The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we are interested in assessing the validity of one version of Kim’s argument against genuine higher level causation. Second, we discuss Wilson’s proposal to consider a weaker notion of emergence as genuinely metaphysical and compatible with Non-Reductive Physicalism. Our conclusion is that both proposals fail: the first in preempting genuine (strong) emergent causation, whereas the second in ensuring a genuinely metaphysical status to weak emergence. After all, Wilson’s proposal strongly depends on (...) the success of Kim’s, not only because it takes it as valid but, also, because in pursuing its own weaker model it shares the presuppositions that led Kim’s to failure. At the end of the day, Wilson’s conception of genuine weak emergence either breaks causal closure or is merely stipulative, namely confined at the descriptive level. (shrink)

Background:Women's health has received renewed attention in the last few years including health rehabilitation options for women affected by breast cancer. Dancing has often been regarded as one attractive option for supporting women's well-being and health, but research with women recovering from breast cancer is still in its infancy. Dancing with Health is multi-site pilot study that aimed to evaluate a dance programme for women in recovery from breast cancer across five European countries.Methods:A standardized 32 h dance protocol introduced a (...) range of Latin American dances presented within a sports and exercise framework with influences from dance movement therapy. Fifty-four women (M age 53.51; SD 7.99) participated in the study who had a breast cancer diagnosis 6 weeks, no indication of metastasis, or scheduled surgery/chemotherapy/radiation treatment for the duration of the intervention. Primary outcome data was collected for anthropometric and fitness measures next to cancer-related quality of life.T-tests and Wilcoxon signed ranked tests were used to establish differences pre and post intervention. Cohen's d was also calculated to determine the effect size of the intervention.Results:Statistically significant changes were found for: (i) weight, right and left forearm circumference and hip; (ii) 6 min walking, right and left handgrip, sit-to-stand and sit-and-reach; (iii) the EORTC-QLQ C30 summary score as well as the subscales of emotional and social functioning and symptoms. In all cases the direction of change was positive, while Cohen's d calculated showed that the effect of the intervention for these parameters ranged from intermediate to large.Conclusion:Changes on the above anthropometric, fitness and quality of life measures suggest that the intervention was of value to the participating women recovering from breast cancer. Results also advocate collaborative efforts across countries to further research. (shrink)

Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI), was I'ound to correlate with n>casurcs of obsessional thinking and depressive and anxious al'lect, t pridic( signs «I' clinical «hscssion ainong individuals prone (oward «h»c»»i«n >I (hi>>king, (« predict depression tive (h (», and to predict I''iilurc «I' electr«dermal responses to habituate am«ng pci>pic having emotional thoughts. The WBSI was inversely correlated with repression as assessed by the Repression-Sensitization Scale, and so tap» a trait that i» itc unlike rcprc»si«n:is traditi«n;illy c«nccivcd.

We provide a framework for understanding agnosticism. The framework accounts for the varieties of agnosticism while vindicating the unity of the phenomenon. This combination of unity and plurality is achieved by taking the varieties of agnosticism to be represented by several agnostic stances, all of which share a common core provided by what we call the minimal agnostic attitude. We illustrate the fruitfulness of the framework by showing how it can be applied to several philosophical debates. In particular, several philosophical (...) positions can be aptly conceived of as instances of agnosticism whilst retaining their differences and distinguishing features. (shrink)

Truth and Norms develops a novel pluralistic view of the normative role that truth exerts on judgements. This view, labeled normative alethic pluralism, provides the best explanation of the variable normative significance that disagreement exhibits in different areas of discourse and is fully compatible with a minimalist conception of truth.

This full-length study of Plato's dialogue Phaedrus, now in paperback, is written in the belief that such concerted scrutiny of a single dialogue is an important part of the project of understanding Plato so far as possible 'from the inside' - of gaining a feel for the man's philosophy. The focus of this account is on how the resources both of persuasive myth and of formal argument, for all that Plato sets them in strong contrast, nevertheless complement and reinforce each (...) other in his philosophy. Not only is the dialogue in its formal structure a dovetail of myth and argument, but the philosophic life that it praises is also shaped by an acknowledgement of the limitations of argument and the importance of mythical understanding. By means of this correlation of form and content Plato invites his readers, through the very act of reading, to take a first step along the path of the philosophical life. (shrink)

