Vague Comparisons

Ratio 29 (4):357-377 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Some comparisons are hard. How should we think about such comparisons? According to John Broome, we should think about them in terms of vagueness. But the vagueness account has remained unpopular thus far. Here I try to bolster it by clarifying the notion of comparative vagueness that lies at its heart.

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-08-22

Downloads
982 (#7,118)

6 months
17 (#55,797)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Hard Choices.Ruth Chang - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (1):1-21.
Sorites On What Matters.Theron Pummer - 2022 - In Jeff McMahan, Timothy Campbell, Ketan Ramakrishnan & Jimmy Goodrich (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 498–523.
An Ignorance Account of Hard Choices.Daniel Villiger - 2022 - Res Philosophica 99 (3):321-337.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Vagueness: A Minimal Theory.Patrick Greenough - 2003 - Mind 112 (446):235-281.
Just What is Vagueness?Otávio Bueno & Mark Colyvan - 2012 - Ratio 25 (1):19-33.
Vagueness as Indeterminacy.Brian Weatherson - 2010 - In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
Propping Up the Collapsing Principle.Henrik Andersson - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):475-486.

Add more references