This article analyses Ukraine’s language policies from 2002 to 2022 within a framework of liberalism, while avoiding making normative judgements or recommendations, updating the discussion raised in Kymlicka and Opalski’s Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? The analysis takes into consideration Ukraine’s present and historic position, including the challenge that postcolonial nation building can pose for achieving liberalism and linguistic justice. The paper focuses on three main areas of language policy: education, businesses and media, and assesses if they can be described (...) as liberal orthodox, pluralist or illiberal. The article begins by defining liberalism and illiberalism, discussing the context of Ukraine’s linguistic diversity and postcolonial context, before outlining the language situation until EuroMaidan. Then, the main issue of language policy in the areas of education, business and media is analysed, before considering whether Ukrainian language laws might be considered liberal or illiberal. Finally, potential future trajectories are outlined. (shrink)

Eleni Panagiotarakou | : The focus of this paper is on the “right to place” as a political theory of wild animal rights. Out of the debate between terrestrial cosmopolitans inspired by Kant and Arendt and rooted cosmopolitan animal right theorists, the right to place emerges from the fold of rooted cosmopolitanism in tandem with environmental and ecological principles. Contrary to terrestrial cosmopolitans—who favour extending citizenship rights to wild animals and advocate at the same time (...) large-scale humanitarian interventions and unrestricted geographical mobility—I argue that the well-being of wild animals is best served by the right to place theory on account of its sovereignty model. The right to place theory advocates human non-interference in wildlife communities, opposing even humanitarian interventions, which carry the risk of unintended consequences. The right to place theory, with its emphasis on territorial sovereignty, bases its opposition to unrestricted geographical mobility on two considerations: the non-generalist nature of many species and the potential for abuse via human encroachment. In a broader context, the advantage of the right to place theory lies in its implicit environmental demands: human population control and sustainable lifestyles. | : Le présent article porte principalement sur le « droit territorial » en tant que théorie politique des droits des animaux sauvages. Issu du débat entre théoriciens cosmopolitistes du droit animal, soit terrestres inspirés par Kant et Arendt, soit enracinés, le droit territorial trouve ses sources dans le cosmopolitisme enraciné qui va de concert avec certains principes environnementaux et écologiques. Contrairement aux cosmopolitistes terrestres, qui préconisent d’étendre les droits de citoyenneté aux animaux sauvages tout en défendant les interventions humanitaires à grande échelle et la mobilité géographique illimitée, j’estime que la théorie du droit territorial est davantage en mesure d’assurer le bien-être des animaux sauvages, grâce à son modèle basé sur la souveraineté. La théorie du droit territorial préconise la non-ingérence dans les communautés fauniques, allant jusqu’à s’opposer aux interventions humanitaires, qui risquent de provoquer des conséquences non désirées. Cette théorie, en mettant l’accent sur la souveraineté territoriale, base son opposition à la mobilité géographique illimitée sur deux considérations : le caractère non généraliste de bon nombre d’espèces, et le risque de mauvais traitements par empiètement humain. Dans un contexte plus large, l’intérêt de la théorie du droit territorial réside dans ses exigences environnementales implicites : le contrôle de la population humaine et l’adoption de modes de vie durables. (shrink)

The author considers the plausibility of granting a “right to place” as an entitlement of citizenship in a nation such as the United States. Such a right would afford people the capacity to live in the places they choose. To explore whether granting such a right is plausible, the author identifies and examines the salient barriers now preventing Americans from choosing their place communities. The final section suggests that these myriad barriers, while formidable, are not (...) insurmountable—a conclusion that, in turn, suggests that an RTP could be plausibly granted to Americans in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

One prominent argument in international law and religious thought for abolishing capital punishment is that it violates individuals’ right to life. Notably, this _right-to-life argument_ emerged from normative and legal frameworks that recognize deadly force against aggressors as justified when necessary to stop their unjust threat of grave harm. Can capital punishment be necessary in this sense—and thus justified defensive killing? If so, the right-to-life argument would have to admit certain exceptions where executions are justified. Drawing on work (...) by Hugo Bedau, I identify a thought experiment where executions are justified defensive killing but explain why they cannot be in our world. A state’s obligations to its prisoners include the _obligation to use nonlethal incapacitation_ (ONI), which applies as long as prisoners pose no imminent threat. ONI precludes executions for reasons of future dangerousness. By subjecting the right-to-life argument to closer scrutiny, this article ultimately places it on firmer ground. (shrink)

