Das Buch enthält die Einführung in die Lektüre sowie den Textkommentar zu den der Analyse der Grundsätze der Modalität gewidmeten "Postulaten des empirischen Denkens überhaupt". Untersucht wird Kants gesamte Theorie der Modalbegriffe (Möglichkeit - Unmöglichkeit, Dasein - Nichtsein, Notwendigkeit - Zufälligkeit) seit Mitte der 1750er Jahre bis zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Die Postulate sind nach Kant nicht objektiv, sondern subjektiv-synthetisch: Der Gegenstand der Erfahrung, welcher zunächst anhand der objektiv-synthetischen Funktionen der Quantität, Qualität und Relation bestimmt wird, lässt sich nun (...) in seinem Verhältnis zum setzenden Subjekt betrachten. Die Postulate thematisieren jedoch nicht - hier liegt die konstitutive Charakteristik dieser synthetischen Urteile a priori - das Subjekt selbst, sondern das Objekt als solches und die Objektivität überhaupt. Wie diese Untersuchung zeigt, antwortet Kant erst hier - nicht in den viel diskutierten Deduktionskapiteln oder in den anderen Grundsatzkapiteln - auf die Frage "Was ist ein Objekt?" und bezieht zugleich Stellung gegenüber anderen philosophischen Theorien der Objektivität des 18. Jahrhunderts: Rationalismus, Empirismus, Idealismus, Skeptizismus. (shrink)

La «Einleitung» de la KrV puede considerarse como un texto particularmente elaborado desde el punto de vista fenomenológico. Este artículo intenta mostrar cómo funciona en el texto (en detalle los §§ III-V) una estructura interpretativa basada en el trabajo y articulación interna de la reflexión (como el movimiento de emergencia, como un especial diferir, del fenómeno). Para mostrar que la filosofía trascendental es la investigación de la facticidad de la Razón como facticidad de la ciencia. Pero donde por “ciencia” habrá (...) que entender el particular concernimiento de la Razón por su propia e interna problematicidad como trascendencia; por cuanto el “conocimiento” no es otra cosa que el ser fáctico de la Razón. Esta lectura tiene también el propósito de rechazar algunas interpretaciones, por parciales (en ambas se trata de una metafísica “revisada”), de este texto; tanto las que lo ven como algo relativo a una epistemología como las que entienden la imposibilidad de la metafísica como un malogro dialéctico de la ontología. (shrink)

This paper presents an elucidation of Kant’s notion of judgment, which clearly is a central challenge to the understanding of the Critic of Pure Reason, as well as of the Transcendental Idealism. In contrast to contemporary interpretation, but taking it as starting point, the following theses will be endorsed here: i) the synthesis of judgment expresses a conceptual relation understood as subordination in traditional Aristotelian logical scheme; ii) the logical form of judgment does not comprise intuitions ; iii) the relation (...) to intuition is not a judgment concern; iv) the response to the question about the ‘x’ that grounds the conceptual relation in judgments must be sought in transcendental aspects: 1) on construction in pure form of intuition, 2) in experience and 3) in the requirements to experience, respectively to mathematical, empirical, and philosophical judgments. The overall purpose is to build up an understanding of judgment that supports a latter assessment of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. (shrink)

This article rereads some of Kant’s writings considered as pre-critical. It tries to investigate how in them the reflection about knowledge progressively takes a new direction against dogmatic positions. In order to do this, this article focuses on some of its specific aspects. We cannot assimilate these works to the revolution that the KrV will signify but we can read them as a preparation for that critical field. We share those interpretations which think that there is more continuity than breaking (...) off between the Kant considered pre-critical and his deployment clearly critical. (shrink)

“내용없는 사고들은 공허하고, 개념들이 없는 직관은 맹목적이다.”(KrV A51=B75)라는 테제로 잘 알려진 것처럼, 대상을 인식하려면 직관과 개념이 모두 필요하다는 것이 칸트의 인식론적 견해라고 여겨진다. 그러나 몇몇 연구자들은 칸트의 인식론에서도 “개념없는 직관(Anschauung ohne Begriffe)” 즉 지성의 활동과 개념을 수반하지 않는 직관이 가능하다고 여긴다. 이러한 배경에서 본 논문은 경험적 직관에서 개념의 역할, 특히 감성적 종합에서 범주의 역할을 명료히 함으로써 칸트에서 개념 없는 직관이 가능한지 밝히는 것을 목적으로 한다. 이를 위해 경험적 직관을 시공간 상에서 배경과 구별되는 개별자에 대한 표상으로 규정하고, B판 연역을 중심으로 경험적 (...) 직관에서 개념이 어떤 역할을 하는지 살핀다. 원전을 검토하는 과정에서 개별자를 지각하는 것에는 시공간이라는 감성의 형식만으로도 충분하다는 한나(Robert Hanna)와 앨레이스(Lucy Allais)의 해석의 문제점을 밝혀, 칸트의 인식론에 따르면 범주라는 대상 일반의 개념이 동반되어야만 통일된 시공간 표상과 개별자 표상이 가능하다는 것을 해명한다. 그 결과 칸트의 인식론에서는 개념없는 직관의 가능성이 뒷받침될 수 없다. (shrink)

In a crucial paragraph (KrV, A 663-664 / B 691-692) of the first part of the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic”, Kant discusses the specific status of the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity. In doing so, he refers to an already proven argument and thus to other passages of the Critique of Pure Reason. In search of this argument the “Transcendental Analytic” but in particular the “first book” of the “Transcendental Dialectic” turn out to be possible reference points. Although (...) this contextualisation demands further systematic and editorial reflections, it also allows the clarification of the status of the principles and their justification in relation to a subjective deduction. Kant offers with the subjective deduction, as introduced in the “Preface” (of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason) and again in the “first book” of the “Transcendental Dialectic”, a first argumentative strategy, which differs from the objective one but provides “some objective validity” (KrV, A 664 / B 692; Kant, 1998, p. 602) and therefore has systematic importance for the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity. My aim is to offer immanent strategies for a justification of the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity in the framework of the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

Das Handlexikon zur KrV gibt verläßliche und unentbehrliche Orientierungshilfen für die systematische Auseinandersetzung mit Kants epochalem Hauptwerk. Es kann für alle Ausgaben, die den Seitenumbruch der ersten und zweiten Auflage (A 1781, B 1787) im Text kennzeichnen, herangezogen werden.

