This paper analyses the ways in which human knowledge of the golden jackal (Canis aureus) is formed in the case of a rural community of the Romanian Danube Delta. We focus on the territory where humans and jackals overlap and, by using wildlife monitoring alongside interviews and participant observation with humans, we detail how villagers come to have a particularly negative view of this resident canid. Foregrounding the jackal's highly symbolic nature, we trace the development of the community's knowledge of (...) this animal via historical, ecological and geographical factors. Finally, we recommend ways in which our findings could be used in future management plans and draw out the implications for future rewilding practices. (shrink)

During the last decade there has been burgeoning research concerning the ways in which we should think of and apply the concept of responsibility for Artificial Intelligence. Despite this conceptual richness, there is still a lack of consensus regarding what Responsible AI entails on both conceptual and practical levels. The aim of this paper is to connect the ethical dimension of responsibility in Responsible AI with Aristotelian virtue ethics, where notions of context and dianoetic virtues play a grounding role for (...) the concept of moral responsibility. The paper starts by highlighting the important difficulties in assigning responsibility to either technologies themselves or to their developers. Top-down and bottom-up approaches to moral responsibility are then contrasted, as we explore how they could inform debates about Responsible AI. We highlight the limits of the former ethical approaches and build the case for classical Aristotelian virtue ethics. We show that two building blocks of Aristotle’s ethics, dianoetic virtues and the context of actions, although largely ignored in the literature, can shed light on how we could think of moral responsibility for both AI and humans. We end by exploring the practical implications of this particular understanding of moral responsibility along the triadic dimensions of ethics by design, ethics in design and ethics for designers. (shrink)

Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, ‘incomparability’ means determinate failure of the three classic value relations ( better than , worse than , and equally good ): two value-bearers are incomparable with respect to a value V if and only if (i) it is false that x is better than y with respect to V , (ii) it is false that x (...) is worse than y with respect to V and (iii) it is false that x and y are equally good with respect to V . Most philosophers have followed Raz in adopting this account of incomparability. Recently, however, John Broome has advocated an alternative view, on which value incomparability is explained in terms of vagueness or indeterminacy . In this paper I aim to further Broome’s view in two ways. Firstly, I want to supply independent reasons for thinking that the phenomenon of value incomparability is indeed a matter of the indeterminacy inherent in our comparative predicates. Secondly, I attempt to defend Broome’s account by warding off several objections that worry him, due mainly to Erik Carlson and Ruth Chang. (shrink)

Deep learning AI systems have proven a wide capacity to take over human-related activities such as car driving, medical diagnosing, or elderly care, often displaying behaviour with unpredictable consequences, including negative ones. This has raised the question whether highly autonomous AI may qualify as morally responsible agents. In this article, we develop a set of four conditions that an entity needs to meet in order to be ascribed moral responsibility, by drawing on Aristotelian ethics and contemporary philosophical research. We encode (...) these conditions and generate a flowchart that we call the Moral Responsibility Test. This test can be used as a tool both to evaluate whether an entity is a morally responsible agent and to inform human moral decision-making over the influencing variables of the context of action. We apply the test to the case of Artificial Moral Advisors and conclude that this form of AI cannot qualify as morally responsible agents. We further discuss the implications for the use of AMAs as moral enhancement and show that using AMAs to offload human responsibility is inadequate. We argue instead that AMAs could morally enhance users if they are interpreted as enablers for moral knowledge of the contextual variables surrounding human moral decision-making, with the implication that such a use might actually enlarge human moral responsibility. (shrink)

Some comparisons are hard. How should we think about such comparisons? According to John Broome, we should think about them in terms of vagueness. But the vagueness account has remained unpopular thus far. Here I try to bolster it by clarifying the notion of comparative vagueness that lies at its heart.

