In political philosophy, reflective equilibrium is a standard method used to systematically reconcile intuitive judgments with theoretical principles. In this paper, we propose that survey experiments and a model selection method—i.e., the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)-based model selection method—can be viewed together as a methodological means of satisfying the epistemic desiderata implicit in reflective equilibrium. To show this, we conduct a survey experiment on two theories of distributive justice, prioritarianism and sufficientarianism. Our experimental test case and AIC-based model selection method (...) demonstrate that the refined sufficientarian principle, a widely accepted principle of distributive justice, is no more plausible than the prioritarian principle. This tells us that some changes of certain intuitions revolving around sufficientarianism should be examined (separately) based on the findings of the survey experiment and AIC model selection. This shows the potential of our approach—both practically and methodologically—as a novel way of applying reflective equilibrium in political philosophy. (shrink)

The central aim of science is to make sense of the world. To move forward as a community endeavor, sense-making must be systematic and focused. The question then is how do scientists actually experience the sense-making process? In this chapter we examine the “practice turn” in science studies and in particular how as a result of this turn scholars have come to realize that models are the “functional unit” of scientific thought and form the center of the reasoning/sense-making process. (...) This chapter will explore a context-dependent view of models and modeling in science. From this analysis we present a framework for delineating the different aspects of model-based reasoning and describe how this view can be useful in educational settings. This framework highlights how modeling supports and focuses scientific practice on sense-making. (shrink)

Management and business literature affirm the role played by stakeholders in corporate social responsibility practices as crucial, but what constitutes a true business–society partnership remains relatively unexplored. This paper aims to improve scholarly and management understanding beyond the usual managers’ perceptions on salience attributes, to include how stakeholders can acquire missing attributes to inform a meaningful partnership. In doing this, a model is proposed which conceptualises CSR practices and outcomes within the frameworks of stakeholder salience via empowerment, sustainable corporate social (...) performances and partnership quality. A holistic discussion leads to generation of propositions on stakeholder salience management, corporate social performance, corporate–community partnership systems and CSR practices, which have both academic and management implications. (shrink)

Reviews the contribution of neural network models in psychiatry and psychopathology, including diagnosis, pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy.

Instead of arguing for a specific animal model, Striedter will review the history and philosophy of animal models in biomedical research, examining their various advantages and limitations.

This article addresses the contributions of the literature on the new mechanistic philosophy of science for the scientific practice of model building in ecology. This is reflected in a one-to-one interdisciplinary collaboration between an ecologist and a philosopher of science during science-in-the-making. We argue that the identification, reconstruction and understanding of mechanisms is context-sensitive, and for this case study mechanistic modeling did not present a normative role but a heuristic one. We expect our study to provides useful epistemic tools (...) for the improvement of empirically-riven work in the debates about mechanistic explanation of ecological phenomena. (shrink)

Economic models, like scientific paradigms, predispose actors towards certain patterns of behavior or practices. Over time these become accepted as normal practice which everybody is expected to observe or to follow. This is how theoretical orthodoxies are established. However, even orthodoxies rely on refinement of techniques. In economics this is widely recognized, as it guarantees competitiveness among various practitioners. The context within which this occurs is often taken for granted since it is implicit in given theoretical models. For instance, (...) in development theory it is assumed that the prevailing Euro-American economic model is universally valid. It is more than likely that this itself has become a social value which the West wants to maintain. Consequently, as a scientific proposition, it cannot be clarified since the West uses its political and military power to guarantee the necessary conditions for the reproduction of the same globally. Insofar as this is true, it is only reasonable to grant the fact that economic models inevitably carry with them unacknowledged normative presuppositions. This is best illustrated by the fierce ideological battle that occurred between the so-called socialist and “free market” adherents during the cold war. (shrink)

A models-based approach has been advocated as a means of overcoming the serious limitations of the traditional approach to physical education. One of the difficulties with this approach is that physical educators have sought to use it to achieve diverse and sometimes competing educational benefits, and these wide-ranging aspirations are rarely if ever achieved. Models-based practice offers a possible resolution to these problems by limiting the range of learning outcomes, subject matter and teaching strategies appropriate to each pedagogical model (...) and thus the arguments that can be used for educational value. In this article, two examples are provided to support a case for educational value. This case is built on an examination of one established pedagogical model, Sport Education, which is informed by a perspective on ethics. Next, I consider Physical Literacy which, I suggest, is an existentialist philosophical perspective that could form the basis of a new pedagogical model. It is argued, in conclusion, that a models-based approach along with a reconstructed notion of educational value may offer a possible future for physical education that is well grounded in various philosophical arguments and the means to facilitate a wide range of diverse individual and social educational ?goods? (shrink)

