What is the fruit of a searching dialogue between faith and reason? This book collects theological and philosophical perspectives on the richness of the faith-reason dialogue, including examples from literature, continental and analytic philosophy, worship and liturgy, and radical approaches to issues of racism and prejudice. The authors strongly resist the temptations to either disregard the faith-reason dialogue or take it for granted. Through their explorations and reflections they open up new vistas and horizons on a topic more necessary than (...) ever. (shrink)

Where the old objectivity question asked, Objectivity or relativism: which side are you on?, the new one refuses this choice, seeking instead to bypass widely recognized problems with the conceptual framework that restricts the choices to these two. It asks, How can the notion of objectivity be updated and made useful for contemporary knowledge-seeking projects? One response to this question is the strong objectivity program that draws on feminist standpoint epistemology to provide a kind of logic of discovery for maximizing (...) our ability to block might makes right in the sciences. It does so by delinking the neutrality ideal from standards for maximizing objectivity, since neutrality is now widely recognized as not only not necessary, not only not helpful, but, worst of all, an obstacle to maximizing objectivity when knowledge-distorting interests and values have constituted a research project. Strong objectivity provides a method for correcting this kind of situation. However, standpoint approaches have their own limitations which are quite different from the misreadings of them upon which most critics have tended to focus. Unfortunately, historically limited epistemologies and philosophies of science are all we get to choose from at this moment in history. (shrink)

This collection of essays, first published two decades ago, presents central feminist critiques and analyses of natural and social sciences and their philosophies. Unfortunately, in spite of the brilliant body of research and scholarship in these fields in subsequent decades, the insights of these essays remain as timely now as they were then: philosophy and the sciences still presume kinds of social innocence to which they are not entitled. The essays focus on Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Marx; on (...) the 'adversary method' model of philosophic reasoning; on principles of individuation on philosophical ontology and philosophy of language; on individualistic assumptions in psychology; functionalism in sociological and biological theory; evolutionary theory; the methodology of political science; and conceptions of objective inquiry in the sciences. In taking insights of both Liberal and Marxian women's movements into the purportedly most abstract and value-free areas of Western thought, these essays chart sexist and androcentric assumptions, claims and practices in the cognitive, technical cores of Western sciences and their philosophies. They begin to identify the distinctive aspects of women's experiences and locations in male-supremacist social structures which can provide resources needed for the creation of post-androcentric thinking in research, scholarship, and public policy. Such uses of feminist insights remain controversial today, and even among some feminists. These authors were all junior researchers and scholars two decades ago; today many are among the most distinguished senior scholars in their fields. Their work here provides a splendid opportunity for upper-level undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy and the social sciences to explore some of the most intriguing and controversial challenges to disciplinary projects and to public policy today. (shrink)

Drawing on J. L. Austin and the later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, she argues for the solution provided by ordinary language philosophy—a philosophy that trusts and utilizes the everyday use of language and the clarity of meaning it ...

: Feminist standpoint theory remains highly controversial: it is widely advocated, used to guide research and justify its results, and yet is also vigorously denounced. This essay argues that three such sites of controversy reveal the value of engaging with standpoint theory as a way of reflecting on and debating some of the most anxiety-producing issues in contemporary Western intellectual and political life. Engaging with standpoint theory enables a socially relevant philosophy of science.

