In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:138 In 2010 the city of Colorado Springs was strapped for cash. Government officials announced that they would either have to raise revenue through increased taxation or cut public services—­ in some cases rather severely—­ including, perhaps, police and fire protection, and even more basic bits of municipal infrastructure. The city shut down one-­ third of residential streetlights and closed public restrooms. Citi­ zens were outraged, but a majority (...) of voters had recently defeated a proposed tax increase. It’s tempting to suppose that the city was trying to teach its citizens a lesson: if you want public services, you have to be willing to pay for them. Colorado Springs is, and has been for some time now, a died-­in-­the-­wool small-­government, anti-­tax-­increase, fiscally conservative town. As Colorado Springs resident Bo Sharifi put it, “As soon as I hear government [say] ‘Oh, we need more money’... I guess I kind of automatically assume there’s probably some other things you could probably cut before firemen, policemen, city lights and that sort of thing.”1 On the surface, that seems reasonable. So... what comes to mind? How about food stamps? What about WIC? Of course these are federal services, not funded by Coloradans alone. There’s government, and then there’s government. Well, how about... well... what? Doesn’t the government spend money on all sorts of things we could very easily do without? Perhaps. Isn’t it part of our job to know or to decide which things these are? If we don’t trust government, even more obviously we don’t trust it with our money, though we pretty clearly have no idea how public funds are actually allocated or spent. When asked whether he remembered the proposed tax increase that the city had voted against, Sharifi replied, “maybe.” Bo and his wife were charged $125 to have Connected: How Trains, Genes, Pineapples, Piano Keys, and a Few Disasters Transformed Americans at the Dawn of the Twentieth Century By Steven Cassedy Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014 JOHN MARIANA Book Reviews 139 their streetlight turned back on. Bo’s wife Sara viewed this as extortion. “By shoveling out a hundred dollars to turn on a streetlight that we kind of felt was supposed to be on anyway, that it was giving them what they wanted,” she said. They who? One resident wrote the city of Colorado Springs a check for $300 to turn the lights on for his entire neighborhood. City Councilwoman Jan Martin pointed out to him that the total cost to the individual Colorado Springs taxpayer to keep the streetlights on—­and to fund the maintenance of public parks and medians, as well as community centers and pre-­recession-­level police and fire services—­by approving the tax increase would have been: $200. He replied that he would never vote for a tax increase. In other words, as the reporter who covered the story (Robert Smith) observed, he would rather pay more to keep the streetlights on in his own neighborhood than to pay for all city services combined. Smith remarked that “Colorado Springs was stepping away from one of the things that we take for granted in most American cities: that we’re all in it together—­ at least when it comes to basic services.”2 As near as I can tell, this is the moral of Steven Cassedy’s exceptionally timely Connected: that we’re all in it together. For much of the book Cassedy merely traces the history of the emergence in the consciousness of ordinary Americans of the concept of the social network, but he is not so much talking about the notion of a network society as such, as I understand him. Or, at any rate, the network society as such is not really his main concern. He is talking about the idea of social, political, national, and ultimately global and universal human interconnectedness that was a distinct product of the complex networked structures (both concrete and abstract) that came to constitute modern American life in the twentieth century (and of course life pretty much everywhere ), and about our understanding of ourselves as so networked.3 On this... (shrink)

Há uma filosofia da diferença que precisa ser mais considerada nos nossos tempos, visto que se opõe à tradição filosófica identitária dos pré-socráticos à atualidade, que se apegou obstinadamente à ideia de identidade, que vislumbra o real, somente através da referência ao idêntico. Nessa perspectiva, os anseios e peculiaridades dos mais diversos movimentos sociais precisam ser ouvidos de modo mais efetivo pela filosofia e pela ciência. Mesmo nas ciências exatas, a teoria não é eterna, quanto mais nas sociais aplicadas, como (...) é na ciência da informação, e consequentemente, na organização do conhecimento. Posto isto, este trabalho tem como objetivo inter-relacionar alguns aspectos históricos da epistemologia geral com as epistemologias feministas, destacando-se a corrente pós-estruturalista. E assim, compreendermos alguns dos seus desdobramentos na organização do conhecimento, a fim de percebermos se ela está disposta a incorporar novas práticas, a partir de reinvindicações de movimentos, como o feminista. Constatamos que além de toda historicidade das relações de poder que tem raízes profundas e muito antigas, há nos dias hodiernos um grupo despreocupado em ratificar novas práticas mais humanizadas e coerentes às várias esferas, dentre as quais está a organização do conhecimento, por questões não só políticas, mas econômicas. (shrink)

Abstract:Jessica Elkayam asks Mariana Ortega about the influence both Latina feminisms and Martin Heidegger have had on the development of Ortega's mestiza theory.

