Assessment Relativism

In Martin Kusch (ed.), Routledge Handbook to Relativism (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Assessment relativism, as developed by John MacFarlane, is the view that the truth of our claims involving a variety of English expressions—‘tasty’, ‘knows’, ‘tomorrow’, ‘might’, and ‘ought’—is relative not only to aspects of the context of their production but also to aspects of the context in which they are assessed. Assessment relativism is thus a form of truth relativism which is offered as a new way of understanding perspectival thought and talk. In this article, I present the main theses of assessment relativism, focusing in particular on highlighting the points of commonality and contrast with other forms of truth relativism. I then offer some critical remarks concerning the motivation of assessment relativism in relation to matters of taste.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Assessment–Sensitivity.Filippo Ferrari - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):516-527.
Non-indexical contextualism, relativism and retraction.Alexander Dinges - forthcoming - In Jeremy Wyatt, Dan Zeman & Julia Zakkou (eds.), Perspectives on Taste. London: Routledge.
Retractions.Teresa Marques - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3335-3359.
Assertoric Force Perspectivalism: Relativism Without Relative Truth.Lionel Shapiro - 2014 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1.
Making sense of relative truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.
Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409.
In defence of a perspectival semantics for 'know'.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):439 – 459.
Defusing epistemic relativism.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):397-412.
Relative Correctness.Teresa Marques - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):361-373.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-02-05

Downloads
393 (#48,636)

6 months
76 (#56,440)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Filippo Ferrari
University of Bologna

Citations of this work

Relativism.Maria Baghramian & Adam J. Carter - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Relativism.Chris Swoyer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

When Truth Gives Out.Mark Richard - 2008 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.
Faultless Disagreement.Max Kolbel - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.
Future contingents and relative truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.

View all 20 references / Add more references