In this paper the author focuses on Australian land management and in particular on the environmental management issues that could have been prompted by the High Court recognition in 1996 (in Wik Peoples v. The State of Queensland) that native title to land and pastoral leaseholdings can co‐exist. Drawing on themes of self‐determination and co‐existence, the paper looks at more specific topics such as aboriginal title to land—what has been called land rights or native title in Australia—and some implications of (...) that for land, sea and resource management. Central to this analysis are competing theories of Aboriginal land management and links between Aboriginal traditional knowledge and conservation of species. These are illustrated through the marine mammal, the dugong. The Australian debates lead to the Canadian debates and then to Scandinavia and the role of the Sami people in protection and management of the Arctic region. Issues of indigenous self determination inevitably provide an overall theme to these discussions. As a matter of global concern, the paper asks, but does not decide, whether indigenous peoples may manage fragile eco‐systems more effectively than outsiders. It maintains that what is important in this context is a broader question. This concerns how culturally inclusive land and resource management can emerge from recognition of indigenous land and human rights and how comparative developments can provide crucial cross‐jurisdictional information for future developments and opportunities in the interests of environmental conservation. (shrink)

This article is an exploration of the social phenomenon of the coloniality of being and universal desires. It examines how coloniality became ingrained in a new form of global consciousness of capitalist aesthetics of consumption, and how from the convergence of globalized electronic capitalism, pervasive global advertisement and consumerism, universal desires were created for a colonized global audience. Many questions arise on agency, citizenship, territoriality and rights of these global audiences. In this global landscape, place making and the (...) class='Hi'>right to the city have to be questioned from a new global perspective of coloniality, race and gender, not from the usual perspective of subaltern groups, but from within the centre of Euro-American Eurocentric society. (shrink)

Against pronouncements of the recent demise of both democracy and the political, I maintain that there is, rather, something amiss with the process of politicization in which social grievances are translated into matters of political concern and become objects of policy-making. I therefore propose to seek an antidote to the de-politicizing tendencies of our age by reanimating the mechanism that transmits social conflicts and grievances into politics. To that purpose, I formulate the notion of a ‘fundamental right to politics’ (...) as the opposite of the techne of policy-making. I articulate this right via a reconstruction of the logical presuppositions of democracy as collective self-authorship. I then recast the concept of non-domination by discerning two trajectories of domination – ‘relational’ and ‘systemic’ ones, to argue that in a viable democracy that makes full use of the right to politics, the dynamics of politicization should take place along both trajectories; currently, however, matters of systemic injustice get translated in relational terms and politicized as concerns for inclusion into and distribution within the existing system of social relations, rather than its radical overhaul. (shrink)

Against pronouncements of the recent demise of both democracy and the political, I maintain that there is, rather, something amiss with the process of politicization in which social grievances are translated into matters of political concern and become objects of policy-making. I therefore propose to seek an antidote to the de-politicizing tendencies of our age by reanimating the mechanism that transmits social conflicts and grievances into politics. To that purpose, I formulate the notion of a ‘fundamental right to politics’ (...) as the opposite of the techne of policy-making. I articulate this right via a reconstruction of the logical presuppositions of democracy as collective self-authorship. I then recast the concept of non-domination by discerning two trajectories of domination – ‘relational’ and ‘systemic’ ones, to argue that in a viable democracy that makes full use of the right to politics, the dynamics of politicization should take place along both trajectories; currently, however, matters of systemic injustice get translated in relational terms and politicized as concerns for inclusion into and distribution within the existing system of social relations, rather than its radical overhaul. (shrink)

This paper addresses whether the often-bemoaned loss of unity of knowledge about humans, which results from the disciplinary fragmentation of science, is something to be overcome. The fragmentation of being human rests on a couple of distinctions, such as the nature-culture divide. Since antiquity the distinction between nature (roughly, what we inherit biologically) and culture (roughly, what is acquired by social interaction) has been a commonplace in science and society. Recently, the nature/culture divide has come under attack in various ways, (...) in philosophy as well as in cultural anthropology. Regarding the latter, for instance, the divide was quintessential in its beginnings as an academic dis-cipline, when Alfred L. Kroeber, one of the first professional anthropologists in the US, rallied for (what I call) the right to ignore—in his case, human nature—by adopting a separationist epistemic stance. A separationist stance will be understood as an epistemic research heuristic that defends the right to ignore a specif-ic phenomenon (e.g., human nature) or a specific causal factor in an explanation typical for a disciplinary field. I will use Kroeber’s case as an example for making a general point against a bias towards integration (synthesis bias, as I call it) that is exemplified, for instance, by defenders of evolutionary psychology. I will claim that, in principle, a separationist stance is as good as an integrationist stance since both can be equally fruitful. With this argument from fruitful sepa-ration in place, not just the separationist stance but also the nature/culture di-vide can be defended against its critics. (shrink)

. Although the courts have ruled that companies are legal persons, they have not yet made clear the extent to which political free speech for corporations is limited by the strictures legitimately placed upon corporate commercial speech. I explore the question of whether or not companies can properly be said to have the right to civil free speech or whether corporate speech is always de facto commercial speech not subject to the same sorts of legal protections as is the (...) right to civil free speech. In the absence of clearly defined legal precedent, I emphasize moral reasons for determining the appropriate limits of corporate civil free speech. Appealing to arguments typically used to justify individual rights to civil free speech, I examine the extent to which this sort of justification may or may not be legitimately extended to corporations. I conclude that corporate rights to civil free speech must be restricted because granting rights of free speech to institutions may, in practice, undermine the moral rationale and practical feasibility of guaranteeing rights of civil free speech to individuals. Furthermore, I argue that granting corporations full rights to civil free speech will undercut attempts to develop good moral character in corporate institutions by undermining the efforts of watchdog organizations. (shrink)

