This volume examines Rawls's theory of international justice as worked out in his controversial last book, The Law of Peoples.

This article is a critical review of work on the concept of rights, Including the concept of human rights, From 1963 to 1978. Our focus is mainly on issues of the analysis of rights and human rights. We do not deal with the closely related issues bearing on the normative foundations of moral and human rights. Nor have we attempted much in the way of historical treatment of our topic. Section I surveys general characterizations of rights. In section ii, We (...) discuss treatments of the defeasibility of rights with special attention to the notion of a prima facie right. Section iii takes up attempts to give an account of human rights. Section iv provides a brief conclusion. A bibliography listing what we take to be the most important works in this area, Including everything cited, Concludes our essay. (shrink)

THE CASE OF SOCRATES, like that of Antigone, holds a high place in the history of the discussion of civil disobedience. Yet the position which Socrates took on this question is seemingly unclear, even with respect to its broadest outlines. This is exhibited by a surprising and considerable divergence of opinion, bearing on what Socrates did and said, in some of the recent writings on civil disobedience.

In his well known proposition that pleasures differ qualitatively, Mill seems to be arguing three principal points. ‘Mental’ pleasures as a kind are intrinsically ‘more desirable and more valuable’ than ‘bodily pleasures’ . This estimation of pleasure, Mill says, is such as to rule out the claim that it ‘should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.’ Indeed, he continued, the ‘superiority in quality’ might be ‘so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account’ . The (...) ‘test of quality and the rule for measuring it against quantity,’ Mill says, is ‘the preference’ of experienced judges . ‘[T]he judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final’. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Background A Global Difference Principle? Two Main Cases A Closer Look Rawls's Background Thinking Puzzlement Rawls's Arguments: an Appraisal Notes.

The procedure I will follow in this paper requires a brief initial note of explanation. Collingwood’s texts are opaque at two points. First, he does not make clear what precisely he meant by the claim that metaphysics is a historical discipline. The prevailing interpretation—which I dispute—has been that he had in mind a similarity or identity of certain methods of inquiry or explanation. Second, and more seriously, he does not make clear the relationship of his two main treatises on metaphysics. (...) They were written and published only seven years apart and one feels there ought to be some connection, if only that of explicit rejection, between them. Their connection is problematic; for they appear, on the surface, very different. Rather like the relationship of Plato’s Laws to his Republic. But Collingwood himself is almost completely noncommittal on how they stand, each to the other. He apparently saw in them some sort of continuity. But beyond this we have no sense of what he took their relationship to be. (shrink)

The procedure I will follow in this paper requires a brief initial note of explanation. Collingwood’s texts are opaque at two points. First, he does not make clear what precisely he meant by the claim that metaphysics is a historical discipline. The prevailing interpretation—which I dispute—has been that he had in mind a similarity or identity of certain methods of inquiry or explanation. Second, and more seriously, he does not make clear the relationship of his two main treatises on metaphysics. (...) They were written and published only seven years apart and one feels there ought to be some connection, if only that of explicit rejection, between them. Their connection is problematic; for they appear, on the surface, very different. Rather like the relationship of Plato’s Laws to his Republic. But Collingwood himself is almost completely noncommittal on how they stand, each to the other. He apparently saw in them some sort of continuity. But beyond this we have no sense of what he took their relationship to be. (shrink)

Two jarring results concerning the main theses of Georg Henrik von Wright's Explanation and Understanding are reached through an examination and criticism of his project. It is shown, contrary to his settled judgment both in EU and subsequently, that the schema of practical inference is a causal principle, and that it is nomological in character. But one feature of von Wright's overall analysis holds up and continues to show promise: his idea of understanding explanation. This idea combines the EU account (...) of the schema and its instantiation with the notion of an intelligible connection of these instantiating elements with one another. Here the schema is deployed in conjunction with the test of intelligible connection as one of its conditions of application. The schema, so deployed, is revisable on the basis of experiences that do not conform to what we expect them to be when they are regimented in accordance with the model of understanding explanation; thus, even though the schema is not a general law, we have a basis for characterizing it as nomological, nonetheless. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

The paper develops a theory of human rights under three main headings: that ways of acting or of being treated require effective normative justification, that they must have authoritative political endorsement or acknowledgement, and that they must be maintained by conforming conduct and, where need be, by governmental enforcement. The paper, then, applies this notion of human rights to two main cases: as constitutional rights within individual states , and as international human rights maintained by confederations of states or by (...) looser international coalitions. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Background John Rawls History of The Law of Peoples Rawls's Law of Peoples The Importance of The Law of Peoples and its Reception How the Book is Organized Some Areas Still to Be Addressed Notes.