Models are indispensable tools of scientific inquiry, and one of their main uses is to improve our understanding of the phenomena they represent. How do models accomplish this? And what does this tell us about the nature of understanding? While much recent work has aimed at answering these questions, philosophers' focus has been squarely on models in empirical science. I aim to show that pure mathematics also deserves a seat at the table. I begin by presenting two cases: Cramér’s random (...) model of the prime numbers and the function field model of the integers. These cases show that mathematicians, like empirical scientists, rely on unrealistic models to gain understanding of complex phenomena. They also have important implications for some much-discussed theses about scientific understanding. First, modeling practices in mathematics confirm that one can gain understanding without obtaining an explanation. Second, these cases undermine the popular thesis that unrealistic models confer understanding by imparting counterfactual knowledge. (shrink)

A review of the literature indicates that linear models are frequently used in situations in which decisions are made on the basis of multiple codable inputs. These models are sometimes used normatively to aid the decision maker, as a contrast with the decision maker in the clinical vs statistical controversy, to represent the decision maker "paramorphically" and to "bootstrap" the decision maker by replacing him with his representation. Examination of the contexts in which linear models have been successfully employed indicates (...) that the contexts have the following structural characteristics in common: each input variable has a conditionally monotone relationship with the output; there is error of measurement; and deviations from optimal weighting do not make much practical difference. These characteristics ensure the success of linear models, which are so appropriate in such contexts that random linear models may perform quite well. 4 examples involving the prediction of such codable output variables as GPA and psychiatric diagnosis are analyzed in detail. In all 4 examples, random linear models yield predictions that are superior to those of human judges. (shrink)

The Human Embryology Collection at the Centre of Anatomy Göttingen, created between 1942 and 1970, represents a unique interrelation of histological sectional series of human embryos and large-format physical models open to the public based on them. The collection was established long after the heyday of human embryology. It is also remarkable in another aspect: while usually models within the discipline are considered research objects, Göttingen embryologist Erich Blechschmidt (1904–1992) based his understanding on a pedagogical impetus. The article highlights the (...) distinctive and unconventional features of Blechschmidt’s undertaking against its disciplinary background. My focus lies on the two practices that are central to human embryology—collecting and modelling—, as well as the derived collection stocks. The special tension between individuality and universality that already characterized the process of their creation is also reflected in the later use of the collection. This tension allowed Blechschmidt to utilize the models in embryological research and anatomical teaching as well as in the broad social debate on abortion and the ethical status of human embryos. (shrink)

Many examples of calibration in climate science raise no alarms regarding model reliability. We examine one example and show that, in employing Classical Hypothesis-testing, it involves calibrating a base model against data that is also used to confirm the model. This is counter to the "intuitive position". We argue, however, that aspects of the intuitive position are upheld by some methods, in particular, the general Cross-validation method. How Cross-validation relates to other prominent Classical methods such as the Akaike Information Criterion (...) and Bayesian Information Criterion is also discussed. (shrink)

The thesis proposes an account of the means of scientific representation focused on similarity, or more specifically, on the notion of “creative similarity”. I first distinguish between two different questions regarding the problem of representation: the question about the constituents and the question about the means of representation (following Suárez 2003; van Fraassen 2008). I argue that, although similarity is not a good candidate for constituent of representation, it can satisfactorily answer the question about the means of representation if adequately (...) characterized. To motivate this position, I dispute the main arguments offered against similarity as means of representation, namely the arguments from variety, vagueness, and misrepresentation, and contend that similarity plays a central epistemic role in practices of representing in science. The study of the role of similarity in scientific practice, I argue, requires the analysis of the uses of judgments of similarity in the construction of scientific models. I examine the cases of the Mississippi Basin Model and the San Francisco Bay Model to illustrate how judgments of similarity are directly involved in the production of epistemically fruitful models. Informed by the practical investigation developed throughout the thesis, I finally outline what I call the creative similarity account of the means of representation. The notion of “creative similarity” helps to capture the way in which similarity, as means of representation, intervenes in actual practices of representing, namely, in the form of a productive interplay of judgments of similarity and distortions (i.e. idealizations, abstractions, simplifications), which is employed by resourceful agents with the aim of understanding aspects of the natural world. (shrink)