Can someone who suspends judgement about a certain proposition <p> be in a relational state of disagreement with someone who believes <p> as well as with some- one who disbelieves <p>? This paper argues for an af- firmative answer. It develops an account of the notions of suspended judgement and disagreement that explains how and why the suspender is in a relational state of disagreement with both the believer and the disbeliever about the very same proposition <p>. More specifically, the (...) paper first provides a characterisation of the norma- tive profile associated with the state of suspended judge- ment in terms of the set of normative commitments that it engenders in the context of inquiry. It then provides a characterisation of the notion of disagreement in terms the incompatibility between the sets of normative com- mitments characteristic of the three states in question— belief, disbelief, and suspension. (shrink)

I have two objectives in this paper. The first is to investigate whether, and to what extent, truth is valuable. I do this by first isolating the value question from other normative questions. Second, I import into the debate about the nature of truth some key distinctions hailing from value theory. This will help us to clarify the sense in which truth is valuable. I then argue that there is significant variability in the value of truth in different areas of (...) discourse. I shall call this the axiological variability conjecture. I illustrate and substantiate AVC by contrasting the occurrence of disagreement in two paradigmatically evaluative areas of discourse, viz. matters of taste, on the one hand, and morality, on the other. I claim that there is a reasonable tendency to care much more about settling moral disagreements than taste disagreements and that this difference has to do, at least partly but significantly, with the different value that truth exhibits in these two areas of discourse. I then turn to the second objective of the paper—namely, to discuss how pluralistic accounts of the nature of truth may deal with the value of truth in light of AVC. I will argue that AVC is a problem for all versions of truth pluralism that are committed to the following two theses: that truth is a value concept; and that this characteristic of the concept has to be reflected in the metaphysical nature of any admissible truth properties—i.e., all the various properties that are admissible in the pluralist account are value-conferring properties and thus intrinsically valuable. In so doing, I will focus primarily on Michael Lynch’s functionalist incarnation of truth pluralism. Lynch terms this “Manifestation Alethic Pluralism”. My reason for this is twofold: first and foremost, MAP is a paradigmatic exemplification of a model of truth pluralism that is committed to both and ; second, MAP has, to date, enjoyed the most discussion, and currently provides the most developed account of truth pluralism. However, I argue that MAP lacks the resources to account for AVC. Owing to this, I suggest two ways out for an advocate of MAP, which force various structural changes in her view. (shrink)

Assessment relativism, as developed by John MacFarlane, is the view that the truth of our claims involving a variety of English expressions—‘tasty’, ‘knows’, ‘tomorrow’, ‘might’, and ‘ought’—is relative not only to aspects of the context of their production but also to aspects of the context in which they are assessed. Assessment relativism is thus a form of truth relativism which is offered as a new way of understanding perspectival thought and talk. In this article, I present the main theses of (...) assessment relativism, focusing in particular on highlighting the points of commonality and contrast with other forms of truth relativism. I then offer some critical remarks concerning the motivation of assessment relativism in relation to matters of taste. (shrink)

Nominalism in formal ontology is still the thesis that the only acceptable domain of quantification is the first-order domain of particulars. Nominalists may assert that second-order well-formed formulas can be fully and completely interpreted within the first-order domain, thereby avoiding any ontological commitment to second-order entities, by means of an appropriate semantics called “substitutional”. In this paper I argue that the success of this strategy depends on the ability of Nominalists to maintain that identity, and equivalence relations more in general, (...) is first-order and invariant. Firstly, I explain why Nominalists are formally bound to this first-order concept of identity. Secondly, I show that the resources needed to justify identity, a certain conception of identity invariance, are out of the Nominalist’s reach. (shrink)

The present paper argues that substantialist metaphysics are in tension with the physicalist idea that the universe is causally closed. The argument is a rather specific one and proceeds through three steps. The first step consists in arguing that monistic substance metaphysics allow for the existence of entities that cannot belong to the intended first order domain. This result sensitively depends on the nature of substances as invariant entities. The second step concludes that, if further domains are to be admitted, (...) then they are inhabited by “higher” or (systematically) “non-standard” entities and that, in both cases if not made somehow innocuous, such entities may take part on the metaphysical construction of the world through their own distinctive properties and causal powers. However, this latter claim is in contradiction with causal closure. But closure is the principle that mainly characterizes physicalist approaches in metaphysics and as such physicalist metaphysics cannot get rid of it. Who attempted making exotic properties and causal powers innocuous usually appealed to the Supervenience Argument. Unfortunately, as the third step proves, this argument is invalid. Finally, the paper looks forward and toward alternative models for physicalist metaphysics, like process-based models. (shrink)

According to the form of logical pluralism elaborated by Beall and Restall there is more than one relation of logical consequence. Since they take the relation of logical consequence to res...