This original study intertwining Latina feminism, existential phenomenology, and race theory offers a new philosophical approach to understanding selfhood and identity. Focusing on writings by Gloría Anzaldúa, María Lugones, and Linda Martín Alcoff, Mariana Ortega articulates a phenomenology that introduces a conception of selfhood as both multiple and singular. Her Latina feminist phenomenological approach can account for identities belonging simultaneously to different worlds, including immigrants, exiles, and inhabitants of borderlands. Ortega’s project forges new directions not only in Latina feminist (...) thinking on such issues as borders, mestizaje, marginality, resistance, and identity politics, but also connects this analysis to the existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger and to such concepts as being-in-the-world, authenticity, and intersubjectivity. The pairing of the personal and the political in Ortega’s work is illustrative of the primacy of lived experience in the development of theoretical understandings of who we are. In addition to bringing to light central metaphysical issues regarding the temporality and continuity of the self, Ortega models a practice of philosophy that draws from work in other disciplines and that recognizes the important contributions of Latina feminists and other theorists of color to philosophical pursuits. (shrink)

SummaryThis article focuses on the analysis of sensibility in the works of three major late eighteenth-century philosophers: Smith, Cabanis and the young Wilhelm von Humboldt. It analyses to what extent Smith's concept of sympathy influenced Cabanis in France and Humboldt in Germany. It argues that modern anthropology, based on a specific theory of sensibility, assumes a strong connection between knowledge acquisition and life in society. This article reveals the strong links between the three authors which were made possible precisely because (...) of their common philosophical background. It proves, for the first time, that Humboldt had access to Condillac's ideas before 1798, since in an early work on the state, the former makes numerous borrowings from speeches Cabanis wrote for Mirabeau, which were in turn strongly influenced by Condillac. (shrink)

Draws from Latina feminism, existential phenomenology, and race theory to explore the concept of selfhood. This original study intertwining Latina feminism, existential phenomenology, and race theory offers a new philosophical approach to understanding selfhood and identity. Focusing on writings by Gloría Anzaldúa, María Lugones, and Linda Martín Alcoff, Mariana Ortega articulates a phenomenology that introduces a conception of selfhood as both multiple and singular. Her Latina feminist phenomenological approach can account for identities belonging simultaneously to different worlds, including immigrants, (...) exiles, and inhabitants of borderlands. Ortega’s project forges new directions not only in Latina feminist thinking on such issues as borders, mestizaje, marginality, resistance, and identity politics, but also connects this analysis to the existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger and to such concepts as being-in-the-world, authenticity, and intersubjectivity. The pairing of the personal and the political in Ortega’s work is illustrative of the primacy of lived experience in the development of theoretical understandings of who we are. In addition to bringing to light central metaphysical issues regarding the temporality and continuity of the self, Ortega models a practice of philosophy that draws from work in other disciplines and that recognizes the important contributions of Latina feminists and other theorists of color to philosophical pursuits. Mariana Ortega is Professor of Philosophy at John Carroll University and coeditor (with Linda Martín Alcoff) of Constructing the Nation: A Race and Nationalism Reader, also published by SUNY Press. (shrink)

In Speculum of the Other Woman, Luce Irigaray argues that “any theory of the subject has always been appropriated by the masculine.” This paper offers an analysis of Irigaray's critique of subjectivity and examines the psychological mechanism referred to as “the phallic economy of castration.” A different way of conceiving the relation between subject and object is explored by imagining a new subject of desire.

Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance: Chronotopes of Law develops a post-metaphysical framework for analyzing the spatio-temporal workings of law and other forms of governance. In this regard, it does not seek merely to combine analyses of legal temporality carried out by anthropologists with analyses of law and space carried out by geographers and socio-legal scholars. Adding two metaphysical abstractions together does not produce anything but somewhat more complex, but equally metaphysical, abstractions. After Kant, 'time' and 'space' are simply categories of human (...) understanding, not metaphysical entities. And, in this book Mariana Valverde develops an anti-metaphysical theoretical approach to law that aims not to theorize the world in general, but rather to be useful to researchers who seek to shed light on the actual workings of law and other forms of governance. Written by one of the foremost theorists in the area, this theoretically innovative work constitutes a major contribution to contemporary studies in law and society. (shrink)

"El libro tiene dos grandes temas: la identidad cultural, sobre la que se expresan opiniones balanceadas entre los extremos posibles, y la 'liberacion social', entendida en general como liberacion con respecto a estructuras opresivas. El itinerario de e.