Digital Humanities is a research field engaged in exploring how humanities scholarship is transformed and extended by the digital and vice versa. The core practice of DH research is modelling which implies the translation of complex systems of knowledge into computationally processable models. In our work we contextualise DH practices within a semiotic framework; namely we consider modelling as a strategy to make sense via practical thinking. A semiotic approach of this kind contributes to stress the dynamic (...) nature of models and modelling, and to reinstate in renewed terms the understanding of modelling as open process of signification enacting a triadic cooperation. Referring to Peirce classification of hypoicons, we reflect on some DH examples of modelling in the form of images, diagrams and metaphors, claiming that a semiotic understanding of modelling could ultimately allow us to surpass the duality object versus model. We thus propose to consider modelling as a creative and highly pragmatic process of thinking and reasoning in which metaphors assume a central role and where meaning is negotiated through the creation and manipulation of external representations combined with an imaginative use of formal and informal languages. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Potochnik (Biol Philos 24(2):183–197, 2009) analyses some uses of optimality modelling in light of the anti-adaptationism criticism. She distinguishes two broad classes of such uses (weak and strong) on the basis of assumptions held by biologists about the role and the importance of natural selection. This is an interesting proposal that could help in the epistemological characterisation of some biological practices. However, Potochnik’s distinction also rests on the assumption that all optimality modelling represent the (...) selection dynamic involved in the system of phenomena being considered. Since this assumption does not hold for models belonging to optimal foraging theory (OFT)—one of behavioural ecology’s important modelling traditions—Potochnik’s proposal has to be critically reappraised. In this paper, we briefly discuss what is optimality modelling and what it means for a model to represent a dynamic of selection or of evolution. Then, we demonstrate that OFT modelling is unable to represent either past or contemporary selection dynamics. In order to make this point, we carefully delineate the theory’s rationale. This allows us to identify and analyse the assumptions on which the theory is built, and to circumscribe precisely the role that natural selection plays in it. Next, we show that the distinction of weak and strong uses of optimality modelling is seriously weakened when OFT modelling is taken into account. More precisely, the distinction is either irrelevant (if the assumption that selection dynamics are represented in all optimality modelling is held) or of a modest utility (if the assumption is dropped). However, we suggest that Potochnik’s original proposal could be saved, and that it even constitutes a tool to appraise the marks left in the literature by the evolution of optimality modelling practices in the last four decades, provided that it is made into a tripartite distinction. (shrink)

The theory of imperatives is philosophically relevant since in building it — some of the long standing problems need to be addressed, and presumably some new ones are waiting to be discovered. The relevance of the theory of imperatives for philosophical research is remarkable, but usually recognized only within the field of practical philosophy. Nevertheless, the emphasis can be put on problems of theoretical philosophy. Proper understanding of imperatives is likely to raise doubts about some of our deeply entrenched and (...) tacit presumptions. In philosophy of language it is the presumption that declaratives provide the paradigm for sentence form; in philosophy of science it is the belief that theory construction is independent from the language practice, in logic it is the conviction that logical meaning relations are constituted out of logical terminology, in ontology it is the view that language use is free from ontological commitments. The list is not exhaustive; it includes only those presumptions that this paper concerns. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with scientific reasoning in the engineering sciences. Engineering sciences aim at explaining, predicting and describing physical phenomena occurring in technological devices. The focus of this paper is on mathematical description. These mathematical descriptions are important to computer-aided engineering or design programs (CAE and CAD). The first part of this paper explains why a traditional view, according to which scientific laws explain and predict phenomena and processes, is problematic. In the second part, the reasons of these methodological (...) difficulties are analyzed. Ludwig Prandtl’s method of integrating a theoretical and empirical approach is used as an example of good scientific practice. Based on this analysis, a distinction is made between different types of laws that play a role in constructing mathematical descriptions of phenomena. A central assumption in understanding research methodology is that, instead of scientific laws, knowledge of capacities and mechanisms are primary in the engineering sciences. Another important aspect in methodology of the engineering sciences is that in explaining a phenomenon or process spatial regions are distinguished in which distinct physical behaviour occur. The mechanisms in distinct spatial regions are represented in a so-called diagrammatic model. The construction of a mathematical description of the phenomenon or process is based on this diagrammatic model. (shrink)

In Making Sense of Life , Keller emphasizes several differences between biology and physics. Her analysis focuses on significant ways in which modelling practices in some areas of biology, especially developmental biology, differ from those of the physical sciences. She suggests that natural models and modelling by homology play a central role in the former but not the latter. In this paper, I focus instead on those practices that are importantly similar, from the point of view of epistemology (...) and cognitive science. I argue that concrete and abstract models are significant in both disciplines, that there are shared selection criteria for models in physics and biology, e.g. familiarity, and that modelling often occurs in a similar fashion. (shrink)