SummaryPhilosophic questions about the adequacy of our prevailing Western conceptions of rationality have emerged from the growing recognition that one cannot simply “add women” as objects of knowledge to the existing bodies of our social and natural knowledge. Recent research in psychology and in moral development theory suggests that our understandings of the rationality of human activity are distorted and obscured by systematically identifying as universally desireable, as Human goals, conceptions of the self, others, and the appropriate relationships between the (...) two which are distinctively masculine. The essay suggests some implications of these research findings for the ways philosophers think about “the problems of philosophy”, moral theory, the role of formality and abstractness, and the “rational reconstructions” of the history of science.RésuméDes questions philosophiques se sont posées, a propos de ľadéquation de nos conceptions occidentales courantes de la rationalité, du fait de la reconnaissance qu'on ne peut pas simplement ajouter les femmes comme objets de connaissance aux corpus existants de notre connais‐sance sociale et naturelle. Des recherches récentes en psychologie et en théorie du développement moral suggèrent que notre comprèhension de la rationalité de ľactivité humaine est déformee et obscurcie par une identification systématique, comme universellement désirables, comme buts de ľhumanité, des conceptions de soi, des autres et des relations entre les deux qui sont distincte‐ment masculines. Cet essai suggère quelques applications de ces resultats de recherche quant à la maniere dont les philosophes pensent les problèmes de la philosophies la morale, le rôle du formel et de ľabstrait et les reconstuctions rationnelles de ľhistoire de la science.ZusammenfassungPhilosophische Fragen ïber die Angemessenheit unserer vorherrschenden Auffassungen von Rationalität im Westen sind durch die wachsende Einsicht entstanden, dass man nicht einfach Frauen als Objekte dem bestehenden Korpus unserer Sozial‐ und Naturwissenschaften hinzufügen kann. Neuere Forschungen in Psychologie und Theorien der moralischen Entwicklung legen nahe, dass unser Verstandnis der Rationalität von menschlichen Handlungen dadurch verzerrl und verdunkelt wird, dass systematische Auffassungen vom Selbst, den andern und den unter ihnen angebrachten Beziehungen als allgemein wünschbare Ziele anerkannt werden, die spezi‐fisch männlich sind. Es werden einige Implikationen dieser Forschungen t'iir die Art, wie Philoso‐phen über die Probleme der Philosophie denken, aufgezeigt – u.a. in bezug auf die Theorie der Moral, die Rolle der Formalisierung und Abstraktion, und die rationalen Rekonstruktionen der Geschichte der Wissenschaft. (shrink)

Some have suggested that Jon Stewart of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (TDS) and Stephen Colbert of The Colbert Report (TCR) represent a new kind of journalist. We propose, rather, that Stewart and Colbert are imitators who do not fully inhabit the role of journalist. They are interesting because sometimes they do a better job performing the functions of journalism than journalists themselves. However, Stewart and Colbert do not share journalists' moral commitments. Therefore, their performances are neither motivated nor (...) constrained by these commitments. Using a virtue theory framework, we suggest that this distinction between journalists and their imitators is morally significant because it implies differences in the kinds of excellence these moral agents are pursuing in their work. Rather than evaluating the work of Colbert and Stewart in the role of journalists, we propose analyzing their contributions to media ethics in the role of media critics. (shrink)

This argument has emphasized the professional character of Darwin's early activities, largely in order to balance the usual portrayal of the amateurishness of his early training and field of study. Arguing this way has revealed the interplay between Darwin's personal interests and his professional obligations, the latter being particularly important for the period from October 1836 to July 1837. In several instances, notably the treatment of his collections, the progress of his thought followed the professional lead directly. In the absence (...) of such a lead Darwin did not pursue certain issues, if only for lack of time. Thus the subject of man did not figure in his initial formulation of a transmutationist position. Only after the commitment to the new point of view had been made did the issues emerge which will be treated in Part II of this article. However, we may close by noting Darwin's inherited disposition on the subject: in the summer of 1837 Darwin responded to Lyell's claim that the change from irrational animal to rational man represented “a phenomenon of a distinct kind from the passage from the more simple to the more perfect forms of animal organization and instinct” with a fanciful doodle in the margin.121 The thoughts behind the bemused scribbling were to occupy a good portion of Darwin's time for the next two years. (shrink)

The "Darwinian revolution" remains an acceptable phrase to describe the change in thought brought about by the theory of evolution, provided that the revolution is seen as occurring over an extended period of time. The decades from the 1790s through the 1850s are at the focus of this article. Emphasis is placed on the issue of species extinction and on generational shifts in opinion.