Plato’s Parmenides is one of the main sources to reconstruct Zeno’s ideas. It has usually been held that Plato presents him there as a follower of Parmenides, whose book intends to defend his master’s argument against those who try to ridicule it. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that Plato never presents Zeno as an advocate of monism, but rather as an expert on the antilogikètékhne, which is used by him to examine and refute pluralism as well as (...) monism. In order to prove this hypothesis, I will consider first the testimony of the Phaedrus, and specially Phdr. 261d6–8 (dk 29 a 13), where Plato explains some characteristics of the antilogiké that are essential to understand the goals of Zeno’s method. Then I will analyze some passages of the Parmenides (Prm. 127a7-d5, 128a1-e4, dk 29 a 11–12; 127d6-128a1; 135d3-6; 136a4-b6; 136e1-4) to show how this method is presented as an intellectual gymnastic, which could be considered as a propaedeutic for the acquisition of truth and knowledge. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to analyze the notion of “loving, knowing ignorance,” a type of “arrogant perception” that produces ignorance about women of color and their work at the same time that it proclaims to have both knowledge about and loving perception toward them. The first part discusses Marilyn Frye's accounts of “arrogant” as well as of “loving” perception and presents an explanation of “loving, knowing ignorance.” The second part discusses the work of Audre Lorde, Elizabeth Spelman, and (...) María Lugones in their attempts to deal with the issue of arrogant perception within feminism, and examines how Lugones's notion of “‘world’-traveling” may help us deal with “loving, knowing ignorance.” Ultimately, the author suggests that we need to become aware of instances of “loving, knowing ignorance,” especially if we are to stay true to Third Wave feminism's commitment to diversity. (shrink)

In times of crises, public health leaders may claim that trials of public health interventions are unethical. One reason for this claim can be that equipoise—i.e. a situation of uncertainty and/or disagreement among experts about the evidence regarding an intervention—has been disturbed by a change of collective expert views. Some might claim that equipoise is disturbed if the majority of experts believe that emergency public health interventions are likely to be more beneficial than harmful. However, such beliefs are not always (...) justified: where high quality research has not been conducted, there is often considerable residual uncertainty about whether interventions offer net benefits. In this essay we argue that high-quality research, namely by means of well-designed randomized trials, is ethically obligatory before, during, and after implementing policies in public health emergencies (PHEs). We contend that this standard applies to both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions, and we elaborate an account of equipoise that captures key features of debates in the recent pandemic. We build our case by analyzing research strategies employed during the COVID-19 pandemic regarding drugs, vaccines, and non-pharmaceutical interventions; and by providing responses to possible objections. Finally, we propose a public health policy reform: whenever a policy implemented during a PHE is not grounded in high-quality evidence that expected benefits outweigh harms, there should be a planned approach to generate high-quality evidence, with review of emerging data at preset time points. These preset timepoints guarantee that policymakers pause to review emerging evidence and consider ceasing ineffective or even harmful policies, thereby improving transparency and accountability, as well as permitting the redirection of resources to more effective or beneficial interventions. (shrink)

s. A: KIuPKB entwickelte in einer einheitIichen Systematik vollstlindige Interpretationen fiir viele Systeme der Modalitatenlogik, die vorber nur syn­ taktisch fixiert waren. Hiermit ergab sich auf dem Wege tiber eine quantoren­ logische Erweiterung des Modalitatensystems S4 zugleich eine Semantik fUr die intuitionistische Priidikatenlogik:. Der vorliegende Ergebnisbericht behandelt im Rahmen der klassischen Priidikatenlogik: zwei Modalitatensysteme, deren aussagenlogische Teile mit den Systemen M von v. WRIGHT und S4 von LEWIS tibereinstimmen. Es gibt verschiedene Moglichkeiten, aussagenlogische Modalitatensysteme quantoren­ logisch zu erweitem. Die hier (...) gewiihlten Erweiterungen sind in einer nabe­ liegenden Weise so vorgenommen, daB die Barcan-Formel (Seite 7) ungiiltig, aber ihre Umkehrung giiltig ist. Fiir die Kripke-Semantik dieser Systeme wird im m. Kapitel ein Voll­ stlindigkeitsbeweis nach den Methoden von KIuPKE [13] durchgefiihrt. Bin einfacherer Vollstiindigkeitsbeweis, der aber wesentIich weniger konstruktiv ist, wird in § 4 in Verallgemeinerung der Methode von HENKIN [7] gegeben. Durch eine Binbettung der intuitionistischen Priidikatenlogik: in das quan­ torenlogische Modalitatensystem S4' flihrt die Semantik des Systems S4' zur Kripke-Semantik der intuitionistischen Priidikatenlogik. Diese Semantik wird im V. Kapitel systematisch behandelt und im VI. Kapitel (iihnlich wie in KIuPKB [J3D mit der Semantik von BETH in Beziehung gebracht. (shrink)