This chapter explores the implications of moral vagueness for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. It characterizes non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to seven theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. It starts by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which “red,” “tall,” and “heap” are said to be. It then argues that the moral non-naturalist seeking to countenance moral vagueness (...) faces a dilemma: are moral properties vague, or perfectly sharp? On either horn of the dilemma, serious problems arise for some of the central tenets of non-naturalism: vague properties seem to threaten Objectivism, Supervenience, and Non-reductivism; on the other hand, sharp properties raise problems for Supervenience and Rationalism. The difficulties on each horn of the dilemma are real, and while they may not be insuperable, they do, at the very least, drastically limit the things non-naturalists can consistently say about moral properties, facts, and reasons. (shrink)

This article advances research on moral responsibility in organizations by drawing on both philosophical virtue ethics grounded in the Aristotelian tradition and Positive Organizational Scholarship research concerned with virtuousness. The article discusses the very conditions that make possible the realization of virtues and virtuousness, respectively. These conditions ground notions of moral responsibility and the resulting praise or blame on organizational contexts. Thus, we analyze the way individuals and organizations may be ascribed interconnected degrees of retrospective moral responsibility and blame as (...) depending on the interplay between the individual conditions leading to virtue and the organizational conditions leading to virtuousness. Based on this analysis, we develop a two‐level account of moral responsibility in organizations that connects individual and organizational moral responsibility through the concepts of virtue and virtuousness. This is further operationalized into practical guidelines to ascribe degrees of individual and organizational blame, which can be used as a tool by managers, policymakers, or industry regulators. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the implications of moral vagueness (viz., the vagueness of moral predicates) for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. I characterise non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to 7 theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. I start by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which ‘red’, ‘tall’, and ‘heap’ are said to be. I then argue that (...) the moral non-naturalist seeking to countenance moral vagueness faces a dilemma: are moral properties vague, or perfectly sharp? On either horn of the dilemma, serious problems arise for some of the central tenets of non-naturalism: vague properties seem to threaten Objectivism, Supervenience, and Non-reductivism; on the other hand, sharp properties raise problems for Supervenience and Rationalism. The difficulties on each horn of the dilemma are real, and while they may not be insuperable, they do, at the very least, drastically limit the things non-naturalists can consistently say about moral properties, facts, and reasons. (shrink)

Moral responsibility for outcomes in corporate settings can be ascribed either to the individual members, the corporation, or both. In the latter case, the relationship between individual and corporate responsibility has been approached as inversely proportional, such that an increase in individual responsibility leads to a corresponding decrease in corporate responsibility and vice versa. In this article, we develop a non-proportionate approach, where, under specific conditions, individual and corporate moral responsibilities interact dynamically, leading to a mutual enhancement of responsibility: the (...) more the corporation is responsible, the more the individuals become responsible and vice versa. We develop this mutually enhancing approach in terms of normative ascriptions of responsibility, while leaving aside empirical implications in terms of mutual awareness of responsibility between individuals and corporations. We explore conceptually the conditions and mechanisms that generate this mutual enhancement and also discuss the implications for research and practice. (shrink)

Dans le Sermon 74 sur le Cantique des Cantiques, Bernard de Clairvaux fait part de son expérience, exprimée en termes de « visites du Verbe ». De son propre aveu, il vise le dévoilement d’une ontologie de la personne qui se réalise pleinement par l’expérience immédiate du Verbe. La construction de la théologie bernardine est reprise dans cet article à partir du mouvement alternatif entre expérience et expression. La capacité humaine de produire de nouvelles formes de langage ne s’épuise pas (...) dans la mise en œuvre de la langue. Pour mettre en exergue cette idée, les termes d’inoperosità (désœuvrement) et d’inappropriable, forgés par Giorgio Agamben, sont utilisés pour montrer dans quelle mesure le cistercien emploie l’art des paroles pour produire l’effet de son expérience personnelle avec Dieu. L’article tente ainsi de montrer que les mots bernardins entrent dans un mode de désœuvrement, afin de nous introduire dans la contemplation du Verbe en tant que forme de vie et transformation intérieure. (shrink)

