This paper takes issue with the exemplarist strategy of fostering virtue development with the specific goal of improving its applicability in the context of education. I argue that, for what matters educationally, we have good reasons to endorse a liberal account of moral exemplarity. Specifically, I challenge two key assumptions of Linda Zagzebski’s Exemplarist Moral Theory (2017), namely that moral exemplars are exceptionally virtuous agents and that imitating their behavior is the main strategy for acquiring the virtues. I will introduce (...) and discuss the notions of enkratic exemplars and injustice illuminators and show that we have good reasons to consider them moral exemplars although they fail to satisfy (either of) the key assumptions. (shrink)

Across a wide range of cultural forms, including philosophy, cultural theory, literature and art, the figure of the clock has drawn suspicion, censure and outright hostility. In contrast, even while maps have been shown to be complicit with forms of domination, they are also widely recognised as tools that can be critically reworked in the service of more liberatory ends. This paper seeks to counteract the tendency to see clocks in this way, arguing that they have many more interesting possibilities (...) than they are usually given credit for. An analysis of approaches to clocks in continental philosophy critiques the way they have too often been dismissed as unworthy of further analysis, and argues that this dismissal is based upon an inadequate understanding of how clocks operate. Seeking to move towards more critical and curious approaches, the paper draws inspiration from critical cartography in order to call for the development of a ‘critical horology’ which would emphasise both the fundamentally political nature of clocks, and the potential for designing them otherwise. A discussion of temporal design provides a range of examples of how clocks might open up new horizons within the politics of time. (shrink)

Par quelque lieu qu'on s'y engage, s'il y a bien «quelque chose» qui insiste dans la pensée de Jean-Luc Nancy--qui en constitue le coeur, irriguant et inquiétant tout le reste de son corpus -, c'est assurément la question de la communauté--sous les divers noms qu'elle peut prendre: «partage», «nous», «comparution», « Mitsein» ou plutôt «Mitdasein», «communication» «être singulier pluriel», «être-en-commun», «avec», «coexistence», «coexposition», «monde», «liberé», «finitude», «espacement originaire» de l'existence, «écotechnie» ou «techné des corps», «toucher», etc. La question de la (...) communauté implique ou ouvre nécessairement celle du sens, étant entendu que la communauté est immédiatement enveloppée dans celle du sens, ou encore plus précisément qu'elle est immédiatement celle du sens, non pas d'un sens, mais du sens--pour autant qu'«il n'y a de sens, comme le dit Bataille, qu'à plusieurs», ce «pluriel» devant d'abord s'entendre chez Nancy comme l'avoir-lieu ou l'espacement même de l'«avec».--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This article is aimed at Foucauldian scholars and seeks to introduce them to ethnographic works that interrogate neoliberal governmentalities. As an analytic category ‘neoliberalism’ has over the last two decades helpfully illuminated connections between seemingly unrelated social changes occurring at multiple scales. Even earlier —in his College de France 1978-9 Birth of Biopolitics lectures, to be precise—Foucault began his engagement with neoliberalism as a dominant political force. Despite being more than three decades old, Foucault’s analysis of neoliberal rationalities remains fresh (...) and insightful, which perhaps explains why scholars inspired by his analytics of governmentality have been able to make major contributions to the current social science literature on neoliberalism. However, there are increasing concerns that governmentality scholars succumb to a more general tendency among social scientists to present neoliberal transformations in monolithic and linear terms. This article critically reviews contributions from a small but growing group of neo-Foucauldian researchers that avoid these tendencies. These researchers investigate the changes wrought by neoliberalism through methodologies that involve combining an analytics of governmentality with ethnographic and quasi-ethnographic methods, and in doing so they avoid deterministic, homogenous and static accounts of social transformation. By beginning with the “everyday,” these works reject the idea that neoliberal governmentality forms a coherent apparatus. Instead these ethnographies of neoliberal governmentalities focus on governmental ensembleges that link neoliberal political rationalities with non-liberal rationalities, and they explore how neoliberal thought and practice is transformed across time and space. (shrink)