Features of threatening cues and the associated context influence the perceived imminence of threat and the defensive responses evoked. To provide additional knowledge about how the directionality of a threat (i.e. directed-towards or away from the viewer) might impact defensive responses in humans, participants were shown pictures of a man carrying a gun (threat) or nonlethal object (neutral) directed-away from or towards the participant. Cardiac and electrodermal responses were collected. Compared to neutral images, threatening images depicting a gun directed-towards the (...) participant induced sustained bradycardia and an increased electrodermal response, interpreted as immobility under attack. This defensive immobility reaction is evoked by high perceived threat and inescapable situations and indicates intense action preparation. Pictures of guns directed-away from the participant induced shorter bradycardia and no significant modulation of the electrodermal response compared to neutral pictures, which might be consistent with the perception of a less threatening situation. The results show that the directionality of threat stimuli is a key factor that prompts different patterns of defensive responses. (shrink)

The overall aim of this project is to provide an explanation of Dasein that takes into account both Dasein's social and individual characters as well as both Division I and II of Being and Time. Chapter 1 provides an exposition of the existentialia of Dasein which illustrate the difference between Heidegger's characterization of human beings as Dasein and the traditional Cartesian epistemic subject. Chapter 2 analyzes the roles of das Man and Mitsein, the existential structures that are key in explaining (...) Dasein's social character. Furthermore, this chapter provides an account of what the individual character of Dasein amounts to, given that Dasein is an entity that has both das Man and Mitsein as part of its existential make-up. Chapter 3 concentrates on the important notion of authenticity or what Heidegger calls resoluteness. It addresses Heidegger's puzzling claims that authentic Being-one's-Self is a modification of das Man and that the das Man self is an existentiell modification of the authentic self. Lastly, Chapter 4 studies the role that the notion of choice plays in Heidegger's existential analytic as well as the relationship that an authentic Dasein has to history. ;In conclusion, this work shows that recent interpretations which portray Dasein as a being that is primarily social and that is completely defined by the norms of its community do not do justice to the fact that Dasein has an individual character which is a key element in its ontological make-up as well as in its ontic involvements, more specifically, in the ways in which, as authentic, it can appropriate the history of its community. In the end, we are left with a picture in which Dasein cannot be seen as wholly dominated by its sociality or as completely individualistic, but as an entity whose existential structure involves a social as well as an individual character, both of which contribute to its being-in-the-world. (shrink)

How to communicate with "the other" who is culturally different from oneself is one of the greatest challenges facing North-South relations. This paper builds on existential-phenomenological and poststructuralist concepts of alterity and difference to strengthen the position of Latina and other subaltern speakers in North-South dialogue. It defends a postcolonial approach to feminist theory as a basis for negotiating culturally differentiated feminist positions in this age of accelerated globalization, migration, and displacement.

It matters that we learn to walk our brave decolonizing talks. … Coalitions that are productive are based on principled associations of mutual understanding and respect, not just declarations of solidarity that mean well but because of privileges of class, "race" or ethnicity, gender, and sexuality do not engage the work of transforming such subjectivity.Silences, when heard, become the negotiating spaces for the decolonizing subject.In this article I reflect about "decolonial woes"—not the misfortunes and distress that are associated with expressions (...) such as "woe is me" but a kind of affliction that is inherent in resistant academic practices that despite their being resistant, even radical and transformative, are... (shrink)