This is a paper about the methodology of normative ethics. I claim that much work in normative ethics can be interpreted as modelling, the form of inquiry familiar from science, involving idealised representations. I begin with the anti-theory debate in ethics, and note that the debate utilises the vocabulary of scientific theories without recognising the role models play in science. I characterise modelling, and show that work with these characteristics is common in ethics. This establishes the plausibility of (...) my interpretation. Taking methodological inspiration from modelling in science gives us new tools for managing idealisations, and a new perspective on pluralism. I demonstrate why this interpretation is a fruitful way of interpreting ethics, by looking at three case studies. First, I return to the anti-theory debate and argue that modelling opens up a new middle ground. Second, I argue that a modelling lens offers a new way of understanding impossibility theorems in population ethics, and their bearing on ethics as a whole. Finally, I show how viewing our work as modelling can be deployed in debates within ethics, using the debate over prioritarianism as an example. I close with further methodological suggestions for those who choose to see themselves as modellers. I discuss the role of counterexamples, our responses to moral disagreement, and the training of new ethicists. (shrink)

Cognitive science has been beset for thirty years by foundational disputes about the nature and extension of cognition—e.g. whether cognition is necessarily representational, whether cognitive processes extend outside the brain or body, and whether plants or microbes have them. Whereas previous philosophical work aimed to settle these disputes, I aim to understand what conception of cognition scientists could share given that they disagree so fundamentally. To this end, I develop a number of variations on traditional conceptual explication, and defend a (...) novel explication of cognition called the sensitive management hypothesis. -/- Since expert judgments about the extension of “cognition” vary so much, I argue that there is value in explication that accurately models the variance in judgments rather than taking sides or treating that variance as noise. I say of explications that accomplish this that they are ecumenically extensionally adequate. Thus, rather than adjudicating whether, say, plants can have cognitive processes like humans, an ecumenically adequate explication should classify these cases differently: human cognitive processes as paradigmatically cognitive, and plant processes as controversially cognitive. -/- I achieve ecumenical adequacy by articulating conceptual explications with parameters, or terms that can be assigned a number of distinct interpretations based on the background commitments of participants in a discourse. For example, an explication might require that cognition cause “behavior,” and imply that plant processes are cognitive or not depending on whether anything plants do can be considered “behavior.” Parameterization provides a unified treatment of embattled concepts by isolating topics of disagreement in a small number of parameters. -/- I incorporate these innovations into an account on which cognition is the “sensitive management of organismal behavior.” The sensitive management hypothesis is ecumenically extensionally adequate, accurately classifying a broad variety of cases as paradigmatically or controversially cognitive phenomena. I also describe an extremely permissive version of the sensitive management hypothesis, arguing that it has the potential to explain several features of cognitive scientific discourse, including various facts about the way cognitive scientists ascribe representations to cognitive systems. (shrink)

The Epistemology Of Computer Simulation has developed as an epistemological and methodological analysis of simulative sciences using quantitative computational models to represent and predict empirical phenomena of interest. In this paper, Executable Cell Biology and Agent-Based Modelling are examined to show how one may take advantage of qualitative computational models to evaluate reachability properties of reactive systems. In contrast to the thesis, advanced by EOCS, that computational models are not adequate representations of the simulated empirical systems, it is shown (...) how the representational adequacy of qualitative models is essential to evaluate reachability properties. Justification theory, if not playing an essential role in EOCS, is exhibited to be involved in the process of advancing and corroborating model-based hypotheses about empirical systems in ECB and ABM. Finally, the practice of evaluating model-based hypothesis by testing the simulated systems is shown to constitute an argument in favour of the thesis that computer simulations in ECB and ABM can be put on a par with scientific experiments. (shrink)

In Making Sense of Life, Keller emphasizes several differences between biology and physics. Her analysis focuses on significant ways in which modelling practices in some areas of biology, especially developmental biology, differ from those of the physical sciences. She suggests that natural models and modelling by homology play a central role in the former but not the latter. In this paper, I focus instead on those practices that are importantly similar, from the point of view of epistemology and (...) cognitive science. I argue that concrete and abstract models are significant in both disciplines, that there are shared selection criteria for models in physics and biology, e.g. familiarity, and that modelling often occurs in a similar fashion. (shrink)