Most states are multination states, and most peoples are stateless peoples. Just as collectives can behave as sovereign states only if they are recognized by the international community, liberal multination states must recognize stateless peoples in order to determine their political status within that state. There is, however, no agreement on the kind of principles that should be considered, especially under classical liberalism, which gives individuals preeminence over groups. Liberal theories that attempt to accommodate collective rights are often based on (...) a comprehensive version of liberalism that subscribes to moral individualism. Within such a framework, they develop a watered-down concept of collective rights. In A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights Michel Seymour explores the theoretical resources of John Rawls’s political liberalism and shows that this particular approach can accommodate genuine collective rights. By Rawls’s account, Seymour explains, peoples are moral agents and sources of valid moral claims and are therefore entitled to collective rights. These kinds of rights translate, in the constitution of the multination state, to a true political recognition for stateless peoples. Ultimately, A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights answers three important questions: Who is the subject of collective rights? What is the object of collective rights? And can they be institutionalized in real politics? (shrink)

When it was first published in France in 1961 as Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la Folie à l'âge Classique , few had heard of a thirty-four year old philosopher by the name of Michel Foucault. By the time an abridged English edition was published in 1967 as Madness and Civilization , Michel Foucault had shaken the intellectual world. This translation is the first English edition of the complete French texts of the first and second edition, including all (...) prefaces and appendices, some of them unavailable in the existing French edition. History of Madness begins in the Middle Ages with vivid descriptions of the exclusion and confinement of lepers. Why, Foucault asks, when the leper houses were emptied at the end of the Middle Ages, were they turned into places of confinement for the mad? Why, within the space of several months in 1656, was one out of every hundred people in Paris confined? Shifting brilliantly from Descartes and early Enlightenment thought to the founding of the Hôpital Général in Paris and the work of early psychiatrists Philippe Pinel and Samuel Tuke, Foucault focuses throughout, not only on scientific and medical analyses of madness, but also on the philosophical and cultural values attached to the mad. He also urges us to recognize the creative and liberating forces that madness represents, brilliantly drawing on examples from Goya, Nietzsche, Van Gogh and Artaud. The History of Madness is an inspiring and classic work that challenges us to understand madness, reason and power and the forces that shape them. (shrink)

We analyse the implications of classical liberal and libertarian approaches for distributive justice in the context of social welfare orderings. We study an axiom capturing a liberal non-interfering view of society, the Weak Harm Principle, whose roots can be traced back to John Stuart Mill. We show that liberal views of individual autonomy and freedom can provide consistent foundations for welfare judgements. In particular, a liberal non-interfering approach can help to adjudicate some fundamental distributive issues relative to intergenerational justice. However, (...) a strong relation is established between liberal views of individual autonomy and non-interference, and egalitarian principles in the Rawlsian tradition. (shrink)

An apparently simple answer to this question is 'diversity': there is a diversity of women readers, diversity of interests, diversity of methods and diversity of results of women reading the Bible. In this article I will discuss the complex reality of the diversity of contemporary women's reading of the Bible. I will discuss women readers under two headings, namely the everyday, non-academic reader on the one hand, and the professional, academically trained biblical exegete on the other. I will first suggest (...) a general comparison of these two groups before I treat each one in greater detail. Finally, I will offer a reading of a story about a woman from the Gospel of Mark that draws on feminist hermeneutics to read for a meaning that liberates women from a burdensome, conventional reading. (shrink)