In the Transcendental Dialectic (KrV, A 599-560/B 627-628), Kant presents the argument of the hundred talers as a concrete example of his general claim against conceiving existence as a real predicate. According to Kant, the content of concepts can be completely determined as merely possible content; in the existential judgment, the subject then relates the completely determined content of his internal thoughts with perception: it is only through perception that the subject knows the content of his concepts as real things (...) of the world. Thus, although in his epistemology conceptual activity plays a crucial role in perceptual activity, Kant still offers an empiricist account of empirical knowledge. Hegel criticizes Kant´s theory of perception by distinguishing representation (Vorstellen) from comprehension (Begreifen) and by developing on that basis a more complex theory of the relation between concept, existence, and empirical knowledge. From the standpoint of representation, concept and existence, being-determined and being-real exclude each other; in comprehension, on the contrary, representation and perception are no longer unilateral forms of knowing: for the mind that comprehends what it perceives, the existence of what it perceives is –when abstractly considered as such– only a collateral product of the way it knows the real world. According to Hegel, comprehension develops the internal necessity of the contents of knowledge and, by doing so, grasps the individual objects that constitute our world. (shrink)

Kants Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft von 1786 stehen ihrem Anspruch nach zwischen einer transzendentalen Kritik der Vernunft - Kant bereitete zur selben Zeit die in wesentlichen Stücken umgearbeitete zweite Auflage der KrV vor - und der Physik als empirischer Wissenschaft. Die Notwendigkeit einer Reflexion über die Naturwissenschaft verhilft dieser Schrift heute wieder zu systematischer Relevanz, nachdem sie lange Zeit nur aus dem Blickwinkel ihrer Bedeutsamkeit für die empirische Naturwissenschaft betrachtet und infolgedessen allenfalls aus wissenschaftshistorischem Interesse rezipiert wurde.

Kant’s introduction in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (KrV) of a spontaneity proper to the understanding is often thought to be one of the central innovations of his Critical philosophy. As I show in this paper, however, a number of thinkers within the 18th century German tradition in the time before the KrV (including the pre-Critical Kant himself) had already developed a robust conception of the spontaneity of the mind, a conception which, in many respects lays the groundwork for Kant’s (...) later, rather more influential account. To illustrate this, I consider three accounts of the spontaneity of the mind—those of Crusius, the pre-Critical Kant, and Tetens—which, while distinct, nonetheless relate to and explicitly draw upon one another in important ways, forming as it were the interconnected and, thus far, largely overlooked pre-Critical context for Kant’s discussion of the spontaneity of the understanding in the KrV. As I conclude, while Kant’s own account of the spontaneity of the understanding, and particularly of the I think clearly departs from these accounts, it nonetheless continues to connect in significant ways with the trailblazing discussions of his immediate predecessors. (shrink)

For Kant, philosophical investigations are inherently analytic. The proper method of philosophy is analysis, and the object of analysis are concepts. Hence, Kant’s short description of philosophy as “rational cognition […] from concepts” (KrV, A 837/B 865) can be substituted by “philosophy is conceptual analysis”. The article shows that Kant follows a representationalism about concepts and a combination of intensional and extensional feature semantics. Against the claim that Kant is a proponent of the concept-judgement-inversion, it is argued that concepts are (...) being articulated in form of singular terms, propositions, and sets of propositions alike. Kant interlinks different kinds of concepts with different kinds of definitions, as the reconstruction of his theory of definitions reveals. Philosophy foremost deals with what Kant calls “given” empirical and pure concepts. Such concepts are object of analysis, i.e., explication and exposition. The article ends with answers to five possible objections. Is philosophy all about analysis? (shrink)

In this paper, I claim that Kant’s subjective deduction in the first edition of the KrV is to be understood in terms of an investigation of the fundamental force(s) (Grundkraft) of the soul, an investigation essential to Wolffian psychology and much debated throughout Germany in the second half of the 1700’s. I argue that the subjective deduction is indeed presented by means of the exposition of the three-fold syntheses but only insofar as these syntheses are employed as pointers towards each (...) of three original sources of cognition. Only taken as such can we do justice not only to the argument’s unique concern as distinct from that of the objective deduction, but also to its dependence upon the justificatory results of that deduction which was after all Kant’s “primary concern”. (shrink)

In der "Transzendentalen Ästhetik" der KrV will Kant zeigen, daß Raum und Zeit Anschauungsformen und daher keine Eigenschaften der Dinge an sich sind. Es scheint jedoch, als übersehe er dabei die Möglichkeit, daß Raum und Zeit Anschauungsformen und zugleich Eigenschaften der Dinge an sich sein könnten. Dagegen soll hier gezeigt werden, daß Kants Beweis durchaus schlüssig ist. Dabei kommt es zunächst darauf an, die genaue Struktur des Kantischen Beweises zu verstehen. Darauf folgt eine Diskussion der Kantischen Begriffe Anschauung sowie Form (...) der Anschauung und reine Anschauung, in der sich unter anderem herausstellt, daß Kants Anschauungsbegriff im Sinne der aktuellen Philosophie des Geistes "externalistisch" konzipiert ist. Dies erlaubt es dann, den Schluß auf die Idealität von Raum und Zeit tatsächlich als Folgerung aus Kants vorhergehenden Ausführungen zu verstehen. Abschließend geht es um einige der Konsequenzen, die sich aus dieser Interpretation für das Verständnis des transzendentalen Idealismus ergeben. (shrink)

Let me start with a well-known story. Kant held that logic and conceptual analysis alone cannot account for our knowledge of arithmetic: “however we might turn and twist our concepts, we could never, by the mere analysis of them, and without the aid of intuition, discover what is the sum [7+5]” (KrV, B16). Frege took himself to have shown that Kant was wrong about this. According to Frege’s logicist thesis, every arithmetical concept can be defined in purely logical terms, and (...) every theorem of arithmetic can be proved using only the basic laws of logic. Hence, Kant was wrong to think that our grasp of arithmetical concepts and our knowledge of arithmetical truth depend on an extralogical source—the pure intuition of time (Frege 1884, §89, §109). Arithmetic, properly understood, is just a part of logic. (shrink)

following list of abbreviations : Ethics — Lectures on Ethics GMM — Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals KrV — Critique of Pure Reason KU — Critique of ...