This paper examines two recent approaches to the nature and functioning of economic models: models as isolating representations and models as credible constructions. The isolationist view conceives of economic models as surrogate systems that isolate some of the causal mechanisms or tendencies of their respective target systems, while the constructionist approach treats them rather like pure constructions or fictional entities that nevertheless license different kinds of inferences. I will argue that whereas the isolationist view is still tied to the representationalist (...) understanding of models that takes the model-target dyad as the basic unit of analysis, the constructionist perspective can better accommodate the way we actually acquire knowledge through them. Using the example of Tobin’s ultra-Keynesian model I will show how many of the epistemic characteristics of modelling tend to go unrecognised if too much focus is placed on the model-target dyad. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to test a causal model of ethical conflict in practice and autonomy in a sample of 254 nurse practitioners working in the primary care areas of family health, pediatrics, adult health and obstetrics/gynecology in the state of Maryland. A test of the model was conducted using a path analytic approach with LISREL 8.30 hypothesizing individual, organizational and societal/market factors influencing ethical conflict in practice and autonomy. Maximum likelihood estimation was used to estimate (...) the parameters most likely to have generated the data. Forty-five percent of the total variance in ethical conflict was explained by the variables of ethical environment and ethical concern. Ethical concern, idealistic philosophy, ethics education in continuing education, percentage of client population enrolled in managed care, and market penetration explained 15% of the total variance in autonomy. The findings of this study indicate that the causal model of ethical conflict in practice and autonomy is consistent with the data and contributed to a fuller understanding of clinical decision making associated with practicing in a managed care environment. The final model supported a conceptual framework that is inclusive of three domains: individual, organizational and societal/market variables. (shrink)

Autonomist accounts of cognitive science suggest that cognitive model building and theory construction (can or should) proceed independently of findings in neuroscience. Common functionalist justifications of autonomy rely on there being relatively few constraints between neural structure and cognitive function (e.g., Weiskopf, 2011). In contrast, an integrative mechanistic perspective stresses the mutual constraining of structure and function (e.g., Piccinini & Craver, 2011; Povich, 2015). In this paper, I show how model-based cognitive neuroscience (MBCN) epitomizes the integrative mechanistic perspective and concentrates (...) the most revolutionary elements of the cognitive neuroscience revolution (Boone & Piccinini, 2016). I also show how the prominent subset account of functional realization supports the integrative mechanistic perspective I take on MBCN and use it to clarify the intralevel and interlevel components of integration. (shrink)

Animal models have long been used to investigate human mental disorders, including depression, anxiety, and schizophrenia. This practice is usually justified in terms of the benefits (to humans) outweighing the costs (to the animals). I argue on utility maximization grounds that we should phase out animal models in neuropsychiatric research. Our leading theories of how human minds and behavior evolved invoke sociocultural factors whose relation to nonhuman minds, societies, and behavior has not been homologized. Thus it is not at (...) all clear that we are gaining the epistemic or clinical benefits we want from this animal-based research. (shrink)

The growing availability of computer power and statistical software has greatly increased the ease with which practitioners apply statistical methods, but this has not been accompanied by attention to checking the assumptions on which these methods are based. At the same time, disagreements about inferences based on statistical research frequently revolve around whether the assumptions are actually met in the studies available, e.g., in psychology, ecology, biology, risk assessment. Philosophical scrutiny can help disentangle 'practical' problems of model validation, and conversely, (...) a methodology of statistical model validation can shed light on a number of issues of interest to philosophers of science. (shrink)

The gap between the metatheoretical inquiries of the analytical philosophy of history, formulated in terms of general principle, and the actual research practices of the historical discipline needs to be bridged. This investigation of the determinants -preconditions, causes, factors, forces - of technological development during the Industrial Revolution makes explicit the range of theoretical instruments used in such studies. The methodologically unavoidable plurality of aspects and perspectives for each concrete inquiry precludes any generally binding model for technological development. Discussion of (...) epistemological presuppositions, by comparing various approaches, can serve to make fully conscious these presuppositions and make them accessible to analysis and criticism. (shrink)

The book "Idealization XIV: Models in Science" offers a detailed ontological, epistemological and historical account of the role of models in scientific practice. The volume contains contributions of different international scholars who developed many aspects of the use of idealizations and models both in the natural and the social sciences. This volume is particularly relevant because it offers original contributions concerning one of the main topic in philosophy of science: the role of models in such branches of the sciences (...) and the humanities like comparative historical sociology, economics, history, linguistics and political philosophy. -/- Contributors are: Giacomo Borbone, Krzysztof Brzechczyn, Mieszko Ciesielski, Adam Czerniak, Xavier de Donato Rodríguez, José L. Falguera, Adolfo García de la Sienra, Lidia Godek, Igor Hanzel, Łukasz Hardt, Krzysztof Kiedrowski, Barbara Konat, Zenonas Norkus, Piotr Przybysz, Piotr Szwochert. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the conceptual problems arising when using network analysis in person- centered care (PCC) in psychiatry. Personalized network models are potentially helpful tools for PCC, but we argue that using them in psychiatric practice raises boundary problems, i.e., problems in demarcating what should and should not be included in the model, which may limit their ability to provide clinically-relevant knowledge. Models can have explanatory and representational boundaries, among others. We argue that we can make more (...) explicit what kind of questions personalized network models can address in PCC, given their representational and explanatory boundaries, using perspectival reasoning. (shrink)