A continuing concern of many feminists and non-feminists alike has been to identify a distinctive feminist method of inquiry. This essay argues that this method question is misguided and should be abandoned. In doing so it takes up the distinctions between and relationships among methods, methodologies and epistemologies; proposes that the concern to identify sources of the power of feminist analyses motivates the method question; and suggests how to pursue this project.

Let Mn♯ denote the minimal active iterable extender model which has n Woodin cardinals and contains all reals, if it exists, in which case we denote by Mn the class-sized model obtained by iterating the topmost measure of Mn class-many times. We characterize the sets of reals which are Σ1-definable from R over Mn, under the assumption that projective games on reals are determined:1. for even n, Σ1Mn=⅁RΠn+11;2. for odd n, Σ1Mn=⅁RΣn+11.This generalizes a theorem of Martin and Steel for L, (...) that is, the case n=0. As consequences of the proof, we see that determinacy of all projective games with moves in R is equivalent to the statement that Mn♯ exists for all n∈N, and that determinacy of all projective games of length ω2 with moves in N is equivalent to the statement that Mn♯ exists and satisfies AD for all n∈N. (shrink)

By combining a flanker task and a cuing task into a single paradigm, the authors assessed the effects of orienting and alerting on conflict resolution and explored how normal aging and Alzheimer’s disease (AD) modulate these attentional functions. Orienting failed to enhance conflict resolution; alerting was most beneficial for trials without conflict, as if acting on response criterion rather than on information processing. Alerting cues were most effective in the older groups— healthy aging and AD. Conflict resolution was impaired only (...) in AD. Orienting remained unchanged across groups. These findings provide evidence of different life span developmental and clinical trajectories for each attentional network. (shrink)

English summary: Through the concept of the ordinary, and what is ordinary, the present volume explores contemporary American philosophy. More specifically, the author presents Stanley Cavells role at the center of this movement to examine its innovative approach to philosophy, one that draws on what we have at hand, but also seeks to discover and invent. French description: Savons-nous vraiment ce qu'est l'ordinaire, ce qui nous est ordinaire? Penser la philosophie americaine, et le role qu'a son coeur joue Stanley Cavell, (...) signifie poser de nouveau ces questions, afin de mettre en evidence une nouvelle voix ou tradition contemporaine qui, a partir du langage ordinaire, parvient a redonner de la vie a des enjeux philosophiques devenus trop conformistes ou etroits, et a rearticuler les questions de langage (ordinaire) au moral et a l'esthetique, comme au politique. A la fois objet de rejet et de fascination, l'ordinaire est comme l'autre de la philosophie, ce qu'elle veut, dans son arrogance, depasser, mais aussi ce vers quoi elle aspire, nostalgiquement, a retourner. Penser la philosophie americaine signifie repenser l'ordinaire en dehors de ces deux tendances: recommencer la philosophie, non pas a zero, mais avec ce qu'on a sous la main, sous les yeux, et qui reste a decouvrir, ou a inventer. (shrink)

C a s e studies have a wide variety of uses in ethics courses,from increasing ethical sensitivity to developing moral reasoning skills. This article focuses on ways to avoid 2 potential pitfalls of using typical case studies: lack of theoretical background and lackof suficient detail. Thefirst part explains how a personal ethics experience can be discussed as early as thefirst day of class in a way that sets the tone and expectations of an ethics course despite students' lack of exposure (...) to ethical principles. Second, is an explanation of how a film can be used as an extended case that is rich enough in detail to sustain discussions about ethical theory over several weeks. (shrink)

Two themes in postcolonial science studies pose unusual challenges for philosophers of science. According to these accounts, the cognitive/technical core of Western sciences, not just their technologies, applications, and social institutions, is permeated by distinctive cultural and political commitments. In this sense, Western sciences are "ethnosciences." Moreover, these analysts want to delink their societies' scientific and technological projects from the West's in order to develop fully modern sciences within their own culturally distinctive scientific traditions. This paper suggests some fruitful ways (...) Western philosophers can take advantage of this opportunity to construct theories of science for Westerners that can interact more realistically and fruitfully with these postcolonial accounts. (shrink)