Leandra Medine indicates that she wants the Man Repeller multi-author blog to ‘serve as an open forum for women to draw their own conclusions’ instead of making ‘any sort of feministic statement’. Medine renders feminism as amorphous and an individual choice but she has been widely lauded for offering a feminist engagement in fashion. Her practices and position, as I argue throughout this article, allow her to fashion feminism, including associating feminism with the man repeller style and replacing aspects of (...) second wave and rights-based feminisms with the purportedly more equitable and liberating website ethos of choice and equality feminism. Yet in replacing ‘feministic’ critiques with promises of stylish cultural change and clothing that reportedly repels men, Medine and other Man Repeller authors elide how systemic oppression functions. This ambivalent relationship to feminism, and dearth of intersectional advocacy, prompted a backlash in 2020. Critics interrogated Medine's facile statement about #BlackLivesMatter, the company's lack of diversity and the unsuccessful restructuring of the blog. As a means of analysing Man Repeller, I employ textual analysis, feminist and queer literature and media theory. I define fashioning feminism as a collaborative and ongoing process of producing feminist positions and thinking, including the negation of certain forms of feminism. I assert that attending to the fashioning of feminism can foreground central and developing feminist theories; the appeal, unstylishness and effacement of feminism; and the connection between style and politics. This includes readers’ interrogations of Man Repeller's politics, which are occurring along with contemporary examinations of racism. Since fashioning feminism is a collaborative and ongoing process of producing feminist positions and thought, engaging with its concepts and debates can further the critical study of feminism, nurture feminist conversations and advocate for social change. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est de développer une hypothèse macrohistorique au sujet de la représentation et de la réalité du loisir qui est la suivante : aussi longtemps que l'humanité n'a disposé que d'instruments de production pré-industriels ou prétechnologiques, une représentation ou conception relativement stable du loisir a perduré à travers de nombreux siècles : son existence a été justifiée en tant que mode de vie privilégié pour les classes sociales dominantes, en parfaite dichotomie avec le travail qui était (...) l'apanage exclusif des classes dominées. À partir du moment où la révolution industrielle va transformer les modes et les rapports sociaux de production sous la direction de la bourgeoisie comme classe dominante, les formes du loisir contemporain vont apparaître comme lieu de la consommation de la richesse réalisée par le développement prodigieux des forces productives. Ce loisir contemporain, dans un premier temps, sera un privilège de la bourgeoisie comme classe dominante et une manifestation de sa domination. Dans un deuxième temps, il deviendra accessible à des couches sociales de plus en plus larges, au sein des sociétés libérales, dans le cadre de la société « dite » de consommation, pour autant que cette consommation devienne un instrument essentiel pour le développement des intérêts de la classe bourgeoise et un rouage nécessaire à la reproduction des rapports sociaux existants.The purpose of this article is to explore a macrohistorical hypothesis concerning the depiction of leisure as opposed to the reality of leisure, a hypothesis which, briefly, may be stated as follows: throughout the countless centuries during which humanity possessed only pre-industrial or pre-technological tools, there persisted a fairly stable depiction or notion of leisure; the existence of leisure was justified as a privileged way of life enjoyed by the dominant classes of society, in perfect dichotomy with work, which was associated exclusively with the dominated classes. From the moment when the industrial revolution, under the direction of the bourgeoisie as dominant class, began to transform the means of production and the social relations arising from production, contemporary forms of leisure began to make their appearance as a visible means of consuming the wealth made possible by the prodigious development of the forces of production. Initially, this contemporary leisure was revealed as a privilege of the bourgeoisie in its role as the dominant class and served to point up its position. Subsequently, in liberal societies, leisure activities became accessible to an ever-wider social group within the framework of the so-called "consumer society", in proportion with the degree to which consumerism had become an instrument necessary for the development of the interests of the bourgeois class and an essential cog wheel in the continuation of existing social relations. (shrink)

This paper extends the analysis of liberal principles in social choice recently proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani (2009a) to infinitely-lived societies. First, some novel characterisations of inegalitarian leximax social welfare relations are derived based on the Individual Benefit Principle (IBP), which incorporates a liberal, non-interfering view of society. This is surprising because the IBP does not explicitly incorporate any preference for inequality, nor does it assign priority to well-off members of society. Second, some impossibility results are derived that highlight a (...) general tension between standard fairness and efficiency axioms in social choice, and a liberal Principle of Non-Interference that generalises IBP. (shrink)

Freud’s earliest hysterical analysands reported a shared grievance about psychoanalysis: while their individual suffering was conditioned by social circumstances, Freud could not “alter these in any way.” If psychic illness is tied to repressive external conditions that the psychoanalyst cannot change, how can a method circumscribed to the individual’s inner life offer liberation, even cure? Motivated by the hysteric’s desire for a better life and Freud’s commitment to our intersubjectivity in common, contributors to this special issue consider psychoanalysis as a (...) political project that holds open the space of collective action—from the analyst’s couch to the picket line, from guerrilla psychoanalysis in revolutionary Algeria and Argentina to clinical treatment for the symptomatology of exile and homelessness. The contributors construct, critique, historicize, and reimagine psychoanalysis as grounds for universal solidarity. Contributors. Gila Ashtor, Ronjaunee Chatterjee, Alex Colston, Rachel Greenspan, Anna Kornbluh, Todd McGowan, Tracy McNulty, Ankhi Mukherjee, Fernanda Negrete, Michelle Rada, Samo Tomšič, Hannah Zeavin. (shrink)