:Recently, Allais, Hanna and others have argued that Kant is a nonconceptualist about intuition and that intuitions refer objectively, independently of the functions of the understanding. Kantian conceptualists have responded, which the nonconceptualists also cite as textual evidence for their reading) that this view conflicts with the central goal of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I argue that the conceptualist reading of KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. is unfounded. Further, I argue (...) that the nonconceptualists are wrong to believe that intuitions as such refer objectively and that they are mistaken about the relation between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis. (shrink)

At the present time, there are several interpretations and modes of Kant’s transcendental philosophy (TP). Which of these interpretations and modes of transcendentalism most adequately express the spirit of TP, i.e. can claim the title of the transcendental ones? For the explication of the ‘idea of transcendental philosophy’ [KrV, A1], here I distinguish two transcendental shifts: methodological and metaphysical ones, which in their totality predetermine the essence and set the specificity of Kant’s transcendental idealism. The methodological transcendental shift that Kant (...) postulates in his definitions of TP in the Critique of Pure Reason [KrV, A11; B25] represents a shift from studying of objects to the analysis and justification of our mode of cognition of objects. This shift sets a fairly wide range of a la Kantian a priori doctrines and predetermines the transcendental turn (Re–Transcendentalising) of modern philosophy. The metaphysical transcendental shift that can be correlated with “the altered method of our way of thinking [in metaphysics]” [KrV, BXVIII], is associated with the splitting of the “thing” into the actual object (or Kantian thing-in-itself) and object of experience (or Kantian appearance), and involves a transition from the study of thing-in-itself to the analysis of the appearance. More precisely, this shift finds its expression in the transcendental triad “object (thing-in-itself; Ding an sich) – appearance (Erscheinung) – representation (Vorstellung)”, which determines the ‘idea’ (essence) of transcendental idealism/metaphysics. (shrink)

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (KrV) presents a priori knowledge of synthetic truths as posing a philosophical problem of great import whose only possible solution vindicates the system of transcendental idealism. The work does not accord any such significance to a priori knowledge of analytic truths. The intelligibility of the contrast rests on the well-foundedness of Kant’s analytic–synthetic distinction and on his claim to objectively or correctly classify key judgments with respect to it. Though the correctness of Kant’s classification is (...) vital to his philosophical project, it has been vigorously challenged since he introduced his famous distinction of judgments. The aim of this essay is to explore several metaphysical motives contributing to Kant’s objective classification claim that have been underemphasized and in part overlooked in the large literature on the topic. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Kant's conception of the history of pure reason and its relation to his metaphilosophy as it is presented in the Critique of Pure Reason [Kritik der reinen Vernunft] (KrV). In particular, I will attempt to answer the following question: why did Kant conclude the KrV with the history of pure reason and why did he insist that, without it, a gap would remain in his system? In the course of attempting to answer this question, I (...) will argue that Kant chose to conclude the KrV with a sketch of the history of pure reason because he took his ability to provide the history of pure reason to be a mark of the adequacy and success of his own philosophical system, in so far as it is the system which comprehends the nature of human reason, specifically the teleological nature of human reason (i.e., the system that recognizes that reason has intrinsic, self-imposed interests and goals) and insofar as it is the only system which, as the culmination of all the past systems of philosophy, is in a position to identify and satisfy all of the interests of human reason. (shrink)

La «Einleitung» de la KrV puede considerarse como un texto particularmente elaborado desde el punto de vista fenomenológico. Este artículo intenta mostrar cómo funciona en el texto (en detalle los §§ III-V) una estructura interpretativa basada en el trabajo y articulación interna de la reflexión (como el movimiento de emergencia, como un especial diferir, del fenómeno). Para mostrar que la filosofía trascendental es la investigación de la facticidad de la Razón como facticidad de la ciencia. Pero donde por “ciencia” habrá (...) que entender el particular concernimiento de la Razón por su propia e interna problematicidad como trascendencia; por cuanto el “conocimiento” no es otra cosa que el ser fáctico de la Razón. Esta lectura tiene también el propósito de rechazar algunas interpretaciones, por parciales (en ambas se trata de una metafísica “revisada”), de este texto; tanto las que lo ven como algo relativo a una epistemología como las que entienden la imposibilidad de la metafísica como un malogro dialéctico de la ontología. (shrink)

In unserer Gegenwart der unwiderruflichen Globalisierung und digitalen Technifizierung, in welcher wir zum ersten Mal in unserer menschlichen Geschichte konkret die Mittel zu einem Gattungssuizid in der Hand haben, ist keine Frage für ein ernsthaftes philosophisches Denken so fundamental wie jene von Kant unter dem Titel „Alles Interesse meiner Vernunft“ am Ende der „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“ gestellte: Was aber sollen wir mit dem, was wir dank unseres Wissens tun können, in unserer Freiheit aber tun? (Vgl. KrV A 805). Husserls (...) Methode kritisch aufnehmend, selbst aber von Heideggers „Sein und Zeit“ ausgehend, dessen Hermeneutik der Zeitigung des Daseins zum Tode jedoch aufbrechend und überschreitend in die Frage nach dem Heil unseres Daseins angesichts des Anderen, hat sich kaum ein Denker des 20. Jahrhunderts dieser Frage so intensiv zugewandt wie Emmanuel Levinas. Das vorliegende Werk umfasst eine Reihe von Studien zu Levinas, die diese Frage als ihren Mittelpunkt haben und sich insbesondere auch auf die in Deutschland noch kaum bekannten Schriften aus dem Nachlass von Levinas stützen. Zusammen mit ihnen wird im deutschen Original ein bereits auf Tschechisch, Italienisch und Spanisch publiziertes Gespräch zugänglich gemacht, welches der Verfasser 1981 mit Emmanuel Levinas in Paris führte. Aus ihm stammt der Titel des Werkes. Was in ihm zur Sprache kommt, sucht nach einer Antwort philosophischen Denkens auf die Frage: Menschlichkeit – schaffen wir das? (shrink)