Carnap reports that while all of the members of the Vienna Circle "were strongly interested in social and political progress," except for Neurath, they all insisted that the "intrusion" of political points of view into the methodology of science would violate the purity of scientific method. In opposition to this still dominant view of the relationship between moral/political values and objective inquiry, this paper specifies four ways in which certain moral/political values are necessary for maximizing objective inquiry in social science. (...) If this argument is correct, a better conception of objectivity is needed. (shrink)

As suggested by David E. Boeyink, casuistry is a promising method for making ethical decisions in journalism because its “case-oriented strategy fits [the] general approach” of many journalists while its stress on consistency guards against arbitrariness. Despite its emphasis on consistency, however, casuistry gives self-interested decision makers enough wiggle room to rationalize whatever is expedient. For this reason, casuistry relies also on character. Yet writers who have studied casuistry have said relatively little about the link between character and casuistry and, (...) when they have, they have focused on the intellectual virtue of phronesis. This article articulates the essential moral virtues necessary to prevent arbitrariness in casuistry when practiced by journalists and demonstrates their relevance in relation to a recent case in which the journalist’s character was a key factor. The article concludes with several strategies for nurturing good character among journalists. (shrink)

This issue of Business & Society contains the transcripts of 12 oral history interviews with founders of and early contributors to the business and society/social issues in management field. The publication of these interviews is the culmination of a very long-term project, with the first interview having been conducted in 1993 with Lee Preston and the most recent interview having been conducted in 2011 with Jim Post. This project has been very much of a team effort with Sandra Waddock, (...) John Steiner, Mary Mallott, Ariane Berthoin Antal, and, of course, our interviewees all playing important roles. (shrink)

Attribution theory is used as a conceptual framework for examining how causal beliefs about peer harassment influence how victims think and feel about themselves. Evidence is presented that victims who make characterological self-blaming attributions are particularly at risk of negative self-views. Also examined is the influence of social context, particularly the ethnic composition of schools and classrooms. It was found that students who were both victims of harassment and members of the majority ethnic group were more vulnerable to self-blaming attributions. (...) In contrast, greater ethnic diversity, that is, classrooms where no one group was in the majority, tended to ward off self-blaming tendencies. Studies of peer harassment are a good context for examining one of the main themes of the special issue, which is how the social context influences the way individuals think and feel about themselves. (shrink)

Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud provided powerful accounts of systematic interested ignorance. Fifty years ago, Anglo-American philosophies of science stigmatized Marx's and Freud's analyses as models of irrationality. They remain disvalued today, at a time when virtually all other humanities and social science disciplines have returned to extract valuable insights from them. Here the argument is that there are reasons distinctive to philosophy why such theories were especially disvalued then and why they remain so today. However, there are even better (...) reasons today for philosophy to break from this history and find more fruitful ways to engage with systematic interested ignorance. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone indagar acerca de la distinción entre el Decir y lo Dicho en la obra de Emmanuel Levinas. Esta distinción sirve a Levinas para proponer una comprensión ética del lenguaje, en la que la significación y la expresión sean capaces de superar las limitaciones y determinaciones del lenguaje sistemático de la ontología, del ser y las esencias. Sobre la base de que el “lenguaje de la ontología” es impertinente para comprender, expresar o comunicar esa “experiencia ética” fundamental (...) del encuentro “cara a cara” con el Rostro del Otro: la experiencia misma de la significancia misma, Levinas propone una comprensión pre-ontológica del lenguaje. Esta comprensión pre-ontológica sería capaz de dar respuesta a las siguientes preguntas: ¿Cuál es el lenguaje, la palabra propia, de ese sujeto pasivo, de ese sujeto que es rehén del Otro , que está sujeto a él? ¿Cuál es el lenguaje del dar-se, qué palabra puede hacerse cargo de lo que es siempre in-apropiable? ¿Cómo será ese lenguaje que intenta decir lo otro del ser, ese lenguaje capaz de “traducir” la significancia que se da en la experiencia ética originaria, aquella en la que la “unicidad insustituible de una persona se expone a otra persona”? En este sentido, proponemos que el Decir es, con respecto a lo dicho, su tener-lugar, la posibilidad misma de comunicación y expresión, en la que se expone la condición pasiva del sujeto. Por otra parte, en la medida en que el Decir es la expresión de la significancia que adviene en la proximidad con el Otro, el Decir es siempre testimonial.This text proposes an inquiry regarding the distinction between the Saying and the Said in Emmanuel Levinas works. Levinas uses this distinction to propose an ethical understanding of language, where significance and expression are capable of overcoming the limitations of ontology`s systematic language, of the being, and the essences. On the basis of that “the language of ontology” is impertinent to understand, express, or communicate this “ethical experience” fundamental for the “face to face encounter” with the Face of the Other: the experience of significance itself, Levinas proposes a pre-ontologic understanding of language. This pre-ontologic understanding would be capable of answering the following questions: What is the language, the word itself of that passive subject, that subject who is a hostage of the Other who is attached to him? Which is the language of giving oneself, which word can take charge of what is always non appropriable? What kind of language will it be that tries to say the other of the being, that language able to “translate” the significance given in the original ethical experience, that where the “irreplaceable uniqueness of a person is being exposed to another person”? In this respect, we propose that the Saying is, regarding the said, its having-occurred, the possibility itself of communicating and expressing, where the passive condition of the subject is exposed. On the other hand, in the measure that the Saying is the expression of the significance which occurs in the proximity with the Other, the Saying is always testimonial. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Coward Conscience and Bad Conscience in Shakespeare and NietzscheSandra BonettoGeorge Bernard Shaw once observed that the whole of Nietzsche was expressed in three lines that Shakespeare puts into the mouth of one of his greatest villains, Richard III 1 : "Conscience is but a word that cowards use / Devised at first to keep the strong in awe / Our strong arms be our conscience; swords, our law" (5.6). (...) More specifically, perhaps, these lines invite a comparison between Shakespeare's repeated association of conscience with cowardice in Richard III, 2 and Nietzsche's negative evaluation of bad conscience, notably in On the Genealogy of Morals. 3 The aim of this article is to offer such a comparative analysis in order to demonstrate that Shakespeare's coward conscience anticipates Nietzsche's understanding of the bad conscience (das schlechte Gewissen) as "the consciousness of guilt" (GM, II, p. 67), including its involvement with the notions of debt, sin, punishment, and God.INietzsche devoted the Second Essay of his Genealogy to the discussion of bad conscience, its origins, and related matters, notably guilt (Schuld) and its relation to duty (Pflicht) and debt (Schuld). The German term Schuld denotes both guilt and debt, and both senses are inextricably linked in Nietzsche's analysis. The bad conscience as consciousness of guilt is also [End Page 512] the consciousness of a debt owed—to another individual, society, and above all to the Christian God. The debt owed to God is one that can never be repaid, so that Christian morality necessitates guilt as "eternal punishment" for man's original transgression (see GM, II, pp. 91–92). Thus, Nietzsche argues, the descriptive equivalent of bad conscience, in the language of Christianity, is sin—"this is the priestly name for the... bad conscience" (GM, III, p. 140). In other words, sin is essentially a debt contracted with God. This is evident, for instance, in the substitution of the word "sin" for "debt" (ophéilema) in the formula of the Our Father as found in St. Luke. Even in the more general description, e.g. in the passage of St. Matthew where Jesus is explaining the implications of the petition "Forgive us or debts as we forgive our debtors," where the expressions paràptoma (fault, error) and armatia (aberration, failing, defect in relation to a norm or whole) are the more common terms used to denote sin, the sense of debt is implicit—we only accept our failure in relation to the Christian norm or whole if we accept that we "owe it to God" to live up to that norm in the first place. Moreover, the notion of debt brings with it the debtor's fear of failing to repay the creditor, so that a fear of punishment results from the sense of not living up to the contractual relationship with God.According to Nietzsche, the basis for the bad conscience and guilt, which he further defines as "anger directed against the self" (GM, I, p. 45), is cruelty, a natural human disposition that is displayed unabashedly in punishment. Bad conscience, he argues, is cruelty turned inward and essentially amounts to self-punishment or "psychical cruelty"—a form of subliminal suffering we impose on ourselves. Speaking of the "psychology of conscience," Nietzsche emphasises therefore that conscience "is not 'the voice of God in man'—it is rather the instinct of cruelty that turns back after it can no longer discharge itself externally" (GM, "A Polemic," p. 312). Bad conscience, or sin, is cruelty directed backwards, at oneself. In short, Nietzsche holds that the bad conscience, experienced by us as the "bite" or "sting" of conscience (morsus conscientiae; Gewissensbiss), results from the internalisation of instincts, notably the instincts to cruelty. Rather than acting on natural impulses, man has come to stifle and repress them: "Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction—all this turned against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of the "'bad conscience'" (GM, II, p.85).Anticipating Freud's theory of repression and pre-empting his psychological interpretation of conscience as superego (Über-Ich), Nietzsche argues, "all instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn [End Page 513... (shrink)