Le Nouveau Monde Amoureux n’a été publié qu’en 1967, un siècle et demi après avoir été écrit par Fourier. Fourier y analyse la société de son temps, critiquant sévèrement le mariage monogame et l’asservissement des femmes. Il élabore un autre modèle théorique et politique de société, l’Harmonie, fondée sur la disparition du mariage monogame, la multiplication systématique des relations amoureuses de toutes natures, et une égalité absolue entre les sexes. A sa publication, l’ouvrage de Fourier est reçu avec enthousiasme, comme (...) précurseur de la « libération sexuelle ». Plutôt que comme un utopiste, un prophète ou un rêveur, Fourier peut sans doute être considéré comme un des inventeurs de la science sociale, qu’il conçoit critique et radicale. (shrink)

Michel Clare est né le 21 février 1927 à Sceaux. Études secondaires, bachelier. Résistance et séjour au Maquis de Lorris à dix-sept ans. Puis sport pour guérir des déceptions d’après la Libération : athlétisme, champion de France du 800 mètres en 1949. De nombreuses fois international. Entre à l’Equipe en 1953 où il occupe les fonctions de grand reporter et spécialiste du ski. Auteur d’un livre sur le Ski (La table ronde). Lauréat de l’Académie des Sports pour une enquête (...) sur les universités américaines et du concours du meilleur article du journalisme sportif. A couvert tous les Jeux olympiques d’hiver et d’été de cette dernière décennie. Collabore, de façon épisodique, à Esprit. (shrink)

Transform your yoga practice into a force for creating social change with this concise, eloquent guide to social justice tools and skills. Skill in Action asks you to explore the deeply transformational practice of yoga as a way to become an agent of social change and work toward a just world. Through yoga practices and philosophy, this book explores liberation for ourselves and others, while asking us to engage in our own agency-whether that manifests as activism, volunteer work, or changing (...) our relationships with others and ourselves. To provide a strong foundation to begin this work, Michelle Cassandra Johnson clearly defines power and privilege, oppression, liberation, and suffering, and invites you to make changes in your life that promote equality and freedom for all. Each chapter ends with a breathwork, asana, meditation, or interpersonal relational practice to help you incorporate this wisdom into your daily life. Each of the practices extend beyond the individual to offer resources and tools to shift institutional policies and procedures in a culture that has left all of us negatively impacted by white supremacy and social inequity. We must awaken to the injustice and suffering of marginalized communities, and we must use our voices and actions toward the liberation of all people. (shrink)

La mondialisation libère les uns et oppresse les autres. Et dans cette partition du monde, chacun est renvoyé à une identité prétendument essentielle et "vraie". D'où un véritable "piège identitaire", négation de l'autre et de sa subjectivité, parfois justifié par l'anthropologie - à l'opposé de sa vocation humaniste et critique. Face à ce défi, le regard contemporain sur le monde doit être repensé, en dépassant le relativisme culturel et ses "ontologies" identitaires. Dans ce livre, Michel Agier prend une position (...) résolument "décentrée", invitant le lecteur à reconsidérer les sens de la frontière : lieu de passage, instable et sans cesse négociée, elle nous fait humains en instituant la place et l'existence sociale de chacun tout en reconnaissant celles des autres. Le mur est son contraire : il incarne le piège identitaire contre l'altérité. Cette enquête sur l'état du monde et sa violence, sur les frontières et les murs, sur le sens des mots ("identité", "civilisation", "race", "culture") propose ainsi une réflexion originale sur la condition cosmopolite, figure à double face : d'un côté, l'étranger absolu, global et anonyme, que dessinent les politiques identitaires sous des traits effrayants ; de l'autre, le sujet-autre, celui qui, venant de l'extérieur de "mon identité", m'oblige à penser tout à la fois au monde, à moi et aux autres. En plaidant pour la validité de l'approche anthropologique, Michel Agier montre ici que pour dépasser le piège identitaire, d'autres manières de penser sont possibles. Réapprendre à passer les frontières où se trouve l'autre, à les reconnaître, est devenu l'un des enjeux majeurs de notre temps. (shrink)