Labor rights are the first to come up for criticism when accounts of human rights are offered in response to philosophical questions about them, and notoriously so Article 24, which talks about `rest and leisure' and `period holidays with pay.' This study first tries to make it plausible why labor rights would appear on the Universal Declaration, and next articulates some philosophical objections to their presence there. The interesting question then is not so much how one could respond to the (...) objections, but to explore what commitments one needs to make to answer our question in a satisfactory manner. To make progress, we can contrast the idea of human rights with conceptions of them. Such conceptions offer answers to a set of philosophical questions about human rights. It would be rather unlikely for any such conception to emerge as the uniquely best philosophical account of human rights since disagreements among different conceptions are complex. What is sensible to ask then is what a conception of human rights would have to be like to count labor rights as human rights, and whether there is a conception of that sort. I offer one conception that I take to be plausible overall, and that does count labor rights as human rights. Or, that is: it does count a right to work as a human right, alas not in the strong interpretation according to which states must create jobs but in the weaker sense that states need to make sure people are not systematically excluded from employment, and are treated in certain ways at their place of work, and it does count a right to leisure as a human right, alas not a right to paid vacations. (shrink)

Property rights are integral part of the freedom and prosperity of every person, although their centrality has often been misprized and their provenance was doubted. Yet, traces of their origin can be found in Magna Carta, signed by the King of England in 1215. It was a turning point in human rights. Namely, it enumerates what later came to be thought of as human rights. Among them was also the right of all free citizens to own and inherit property. (...) The European Convention on Human Rights was heavily influenced by British legal traditions, including Magna Carta. Among other rights, it also guaranties the right to property as a human right. Moreover, the protection of property rights has been extended to intellectual property rights as well. Namely, the European Court of Human Rights has provided protection of intellectual property rights through the adoption of decisions that interpret the right to property, in relation to intellectual property protection claims. It has extended the human rights protection of property to the mere application for registration of the trade mark. This paper has placed its focus on the development and treatment of the right to property starting from Magna Carta to the European Convention on Human Rights, as modern version of Magna Carta. In this sense, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and its role and approach in the protection of the right to property will be examined as well. (shrink)

Modernity is marked by the advent of technologies capable of storing data almost indefi­nitely. On the other hand, the data collection takes place without the conscious permission of the users. The storage and collection of personal data is a potential problem, since the digital footprint of a person on the Internet has an impact on the social and political rep­resentation of the individual, its perception by other actors. Compromising the content of a digital footprint can expose information that is (...) not intended for others. There is cur­rently an increasing trend of misuse of stored data, both by criminals and by companies that use the data for sale or surveillance. The need to control how data is collected, stored and used leads to the emergence in the academic literature and the legal field of the “right to be forgotten”, which allows a person to actively moderate the process of collecting and storing data, to participate in determining the circle of those to whom they can be accessed, and delete personal data. The adoption of such a right not only allows the state to influence the collection and storage of data, regulating interactions through law-making activities, but also to realize the potential of an autonomous individual. The prospect of legislating the right to be forgotten has sparked debate in the academic and professional community about the destruction of the free marketplace of ideas and the imposition of political censor­ship on the Internet. The article deals with the philosophical, ethical and political founda­tions of the right to be forgotten. The article substantiates the conclusion that the right to be forgotten has a positive heuristic potential, but at the same time it has conceptual flaws, and is also not able to completely correct the current situation of data processing. However, the implementation of the right to be forgotten in the future can have a beneficial effect on the current situation in the field of collection and storage of personal data. (shrink)

OBJECTIVES: To analyse the attitudes of medical personnel towards terminally ill patients and their right to be fully informed. DESIGN: Self-administered questionnaire composed of 56 closed questions. SETTING: Three general hospitals and eleven health centres in Granada (Spain). The sample comprised 168 doctors and 207 nurses. RESULTS: A high percentage of medical personnel (24.1%) do not think that informing the terminally ill would help them face their illness with greater serenity. Eighty-four per cent think the patient's own home is (...) the best place to die: 8.9% of the subjects questioned state that the would not like to be informed of an incurable illness. CONCLUSION: In our opinion any information given should depend on the patient's personality, the stage of the illness and family circumstances. Our study confirms that a hospital is not the ideal environment for attending to the needs of the terminally ill and their families. (shrink)