The biological sciences have become increasingly reliant on so-called 'model organisms'. I argue that in this domain, the concept of a descriptive model is essential for understanding scientific practice. Using a case study, I show how such a model was formulated in a preexplanatory context for subsequent use as a prototype from which explanations ultimately may be generated both within the immediate domain of the original model and in additional, related domains. To develop this concept of a descriptive model, (...) I focus on use of the nematode worm Caenorhabditis elegans and the wiring diagrams that were developed as models of its neural structure. In addition, implications of the concept of a descriptive model, particularly its relevance for the data-phenomena distinction as well as its relation to long-standing debates on realism, are briefly examined. (shrink)

The philosophy of mathematics has been accused of paying insufficient attention to mathematical practice: one way to cope with the problem, the one we will follow in this paper on extensive magnitudes, is to combine the `history of ideas' and the `philosophy of models' in a logical and epistemological perspective. The history of ideas allows the reconstruction of the theory of extensive magnitudes as a theory of ordered algebraic structures; the philosophy of models allows an investigation into the way (...) epistemology might affect relevant mathematical notions. The article takes two historical examples as a starting point for the investigation of the role of numerical models in the construction of a system of non-Archimedean magnitudes. A brief exposition of the theories developed by Giuseppe Veronese and by Rodolfo Bettazzi at the end of the 19th century will throw new light on the role played by magnitudes and numbers in the development of the concept of a non-Archimedean order. Different ways of introducing non-Archimedean models will be compared and the influence of epistemological models will be evaluated. Particular attention will be devoted to the comparison between the models that oriented Veronese's and Bettazzi's works and the mathematical theories they developed, but also to the analysis of the way epistemological beliefs affected the concepts of continuity and measurement. (shrink)

The socio-religious panorama of the African religion deserves a close observation of its foundation and function. The perception of the spirit world is dominant in Africa. Similarly, spiritual warfare in the African context is prevalent in the mind and worldview of an African. Spiritual warfare derives its framework from African Traditional Religion (ATR). Hence, understanding ATR’s complexity helps us with the understanding of spiritual warfare. Some essential questions to understand would be what is spiritual warfare from an ATR perspective? How (...) do Africans perceive spiritual warfare? And how do Africans engage in spiritual warfare? What is the place of ATR in spiritual warfare? African Traditional Religion acknowledges the reality and functionality of witchcraft. The perception of the reality of evil forces in Africa attracts all forms of spiritual rites, seeking more extraordinary spiritual powers for defensive and offensive spiritual warfare. This article argues that the effectual Christian response to spiritual warfare with witchcraft practices in Africa is ‘the classical model’ of spiritual warfare. The article provides a synopsis of the models of spiritual warfare, that is, the classical model (CW), world systems model (WSM), ground-level deliverance model (GLDM), and strategic-level deliverance model (SLSW). Subsequently, the article provides the framework for African spiritual warfare and witchcraft practices from traditional and contemporary perspectives. Lastly, the article argues that the Evangelical Christian Response to witchcraft practices is rooted in ‘the classical model’ of spiritual warfare. Contribution: The article contributes to African religiosity within the African context. It reveals the ongoing argument about the continuity and discontinuity of the ATR beliefs and practices in Christianity. The article adds to the evangelical or classical arguments in support of the discontinuity of ATR beliefs and practices in Christianity. (shrink)

Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At (...) least since Hume argued that reason "is and of right ought to be the slave of the passions," many philosophers have held that desires play an essential role both in practical reason and in the explanation of intentional action. G. F. Schueler looks at contemporary accounts of both roles in various belief-desire models of reasons and explanation and argues that the usual belief-desire accounts need to be replaced. Schueler contends that the plausibility of the standard belief-desire accounts rests largely on a failure to distinguish "desires proper," like a craving for sushi, from so-called "pro attitudes," which may take the form of beliefs and other cognitive states as well as desires proper. Schueler's "deliberative model" of practical reasoning suggests a different view of the place of desire in practical reason and the explanation of action. He holds that we can arrive at an intention to act by weighing the relevant considerations and that these may not include desires proper at all. (shrink)

