to some ideal of rigour or to some pre-theoretical understanding of validity. What follows can be taken as conditional on the assumption that such a characterization can be provided. (shrink)

The notion of validity for modal languages could be defined in two slightly different ways. The first is the original definition given by S. Kripke, for which a formula φ of a modal language L is valid if and only if it is true in every actual world of every interpretation of L. The second is the definition that has become standard in most textbook presentations of modal logic, for which a formula φ of L is valid if and (...) only if it is true in every world in every interpretation of L. For simple modal languages, “Kripkean validity” and “Textbook validity” are extensionally equivalent. According to E. Zalta, however, Textbook validity is an “incorrect” definition of validity, because: (i) it is not in full compliance with Tarski’s notion of truth; (ii) in expressively richer languages, enriched by the actuality operator, some obviously true formulas count as valid only if the Kripkean notion is used. The purpose of this paper is to show that (i) and (ii) are not good reasons to favor Kripkean valid- ity over Textbook validity. On the one hand, I will claim that the difference between the two should rather be seen as the result of two different conceptions on how a modal logic should be built from a non-modal basis; on the other, I will show the advantages, for the question at issue, of seeing the actuality operator as belonging to the family of two-dimensional operators. (shrink)