This article is aimed at Foucauldian scholars and seeks to introduce them to ethnographic works that interrogate neoliberal governmentalities. As an analytic category ‘neoliberalism’ has over the last two decades helpfully illuminated connections between seemingly unrelated social changes occurring at multiple scales. Even earlier —in his College de France 1978-9 Birth of Biopolitics lectures, to be precise—Foucault began his engagement with neoliberalism as a dominant political force. Despite being more than three decades old, Foucault’s analysis of neoliberal rationalities remains fresh (...) and insightful, which perhaps explains why scholars inspired by his analytics of governmentality have been able to make major contributions to the current social science literature on neoliberalism. However, there are increasing concerns that governmentality scholars succumb to a more general tendency among social scientists to present neoliberal transformations in monolithic and linear terms. This article critically reviews contributions from a small but growing group of neo-Foucauldian researchers that avoid these tendencies. These researchers investigate the changes wrought by neoliberalism through methodologies that involve combining an analytics of governmentality with ethnographic and quasi-ethnographic methods, and in doing so they avoid deterministic, homogenous and static accounts of social transformation. By beginning with the “everyday,” these works reject the idea that neoliberal governmentality forms a coherent apparatus. Instead these ethnographies of neoliberal governmentalities focus on governmental ensembleges that link neoliberal political rationalities with non-liberal rationalities, and they explore how neoliberal thought and practice is transformed across time and space. (shrink)

This paper provides new insights into the food security performance of long and short food chains, through an analysis of the resilience of such chains during the severe weather events that occurred in the Australian State of Queensland in early 2011. Widespread flooding cut roads and highways, isolated towns, and resulted in the deaths of people and animals. Farmlands were inundated and there were food shortages in many towns. We found clear evidence that the supermarket-based food chain delivery system experienced (...) significant difficulties in supplying food to flood-affected towns. In contrast, more localized food supply chains—which relied upon supply from growers in peri-urban areas and community-based food initiatives—remained largely intact, and provided food at a time when the supermarkets were limited in their ability to respond to consumer demand. However, on closer examination of food distribution during flooding in the regional city of Rockhampton and in the State capital, Brisbane, the demarcation of success between “long” and “short” food chains became blurred. Both types of food supply chains shared some key resilience characteristics in responding to crisis but diverged in other important ways. We argue that conceptualizing food chains in terms of key elements of resilience—scale, diversity, flexibility and cohesion—may be more fruitful than the short-long dichotomy alone. This approach is particularly useful when prioritizing food security as the basis for evaluating food system sustainability in a context of predicted increases in extreme weather events and future climate change. (shrink)

In the Second Treatise of Government, Locke clearly intends to construct a political order that limits the harm a tyrannical ruler can do, but his account of prerogative also effectively limits the good a ruler can do. If political and paternal power are distinct, then the standard for legitimate rule is not the public good but the good as the public understands it. The significance of this distinction becomes clear when we recognize Locke’s pessimism about our ability to adequately judge (...) the public good. Locke’s reliance on the public’s judgment as the final authority, despite his expectation that we will judge badly, can be explained in practical or pedagogical terms. He further suggests that the limits to a ruler’s power follow from inherent limits on what human beings can know about the good. (shrink)

In the Second Treatise of Government, Locke clearly intends to construct a political order that limits the harm a tyrannical ruler can do, but his account of prerogative also effectively limits the good a ruler can do. If political and paternal power are distinct, then the standard for legitimate rule is not the public good but the good as the public understands it. The significance of this distinction becomes clear when we recognize Locke’s pessimism about our ability to adequately judge (...) the public good. Locke’s reliance on the public’s judgment as the final authority, despite his expectation that we will judge badly, can be explained in practical or pedagogical terms. He further suggests that the limits to a ruler’s power follow from inherent limits on what human beings can know about the good. (shrink)

This rich and varied collection of essays addresses some of the most fundamental human questions through the lenses of philosophy, literature, religion, politics, and theology. Peter Augustine Lawler and Dale McConkey have fashioned an interdisciplinary consideration of such perennial and enduring issues as the relationship between nature and history, nature and grace, reason and revelation, classical philosophy and Christianity, modernity and postmodernity, repentance and self-limitation, and philosophy and politics.

John Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education emphasizes the need to develop the habit of rationally judging which desires should be fulfilled. While nurture plays an essential role in this development, nature provides the fundamental desire for self-preservation, the end in light of which reason makes its judgments. The significance of this natural element in Lockean virtue has generally been overlooked, but it becomes clear through a comparison to Aristotelian virtue. Locke rejects any virtue that would require changing our most basic (...) desires, and he does so as part of his rejection of a political order designed for such education. Locke’s account of education is not purely transformative; rather, it is intended to prevent the transformation that would be part of an Aristotelian moral education. (shrink)