Leemos la analítica de Kant mediante una alegoría arquitectónica con fines dicácticos. Examinamos los límites de una tal metáfora sostenida: el malentendido de la síntesis como resultado de un proceso que parte de lo más simple ; la dificultad de ilustrar lo trascendental con lo empírico ; el uso de lo más escolástico de Kant, las facultades ; la dificultad de representar lo subjetivo. Los principales términos comparativos son: habitar conocer, edificio experiencia fenoménica, garantía de habitabilidad validez objetiva, suministrador de (...) materiales sensibilidad, arquitecto entendimiento, plano concepto, tareas básicas / categorías, maestro de obras imaginación, procesos de montaje esquemas, Consejo Juicio, Sujeto-del-Arte Apercepción trascendental, etc. Su despliegue muestra una sorprendente adaptabilidad a los problemas de la KrV. (shrink)

An unrecognised copy (1665) in Kant’s private library of Michael Piccart’s Isagoge (1605), an introduction to the system of Aristotelian philosophy together with Kant’s own remarks on this author (Refl 4160, AA 17, p. 439) can be established as an original source for the Kantian ‘ideosphere’. First, I point out contexts and consequences of Piccart’s Altdorfian Aristotelianism, in contrast to the Königsbergian Aristotelianism (emphasised by Tonelli’s research). To further check the quality of Piccart as a source of Kant’s, a conceptual (...) case-study is elaborated with Kant’s critical distinction between analytics as a “logic of truth” (KrV, B 85) and dialectics as a “logic of illusion” (KrV, B 86). Hereby, dialectics is understood as part of an Aristotelian division of logic in analytics, dialectics and sophistics (Königsberg/Rabe versus Altdorf/Piccart). As will be shown by the paradigmatic case of the famous Königsbergian proponent of Aristotelianism, Paul Rabe, Kant cannot have received the suggestion for his own critical distinction from Rabe’s Cursus Philosophicus. Instead, Piccart refers to a passage of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which suggests the very distinction between an analytic philosopher who searches for scientific truth and dialecticians and sophists. For different reasons, they do not claim any scientific seriousness. (shrink)

By considering the semantic footings of the so-called antinomies of pure reason, this article contributes to the debate about whether Kant was committed to semantic realism or anti-realism. That is, whether verification-transcendent judgements are truth-apt (realism) or not (anti-realism). Against the (empiricist) semantic principle that Strawson, and others, have ascribed to Kant as the “principle of significance,” the bedrock of my article is what I call Kant’s Real Principle of Significance: an extension-based and normative principle stating that a judgement can (...) have no “significance” or “objective validity” (truth-value) without a universally recognizable norm for verifying it. This principle entails semantic anti-realism. I argue that we can extract the principle from the antinomy chapter of KrV, since in there Kant concludes that judgements of the form “the world as such is x” are without “significance” (lack a truth-value) in virtue of being unverifiable as a matter of principle. I propose that Kant’s reference to some of the antinomical judgements as “false” is not incompatible with this anti-realist reading because he operates with two distinct world-concepts: an illegitimate transcendental realist one and a legitimate transcendental idealist one. In contrast to most anti-realist Kant-interpretations, it is furthermore argued that any satisfactory anti-realist construal of Kant’s view must be compatible with his assertion that the thesis in the third antinomy about freedom “can be true.” That requires a thicker conception of “significance” or “objective validity” than what is often ascribed to Kant, which is encapsulated by the Real Principle of Significance. (shrink)

Razlika između prikaza vrhunskog sportaša nekad i danas možda se najbolje ocrtava u točki susreta kiborg-teorije i studija o sportu. Rekonceptualizacija pojma ‘sportaš’ u tome se smislu otvara kao pomak od ‘prirodnoga’ ka ‘umjetnom’. Tijekom ljudske povijesti vrhunski sportaši uvijek su bili doživljavani kao na određeni način ‘ne-prirodni’ i slavljeni kao heroji koji su nadvladali granice svojih prirodnih tijela. Današnji sportski događaji privlače više gledatelja nego ikada ranije, a oštra konkurencija podiže i same standarde i kriterije natjecanja. Sportovi koji privlače (...) mase gledatelja već su odavno predstave ‘nakaza’; gledateljima na stadionima ili pred televizorom u udobnosti njihovih domova gotovo je nemoguće zamisliti da bi i sami ikad mogli postići tako super-mišićavo tijelo sa super-brzim refleksima. Staromodni krv, znoj i suze još su uvijek negdje prisutni, iako inkorporirani u napredna dostignuća moderne tehno-kulture. Mnoštvo pitanja koja proizlaze iz takve perspektive pronašla su svoje mjesto za raspravu u relativno novom pluriperspektivnom pristupu izazovima biotehnološkog doba – bioetici. Bioetika nudi platformu za dijalog o bitnim pitanjima današnjice, dijalog koji nadrasta disciplinarne, stručne, historijske i kulturološke pozicije. Takav diskurs suočava se, međutim, sa pluralizmom u pristupima kao i metodološkim barijerama te pretpostavlja stvaranje odgovarajuće teorijske podloge. Ovaj rad će izdvojiti samo neke problemske točke koje u području sporta plastično ocrtavaju nedostatnosti postojećih monoperspektivno orijentiranih koncepcija. U tome smislu, naglasit će se samo neki simptomi koji ukazuju na dezorijentiranost svakodnevnog življenja, a koji se na osoben način prikazuju u sportu: krhkost etičkih pozicija sadržanih u konceptima »duha sporta« i fair playa u sučeljavanju sa znanstveno-tehničkim napretkom, objektivacija tijela, te porast interesa za aktivnostima visokog rizika. U ovome radu navedena obilježja razumijevaju se kao znakovi potrebe za nadilaženjem redukcionističkih i monoperspektivnih pristupa, donedavno dominantnih, a koje osobit bioetički pristup ima mogućnosti nadići. (shrink)

Este ensayo interpreta KrV A592-602/B620-630 no sólo como la refutación al argumento ontológico, sino como el lugar donde Kant encara una cuestión más radical: cómo puede el entendimiento humano, considerado desde un punto de vista lógico-general, predicar la existencia. Esta primera parte analiza específicamente la refutación del argumento ontológico. Este análisis concluirá que se requiere de una facultad diferente del entendimiento para conocer lo existente como tal.