People's “right to truth” or their “right to know” about their government's human rights abuses is a growing consensus in human rights discourses and a fertile area of work in international and humanitarian law. In most discussions of this right to know the truth, it is commonly seen as requiring the state or international institutions to provide access to evidence of the violations. In this paper, I argue that such a right naturally has many epistemic aspects, (...) and the tools of social epistemology can be helpful in elucidating what such a right entails. As a beginning for this project, I draw on those resources to argue that the right to know the truth is only meaningful if it includes a right to understand the abuses, and that such understanding can only come through the development of community epistemic capacities. Given this, I further argue that the state has a duty to support the development of these capacities, and that a critical place for beginning this process is in public schools. (shrink)

Many people believe that it is permissible for people who are suffering from terminal illnesses to commit suicide or even that such people have a right to commit suicide. Some have also argued that it follows that it is permissible for them, or that they have a right, to use the assistance of another person. First, I assume that it is permissible for a person to commit suicide and ask whether it follows that it is also permissible for (...) the person to employ an agent to assist in the death. Second, I assume that people have a right to commit suicide and ask whether it follows that the right holders have a right to employ an agent to assist with the death. I argue that the permissibility of suicide does not by itself entail the permissibility of employing someone to assist in the suicide. I also argue that the right to commit suicide does not by itself entail the right to assisted death. Instead, what follows is that there is a right not to have unreasonable restrictions placed on the means by which one can exercise one's right to commit suicide. Whether a restriction is reasonable depends on the conclusion reached when one has weighed a number of policy considerations. (shrink)

In recent developments in political and legal philosophy, there is a tendency to endorse minimalist lists of human rights which do not include a right to political participation. Against such tendencies, I shall argue that the right to political participation, understood as distinct from a right to democracy, should have a place even on minimalist lists. In addition, I shall defend the need to extend the right to political participation to include participation not just in (...) national, but also in international and global governance processes. The argument will be based on a cosmopolitan conception of political legitimacy and on a political conception of human rights that is normatively anchored in legitimacy. The central claim of my paper is that a right to political participation is necessary – but not sufficient – for political legitimacy in the global realm. (shrink)

This article sets out to describe how churches have responded and continue to respond to fast-changing urban environments in Pretoria Central and Mamelodi East, animating Henri Lefebvre’s sociological perspective of citadins or urban inhabitants. We make tentative interpretations and offer critical appreciation. Churches, which were historically separated from the city centre, now directly participate in claiming a right to the city. With necessary fluidity, churches express lived African urbanisms through informality, place-making, spatial innovation and everyday rituals. Though not (...) exhaustive, the article focuses on rituals shared among historic urban Christians and contemporary African urban Christians, namely prayer, listening to the Bible and worship. These rituals, when combined with the churches’ spatial innovation, to a certain degree contribute to place-making. (shrink)

The study of the place and role of religious education in the post-secular world is undoubtedly increasing. First of all, this is due to the loss of religion of its influence on modern society, the growth of globalization processes, and attempts to preserve national and cultural identity. At the same time, we are talking not only about the problems inherent in whole countries and peoples, but also about the right of an individual to his own worldview and moral (...) choice - freedom of conscience, and most importantly - the possibility of realizing this choice. (shrink)

This commentary examines the incursion on the neutrality of medical personnel now taking place as part of the human rights crises in Bahrain and Syria, and the ethical dilemmas which these incursions place not only in front of physicians practicing in those nations, but in front of the international community as a whole.In Bahrain, physicians have recently received harsh prison terms, apparently for treating demonstrators who clashed with government forces. In Syria, physicians are under the same political pressure (...) to avoid treating political demonstrators or to act as informants against their own patients, turning them in to government authorities. This pressure has been severe, to the point that some physicians have become complicit in the abuse of patients who were also political demonstrators.This paper posits that physicians in certain countries in the Middle East during the “Arab Spring,” specifically Syria and Bahrain, are being used as both political pawns and political weapons in clear violation of Geneva Convention and World Medical Association guidelines, and that this puts them into the most extreme sort of “dual loyalty” dilemma. They are being forced to choose between their own safety and well-being and that of their patients – a negative sum scenario wherein there is no optimal choice. As such, an international call for a United Nations inquiry must be made in order to protect the neutrality of medical care and personnel during times of armed conflict. (shrink)

Democratic theory offers robust resources in order to defend the claim that noncitizens are, in many cases, entitled to the right to vote in their place of residence, regardless of their citizenship. On this, Avner de Shalit and I are in broad agreement. But the route we take to justify this right rests on substantially different argumentation: whereas I believe that residence is necessary and sufficient to justify the right to vote at the municipal and, more (...) controversially, at the national level, de Shalit believes that noncitizens must also intend to reside in a city over the longer term in order to merit the right to vote on city matters. I will argue that this focus on intention is dangerous for the most vulnerable of city dwellers, who are most in need of the right to vote, even if only at the city level. In particular, I argue that the only way that the right to vote can play its protective role is if it is available to migrants on the basis of residence, regardless of their stated intention. (shrink)