Este artículo revisita la crisis argentina de 2001 a través de un análisis de las disputas en torno al significante “crisis” en los discursos de los dirigentes políticos del periodo 1999-2003, desde una perspectiva que articula el pensamiento político posfundacional y el análisis del discurso argumentativo. Como resultado, se identifica allí un proceso desarticulación-rearticulación de consensos sobre lo posible y lo deseable en relación con la propia crisis (causas, alcances, soluciones) y con la configuración del tiempo de lo común (en (...) dos niveles, el de la narrativa histórica y el del tiempo ontológico). Finalmente, se ofrece una clave interpretativa que vincula el proceso de pérdida de legitimidad de la palabra política que caracterizó al periodo con el carácter anti-política que comporta la forma inevitabilista de concebir el tiempo de lo común. (shrink)

Este texto se sitúa en la juntura de los feminismos del sur que señalaron el encubrimiento de la heterogeneidad de las mujeres indo-afro-latino-americanas. Desde las cadencias y los ritmos de las voces de mujeres de Nuestra América cuyos saberes interrumpen, disrumpen e intervienen muestra que los problemas del feminismo blanco burgués del norte no son los de todas las mujeres puesto que algunas mujeres escapan a la fragilidad femenina que justifica el paternalismo y los micromachismos dentro y fuera de la (...) academia, incluso dentro y fuera de la misma clase, etnia o generación. Desde los feminismos del sur se propone habilitar un diálogo entre/con “las otras” de nosotras no sólo para articular teóricamente y coalicionar políticamente nudos epistémicos que pongan en crisis el modelo de la representación y con ello una revisión del punto de vista, sino también para desmontar, paralelamente desde la ontología relacional que suponen, el privilegio epistemológico, la violencia epistémica y el extractivisimo académico que ubica y posiciona a unas sobre otras en la reproducción de “las otras de nosotras”. A partir de los posicionamientos de María Lugones, Rita Segato, Aura Cumes, Lorena Cabnal y Julieta Paredes, se propone visibilizar los nudos epistemológicos venidos de los feminismos comunitarios e indígenas que habilitan ampliaciones metodológicas desde las que podrían configurarse una historia de las resistencias de las mujeres de Latinoamérica en la exterioridad de los paradigmas euronortecentrados. (shrink)

It's time that philosophers read Gloria Anzaldúa as a philosopher. Scholars have been hinting at it for some time, but in describing her they still tend to choose the terms “theorist,” “feminist,” and “thinker” instead of “philosopher.” Anzaldúa fits into all of these categories, but from her notes, we know that Anzaldúa also thought of herself as a philosopher. In 2002, for instance, she called herself a “feminist‐visionary‐spiritual‐activist‐poet‐philosopher fiction writer.” This essay argues that we should grant Anzaldúa's wish to be (...) considered a philosopher in addition to the other appellations, and focuses on works that she read and wrote in the first half of her scholarly career, including the publication of Borderlands/La Frontera in 1987. The evidence for the claim that Anzaldúa thought of herself as a philosopher is mostly archival, but some of it also appears in her published works. Once philosophers explicitly begin to recognize Anzaldúa as a philosopher, comparisons between her and other already recognized philosophers will become fuller and bear more fruit. (shrink)

This article calls for an examination of the spectral operations of the perceptual architecture of colonization in conjunction with the enactment of a decolonial feminism as proposed by María Lugones. The first section discusses both the notion of ghostly subjectivity from Lugones's early work as well as the echoes of this notion in her recent work on the coloniality of gender that emphasizes the gender/race/sex nexus. Subsequently, through a photographic example, the article presents an analysis of the perceptual operations of (...) specter‐making in practices of colonization in light of Lugones's understanding of the “light” and “dark” sides of the coloniality of gender. This analysis highlights not only the intricate nexus between racialization and gender and sex norms both in the past and in the present context, but it also points to the necessity for of a decolonial feminism attuned to perceptual practices or a decolonial aesthesis. (shrink)

Este artículo propone abordar los archivos de inteligencia desde una perspectiva archivística incorporándola a modo de sistema de interpretación a partir de utilizar sus principios y algunos de los conceptos y procedimientos que la integran. Para ello, presenta brevemente el lugar que han ocupado las demandas por memoria, verdad y justicia en la identificación y puesta a la consulta de documentación de inteligencia en la Argentina; desarrolla la especificidad del marco conceptual archivístico para pensar la producción, gestión e investigación de (...) este tipo de documentos; realiza un recorrido por los diferentes casos de archivos de inteligencia de los que se tiene conocimiento; analiza las consecuencias que las formas de conceptualizar el Archivo han tenido sobre las tareas de gestión e investigación; y problematiza las posibilidades de indagación sobre los mismos. De esa manera, se busca destacar la importancia de valorar los conceptos referidos a la principal y primera tarea de tratamiento archivístico: la identificación; a los fines de focalizar la mirada en cuestiones vinculadas a las posibilidades de recuperar el contexto de producción de los documentos y, de esa manera, habilitar la lectura de la información literal que portan los registros en diálogo con sus contextos. Entendiendo que es a partir de ello que se abre la posibilidad de que los documentos puedan servir tanto como fuente para la historia, como para la memoria institucional y/o para la garantía en el ejercicio de derechos de todas y todos. (shrink)