We typically think of resentment as an unjustifiable and volatile emotion, responsible for fostering the worst political divisions. Recognizing Resentment argues instead that sympathy with the resentment of victims of injustice is vital for upholding justice in liberal societies, as it entails recognition of the equal moral and political status of those with whom we sympathize. Sympathizing with the resentment of others makes us alive to injustice in a way no rational recognition of wrongs alone can, and it motivates us (...) to demand justice on others' behalves. This book rehabilitates arguments for the moral and political worth of resentment developed by three influential thinkers in the early liberal tradition - Joseph Butler, David Hume, and Adam Smith - and uses these to advance a theory of spectatorial resentment, discussing why we should be indignant about the injustice others face, and how such a shared sentiment can actually bring liberal citizens closer together. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ Je veux m'attarder à trois aspects importants du Droit des gens de John Rawls. Je veux tout d'abord montrer que cette oeuvre contribue à réfuter l’interprétation erronée selon laquelle Rawls souscrirait à une conception individualiste du libéralisme. Je veux en deuxième lieu souligner l’importance d'intégrer un droit des peuples au sein de la philosophie politique libérale. Le principe de l’égalité entre les peuples peut être interprété comme ayant un corollaire, à savoir, le principe du développement égal des peuples, et (...) ce dernier principe est susceptible de nombreuses applications progressistes au niveau de la justice internationale. En troisième lieu, je veux suggérer que même si des amendements importants étaient apportés à la version initiale du Droit des gens, au point d'inclure, à l’encontre de l’opinion exprimée par Rawls, le principe de différence et d'en reconnaître l’universalité, on ne serait quand même pas en présence d'un libéralisme de type individualiste. ABSTRACT I would like to consider three important aspects of Rawls' Law of Peoples. I want to show, first, that the work serves to refute the mistaken interpretation according to which Rawls would subscribe to an individualistic interpretation of liberalism. Second, I also want to underline the importance of incorporating a law of peoples within a liberal political philosophy. The principle of equality between peoples can be interpreted as having a corollary, the principle of an equal development between peoples, and this last principle paves the way to many progressist applications at the level of international justice. Third, I want to suggest that even if amendments were made to the initial version of The Law of Peoples in such a way that, pace Rawls, it would now contain among its principles the difference principle and would recognize its universal status, the resulting approach would still not be a liberal individualism. (shrink)

This article attempts a philosophical defense of an autonomy-based approach to multicultural education. I contend that multicultural education is necessary in order for students to be able to develop personal autonomy. This, in turn, can empower students to effectively formulate their own version of the good life. The development of autonomy need not, as many critics claim, promote atomistic individualism. Rather, contemporary liberal autonomy strives for a balance between the individual and the community. In defending multicultural education, my argument relies (...) on Joseph Raz's notion of autonomy and Will Kymlicka's concept of a context of choice. I conclude that through multicultural education, students can expand their contexts of choice and consequently develop individual autonomy, an essential ingredient of the good life. (shrink)

This paper examines Richard Rorty’s “ironic liberalism,” arguing that it has no rational justitication. Rorty’s neopragmatism is first taken into account, tracing its origin and development to the political education he received in his youth. As is well known, Rorty defines himself as a liberal democrat, claiming that Westem liberal thought has produced the best form of political and social life which has ever appeared on our planet. However, if one asks why he is so positive about that, no answer (...) can be found in Rorty’s works. The paper goes on revealing Rorty’s political philosophy as a corollary of his overall meaning holism, which takes the social and political body to be a Quinean net with no center and no boundary. Resorting to a mental experiment, the paper eventually shows that Rorty’s ironic liberalism is not a position which facilitates human choice in dramatic conditions. Any totalitarian ideology rnight readily discard ironic liberalism, because it would be easy to show that its supporters cannot even argue in favor of their convictions. (shrink)