In this paper we investigate whether and to what extent scientists (e.g. inquirers such as epidemiologists or virologists) can have rational and fruitful disagreement with what we call post-enquirers (e.g. conspiratorial anti-vaxxers) on topics of scientific relevance such as the safety and efficacy of vaccines. In order to accomplish this aim, we will rely and expand on the epistemological framework developed in detail in Ferrari & Moruzzi (2021) to study the underlying normative profile of enquiry and post-enquiry. We take (...) it that our analysis provides an effective explanation of why standard argumentative strategies such as fact-checking and debunking cannot work in the context of disagreement between scientists and denialists unless they are coupled with a discussion of the values that are endorsed by the scientific community. (shrink)

Commentators are divided on the interpretation of Metaphysics Z4 1029b13–22. For one thing, it is unclear whether the passage rejects a claim about the essence of surface, or about the essence of pale. It is usually thought that the claim is disavowed because it involves a circular definition. However, this is conjectural, since Aristotle does not explicitly say anything about circularity in the lines in question. I argue here for an alternative account, which reads the disputed lines as an extension (...) of the immediately preceding remarks. If correct, this also solves the problem as to just what Aristotle is denying. As will emerge, my story is helped by St. Thomas’ reading of lines 21–22, an account that has been curiously ignored in the recent literature. (shrink)

It has been claimed that the earliest expression of a robust scepticism is in the Catalogue of Ships in theIliad, and even commentators who would not go that far have thought the passage an important guide to epistemological attitudes in Homeric antiquity. It will be argued here that a close examination of the text does not support such conclusions. On the other hand, there are respectable reasons for an interpretation in which religious factors are operative, rather than epistemic ones. The (...) conclusion to be drawn is that the epistemic reading is groundless. (shrink)

Schlick’s relationship with the Tractatus has been mainly investigated in what concerns the conception both of language and world, the insight of logic, the criteria of verifiability, the proper role of philosophy as mental activity. However, some other features of Schlick’s reading of the Tractatus require a closer consideration. In the 1920s, Schlick was dealing with the questions of ethics (and, to some extent, of religion), that represent from the early days the core issue of his philosophy of culture. Schlick’s (...) intellectual relationship with Wittgenstein ought to be explored also in this broader context, namely after his first encounter with the Tractatus. As it emerges from their private conversations in 1929, Schlick did not agree with Wittgenstein’s account of ethics as a domain going beyond the limits of language. Whereas Wittgenstein maintains that “that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same [Tractatus 6.421]”, Schlick considers ethics as a factual science. As he says in the Problems of ethics (1930), “if there are ethical questions that have meaning, and are therefore able to be answered, then ethics is a science”. Wittgenstein’s position is patently in contrast with Schlick’s. According to Wittgenstein, ethics, no differently from religion, cannot be tested as is usual for meaningful propositions, namely by recurring to hypotheses, high probability or knowing. My paper aims at highlighting this contrast, that is rooted both in the Tractatus and in Schlick’s conception of ethics as science already endorsed in his work before the arriving in Vienna. How Schlick would have appreciated Wittgenstein’s late thoughts on ethics remains, at any rate, an open question. (shrink)

In this book, we interpret post-truth as a multifaceted phenomenon which involves fake news, emotion-driven rhetoric (vs fact-driven discussion), credulism in the social-media, conspiracy theories and scientific denialism. We develop three models intended to represent the multifaceted nature of post-truth in terms of deviated forms of enquiry – which we label “post-enquiries”. The first form of post-enquiry posits the existence of alternative facts; the second prioritizes emotions over facts; the third limits the scope of the norms of enquiry. We elaborate (...) on the third model in relation to scientific denialism and we apply it to analyse the case of flat-earthism. (shrink)

Educational neuroscience promises to incorporate emerging insights from neuroscience into education, and is an exiting renovation of cognitive science in education. But unlike cognitive neuroscience—which aims to explain how the mind is embodied—educational neuroscience necessarily incorporates values that reflect the kind of citizen and the kind of society we aspire to create. Neuroscience can help fulfill the mandate of public education, but only as a tool that is part of a broader conversation about what schools should strive to achieve for (...) the millions of students who attend them. I propose that educational neuroscience must advance our understanding of how knowledge is embodied in light of efforts to promote personal learning and development. (shrink)

The Commentary on the Categories by Abū l-Farağ ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib is an important representative of the Aristotelian tradition in Arabic culture.