Este ensayo interpreta KrV A592-602/B620-630 no sólo como la refutación al argumento ontológico, sino como el lugar donde Kant encara una cuestión más radical: cómo puede el entendimiento humano, considerado desde un punto de vista lógico-general, predicar la existencia. Esta primera parte analiza específicamente la refutación del argumento ontológico. Este análisis concluirá que se requiere de una facultad diferente del entendimiento para conocer lo existente como tal.

Este ensayo interpreta KrV A 592-602/B 620-630 no sólo como la refutacióndel argumento ontológico, sino como el lugar donde Kant encara una cuestión más radical: cómo puede el entendimiento humano, considerado desde un punto de vista lógico-general, predicar la existencia. Esta segunda parte argumenta que la discusión de la tesis “‘existe’ no es un predicado real” es una contribución a la solución de aquella cuestión que es independiente de la discusión del argumento ontológico.

Kant was never satisfied with the version of his “Refutation” published in 1787 (KrV, B 275-279). His dissatisfaction is already evident in the footnote added to the preface of the second edition of the Critique in 1787. As a matter of fact, Kant continued to rework his argument for at least six years after 1787. The main exegetical problem is to figure out who is the target of the “Refutation”: a non-sceptic idealist or a global sceptic of Cartesian provenance or (...) both. In this last case, a related problem is to know whether either of them is the Cartesian sceptic of the first Meditation, the idealist sceptic of the second Meditation and first part of the third Meditation, or some other non-sceptic idealist. I present and defend a new reconstruction of Kant’s “Refu­tation” as a successful argument against Mendelssohnian idealism of Cartesian provenance. This defence is based on a simple logical sketch of the proof provided by Dicker, but essentially modified in the light of Dyck’s insight about Kant’s opponent. How shall I support my reading? First, by appealing to overwhelming textual evidence according to which the proof is of the existence of mind-independent things, showing that Kant’s main opponent is Mendelssohn’s idealism of Cartesian provenance. Finally, I support my reading by showing that Kant’s “Refutation” is doomed to fail against all forms of global scepticism, but is quite successful against Mendelssohn’s idealism. (shrink)

In this essay I offer a partial rehabilitation of Cohen’s Kant interpretation. In particular, I will focus on the center of Cohen’s interpretation in KTE, reflected in the title itself: his interpretation of Kant’s concept of experience. “Kant hat einen neuen Begriff der Erfahrung entdeckt,”7 Cohen writes at the opening of the first edition of KTE (henceforth, KTE1), and while the exact nature of that new concept of experience is hard to pin down in the 1871 edition, he states it (...) succinctly in the second edition (henceforth KTE2): experience is Newtonian mathematical natural science.8 While this equation of experience with mathematical natural science has few contemporary defenders, I believe it is substantially correct, with one important qualification. Kant uses the term Erfahrung in a number of different senses in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (henceforth, KrV). I will argue that a central, and neglected, sense of that key technical term aligns with Cohen’s reading; what Kant sometimes refers to as ‘universal experience’ (sometimes, simply ‘experience’) is, in broad outlines, correctly interpreted by Cohen as mathematical natural science. (shrink)

In §12 of his 1837 magnum opus, the Wissenschaftslehre, Bolzano remarks that “In the new logic textbooks one reads almost constantly that ‘in logic one must consider not the material of thought but the mere form of thought, for which reason logic deserves the title of a purely formal science’” (WL §12, 46).1 The sentence Bolzano quotes is his own summary of others’ philosophical views; he goes on to cite Jakob, Hoffbauer, Metz, and Krug as examples of thinkers who held (...) that logic abstracts from the matter of thought and considers only its form. Although Bolzano does not mention Kant by name here, Kant does of course hold that “pure general logic”, what Bolzano would consider logic in the traditional sense (the theory of propositions, representations, inferences, etc.), is formal. As Kant remarks in the Introduction to the 2nd edition of Kritik der reinen Vernunft , (pure general) logic is “justified in abstracting – is indeed obliged to abstract – from all objects of cognition and all of their differences; and in logic, therefore, the understanding has to do with nothing further than itself and its own form” (KrV, Bix).2. (shrink)

The article defends Heidegger’s view that the main question of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is the question of being. It is also argued that Heidegger special understanding of the level and method of KrV deserves serious attention. Finally it is argued that Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of the KrV is best seen as representative of an hermeneutical conception of phenomenology.

Consider the following objection of Bennett to Kant: The least swallowable part of Kant's whole theory of freedom is the claim that the causality of freedom is not in time. This follows from Kant's doctrine that time is an appearance, and anyway the theory of freedom needs it: it is because the noumenal cause of an event is not in time, and thus is not itself an event, that it escapes the causality of nature. Kant is unembarrassed: ‘Inasmuch as it (...) is noumenon, nothing happens in it; there can be no change requiring dynamical determination in time, and therefore no causal dependence upon appearances … No action begins in this active being itself; but we may yet quite correctly say that the active being of itself begins its effects in the sensible world’ [KrV, A541=B569]. That is indefensible. Something in which ‘nothing happens’ cannot be ‘active’ or ‘begin’ a train of events. (shrink)