Digital platform economy has radically changed the modes in which work is organized, stretching the functionality of legal environment of work and its governance. This article builds on a strand of labor law scholarship that advances the need to rethink the legal construction of work and work relationship in order to adapt it to the dynamically evolving socio-economic context. By applying a business and human rights lens to this process, this article confutes the mainstream argument that labor rights guarantees remain (...) contingent on an individual’s enjoying the status of an employee under national jurisdiction. We survey a largely underexamined conception of affording protection to platform workers under International Human Rights Law (IHRL). In doing so, we argue that the instruments of IHRL may in some respects be even better placed than that of national law, both strengthening and complementing areas where state protection is weak or non-existent. Through the right to just and favorable conditions of work perspective, we outline the non-contested, albeit partly poorly implemented obligations of states, as well as largely contentious and contested responsibilities of private actors such as digital platforms towards the rights-holders. We conclude by arguing that the leverage offered by IHRL in the struggle to curb a quasi-sovereign power of the platform largely outweighs the democratically motivated objections this avenue may raise. (shrink)

This article argues that hunger in Canada, while being an outcome of unemployment, low incomes, and inadequate welfare, springs also from the failure to recognize and implement the human right to food. Food security has, however, largely been ignored by progressive social policy analysis. Barriers standing in the way of achieving food security include the increasing commodification of welfare and the corporatization of food, the depoliticization of hunger by governments and the voluntary sector, and, most particularly, the neglect by (...) the federal and provincial governments of their obligations to guarantee the domestic right to food as expressed in international human rights law. The interconnectedness of hunger, welfare, and food security issues in a first world society are explored from the perspective of progressive social policy and food security analysis and the development of alternative strategies. In terms of advancing the human right to food in Canada, particular emphasis is placed on the role of the state and civil society, and the social and economic rights of citizenship built on an inclusive social policy analysis and politics of welfare, food security and human rights. (shrink)

Recent years have seen an increase in the turn to rights discourse within the context of access to health and specifically health care. Developments took place at both the national and global levels, with a significant increase in right to health litigation around the world1 and developments at the international level, such as the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health and the adoption of a “General Comment” on the topic by the UN Committee (...) on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (shrink)

Who has the right to be a full member of a nation-state? Inherited privileges, for reasons of birth or blood, as they are put forward by and, should force us to ask: Why is it that someone cannot become a full member of a society, even if she lives, works, and has her affective relations within the borders of that nation-state? As Ayelet Shachar underlines, the place of birth is fundamental in the assignment of political membership. The aim (...) of this article is to examine if we should get rid of the idea of citizenship or if we can just widen the concept in order to think a theory wide enough to include those who now are misrecognized. (shrink)

This article places the concept of "right to know," which is normally associated with law, in a moral framework. It outlines multiple meanings of the concept, emphasizing the institutional nature of "right to know." Then the article imbeds this understanding in moral thinking, including a discussion of the moral elements of rights, and applies that understanding in specific journalistic situations.

In 2008, the Minister of Health for Iceland issued a new regulation intended to govern assessment practices related to placement in nursing homes. One of the aims of the regulation was to ensure that those with the most severe need would have priority. This would be achieved, in part, by requiring older people to exhaust all available community‐based service options before an assessment for placement would even take place. The new regulation was received with some hostility and criticism on (...) the part of older people and their relatives, who described the changed expectations as ‘abandonment’ by the authorities. We present our analysis of these changes by examining how older people and families are reconfigured through the new policy and argue that this ‘new’ practice of de‐institutionalization is underpinned by a shifting epistemic and normative context that is working to create a new identity and a different way of life in advanced age in Iceland. The analysis has implications for other nations as well, as much policy related to older people is broadly informed by this idea that ‘home is best’, that is, the idea that more care simply needs to happen outside of institutional settings. (shrink)

Patients with the controversial diagnosis of body integrity identity disorder report an emotional discomfort with having a body part that they feel should not be there. This discomfort is so strong that it interferes with routine functioning and, in a majority of cases, BIID patients are motivated to seek amputation of the limb. Although patient requests to receive the best available treatment are generally respected, BIID demands for amputation, at present, are not. However, what little has been said in the (...) ethics literature on the subject tends to favour doing so in cases of BIID. The general argument is that BIID demands should be respected, first, because of the importance that is already placed on respecting autonomy in medical decision-making contexts and second, because of the potential harm of not providing amputation coupled with the fact that no alternative means of relieving suffering exists. The defence of the right to self-demanded amputation is thus typically supported by the use of analogies with other unproblematical cases in order to show that the denial of BIID patient demands is inconsistent with conventional medical norms and practices. This paper criticises the appropriateness of the particular analogies that are thought to shed light on the allegedly unproblematical nature of BIID demands and argues that a proper understanding of the respect for autonomy in the medical decision-making context prohibits agreeing to BIID demands for amputation. (shrink)