Hermann Cohen, der Begründer der Marburger Schule des Neukantianismus, hat einen bis dato unterirdischen Einfluss auf den Logischen Empirismus ausgeübt. Seine Konzeption der transzendentalen Methode sowie seine scharfe Polemik gegen den Psychologismus wurden insbesondere von Rudolf Carnap und Hans Reichenbach zum Teil angenommen, aber zugleich auch umgewandelt. Reichenbach’s Analyse der Wissenschaft und Carnaps logische Analyse wissenschaftlicher Sätze sind mit Cohens Ansatz in dem Sinne noch verbunden, dass die Kritik der Vernunft Kantischer Prägung durch die Eruierung der begrifflichen Struktur wissenschaftlicher Theorien (...) ersetzt wird. Trotz offensichtlicher Differenzen handelt es sich doch um einen Zusammenhang, auf den die Forschung weiter einzugehen hat. (shrink)

Long‐term potentiation (LTP) of excitatory synapses is a leading model to explain the concept of information storage in the brain. Multiple mechanisms contribute to LTP, but central amongst them is an increased sensitivity of the postsynaptic membrane to neurotransmitter release. This sensitivity is predominantly determined by the abundance and localization of AMPA‐type glutamate receptors (AMPARs). A combination of AMPAR structural data, super‐resolution imaging of excitatory synapses, and an abundance of electrophysiological studies are providing an ever‐clearer picture of how AMPARs are (...) recruited and organized at synaptic junctions. Here, we review the latest insights into this process, and discuss how both cytoplasmic and extracellular receptor elements cooperate to tune the AMPAR response at the hippocampal CA1 synapse. (shrink)

David Eso and Kay Burns edition of philosopher Leo Ferraris previously unpublished 1973 manuscript brings to light a long forgotten satirical work, which, in an age of fake news, possesses renewed relevance. The editors contextualize The Earth is Flat! for the reader with a scholarly introduction and a humorous Forewarning. Author, Leo Ferrari, draws on his extensive knowledge of classical thought and its key figures to present a history of ideas that is sometimes accurate, sometimes speculative. Speculative or alternative (...) aspects of this history support his Flat Earth theme, as do a number of scientific experiments outlined, which the reader is encouraged to try. He traces the conflict between Globularist and Planoterrestrial beliefs from antiquity to his contemporary moment of the early 1970s, marked by space exploration. Later chapters chart the activities and philosophies of the Flat Earth Society of Canada, including Ferraris experience on the lecture circuit and in media platforms. The authors method is to blur the line between seriousness and humour and to show that intellectual work can also be good fun. He uses the idea of a spinning, spherical planet to symbolically represent the alienating effects of technological modernity. (shrink)

The heristic argument with which Meno questions the possibility of inquiry and knowledge is tackled by Socrates through the reference to an archaic and religious doctrine, according to which the soul is immortal and has seen all things. Through this reference Socrates actually wants to affirm the affinity between the soul and the world of forms. So behind the myth of the prenatal vision of forms by the soul Plato intends to assert the ontological condition of the soul, that is, (...) its affinity to forms. (shrink)

This is the second part of a paper devoted to the study of the maximal intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property , whose first part has appeared in this journal with the title “A method to single out maximal propositional logics with the disjunction property I”. In the first part we have explained the general results upon which a method to single out maximal constructive logics is based and have illustrated such a method by exhibiting the Kripke semantics of (...) maximal constructive logics extending the logic ST of Scott, for which, in turn, a semantical characterization in terms of Kripke frames has been given. In the present part we complete the illustration of the method of the first part, having in mind some aspects which might be interesting for a classification of the maximal constructive logics, and an application of the heuristic content of the method to detect the nonmaximality of apparently maximal constructive logics. Thus, on the one hand we introduce the logic AST , which is compared with ST and is seen as a logic “alternative” to it, in a sense which will be precisely explained. We provide a Kripke semantics for AST and show that there are maximal constructive logics which neither are extensions of ST nor are extensions of AST. Finally, we give a further application of the results of the first part by exhibiting the Kripke semantics of a maximal constructive logic extending AST. On the other hand, we compare the maximal constructive logics presented in both parts of the paper with a constructive logic introduced by Maksimova , which has been conjectured to be maximal by Chagrov and Zacharyashchev ; from this comparison a disproof of the conjecture arises. (shrink)