Kant was never satisfied with the version of his “Refu- tation” published in 1787 (KrV, B 275-279). His dissatisfaction is already evident in the footnote added to the preface of the second edition of the Critique in 1787. As a matter of fact, Kant continued to rework his argument for at least six years after 1787. The main exegetical problem is to figure out who is the target of the “Refutation”: a non-skeptic idealist, a global skeptic of Cartesian provenance or (...) both. In this last case, the related problem is to know whether either of them is the Cartesian skeptic of the first Meditation, the idealist skeptic of the second Meditation and first part of the third Meditation, or some other non-skeptic idealist. I present and defend a new reconstruction of Kant’s “Refu- tation” as a successful argument against Mendelssohnian idealism of Cartesian provenance. This defense is based on a simple logical sketch of the proof provided by Dicker but essentially modified in light of Dyck’s insight about Kant’s opponent. How shall I support my reading? First, by appealing to overwhelming textual evidence according to which the proof is of the existence of mind-independent things, showing that Kant’s main opponent is Mendelssohn’s idealism of Cartesian provenance. Finally, I support my reading by showing that Kant’s “Refutation” is doomed to fail against all forms of global skepticism but is quite successful against Mendelssohn’s idealism. (shrink)

Kant’s investigations into so‐called a priori judgments of pure mathematics in the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV) are mainly confined to geometry and arithmetic both of which are grounded on our pure forms of intuition, space, and time. Nevertheless, as regards notions such as irrational numbers and continuous magnitudes, such a restricted account is crucially problematic. I argue that algebra can play a transcendental role with respect to the two pure intuitive sciences, arithmetic and geometry, as the condition of their (...) possibility. It follows that Kant’s schematism of the concept of magnitude ought to be quantitatively represented in algebraic formulas in general, and also undergo several modifications in order to suit continuities. (shrink)

In what follows, I will detail Kant's criticism of the Leibnizian conception of mind as it is presented in key chapters of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft . Approaching Kant with such a focus goes against the current predominant in contemporary Kant scholarship. Kant's engagement with Leibniz in the KrV is often taken as limited to the refutation of the latter's relational theory of space and time in the Aesthetic and the general criticism presented in the Amphiboly chapter, inasmuch as (...) Kant is taken to be primarily concerned with addressing empiricist opponents (a focus particularly evident in the English-language commentary). In addition, the argument against rational psychology in the Paralogisms is taken as challenging an essentially Cartesian position. The first two chapters of this project will introduce the Leibnizian conception of the mind, contrasting it with its Cartesian predecessor, and consider the career of the Leibnizian conception in the schools of 18th century Germany. As I will show, it was the Leibnizian conception of mind that held sway, despite scattered challenges, and that would have primarily been on Kant's mind when he turned to consider the extravagant claims of metaphysical psychology. In chapters 3-5, I turn to Kant's criticism of this conception as presented in the Transcendental Analytic of the KrV . There, I show how the subjective and objective deductions, in addition to the Amphiboly chapter, all address the Leibnizian claim of a parallelism between the investigations of the mental and the physical. In chapters 6-8, I consider the case against the Leibnizian conception of mind as presented in the Transcendental Dialectic, claiming that the doctrine of transcendental illusion plays an important (though largely ignored) role in explaining the grounds of the Leibnizian conception as it is transmitted in the rational psychology of Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius, and Kant himself in the 1770's. Moreover, I argue that the limits Kant sets to empirical psychology are consistent with his criticism of the Leibnizian conception of mind, and, significantly, are motivated by deeper practical concerns. (shrink)

Svrha je ove rasprave predstaviti koncepciju nacije u djelu Carla Cattanea. Kako značajan talijanski mislilac Carlo Cattaneo nikada nije sustavno izložio taj svoj koncept, ovaj se rad temelji na njegovoj sistematizaciji, što ju je u svojoj knjizi Krv i tlo izveo Nicolao Merker. U radu će se posebice pokazati kako Cattaneo eksplicira narav nacije polazeći od objektivnih konotacija i ne gubeći iz vida da su one utemeljene u ljudskoj svijesti, te da se moderna nacija iskazuje kao proizvod društvenog života. Rad (...) sljedstveno naglašava da se moderna nacija u Cattanea predstavlja kao biće izvornije od građanskog društva, a istovremeno usko povezano s idejom slobode i jednakosti. Konačno, rad pokušava ukazati na sličnost između Cattaneova lokalnog principa i austromarksističkog stajališta o kulturnoj autonomiji, kakvo je definirao Otto Bauer.The intention of this short essay is to present Carlo Cattaneo’s conception of the nation. Since Cattaneo never wrote an essay where he gave an exhaustive explanation of this concept, this paper develops on the basis of outlines made by Nicolao Merkel in the book Il sangue e la terra . In particular, this essay seeks to demonstrate that Cattaneo explicated the nature of nation starting with objective connotations, without overlooking that these connotations are pondered by human conscience, the modern nation being a product of social life. Consequently the paper highlights that the modern nation in Cattaneo is presented as being primordial to the origin of civil society and at the same time, intimately connected to the idea of freedom and equality. Finally, the paper tries to highlight the similarity between Cattaneo’s locality principal and the austro-marxist proposal of the cultural autonomy as defined by Otto Bauer. (shrink)

Starting from our attention to the systematic divisions of the KrV, we address the chapter III of Analytic of principles and its theses on the transgression of reason and the negative expansion. Our proposal is to show the specificity of the concept of noumenon in relation to the other categories of understanding without neglecting its place within Transcendental Analytic. The peculiarity of this concept expresses in a privileged way the relation of critique to the limits of knowledge, since noumenon is (...) a representation that is excluded from the possibility of intuition, but is included in the analysis of knowledge. We therefore intend to shed light on the arguments that, on the one hand, limit knowledge and, on the other hand, allow thought a way to go beyond experience. Thus, in the analysis activity that detaches itself from specific interests in favour of an impartial investigation, the critic’s position can embrace the inside and the outside of the delimitation of knowledge. (shrink)