The aim of my dissertation is to show that Plato’s metaphysics in the Laws (Chapter 1) commits him to particular accounts of virtues (Chapter 2) and political leadership (Chapter 3). In the first chapter, I show that Laws X contains a metaphysical-cosmological theory that is directly relevant to Plato’s discussion of virtue. With this proposal, I reject the assumption that Plato’s Laws does not contain any extended discussion of metaphysics. I develop this argument by attending to a puzzling passage that, (...) I think, has not received the attention it deserves: in X 896d-e Plato seems to talk of a good and a bad cosmic soul. Given his theological-cosmological commitments, it seems inconceivable that he takes there to be a bad cosmic soul. This passage, I argue, makes sense once we attend to the immediately preceding text. This text contains a comprehensive metaphysical account of movement in the universe. Plato presents ten kinds of movement, among them “Other Movement” and “Self/Other Movement.” Only the Self/Other Movement of the cosmic soul is independent and good. This account enables us to make sense of the passage that mentions a bad cosmic soul: Plato entertains the hypothesis that there is such a soul, because he must explain where bad things in the universe come from. But the hypothesis that they come from a bad cosmic soul is immediately dismissed. Instead, the bad in the world is generated by those kinds of movements that are “lesser” as compared to the Self/Other Movement of the cosmic soul. This includes human movement. Human beings are Dependent Self-Movers: they participate both in bodily movement (Other Movement) and in psychic movement (Self/Other Movement). Since bodily movement is dependent, human beings cannot be inherently good. This status limits humans and makes them passive, weak, and inherently vulnerable to corruption. In the second chapter of my dissertation, I turn to the intriguing notion of demotic virtues. According to Plato, attainable virtues are “demotic,” literally, “people-like.” So far, there is not much scholarship on this notion, as Plato construes it in the Laws. Insofar as there is work on demotic virtue in Plato, it tends to address passages from across the corpus. Contrary to this approach, I argue that the very framework of the Laws draws attention to the way in which human nature frames our ability to become virtuous. In the Laws, demotic virtues are the virtues of human beings. On this reading, “demotic” speaks to the ethical implications of a dependent nature. Human beings cannot attain perfect virtue. Only divine beings are perfect models of virtue; they are also perfect models of political organization, psychic states, as well as poetic and governance skills in the Laws. Demotic virtues, on the other hand, are a humanly-accessible type of virtue that does not require precise knowledge, and that everyone can possess. Given their ethical limitations, the “first-best” political system (i.e. the one achieved solely through reason) is out of human reach. But mortals have access to a second-best tool to achieve a second-best order: laws. Laws are expressions of νοῦς tailored to human needs, and are meant to make humans as godlike as possible. In the third chapter, I argue that none of Magnesia’s magistrates possesses perfect virtue. Plato first introduces demotic virtues when he discusses the city’s rulers. Why should “people-like” virtues figure in the discussion of those who are presumably best? I believe that this puzzle is instructive; its solution reveals an important aspect of the Laws’ theory of virtue. The rulers have two features (XII 965a-968a): they have cosmological knowledge about soul and universe, and they have demotic virtues. Rather than assume that both of these traits differentiate them from the non-rulers, I argue that only the first trait, their knowledge, marks them out. Rulers have knowledge that others lack, but they cannot attain a different type of virtue based on that. Through an examination of Magnesia’s offices, I show that even the highest-standing officials must make an ongoing effort to sustain virtues. An analogous consideration applies to the laws. Laws can attain a high level of goodness, but they inherit the temporal and imperfect nature of their human creators. Over time, and viewed in the light of experience, laws require amendments and corrections. Eventually, Magnesia’s officials will declare them stable, but not because they attain inherent stability. Rather, the laws should be perceived as stable, and hence the process of amendments shall be called to a halt. My account of the magistrates’ demotic virtues explains why Magnesia depends on an intricate system of examination and testing. Plato scholars tend to be fairly silent on these policies of testing. I argue, however, that Plato makes a proposal we can appreciate: rather than defend the superior standing of rulers, he argues for political accountability. This need to hold leaders accountable is the political manifestation of the type of virtue human beings can attain, one that is “people-like” rather than “divine-like.”. (shrink)

