The theory of imperatives is philosophically relevant since in building it — some of the long standing problems need to be addressed, and presumably some new ones are waiting to be discovered.
The relevance of the theory of imperatives for philosophical research is remarkable, but usually recognized only within the ﬁeld of practical philosophy.
Nevertheless, the emphasis can be put on problems of theoretical philosophy.
Proper understanding of imperatives is likely to raise doubts about some
of our deeply entrenched and tacit presumptions.
In philosophy of language it is the presumption that declaratives provide the paradigm for sentence form; in philosophy of science it is the belief that theory construction is independent from the language practice, in logic it is the conviction that logical meaning relations are constituted out of logical terminology, in ontology it is the view that language use is free from ontological commitments.
The list is not exhaustive; it includes only those presumptions that this paper concerns.