The employee motivation at the organizational level is naturally quantified in achieving performance goals. In this paper are studied the motivational factors from the perspective of employee work performance reflected, vertically, in the organizational performance and further in the macroeconomic performance. Using an empirical study in which the observed data were obtained through a survey conducted in this year among the Romanian employees, in this paper we validate three hypotheses that establish the association of employee performance, on the one hand (...) with proactive personality traits and on the other hand with certain motivational factors. As well, we highlight some managerial implications that can contribute to increasing workplace performance by using of appropriate motivational factors. (shrink)

This volume is the first collection of articles dedicated to Wittgenstein s thoughts on colour, focusing in particular on his so-called Remarks on Colour, a piece of writing that has received comparably little attention from Wittgenstein scholars. The articles discuss why Wittgenstein wrote so intensively about colour during the last years of his life andwhat significance these remarks have for understanding his philosophical work in general.".

Social robots are increasingly developed for the companionship of children. In this article we explore the moral implications of children-robot friendships using the Aristotelian framework of virtue ethics. We adopt a moderate position and argue that, although robots cannot be virtue friends, they can nonetheless enable children to exercise ethical and intellectual virtues. The Aristotelian requirements for true friendship apply only partly to children: unlike adults, children relate to friendship as an educational play of exploration, which is constitutive of the (...) way they acquire and develop virtues. We highlight that there is a relevant difference between the way we evaluate adult-robot friendship compared to children-robot friendship, which is rooted in the difference in moral agency and moral responsibility that generate the asymmetries in the moral status ascribed to adults versus children. We look into the role played by imaginary companions (IC) and personified objects (PO) in children’s moral development and claim that robots, understood as Personified Robotic Objects (PROs), play a similar role with such fictional entities, enabling children to exercise affection, moral imagination and reasoning, thus contributing to their development as virtuous adults. Nonetheless, we argue that adequate use of robots for children’s moral development is conditioned by several requirements related to design, technology and moral responsibility. (shrink)

On the background of recent concerns regarding online education in times of pandemic and a growing pedagogical divide in terms of unequal access to skilled teachers, we consider it timely to open a debate surrounding the use of social robots in education fulfilling a role that is anchored in the institution of pedagogs in Antiquity and which was somewhat left aside from contemporary inquiries: the pedagogical role of supporting and complementing the teaching activity. We develop our conceptual philosophical contribution to (...) this debate around the following question: Is the use of social robots in primary and lower secondary education an intervention that can contribute positively to bridging the pedagogical divide? We offer a moderate-positive answer to this question within the normative framework of Aristotelian virtue ethics. Namely, we argue that social robots in the form of collaborative robots (cobots) can be co-designed as pedagogical enabling devices to provide support to children for acquiring intellectual virtues necessary in the educational process and thus contribute to solving part of the pedagogical divide. (shrink)

„Strategia noastră a fost de a gândi un text util pentru profesori, dar de a-l scrie mai ales pentru studenți. Etica este interesantă cu precădere atunci când pune în joc intuiții morale sau valori diferite și când ne confruntăm cu dileme în care decizia nu este evidentă, iar dezacordul este rezonabil. Prin urmare, am încercat să ne ferim pe cât a fost posibil de verdicte și de simpla enumerare a unor interdicții. Veți observa că, de cele mai multe ori, exercițiile (...) și temele de discuție nu au soluții impuse. Nu pentru că autorii manualului nu ar adera la anumite soluții (poate nu la aceleași!), ci pentru că ni s-a părut mult mai importantă conturarea problemelor. Dilemele și întrebările deschise generează dezbateri și prilejuiesc reflecție. Sentințele, pe de altă parte, tind să ucidă discuția și să prilejuiască mai curând reacții de îmbrățișare sau de respingere vehementă. Dacă vom ajunge, în comunitățile noastre profesionale și în societate, să vorbim mai mult unii cu alții și mai puțin unii la alții, vom fi făcut probabil un pas major în direcția corectă pentru dezvoltarea unei atitudini morale.” (Autorii). (shrink)