The essay focuses on Gloria Anzaldúa’s narrative of overcoming shame in Borderlands/La Frontera. It addresses the question of coming to terms with multiple conditions of oppression obstructing the creative agency of radical Latina subjects. The discussion occurs along two intersecting planes: (1) the existential question of self-knowledge as the self undergoes the difficult process of identifying and releasing the weight of past oppressions and (2) the situated character of Anzaldúa’s Chicana/Latina condition in light of the heteronormative and epistemic constraints she (...) faces as a Latina writer whose work is intimately interlinked with her sense of self. Anzaldúa’s message of overcoming shame is shown to have some affinities with Friedrich Nietzsche’s reflections on freedom from shame as the ultimate seal of liberation. Considered as Anzaldúa’s companion in a journey in self-overcoming at the crossroads of indigenous and Chicana/Tejana cultures, her new mestiza takes on a new significance. (shrink)

: The aim of this essay is to analyze the notion of "loving, knowing ignorance," a type of "arrogant perception" that produces ignorance about women of color and their work at the same time that it proclaims to have both knowledge about and loving perception toward them. The first part discusses Marilyn Frye's accounts of "arrogant" as well as of "loving" perception and presents an explanation of "loving, knowing ignorance." The second part discusses the work of Audre Lorde, Elizabeth Spelman, (...) and María Lugones in their attempts to deal with the issue of arrogant perception within feminism, and examines how Lugones's notion of "'world'-traveling" may help us deal with "loving, knowing ignorance." Ultimately, the author suggests that we need to become aware of instances of "loving, knowing ignorance," especially if we are to stay true to Third Wave feminism's commitment to diversity. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to carry out an analysis of the multi-voiced, multi-cultural self discussed by Latina feminists in light of a Heideggerian phenomenological account of persons or "Existential Analytic." In so doing, it points out similarities as well as differences between the Heideggerian description of the self and Latina feminists' phenomenological accounts of self, and critically assesses María Lugones's important notion of "world-traveling." In the end, the essay defends the view of a "multiplicitous" self which takes insights (...) from Lugones's view of the self that "travels 'worlds'" and from other Latina feminists' accounts of self as well as from Martin Heidegger's account of Dasein. (shrink)

En este trabajo me interesará presentar algunos argumentos feministas en contra de la relación de alquiler del embarazo. Mi objetivo principal es distinguirlos de posiciones conservadoras o neoconservadoras también contrarias a esta actividad que se fundan en supuestos diferentes por lo que no es apropiado compararlas aun cuando también se presenten como objetoras. En segundo lugar, me interesará evidenciar el impacto de algunos planteos tempranos desde el feminismo en la bioética. En tercer lugar, propondré dos ejes para continuar profundizando las (...) reflexiones sobre esta temática: una visión relacional y contextual de la autonomía y la desbiologización y rebiologización de un vínculo social. (shrink)

I argue that, in Plato’s Laws, demotic virtues (δημόσιαι ἀρεταί, 968a2) are the virtues that non-divine beings can attain. I consider two related questions: what demotic virtues are and how they relate to divine virtue. According to my interpretation, demotic virtues are an attainable – but unreliable – type of virtue that non-divine beings can improve through knowledge. These virtues are not perfect; only divine beings possess perfect virtue. However, this does not mean that perfect virtue plays no part in (...) the ethical lives of non-divine beings. It serves as a “regulative ideal” for everyone who is not a god. (shrink)