The first section takes up some main details of American constitutional history. At the end of that section and in section two, we concentrate on one constitutional doctrine in particular, judicial review. We argue that this doctrine rests, traditionally, on the foundational idea of a permanent tension between democratic institutions and basic rights. In section three, we deal with the problem just raised, by suggesting an alternative view of the relationship that exists between these fundamental constitutional elements. Here we attempt (...) to show that there is an essential principled harmony between basic constitutional rights and democratic majority rule. And we try to locate judicial review within this alternative conception. Then in section four and in the conclusion we discuss the institutional arrangements for the practice of judicial review in the light of this alternative conception. (shrink)

The notion of rule utilitarianism (a twentieth-century addition to the canon of utilitarian thought) has been discussed under two main headings—ideal-rule utilitarianism and 'indirect' utilitarianism. The distinction between them is often hazy. But we can sketch out each perspective along three different dimensions, contrasting the two conceptions of rule utilitarianism at each of three main hinge points: (1) the grounding of rules, (2) the allowed complexity of rules, (3) the conflict of rules. These two profiles constitute ideal types, but they (...) help us see that we can regiment and focus utilitarian intuitions in two quite distinct ways. An interesting test case is provided by J.S. Mill. He has been associated with each of these perspectives (with a utilitarianism of ideal rules by R.B. Brandt and with indirect utilitarianism by John Gray), but careful attention to Mill's main arguments indicates, I believe, that he adheres to neither consistently, though he is closer to the indirect utilitarian position. (shrink)

This paper concerns the notion of intelligibility as applied to action explanations, of the sort typically found in history in particular. The paper has two sections.

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. A burgeoning human rights movement followed, yielding many treaties and new international institutions and shaping the constitutions and laws of many states. Yet human rights continue to be contested politically and legally and there is substantial philosophical and theoretical debate over their foundations and implications. In this volume distinguished philosophers, political scientists, international lawyers, environmentalists and anthropologists discuss some of the most difficult questions of human rights (...) theory and practice: What do human rights require of the global economy? Does it make sense to secure them by force? What do they require in jus post bello contexts of transitional justice? Is global climate change a human rights issue? Is there a human right to democracy? Does the human rights movement constitute moral progress? For students of political philosophy, human rights, peace studies, and international relations. (shrink)

An Essay on Metaphysics is one of the finest works of the great Oxford philosopher R. G. Collingwood : in it he considers the nature of philosophy, especially of metaphysics, and puts forward his original and influential theories of absolute presuppositions, causation, and the logic of question and answer. Three fascinating unpublished pieces by Collingwood have been added for this revised edition: they illuminate and amplify the ideas of the Essay, to which they are closely related. The editor Rex Martin (...) contributes a substantial introduction telling the story of the composition of all these works, discussing their major themes, and setting them in the context of Collingwood's philosophy as a whole. (shrink)

An Essay on Metaphysics is one of the finest works of the great Oxford philosopher R. G. Collingwood : in it he considers the nature of philosophy, especially of metaphysics, and puts forward his original and influential theories of absolute presuppositions, causation, and the logic of question and answer. Three fascinating unpublished pieces by Collingwood have been added for this revised edition: they illuminate and amplify the ideas of the Essay, to which they are closely related. The editor Rex Martin (...) contributes a substantial introduction telling the story of the composition of all these works, discussing their major themes, and setting them in the context of Collingwood's philosophy as a whole. (shrink)

An Essay on Metaphysics is one of the finest works of the great Oxford philosopher R. G. Collingwood : in it he considers the nature of philosophy, especially of metaphysics, and puts forward his original and influential theories of absolute presuppositions, causation, and the logic of question and answer. Three fascinating unpublished pieces by Collingwood have been added for this revised edition: they illuminate and amplify the ideas of the Essay, to which they are closely related. The editor Rex Martin (...) contributes a substantial introduction telling the story of the composition of all these works, discussing their major themes, and setting them in the context of Collingwood's philosophy as a whole. (shrink)

It has been claimed that several of the rights in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights - in particular the social and economic rights to the provision of welfare in, for example, education - cannot literally be rights of everybody. We find two main lines of analysis that have been raised to back up this claim. One of these lines is theoretical or normative in nature. Here I take up Onora O’Neill’s concern with the counterpart obligations that attach to (...) the UDHR social and economic rights. She argues that these obligations do not have a universal character and cannot backstop universal moral rights. I suggest ways around her argument. The other main line concerns feasibility. Here I take up the argument that the UDHR social and economic rights apparently cannot, under existing conditions, be fulfilled at even a minimal level for millions upon millions of people. James Nickel, well aware of this problem, argues that these rights nonetheless do not, on grounds of infeasibility, fail of universality. I try to counter his argument. But I add, in conclusion, that these pressing practical problems with the UDHR welfare rights could possibly be removed in time, with concentrated effort. (shrink)

Among Collingwood’s major books his Essay on Philosophical Method is, perhaps, the least well-known. There were a few reviews, some unfavorable, at the time of publication and, after that, an essay or two. But the book has largely been ignored.