Subjective Validity, Self-Consciousness and Inner Experience: Comments on Kraus

Kantian Review 27 (3):461-467 (2022)
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Abstract

I raise three related objections to aspects of Katharina Kraus’s interpretation in Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation. First, I reject her claim that representations count as merely subjectively valid for Kant if they represent objects from the contingent perspective of a particular subject. I argue that Kant in fact describes consciousness of subjectively valid representations as consciousness of one’s own perceptions rather than of the objects perceived, and therefore that it plays a bigger role in his account of self-consciousness than Kraus allows. Second, whereas Kraus argues that the transcendental unity of apperception structures the content of any consciousness that is possible for a subject, I note that Kant also allows for a merely empirical unity of apperception, which he describes as in principle different from transcendental unity. Finally, I raise some worries for Kraus’s suggestion that we can be aware of the activity of thinking through inner sense.

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Janum Sethi
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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Kant on Empirical Self-Consciousness.Janum Sethi - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):79-99.

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