Although racism has always been present in the therapy room, the recent political climate and flood of news stories highlighting racist narratives and behaviors have made race and racism more salient in our society. For white therapists who align with antiracism in their self-identity and practice, this may present a difficult ethical dilemma when race and racism enter the therapy office. Therapists have a duty to protect client autonomy and self-determination as much as possible. However, therapists also have a (...) responsibility to the communities in which they work and to not willingly condone activities of others that hold prejudice, both of which are threatened with unacknowledged racism. This article addresses the issue of whether to work with racism as a clinical and ethical concern with white clients who hold racist ideas and narratives, and then offers a concise clinical model for therapists to help guide their practice. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of fundamental entities in set theory. It takes up J. Hamkins’ claim that models of set theory are such fundamental entities and investigates it using the methodology of P. Maddy’s naturalism, Second Philosophy. In accordance with this methodology, I investigate the historical case study of the use of models in the introduction of forcing, compare this case to contemporary practice and give a systematic account of how set-theoretic practice can be said to introduce (...) models as new entities. In conclusion, I argue for a view that takes both sets and models to be fundamental entities in set theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to show that considering technological models as they arise in engineering disciplines can greatly enrich the philosophical perspective on models. In fluid mechanics, (at least) three types of models are distinguished: mathematical, computer and physical models. Very often, the choice of a particular mathematical, computer or physical model highly affects the type of solutions and the computational time needed for it. Technological models not only aim at a correct description of the physical phenomena, but (...) also for an efficient and accurate simulation. The problem arises how heterogeneous models of an engineering problem can be brought together and be compared to each other as regards their function and technological efficiency. There are two developments in the history of fluid mechanics that have greatly influenced the use of models in the field: The introduction of the concept of the boundary layer by Ludwig Prandtl in 1904 made it possible to apply ideal analytical solutions, which at the time were almost entirely based on Euler’s equations for inviscid fluids, to interesting real cases and to approximate the theoretical Navier-Stokes equations to practical engineering problems, i.e. to cases at high Reynolds numbers. This made it possible to link the empirical tradition of hydraulics with the theoretical tradition of analytical mechanics and therefore lead to a kind of equilibrium in the use of mathematical and physical models. In the 1970s the introduction of the computer has greatly pushed back the importance of both physical and mathematical (analytic) models alike without making them superfluous. There remain, however, three different ways to conceive of physical models in fluid mechanics, and thus of the experimental ingredient, depending on whether they are devised from an analytical, computational or measurement theoretical point of view. Yet even inside the tradition of computer simulation, different practices have formed according to the programming methods used. The choice of method either depends on considerations of efficiency in terms of costs and time, or on historically contingent factors, like availability of instruments and programming packages or the arbitrary choice of a forerunner. Seen from a technological point of view the factors that make models “autonomous agents” and thus (relatively) independent from theory depend on efficiency constraints. Models are means to solve problems in a certain practical perspective by the most efficient means available. To develop a model is a “fast and frugal way” to get to grips with a certain region of reality, whereas the theoretical approach stresses the importance of universal features. (shrink)

일찍이 필자는 미래세대나 자연적 존재가 법적 권리능력을 발휘할 수 있는 ‘생태법인 (eco legal person)’ 제도의 도입을 제기한 바가 있다. 이글의 목적은 생태법인의 구체적 인 적용 모델 제시를 통해 생태법인 제도 도입의 의의와 실용성을 논증하는 데 있다. 법치주의 체제에서는 법인 제도를 통해 인간 이외의 존재에게 법인격을 부여하여 그들 의 권리를 스스로 행사할 수 있도록 한다. 그러나 현행 법체제에서는 자연의 존재물을 법 인격의 주체로 인정하지 않는다. 하지만 법인 제도는 사회의 원활한 운용을 위해 창조된 것이다. 그리고 법인의 대상과 내용은 사회적 필요성에 의해서 다양해지고 (...) 확장되었다. 따 라서 자연의 존재물에 법인격을 부여하지 말라는 절대 원칙은 없다. 스톤(Christopher D. Stone)은 미네랄 킹 계곡에서 추진되는 스키장 건설을 반대하는 소송에서 개발로 인해 파괴될 자연에도 법적 지위가 부여되어야 한다고 주장하였다. 2017 년 뉴질랜드 의회는 원주민 마우리족의 오랜 삶의 터전인 환가누이강에 법인격을 부여하 는 법률을 만들었으며 필리핀에서는 아직 태어나지도 않은 아이가 소송 당사자의 일원이 되어 밀림 개발을 막는 재판에서 승소한 사례가 있다. 제주남방큰돌고래는 세계자연보전연맹(IUCN)에서 보호가 필요하다고 지정한 멸종위기 해 양생물이다. 하지만오늘날 제주남방킁돌고래는 해양오염과난개발, 해양관광산업의난립으로 심각한 위협에 처해있다. 제주남방큰돌고래에 법인격을 부여하고 그 권리를 행사할 수 있는 생태법인 제도를 운용한다면 제주남방큰돌고래가 스스로 자기보호에 나설 수 있게 된다. 생태법인 제도의 도입은 자연을 바라보는 인간의 인식과 태도를 근본적으로 전환하는 계기가 될 수 있다. 이 글을 통해 헌법에 자연의 권리가 명시되고 특별환경법원 기능을 담 당하는 생태법원 설치 논의가 촉발되기를 기대한다. (shrink)