Pour la première fois, Michel Onfray prend la parole sur son initiative collective, heureuse et spectaculaire : la création, en 2002, de l'Université populaire de Caen. Pourquoi, comment, pour qui, contre quoi : armé de sa plus belle plume, enthousiaste et percutant comme jamais, il explique, défend et revendique ce projet un peu fou, devenu un incroyable succès... populaire. L'Université populaire de Caen en 2002 est avant tout une réponse à la situation politique du moment : la présence d'un (...) candidat d'extrême-droite à l'élection présidentielle. Georges Deherme avait créé les universités populaires pour instruire la classe ouvrière, en réalisant le voeu formulé par Condorcet un siècle plus tôt : développer "une instruction qui rende la raison populaire". Cette ambition suppose qu'on souscrive à deux propositions : l'ignorance enchaîne et le savoir libère. En reprenant le flambeau, Michel Onfray s'inscrit en faux contre les dogmatismes étroits, la moralisation, le formatage intellectuel de l'université française. Il revendique l'exploration de ce qu'il appelle les "marges philosophiques de l'historiographie officielle", sans élitisme ni démagogie. A la demande toujours croissante de philosophie, d'aucuns répondent par la commercialisation du savoir, d'autres par le bavardage collectif (les "cafés philo"...) ou l'infantilisation. A l'extrême opposé, le projet de Caen se fonde sur des valeurs démocratiques et libertaires : il s'agit de rassembler des "amis" (comme Epicure dans son jardin), pour partager et dialoguer avec tous ceux qui ont soif de savoir, dans un but philosophique commun : "se faire libre" (Nietzsche). (shrink)

The writings published here are not so much an epitome as episodes. But most do not digress. They mark the turns and turning points of a human style, the tropes of an expressive life embodying the changing tempos of an age. Until we fall silent, all of us are trying to say. These fragmentary efforts to speak to, rejoin, and help create a new community of liberated human beings constitute the epigraphs of Sartre's historical inscription.

The debate between liberals and communitarians has still left liberalism without a plausible ethics. The ethics of character wants to offer a solid connection between political theory and personal identity, stressing the ethical role of the invariables of character against modern subjectivist competitors, such as authenticity. At a political level the ethics of character leads us beyond resourcist conceptions of justice. Key Words: ethics of character • personal identity • virtues • well-being.

This paper examines Richard Rorty’s “ironic liberalism,” arguing that it has no rational justitication. Rorty’s neopragmatism is first taken into account, tracing its origin and development to the political education he received in his youth. As is well known, Rorty defines himself as a liberal democrat, claiming that Westem liberal thought has produced the best form of political and social life which has ever appeared on our planet. However, if one asks why he is so positive about that, no answer (...) can be found in Rorty’s works. The paper goes on revealing Rorty’s political philosophy as a corollary of his overall meaning holism, which takes the social and political body to be a Quinean net with no center and no boundary. Resorting to a mental experiment, the paper eventually shows that Rorty’s ironic liberalism is not a position which facilitates human choice in dramatic conditions. Any totalitarian ideology rnight readily discard ironic liberalism, because it would be easy to show that its supporters cannot even argue in favor of their convictions. (shrink)

Michel Foucault's The History of Sexuality-the first volume of which was published in 1976-exerts a vast influence across the humanities and social sciences. However, Foucault's interest in the history of sexuality began as early as the 1960s, when he taught two courses on the subject. These lectures offer crucial insight into the development of Foucault's thought yet have remained unpublished until recently. This book presents Foucault's lectures on sexuality for the first time in English. In the first series, held (...) at the University of Clermont-Ferrand in 1964, Foucault asks how sexuality comes to be constituted as a scientific body of knowledge within Western culture and why it derived from the analysis of "perversions"-morbidity, homosexuality, fetishism. The subsequent course, held at the experimental university at Vincennes in 1969, shows how Foucault's theories were reoriented by the events of May 1968; he refocuses on the regulatory nature of the discourse of sexuality and how it serves economic, social, and political ends. Examining creators of political and literary utopias in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from Sade to Fourier to Marcuse, who attempted to integrate "natural" sexualities, including transgressive forms, into social and economic life, Foucault elaborates a double critique of the naturalization and the liberation of sexuality. Together, the lectures span a range of interests, from abnormality to heterotopias to ideology, and they offer an unprecedented glimpse into the evolution of Foucault's transformative thinking on sexuality. (shrink)