This article attempts to elucidate the ethical meaning behind the words ‘the ethics of self’ and ‘an ethical self’, particularly in the light of Noddings’ ‘ethical self’, in order to show the relevance of these terms to the practice of ethical caring. It examines the relationship that Noddings believes exists between one’s actual self and the vision one has of one’s ideal self. I attempt to draw out a meaning derived from the texts in which this concept has been captured, (...) while at the same time juxtaposing the concept ‘ethic of care’ from my own research, together with the meaning given by philosophers Peta Bowden, Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil, who have written on the subject, albeit indirectly in some instances. A participant in a colleague’s research on care and patient satisfaction used similar expressions, and gave the impetus for this article. (shrink)

This article argues that empathic listening deceives naive sources into thinking that they will be portrayed favorably in news stories. It suggests that a fair practice of interviewing obligates journalists to obtain informed consent from their sources in advance. Journalists may waive this obligation only when the personal integrity of sources is protected against the pragmatic calculations that tend to prevail in journalism ethics.

This essay examines the issue of questionably obtained information in journalism, defined as information obtained in violation of source expectations. The analysis combines Ross's theory of variable-weight duties and the case-based method of casuistry to specify the duties involved in journalist-source interaction and the sorts of circumstances that may justify weighting these duties differently. A three-part test is offered for determining when journalists have reasonable grounds for occasionally using questionably obtained information. These conservative guidelines for justifying exceptions guard against arbitrary (...) dismissal of legitimate source expectations. Meanwhile, several green light guidelines suggest strategies for preventing the problem of questionably obtained information. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein hat in seinem späten Werk »Philosophische Untersuchungen« die grammatische Beschreibung unserer lebensweltlichen Handlungen ins Zentrum seiner Überlegungen gestellt. Diese Abkehr von essentialistisch-aristotelischen Wesensdefinitionen in der Philosophie hat bis heute nichts von ihrer Sprengkraft verloren. Mit Habermas sind die »weltkonstituierenden Leistungen« im 20. Jahrhundert auf »grammatische Strukturen« übergegangen. Die Rede des Subjekts von sich selbst erscheint dann in einem neuen Licht: Es ist in einer grammatischen Weise verfasst, im Wissen um die ständige Veränderbarkeit jener Regelsysteme, die durch die Orientierung (...) an grammatischen Standards in die Praxis überführt und dort temporär stabilisiert werden. Erstmals beschreibt der Band die Kategorie der Grammatischen Subjektivität als Erweiterung des Referenzrahmens, innerhalb dessen Menschen von sich sprechen: im Blick auf Themen wie Wissen, Ethik, Politik, die Umstände der Moderne oder den Begriff des Cogito. (shrink)