This volume reflects the ‘philosophy of science in practice’ approach and takes a fresh look at traditional philosophical problems in the context of natural, social, and health research. Inspired by the work of Nancy Cartwright that shows how the practices and apparatuses of science help us to understand science and to build theories in the philosophy of science, this volume critically examines the philosophical concepts of evidence, laws, causation, and models and their roles in the process of scientific reasoning. (...) Each chapter is an important one in the philosophy of science, while the volume as a whole deals with these philosophical concepts in a unified way in the context of actual scientific practice. This volume thus aims to contribute to this new direction in the philosophy of science.​. (shrink)

Malgré l’avènement de la figure de l’acteur créateur au tournant des XIXe et XXe siècles, les procédés de copie, d’imitation et de réactivation constituent une part non négligeable des outils convoqués dans les exercices spécifiques au jeu. Cette persistance, qui trouve son origine dans le Paradoxe sur le comédien de Diderot, se lit et se décline tout au long de l’histoire des théories du jeu, dans le recours fréquent à un modèle, dont le type varie (nature ou réel, arts plastiques, (...) personnage théâtral, performance). C’est cette double continuité, celle des procédés de copie et du modèle dans les théories du jeu auxquelles s’adossent des pratiques et dont découlent des modes de fabrication, qui a nourri une expérimentation pédagogique pratique au sein de La Manufacture – Haute École des Arts de la Scène de Lausanne. Les ateliers élaborés pour les étudiant.e.s consistant à mettre en œuvre ces trois opérations, à leur proposer une histoire sensible, c’est-à-dire éprouvée, du jeu de l’acteur, et à leur faire percevoir l’importance des procédés de copie, d’imitation et de réactivation dans la pensée et dans la pratique du jeu. (shrink)

In this topical section, we highlight the next step of research on modeling aiming to contribute to the emerging literature that radically refrains from approaching modeling as a scientific endeavor. Modeling surpasses “doing science” because it is frequently incorporated into decision-making processes in politics and management, i.e., areas which are not solely epistemically oriented. We do not refer to the production of models in academia for abstract or imaginary applications in practical fields, but instead highlight the real entwinement of science (...) and policy and the real erosion of their boundaries. Models in decision making – due to their strong entwinement with policy and management – are utilized differently than models in science; they are employed for different purposes and with different constraints. We claim that “being a part of decision-making” implies that models are elements of a very particular situation, in which knowledge about the present and the future is limited but dependence of decisions on the future is distinct. Emphasis on the future indicates that decisions are made about actions that have severe and lasting consequences. In these specific situations, models enable not only the acquisition of knowledge (the primary goal of science) but also enable deciding upon actions that change the course of events. As a result, there are specific ways to construct effective models and justify their results. Although some studies have explored this topic, our understanding of how models contribute to decision making outside of science remains fragmentary. This topical section aims to fill this gap in research and formulate an agenda for additional and more systematic investigations in the field. (shrink)

Seeing that socio-legal theory has produced a number of compelling grand theories about law’s development as a body of knowledge, this contribution analyzes legal evolution on the micro-level of decision-making in concrete cases. To that end, law finding is reconstructed as a three stage process of reason-based rule-construction. Legal evolution is argued to stem from the argumentative jumps that are made in this process in order to use what is initially drawn from the body of legal knowledge in new cases. (...) These jumps are justified by additional reasoning that plays a crucial role in that it brings new information to the law finding process. It is explained how this new information gets incorporated in the body of knowledge as a result of discursive maneuvers of legal practitioners. (shrink)

This volume reflects the ‘philosophy of science in practice’ approach and takes a fresh look at traditional philosophical problems in the context of natural, social, and health research. Inspired by the work of Nancy Cartwright that shows how the practices and apparatuses of science help us to understand science and to build theories in the philosophy of science, this volume critically examines the philosophical concepts of evidence, laws, causation, and models and their roles in the process of scientific reasoning. (...) Each chapter is an important one in the philosophy of science, while the volume as a whole deals with these philosophical concepts in a unified way in the context of actual scientific practice. This volume thus aims to contribute to this new direction in the philosophy of science.​. (shrink)