Qu’en est-il pour nous aujourd’hui de la prétention au savoir absolu dont la Phénoménologie de l’Esprit se voulait la justification ? Renvoie-t-elle encore à la clôture sur soi du discours dont ont parlé tant d’interprètes ? L’analyse de la représentation religieuse, celle de la belle âme, ne peuvent-elles au contraire être comprises comme une mise en question de toute métaphysique de la subjectivité ? En sorte que, loin d’être le comble du dogmatisme métaphysique, la Phénoménologie chercherait à nous en libérer, (...) comme le soutiennent des lectures telles que celles de R. Brandom, R. Pippin ou T. Pinkard.What means for us today the claim to absolute knowledge the Phenomenology of Spirit wanted to justify ? Is it still referring to the closure of discourse so many commentators have been talking about ? On the contrary, the way in which representation and beautiful soul are analyzed couldn’t it be understood as a way of questioning any metaphysics of the subjectivity ? Thus, far from bringing the metaphysical dogmatism to a climax, the Phenomenology would be an attempt to free us from it, just as readers like R. Brandom, R. Pippin or T. Pinkard point it out. (shrink)

Jean-Michel Rabaté uses Nietzsche's image of a "pathos of distance," the notion that certain values cannot originate in a community but are created by a few gifted and lofty individuals, as the basis for a wide-ranging investigation into the ethics of the moderns. The expression of "pathos of distance" impressed would-be modernists like the American James Huneker and the Irish poet W. B. Yeats as they confronted the new in the arts. Later, it helped Deleuze and Barthes make sense (...) of modernity when they tried to tease out all the implications of "distance." Despite Benjamin criticism of Nietzsche's doctrine of the "eternal return of the same" in the Arcades Project, in his "Theses on the Philosophy of History" Benjamin envisions a redeemed history that follows Nietzsche's basic intuition about the need to make every moment count for history. By first establishing this unlikely meeting of Nietzsche and Benjamin through their ideas of history and ethics, Rabaté is able then to provide an original genealogy for the ethics of the modern, moving through figures and moments as varied as Yeats and the birth of Irish Modernism, the ethics of courage in Virginia Woolf, Rilke, Apollinaire, and others in 1910, Gide and Genet's ethical impulse to combine erotic liberation with the motivation for political revolution, and Derrida's reading of Joyce's Ulysses and a modern mode of writing that sought to get closer to the senses. The result is a fascinating critique of Nietzsche, Benjamin, affect theory, and the origins of the ethics of modernism. (shrink)

L’inégalité est une thématique sociale, abordée de façon récurrente dans les médias. Appliquant une approche de « sémantique discursive », nous examinerons l’usage d’inégalité dans le discours de presse en circonscrivant les principales dimensions sémantiques du nom à travers ses fonctionnements préférentiels en cotexte, étroit ou élargi. Après quelques questionnements sémantico-référentiels autour du mot, l’étude du corpus – constitué d’articles issus des journaux Le Monde, Libération et Le Figaro – montrera qu’inégalité fonctionne, à la fois, comme un lieu d’observation, d’évaluation (...) et de revendication. L’analyse conduit également à penser que l’usage partagé et consensuel du segment lutte contre les inégalités dans le corpus fait apparaître une forme de « langue de bois ». (shrink)

In this interview M. Riot-Sarcey returns to a number of marginalized figures in labour history. Against the domination of the form of the party, as established since the end of the 19th century, which discounts the hypothesis of the proletariat’s ability to liberate itself, the author re-emphasises here the vitality of the forms of worker self-organization that had preceded the hegemony of the party, in particular after 1848 and the disillusionment of the labour movement regarding the republic. These autonomous worker (...) organizations constituted the site for the exercise of a collective liberty, the modality of which was a fraternity, that is, a form of mutual assistance coupled with the acknowledgement of a plurality of capacities. In the face of the entrenchment of naturalized categories, M. Riot-Sarcey’s intention here is to explore a series of dissonant voices, in particular those of rebel women who seized on the opportunity of the revolution in order to destabilize established norms. Against the imposition of a consensual version of the political discourse (Republic, Fraternity) the author invites us to reactivate the repressed potentialities of these terms. She envisages her work as a historian as a reactivation of those past experiences which have been marginalized by the party through the naturalization of categories and the imposition of a consensual reading. This marginalized memory is a resource for present-day struggles. (shrink)