A saga “Campo Geral”, a primeira de Corpo de Baile (2016), fornece-nos relatos de atitudes diante da morte. Este trabalho versará especificamente sobre um ponto de vista recorrente na obra de Guimarães Rosa: o infantil. Para tanto, Miguilim e Dito, as crianças-poetas, nos proporcionarão ensinamentos que transcendem as dicotomias dos homens velhos, ilustrando o potencial poético da experiência da morte, seja a própria ou de outrem. Recorreremos aos estudos rosianos de Melo e Souza (2008) e a diversos pensadores da morte, (...) como Michel de Montaigne (2016) e Philippe Ariès (2017), além de pensadores da vida, como Miguel de Unamuno (2013), para analisar a experiência da morte não mais como um nefasto acontecimento, mas como parte essencial da vida que não cessa de brotar.Palavras-chave: Morte. Poesia. Infância. Guimarães Rosa. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Anger in a Perilous Environment:María LugonesMariana Alessandriin a hundred years, maybe our commonsense beliefs about anger will come from a distinguished line of Women of Color like Audre Lorde, bell hooks, and María Lugones, who make a case for listening to our anger instead of stifling it. But our ideas about anger still come from ancient Greek and Roman philosophers. Their stories about how anger works and why it (...) is bad have been dominant throughout history, and they are not kind to angry women in the twenty-first century. They have created a perilous environment for us, existentially speaking, by painting anger as irrational, crazy, and ugly. They have left us no way to handle our anger that does not amount to trying to control, suppress, or eradicate it. In this short paper, I contrast a philosophy of anger left to us by ancient Western philosophy with a contemporary one offered by Latina feminist María Lugones. Lugones offers a philosophy of anger that assumes it has something to teach us about our perilous environment.1Part I: Anger Seen in the LightPlato compared passions like anger to a hard-to-control, hot-blooded, black-skinned horse that must be reined in by the "charioteer" of reason (Phaedrus, ln. 253E). He thought we should use self-control to contain our anger, and he was not alone. The Roman Stoic Seneca, who described anger similarly, once told a story about Plato getting livid (Potegal and Novaco 9–24). Instead of beating one of his slaves, Plato froze, his hand drawn back in striking position. A friend asked Plato what he was doing. "I am making an angry man expiate his crime," Plato replied (Seneca, De Ira, Book III, section 12). Plato's freezing was his way of acknowledging that rage is weakness. Seneca formulated this scene into a principle: the only appropriate time to express anger is when you are not angry. Otherwise, you are a slave to your emotion. [End Page 23]I became angry during quarantine. I had been promised a year without teaching or administrative responsibility, but everything changed when the schools went remote. Since my kids were home anyway, I decided to home-school them. But I found myself becoming angry almost daily, and it was upsetting. To make sense of it, I went back to my philosophical sources.I consulted Epictetus, the Stoic philosopher whose Handbook I used to read every year. For the fifteenth time, he told me that "an uneducated man blames others; a partially educated man blames himself. A fully educated man blames no one" (13). While I could not control my circumstances in 2020—Epictetus granted that I did not have the power to end a pandemic or reopen schools—I could control my bursts of anger. Instead of blaming my spouse and kids for my troubles, I should blame myself for expecting life to be easier. Better yet, I should blame no one and accept the new normal gracefully. I also reread the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, the second-century Roman emperor and Stoic who believed that yielding to anger is a sign of weakness (Potegal and Novaco 16). Marcus reformulated one of the central tenets of Stoicism: "Disturbance comes only from within—from our own perceptions" (38). His advice? Lower your expectations. Remember that the only person you can change is yourself. To that end, expect people to irritate you daily and you will be ready for it (17). For me, that meant remembering that having kids meant having messes. But expecting a mess did not clean the table every night, load or unload the dishwasher, or vacuum the crumb-riddled floor. Marcus did not send his servants to clean my house. So, I left him for Aristotle.Aristotle's soul was not a charioteer with horses, but it was tripartite: feelings, predispositions, active conditions. Feelings are hard to change, Aristotle thought, so let's not waste too much energy trying. Predispositions just name the likelihood of feeling a particular feeling. Both categories matter, but chiefly because self-knowledge is a philosophical virtue. Mostly, Aristotle urged us to cultivate our "active conditions." Forever a... (shrink)

Mike Schutt dissects ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), exposing its vagueness, excessive breadth, and prima facia viewpoint discrimination.

The following paper discusses Latina feminist debates on selfhood and identity. Since work by Latina feminists is not widely recognized or studied within the discipline of philosophy, the aim of the first section of this paper is to provide a brief introduction to Chicana feminism as it has been and continues to be pivotal in the development of Latina feminism. Included in this section is an introduction to the work of celebrated Chicana theorist Gloria Anzaldúa who has played a major (...) influence in the theories of selfhood and identity developed by Latina feminists discussed in this paper. The second section analyzes the work of key contemporary Latina philosophers and theorists and shows the manner in which these theorists are reclaiming the notion of experience. (shrink)