The Platonic myth in Book X of The Republic tells us how the choice of “destinies” is carried out by human souls about to be born. The revenant Er, in his particular nekia, returns to life to tell all he has seen and heard: that what life bring us is related to the good or bad choice of our future life trough a draw carried out under the eyes of Necessity and her three daughters: Lachesis, Clotho and Atropo, who weave (...) the destiny of men (The Republic, Book X, 617e): Theintelligible character of this choice has the burden of a determinism ab origine without possibility of rewriting it, making our fate an inalterable journey. Kant could say the same in KrV, although it is true that the doctrine of the “intelligible character” only appears specifically in 1781, in the light of the Third Antinomies, in the“Dialectic” of the Critique of Pure Reason. Anyway, its long shadow appears in other texts (as in Religion Within Limits of Reason Alone of 1793)– that each one of voluntary acts of men: “it is predetermined, well before it occurs, in the empirical character of man” (KrV, A 553 / B 581) would suppose that this intelligiblecharacter would have to be understood together with the problem of freedom and decision. That threshold pointed out by Kant will be trespassed by Schelling, who will form a concept of freedom of a metaphysical character (libertas ex) which will send us to an origin, beyond all times, in which the de-cision, as ex-cision, restructures and sets in order our time. Cut or beginning, it is a wound without stitches which implies the proper opening of being into existence. (shrink)

In this Kant Dossier the reader will have the opportunity to encounter the still incessant fruits of the actuality of Kant’s thought in its practical and theoretical domains. Writings that remind us of the famous passage of the Critique of Pure Reason in which Kant invites us to collaborate with his philosophy "it seems to me that it may be to the reader something of no small attraction to join his effort with that of the author, if he intends to (...) accomplish entirely and in a lasting way a great and important work, according to the plan proposed to him." (KrV, A XIX, 15-18). It is with this spirit that I thank, on behalf of the magazine Pólemos and the Department of Philosophy of Unb, colleagues who henceforth honor us with their work. Good reading to all! (shrink)

Resumen: El presente artículo constituye un estudio sobre el concepto de determinación trascendental temporal expuesto por Kant en el marco del esquematismo trascendental kantiano en KrV. Con este objeto, se exponen las razones de la preminencia de la definición de esquema como transzendentale Zeitbestimmung, frente a otras asociadas a la interpretación estática del esquematismo y, fundamentalmente, frente aquella donde se presenta como un proceso de subsunción o de aplicación de las categorías a las intuiciones puras, reconstruyendo a su vez el (...) alcance de dicha noción a partir del análisis del estatuto de la determinación temporal en otras obras del corpus kantiano. Abstract: In this paper, I focus on the concept of transcendental time-determination exposed by Kant in relation with the transcendental schematism in KrV. With this aim, I discuss why the definition of "schema" as transzendentale Zeitbestimmung is more relevant than other kinds of definitions: the one derived from a static interpretation of the schematism and the one where the schematism is understood as a process of subsumption or application of categories to pure intuitions. Finally, I reconstruct the role of the schema through an analysis of the time-determination as it is developed in the rest of Kant's corpus. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Synthetische Reflexion. Zur Stellung einer nach Kategorien reflektierenden Urteilskraft in Kants theoretischer PhilosophieKonstantin PollokManfred Kugelstadt. Synthetische Reflexion. Zur Stellung einer nach Kategorien reflektierenden Urteilskraft in Kants theoretischer Philosophie. Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte 132. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gravier, 1998. Pp. 341. Cloth, DM 190.00.Zunächst etwas scheinbar Äußerliches: Die "Dunkelheit" einer philosophischen Darstellung ist dann zu entschuldigen, wenn zumindest "das Princip richtig angegeben worden" ist. So sieht es Kant (nicht (...) nur) in der Kritik der Urteilskraft. In Manfred Kugelstadts Buch Synthetische Reflexion liest man Ähnliches: "Werden dann schließlich auch, in den beiden Anhängen, ganz erhebliche Dunkelheiten im einzelnen bleiben, so sollte dies doch kein Einwand sein, wenn nur hinreichend deutlich gemacht werden kann, daß wir auch da den Grundgedanken richtig angegeben haben." (14) Eine Probe solcher Dunkelheit liefert Kugelstadt jedoch schon zu Beginn: "So werden auch gleich im folgenden die in diesem Abschnitt B. wohlgemerkt auch bereits thematische, an sich immer nur zusätzliche analytische Reflexion und Subsumtion, bzw. uneigentliche 'Determination', der reflektierenden Urteilskraft nach analytischer Bewußtseinseinheit und jene gerade erwähnte synthetische Reflexion und wirkliche Determination qua Subsumtion der bestimmenden Urteilskraft nach objektiv synthetischer Einheit noch nicht immer hinreichend deutlich unterschieden und auseinandergehalten. - Man muß diese Bemerkungen und nachträglichen Korrekturen noch eine Zeitlang in Gedanken behalten. Denn diese Unstimmigkeiten, die sich uns erst spät geklärt haben und an denen Kant selbst durchaus ein gut Teil Schuld trägt, finden sich an einigen wenigen verstreuten Stellen wiederholt noch ein ganzes Stück in den Hauptteil dieser Arbeit hinein.)" (4f.) Die Unstimmigkeiten - Kugelstadt spricht in bezug auf seinen eigenen Text auch vom "erneut Unlogischen der Gedankenführung" (7) - Kant anzulasten ist eine fragwürdige Sache. Noch fragwürdiger ist jedoch, daß ein Text, dessen Unstimmigkeit nicht erst die Rezensenten bemerken, sondern bereits der Autor selbst mehrfach hervorhebt, überhaupt in dieser Form publiziert wird.Doch worum geht es dem Text? Schon die Antwort darauf ist nicht einfach, denn der Text enthält keine Exposition des Themas und keine Erläuterung der These bzw. [End Page 128] deren Konsequenzen. Dabei ist das Thema der bestimmenden bzw. reflektierenden Urteilskraft für das Verständnis von Kants Kritischem System von zentraler Bedeutung und aufgrund der weitreichenden Konsequenzen für seine Erkenntnistheorie, seine Ästhetik und seine Naturphilosophie auch einer Erklärung wert. Stattdessen beginnt Kugelstadt unmittelbar mit einem Kant-Referat. Er ist dabei bestrebt, die Kantische Differenzierung von bestimmender und reflektierender Urteilskraft (KdU: AA V 179) zu erläutern. Kugelstadt vertritt die These, daß die reflektierende Urteilskraft nach Kant ausschließlich reflektierend (und nicht bestimmend) ist, daß aber die bestimmende Urteilskraft nach Kant auch reflektierend ist. Diese These hat natürlich prima facie wenig textliche Evidenz für sich, denn Kant schreibt in unmittelbarem Anschluß an die genannte Differenzierung: "Die bestimmende Urtheilskraft unter allgemeinen transscendentalen Gesetzen, die der Verstand giebt, ist nur subsumirend", wodurch ein Gegensatz zur reflektierenden Urteilskraft bezeichnet ist. Es muß also um einen anderen Sinn von 'reflektierend' gehen. Die Reflexion der bestimmenden Urteilskraft sieht Kugelstadt in einer synthetischen Vergleichung der empirischen Anschauungen bzw. bloß empirischer Begriffe untereinander und mit den Kategorien. Dahingegen gehe es der bloß reflektierenden Urteilskraft um eine Klassifizierung der bereits erkannten Gegenstände gemäß einem zu suchenden Gesetz. Diese bloß reflektierende Urteilskraft, die "nicht das allergeringste (!)" (4) zu tun hat mit der auch reflektierenden Urteilskraft, interessiert in der Abhandlung nicht weiter. Stattdessen wird die Reflexion der bestimmenden Urteilskraft zu einer Rehabilitierung des Sinnlichen verwendet: nicht nur die Kategorie bestimmt das sinnliche Material, wodurch ein Erfahrungsbegriff entstehen kann, sondern auch umgekehrt wird die Kategorie durch das Materiale bestimmt. Diese letztere Bestimmung ist nach Kugelstadt eine Reflexion der bestimmenden Urteilskraft. Abgesehen von textlichen Problemen - das Opus postumum wird zur Interpretation der KrV herangezogen (vgl. z. B. 54ff.) - verlieren bei diesen Bestimmungen die Begriffe der Bestimmung und der Reflexion selbst ihre Bestimmtheit. Denn daß die Kategorien erst durch Anschauungen ihre objektive Realität erhalten, kann man bei Kant wohl lesen (z. B. KrV B 288). Dies jedoch Reflexion zu nennen trägt nichts zum Verständnis jenes Bezugs bei. Denn Reflexion - selbst die "transzendentale Reflexion" (KrV A 261) - ist in der Kantischen Konzeption etwas diesem Prozeß Nachträgliches. Und damit... (shrink)