If a state with liberal political and justificatory commitments extends benefits of various kinds to persons forming families, what qualifications may such a state place on the right to access to those benefits? I will make two assumptions for the purposes of this paper. The first is the political and justificatory terrain of some form of political or otherwise non-perfectionist liberalism. The assumption is that we are considering the resources and limitations of a community of persons who accept (...) moral pluralism (if not a specific doctrine like the "burdens of judgment"), some priority for individual freedom, and the obligation to justify public coercion and exclusion in terms accessible and fair to all members of morally and culturally diverse society. The second is that it is justified for a liberal state to recognize some forms of domestic partnerships or families in the first place and extend further benefits to them such as tax credits or laws extending (or facilitating the extension of) medical or social insurance. It is, of course, possible to imagine the argument that the liberal state gets out of the marriage business by getting out of it entirely - by extending no recognition or positive rights to families whatsoever beyond negative non-interference rights. I am interested in the dilemma of a society broadly like existing liberal ones which is committed both to subsidizing families and also to justificatory neutrality (expressed in American constitutional legal terms as the requirement of providing a "rational basis" for unequal treatment). Given these assumptions, I believe that the most justifiable policy on liberal grounds is not the institution of "marriage" increasingly open to new constituent relationships but rather a status of "registered domestic partnership" which fulfills the social and moral aims behind subsidizing the family but is entirely neutral not only to the gender or even to the numbers of the partners, but also to the affective and emotional content of domestic life and the purposes behind contracting domestic partnerships. So is there a right to polygamy and incestuous marriage? There is not a specific right to either and thus there is no a priori reason why some restrictions or even prohibitions on them might not be justified, but the same is true for every specific act where a general right to the freedom exists. I argue in this paper, however, that the arguments compatible with public reason for prohibiting them outright, or even for excluding them from the permissible types of legally registered partnerships, are quite weak. I argue that objections to polygamy from (1) female autonomy, (2) damage to children, (3) fairness in the marital market, and (4) the unfair burdening of society are serious and worth refuting, but do not establish a victorious case against multi-member relationships. As to incest, there are two separate questions. The first is whether the new institution of "registered domestic partnerships" should be open to them. The answer to that, given the state's lack of interest in citizens' reasons for forming partnerships and in what they do whilst being registered in one, is clearly "yes." The second is whether, entirely separate from the issue of legal recognition of domestic partnership, the state has a legitimate rational interest in deterring, preventing or punishing consanguineous sexual relations between close blood relations (first-degree incest). Here, the objections to allowing such relations are those from (1) child abuse; (2) unfair burdening of society; and (3) the creation of bad lives. I argue that while rape and other forms of child abuse would be no more legal or tolerated than they are now, the concern about any form of weakening a society's legal and political resources to combat such abuses does indeed register on the justificatory scale, but does not prove that such first-degree incestuous sexual relations are inherently bad enough to warrant intervention. I then argue that the concern about unfairly burdening society with unhealthy persons is not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, but nor is it strong enough to justify an outright prohibition. Finally, I argue that a concern to dissuade persons from creating certain kinds of lives (children with extreme birth defects) is also not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, and in fact goes further towards explaining why we might have a legitimate interest in intervening. Nonetheless, I argue that the criminalization of such acts only make sense when they are indicators of other offenses, namely negligence or abuse, and it thus seems that the act of consanguineous reproduction is itself insufficient. (shrink)

On Borders asks when are borders legitimate, and it offers a new theory to answer the question. The book challenges critical and normative theories that criticize or justify borders solely in terms of identity, and instead frames borders and border legitimacy from the perspective of place and presence. Instead of thinking of borders as the exclusionary limit of identity groups, the book develops a theory of territorial jurisdictions grounded on place-specific relations, giving central roles to urban settings and (...) the environment. Paulina Ochoa Espejo calls this the "watershed model" of territorial rights and borders. (shrink)

Working from a concept of politics of education that encompasses legal,ethical and pedagogical levels of analysis, this paper presents theresults of a field work project on the meaning and current state of theright to education with a larger philosophical discourse. Talk ofeducation as a human right presupposes taking part in a horizon ofinterpretation. Projected is a view of person as a subject, i.e., assomeone not only placed in a specific context, but also as someone whois capable of distancing him/herself (...) from local and culturalconditioning. (shrink)

The article raises the issue of ‘the right to be ill’, formulated by Tadeusz Kielanowski, a Polish physician and humanist. According to him, the right to health should be supplemented by the principle which would serve the protection of people with diseases or disabilities. One-sided interpretation of ‘the right to health’ may result in various forms of intolerance and discrimination. This paper presents what dangers Kielanowski recognized and explains why his approach was considered to be a novelty; (...) what the idea of ‘the right to be ill’ is, how the need for it is substantiated. This idea is considered in the context of human rights and it constitutes a starting point for the reflection on social phenomena connected with medicine. Taking into account the changes in medical ethics and culture which have taken place in the recent decades the question has been asked—is it worth talking about the right to be ill these days? Giving positive answers to this question, the spheres and issues that have been presented can be analyzed and assessed from the perspective of the right to be ill. (shrink)