John Locke's educational program has long been considered to have two primary aims: to habituate children to reason and to raise children capable of meeting the demands of citizenship that he details in his Two Treatises of Government. Yet Locke's educational prescriptions undermine citizens’ capacity for honesty, a critical political virtue for Locke. To explain how Locke's educational prescriptions are self-undermining, we turn to Rousseau's extended critique of Locke's Some Thoughts on Education in his Émile. We argue that Rousseau explains (...) why such an education allows a natural desire to dominate to flourish, rendering children who receive it dishonest and incapable of self-government. Rousseau's critique exposes how a liberal education focused solely on autonomy cannot produce the kinds of citizens a Lockean politics requires. (shrink)

Critical theory and critical thinking emphasize the power of self-reflection and educative analysis where students in higher education become motivated to change their present societal reality by being strategic and action orientated. Central to these theories is the enlistment of strategies that utilize educational vehicles infused with critical thinking to engage students in the process of intensive evaluation of the theory, values, knowledge and skiIls of their respective fields with the often transformative impact upon a student’s worldviews. This article reviews (...) the theoretical and historical tenets of ctitical theory and its interdependence and reinforcing relationship with critical thinking. An illustration is offered that represents the cyclical and often transformative relationship between critical theory and critical thinking. Along with a definition of critical thinking there is a discussion of the difference between critical thinking and other forms of thinking. Last, at the core of the article will be suggestions for designing trans disciplinary teaching methods based upon Freire’s critical consciousness with an emphasis upon an instructor’s self-evaluative, liberating stance towards education. Strategies will be introduced that engage students in the act of intensive critical thinking becomes transformative. (shrink)

This paper sketches a brief account of multiculturalism in order to distinguish it from other positions that have been under attack recently. Following this, we address two prevalent and diametrically opposed criticisms of multiculturalism, namely, that multiculturalism is relativistic, on the one hand, and that it is absolutist, on the other. Both of these criticisms, we argue, simply mask liberal democratic theory's myth- begotten attempt to resolve the tension between the one and the many. Multiculturalism challenges the myths of meritocracy (...) and abstract individualism which underlie liberalism; properly understood, it evades the criticisms often hurled at it. (shrink)

La méthode réflexive caractérise une psychologie, métaphysique du sujet, qui n’imite pas les sciences d’objet et par laquelle la philosophie dépasse la simple conscience de soi déjà éveillée au monde et à soi, redoublant ainsi cet éveil pour accomplir l’homme en l’homme. Lagneau remonte à la source de l’évidence et rien n’est plus difficile, parce qu’alors la pensée ne peut plus compter sur l’évidence pour se comprendre. La philosophie ainsi pratiquée n’est rien en dehors de la réflexion en acte, jamais (...) elle ne se fige en doctrine. C’est pourquoi il n’y a pas ce qu’on pourrait appeler une philosophie de Lagneau, mais seulement ses cours pieusement transcrits par des élèves. Cette idée de la philosophie fonde une pratique de la lecture des grands philosophes qui les met en dialogue et ainsi leur redonne vie, les libérant des préjugés qui trop souvent les caricaturent. (shrink)

Sur les années 68, Martine Storti nous a déjà livré deux livres de type autobiographique, Un Chagrin politique, paru en 1996, et 32 jours de mai, en 2006. J’ai donc ouvert avec curiosité ce nouvel ouvrage en me demandant bien ce qu’elle pourrait nous dire de neuf à l’occasion de la célébration des 40 ans du MLF. L’essentiel n’est pas dans l’avant-propos ou dans les introductions des textes, classés par année, qui offrent un récit dans l’ensemble convenu et une impression (...) de déjà lu. Mais l’in... (shrink)

Malgré l’ample libération de la puissance de la pensée qui s’opère en l’oeuvre de Léon Brunschvicg, celle-ci n’est cependant pas pleinement restituée à ellemême. Pourquoi ne l’est-elle pas? Telle est l’interrogation de cette étude. Elle montre d’abord les modalités restrictives sur lesquelles la vie de la conscience bute. Les deux entraves non défaites – l’identification de la pensée à la conscience et de nous au « pour nous » – proviennent directement d’une reprise implicite de l’aristotélisme. Dans un rapport ambigu, (...) Brunschvicg dénonce certaines thèses d’Aristote et en reprend d’autres, les plus fondamentales. L’étude s’achève sur l’esquisse des conditions d’une rupture réelle avec le néo-aristotélisme, le désensevelissement de la puissance du penser donc, « l’excès du représentatif ». (shrink)