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously includes immortality as one of the three “ideas” that give rise to “unavoidable problems of reason” (KrV, B7)1 and thereby constitute the basic subject-matter of metaphysics. Interpreters have paid a great deal of attention to the other two ideas, God and freedom; yet very few studies of Kantian immortality have ever been undertaken. This should come as no surprise, once we realize that Kant himself used the word “immortality” and its cognates only (...) 40 times in all three of his great Critiques. (By comparison, forms of the words “God” and “free(dom)” appear 119 and 509 times, respectively, in the three Critiques.) Kant’s theory of immortality – if he can be said to have one – is therefore exceedingly difficult to understand. For example, he says at one point (KrV, B395n): “Metaphysics has only three ideas as the proper purpose of its investigation: God, freedom, and immortality – and in such a way that the second concept, when combined with the first, is to lead to the third as a necessary conclusion.” How are we to understand this claim ? Does Kant really mean that combining the concept of freedom with the concept of God somehow gives rise to immortality as a necessary inference? In any case, why does Kant say so little about immortality, even though he portrays it as one of three ideas that constitute the “final aim” of all metaphysical speculation ? These and other puzzles raised by Kant’s occasional comments on immortality will be the focus of this paper. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant famously defined philosophy to be about three questions: “What can I know? What should I do? What can I hope for?” (KrV, B833). I want to suggest that the three questions of our course on the philosophy of computing are: What is computing? What should we do with computing? What could computing do?

Both European and Anglo-American philosophical traditions of Kant scholarship draw a sharp distinction between Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophies. They cite KrV, A 14.23 –28; KrV, A 15.01– 09; KrV, B 28.22 – 28; KrV, B 29.01 –12 as evidence that the analyses of intuition, understanding and reason proffered in the first Critique apply to cognition only, and therefore do not significantly illuminate his analyses of inclination, desire, or respect for the moral law in the Groundwork, second Critique, Metaphysics of (...) Morals, or Religion. This paper is part of a larger project that takes issue with this near-universal consensus, and with the canonical interpretation of KrV, A 14.23– 28; KrV, A 15.01 –09; KrV,B 28.22 –28; KrV, B 29.01 – 12. Many of the most important terms in Kant’s mature moral philosophy – such as “action,” “reason,” “freedom,” “will,” “categorical,” “imperative,” “ought,” “maxim,” “duty,” “inclination,” “end,” and “idea” – are introduced, and sometimes elaborated at length, in the first Critique; and often appear in the Groundwork with little or no further elaboration. This suggests that Kant intended the analysis of self and rationality in the first Critique to serve as a formal foundation for his subsequent analysis of practical deliberation and moral motivation in the Groundwork. Here I argue specifically that Kant’s use of the first-/third-person asymmetry in his analysis of action in the first Critique’s Resolution of the Third Antinomy is necessary to his account of moral motivation and moral intention in the Groundwork; and that the structure of pure apperception he offers in the Transcendental Deduction resolves this asymmetry. (shrink)

It is quite standard, even banal, to describe Kant's project in the Critique of Pure Reason [KrV] as a critical reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism, most directly expressed in Kant's claim that intuitions and concepts are two distinct, yet equally necessary, and necessarily interdependent sources of cognition. Similarly, though Kant rejects both the rationalist foundation of morality in the concept of perfection and that of the empiricists in feeling or in the moral sense, one might broadly characterize Kant's moral philosophy (...) as an attempt to reconcile the apriori universality and necessity of rationalist ethics with empiricist or sentimentalist strictures concerning the distinction between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’, between third personal knowledge of the good and first personal motivation. (shrink)