The organ transplantation enterprise is morally flawed. “Brain‐dead” donors are the primary source of solid vital organs, and the transplantation enterprise emphasizes that such donors are dead before organs are removed—or in other words that the dead donor rule is followed. However, individuals meeting standard diagnostic criteria for brain death—unresponsiveness, brainstem areflexia, and apnea—are still living, from a physiological perspective. Therefore, removing vital organs from a heart‐beating, mechanically ventilated donor is lethal. But neither donors nor surrogates nor the public in (...) general are typically informed of this obviously relevant information. Therefore, donors or surrogates do not provide valid consent for a lethal medical procedure. This is a serious moral failing on the part of the transplant community. To address this concern, I advocate for accurate and fully transparent communication of information to the public to allow for an informed civic dialogue about the ethics and legality of lethal organ procurement. Furthermore, I advocate that systems be put in place by the transplant community to allow for valid consent for lethal organ procurement. (shrink)

For over last 70 years, the concept of "return" attained primary focus for the national narrative of Palestinian struggle against devastating conditions, categorized as eviction from ancestral homeland, diffusion in all aspects and reconstitution of national unity. However, the very idea create fears among Israelis regarding their authority of whole Zionist enterprise, as well as demographic stability of Arab-Jewish ventures, with regards to the return of large number of Palestinians to their own places or any other part in Palestine. Discrimination (...) in opposition to Palestinians is no longer perpetrated fully by Israeli state, but common to its society, as well. Our article is an answer to the complicated question: Can refugees along with other displaced victims ever claim their right in entering Israel and Palestine, since this State includes Gaza and West Bank territories? Various articles have made an attempt to clarify the matter through some internal laws and have also interpreted the rights mentioned in ‘International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights’, particularly while clarifying the idea evolved from the typical term: 'his own country’. The article focuses on the viable first point, specifically on the claim as a right of the Diasporas return to the formerly called ‘Palestine’. Various resources are utilised for the purpose of the research. This includes books, scholarly researched articles and newspapers etc. The study is analytical in nature and based on qualitative research method. Most of the literature used for the article is Secondary. The conclusion drawn in precise manner is that the intentions are blended in repeated violations of human rights, along with ethnic and religious refining and various innumerable deficiencies, and try to become regularly involved in sensitive issues. This turned out to be disheartening for the people living there as no efforts are made for a truthful resolution. (shrink)

Patients sometimes request procedures their doctors find morally objectionable. Do doctors have a right of conscientious refusal? I argue that conscientious refusal is justified only if the doctor's refusal does not make the patient worse off than she would have been had she gone to another doctor in the first place. From this approach I derive conclusions about the duty to refer and facilitate transfer, whether doctors may provide 'moral counseling,' whether doctors are obligated to provide objectionable procedures (...) when no other doctor is available, why the moral consensus among doctors seems relevant even though it does not determine whether something is morally acceptable, and whether doctors should stay out of fields whose standard procedures they find morally unacceptable. (shrink)

This article is concerned with exploring the idea of places as providing persons with nourishment. This version of person–place relations is displayed in a paper by McHugh and, in provocative fashion, in Michel Serres’s analysis of the human condition as a parasitic one. Unlike McHugh, Serres combines his analysis of parasites with a concern that principled actors may be insufficiently attached to places. His views are revealed in his interpretations of works by Molière and Plato. By reinterpreting these works, (...) I try to suggest that Serres’s well-founded scepticism as to the level of commitment of principled actors to the places that, as he rightly points out, are nourishing them, may not apply to the sub-set of principled actors who deserve to be called particular. (shrink)

The isolation of the Netherlands as the only country in which voluntary euthanasia is legal is about to end. In October 2001 the Belgian Senate voted by almost a 2:1 margin to allow doctors to act on a patient's request for assistance in dying. The legislation is expected to pass the lower house shortly. That the Netherlands' closest neighbor is likely to be the next country to take this step should provide food for thought among those who have denounced voluntary (...) euthanasia in the Netherlands as rife with abuses. If that were really the case, why would the country that is better placed than all others to know what goes on in the Netherlands – not only because of its geographical proximity, but because most of its people are Dutch-speaking – be ready to copy the Dutch model? (shrink)

The isolation of the Netherlands as the only country in which voluntary euthanasia is legal is about to end. In October 2001 the Belgian Senate voted by almost a 2:1 margin to allow doctors to act on a patient's request for assistance in dying. The legislation is expected to pass the lower house shortly. That the Netherlands' closest neighbor is likely to be the next country to take this step should provide food for thought among those who have denounced voluntary (...) euthanasia in the Netherlands as rife with abuses. If that were really the case, why would the country that is better placed than all others to know what goes on in the Netherlands – not only because of its geographical proximity, but because most of its people are Dutch-speaking – be ready to copy the Dutch model? (shrink)

This paper examines the ways that feminists have built on and transformed Mary Wollstonecraft’s Enlightenment idea that women’s rights are human rights. It argues that Wollstonecraft’s marginal attention to the issue of sexual violence reflects the mind-body dualism of her era where reason divorced from the body established our dignity as persons. Today’s feminists reject this dualism. They have adopted and retooled Wollstonecraft’s idea that women’s rights are human rights to (1) create solidarity among women of different places, races, classes, (...) religions etc., (2) break the silence surrounding the experience and meaning of rape, and (3) create grassroots, national and international forums that expose the fact that sexual violence is one of the crucial anchors of patriarchy. Wollstonecraft believed that human rights were guaranteed by reason and God. We find that these rights are embodied and fragile. They depend on us to make them real. Addressing this responsibility, the paper ends with a question: Are we up to the task? (shrink)

This article is an analysis of the relationship between US hospice structure and the feeling of being a burden to others (FBO). A goal of US hospice care is to reduce the FBO. But in America, hospice is limited in its ability to do so because of the high caregiver burden it places on family members of dying people. Through a historical study, I show that this burden was excessive when the hospice system was created and has worsened over time. (...) Through three ethnographic vignettes, I demonstrate how this burden inculcates in dying people the FBO. I then examine the bioethical implications of this finding for the existing US debate about physician-assisted suicide (PAS). The presence of FBO due to insufficient hospice care supports arguments made by PAS opponents about the social pressure placed on dying people. This finding is not itself sufficient to resolve the “right to die” debate. But it provides the ground for a compromise, across the debate, to reduce the FBO by changing US hospice structure. The resulting consensus will further the goals of both PAS proponents and opponents. (shrink)

This article is an analysis of the relationship between US hospice structure and the feeling of being a burden to others. A goal of US hospice care is to reduce the FBO. But in America, hospice is limited in its ability to do so because of the high caregiver burden it places on family members of dying people. Through a historical study, I show that this burden was excessive when the hospice system was created and has worsened over time. Through (...) three ethnographic vignettes, I demonstrate how this burden inculcates in dying people the FBO. I then examine the bioethical implications of this finding for the existing US debate about physician-assisted suicide. The presence of FBO due to insufficient hospice care supports arguments made by PAS opponents about the social pressure placed on dying people. This finding is not itself sufficient to resolve the “right to die” debate. But it provides the ground for a compromise, across the debate, to reduce the FBO by changing US hospice structure. The resulting consensus will further the goals of both PAS proponents and opponents. (shrink)

This article is an analysis of the relationship between US hospice structure and the feeling of being a burden to others. A goal of US hospice care is to reduce the FBO. But in America, hospice is limited in its ability to do so because of the high caregiver burden it places on family members of dying people. Through a historical study, I show that this burden was excessive when the hospice system was created and has worsened over time. Through (...) three ethnographic vignettes, I demonstrate how this burden inculcates in dying people the FBO. I then examine the bioethical implications of this finding for the existing US debate about physician-assisted suicide. The presence of FBO due to insufficient hospice care supports arguments made by PAS opponents about the social pressure placed on dying people. This finding is not itself sufficient to resolve the “right to die” debate. But it provides the ground for a compromise, across the debate, to reduce the FBO by changing US hospice structure. The resulting consensus will further the goals of both PAS proponents and opponents. (shrink)

This article is an analysis of the relationship between US hospice structure and the feeling of being a burden to others. A goal of US hospice care is to reduce the FBO. But in America, hospice is limited in its ability to do so because of the high caregiver burden it places on family members of dying people. Through a historical study, I show that this burden was excessive when the hospice system was created and has worsened over time. Through (...) three ethnographic vignettes, I demonstrate how this burden inculcates in dying people the FBO. I then examine the bioethical implications of this finding for the existing US debate about physician-assisted suicide. The presence of FBO due to insufficient hospice care supports arguments made by PAS opponents about the social pressure placed on dying people. This finding is not itself sufficient to resolve the “right to die” debate. But it provides the ground for a compromise, across the debate, to reduce the FBO by changing US hospice structure. The resulting consensus will further the goals of both PAS proponents and opponents. (shrink)

This article explores the very limited cases historically in the twentieth century when human rights was used in American policy debate as a defending principle for the provision of government-guaranteed universal healthcare. It discusses these cases and examines various reasons as to why this is so, noting the major emphasis in American political culture on negative rather than positive liberty. It examines the shift in political culture from the Roosevelt, Truman, and Johnson eras that embraced social and economic rights and (...) defined them as such to the post-Reagan era when conservative ideologies were ascendant. These ideologies reject the legitimacy of social and economic rights and remain dominant in the United States. It comparatively situates the American refusal to consider universal healthcare a human right with European affirmations of such a right and to those found in various treaties of international law. Finally, it analyzes how Barack Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act—while not adopting the rhetoric of human rights does, functionally, enable as a matter of public policy an entitlement to healthcare. (shrink)