The formalism of abstracted quantum mechanics is applied in a model of the generalized Liar Paradox. Here, the Liar Paradox, a consistently testable configuration of logical truth properties, is considered a dynamic conceptual entity in the cognitive sphere (Aerts, Broekaert, & Smets, [Foundations of Science 1999, 4, 115–132; International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 2000, 38, 3231–3239]; Aerts and colleagues[Dialogue in Psychology, 1999, 10; Proceedings of Fundamental Approachs to Consciousness, Tokyo ’99; Mind in Interaction]. Basically, the intrinsic contextuality of (...) the truth-value of the Liar Paradox is appropriately covered by the abstracted quantum mechanical approach. The formal details of the model are explicited here for the generalized case. We prove the possibility of constructing a quantum model of the m-sentence generalizations of the Liar Paradox. This includes (i) the truth–falsehood state of the m-Liar Paradox can be represented by an embedded 2m-dimensional quantum vector in a (2m) m -dimensional complex Hilbert space, with cognitive interactions corresponding to projections, (ii) the construction of a continuous ‘time’ dynamics is possible: typical truth and falsehood value oscillations are described by Schrödinger evolution, (iii) Kirchoff and von Neumann axioms are satisfied by introduction of ‘truth-value by inference’ projectors, (iv) time invariance of unmeasured state. (shrink)

We show that Bell inequalities can be violated in the macroscopic world. The macroworld violation is illustrated using an example involving connected vessels of water. We show that whether the violation of inequalities occurs in the microworld or the macroworld, it is the identification of nonidentical events that plays a crucial role. Specifically, we prove that if nonidentical events are consistently differentiated, Bell-type Pitowsky inequalities are no longer violated, even for Bohm's example of two entangled spin 1/2 quantum particles. We (...) show how Bell inequalities can be violated in cognition, specifically in the relationship between abstract concepts and specific instances of these concepts. This supports the hypothesis that genuine quantum structure exists in the mind. We introduce a model where the amount of nonlocality and the degree of quantum uncertainty are parameterized, and demonstrate that increasing nonlocality increases the degree of violation, while increasing quantum uncertainty decreases the degree of violation. (shrink)

We support the authors' claims, except that we point out that also quantum structure different from quantum probability abundantly plays a role in human cognition. We put forward several elements to illustrate our point, mentioning entanglement, contextuality, interference, and emergence as effects, and states, observables, complex numbers, and Fock space as specific mathematical structures.

In this paper we concentrate on the nature of the liar paradox asa cognitive entity; a consistently testable configuration of properties. We elaborate further on a quantum mechanical model (Aerts, Broekaert and Smets, 1999) that has been proposed to analyze the dynamics involved, and we focus on the interpretation and concomitant philosophical picture. Some conclusions we draw from our model favor an effective realistic interpretation of cognitive reality.

We put forward the hypothesis that there exist three basic attitudes towards inconsistencies within world views: (1) The inconsistency is tolerated temporarily and is viewed as an expression of a temporary lack of knowledge due to an incomplete or wrong theory. The resolution of the inconsistency is believed to be inherent to the improvement of the theory. This improvement ultimately resolves the contradiction and therefore we call this attitude the ‘regularising’ attitude; (2) The inconsistency is tolerated and both contradicting elements (...) in the theory are retained. This attitude integrates the inconsistency and leads to a paraconsistent calculus; therefore we will call it the paraconsistent attitude. (3) In the third attitude, both elements of inconsistency are considered to be false and the ‘real situation’ is considered something different that can not be described by the theory constructively. This indicates the incompleteness of the theory, and leads us to a paracomplete calculus; therefore we call it the paracomplete attitude. We illustrate these three attitudes by means of two ‘paradoxical’ situations in quantum mechanics, the wave-particle duality and the situation of non locality. (shrink)

Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

This article documents some foregrounding devices that the media use to attract readers' attention to linguistic forms, all identified in sports reports relating to the Euro 2004 Football Championship published in various British newspapers. A functional explanation is offered in terms of the poetic and interactive character of such devices and their role in simulating friendship and encouraging `bonding' between the writers and readers. Their omnipresence in the British media is linked with structural characteristics of the English language, the readiness (...) of the British to tolerate manipulation of linguistic forms, and the general trend towards `infotainment' in the media. (shrink)

This article analyses the reception of John Rawls's thought by Otfried Höffe, Jürgen Habermas and other political theorists on the German liberal left. It argues that, ironically, as Rawls's theory has become more historically self-conscious and sociologically oriented since A Theory of Justice, Habermas, while denying any fundamental difference between him and Rawls in this `neo-Kantian family quarrel', has moved in the opposite direction. One might even say that there has been some mid-Atlantic convergence in political theory. Nevertheless, there remain (...) peculiarities of German political thought, in particular its more sociological bent, a (positive or negative) fixation on the state, and the persistently felt need finally to reconcile a perceived conflict between liberalism and democracy. (shrink)

This article discusses whether Christian talk about God can be literal. First, it is argued that the meaning of a word cannot be reduced to its use, that metaphorical language is indirect in its use of words, and that the change of meaning of a word by analogical extension differs from the change of meaning by repeated metaphorical use. Next, it is shown that in Christian talk about God, God can be literally referred to by God's proper name, “YHWH,” and (...) by words that in contexts of prayer and praise function as proper names. Then it is argued that terms for non‐basic actions can be literally applied to the Christian God, and that some of God's essential properties can be literally described on the basis of his self‐revealing actions. (shrink)

There are fourteen original papers in this substantial volume devoted to the general problem of the relation of Marxism, or at least Marxism as found in the works of Marx, and moral theory. The questions are, in Nielsen's words, “whether there should be or even could be a Marxist moral theory and if there could be a Marxist moral theory, what sort of a moral theory it should be”. Why does he not include the question what Marx's moral theory is? (...) For a few of these writers do think that Marx had some moral views that inform his writing, and attempt to say what they are. But Nielsen is justified in putting the questions they treat of in the way he does, for as is commonly known, Marx had no explicit, worked- out moral theory. So if one wishes to argue that he nevertheless has a morality or part of a morality, one has no alternative to attempting to infer it from what he does say. (shrink)

_Moral Matters_ is a concise and accessible look at such ethical issues as euthanasia, animal rights, abortion, and pornography. It provides a focused set of views from the unified perspective of one of North America’s leading libertarian thinkers, and aims to provoke thought and discussion as well as to enrich understanding. For the new edition the text has been revised throughout, the introduction has been greatly expanded, and a new chapter on environmental issues has been added.

At the present time and for the foreseeable future, likely, there is no defence, strictly speaking, against nuclear weapons. Nations facing a threat of attack involving nuclear weapons, therefore, have only three alternatives: resort to deterrence, try to get by with conventional defences, or surrender. It is discussable which of these is the most prudent option for any given nation, but I argue that we cannot accept any view entailing that the first is not a right. What we can do, (...) however, is to insist that even deterrence be as nearly as possible a purely defensive effort. This can be done by maintaining a military establishment which is incapable of serving offensive purposes, however capable it is of serving defensive ones. If all of the world’s States were thus equipped, there could be no rational prospect of nuclear war. The recently developed Cruise Missile exemplifies a weapons system that would make this possible. (shrink)

The general subject of Professor Bond's book, Reason and Value, is, as the title implies, the relation between reason and value, or more precisely the connections between concepts of motivation and value, with reasons as the contested notion in between. Bond offers a thesis that at least appears to go very much against the current trend on these matters. Whereas most recent theorists of note have tied justificatory reasons as well as explanatory reasons to desire, thus holding, in effect, that (...) values are somehow a function of desire, Bond wishes to cut the link between value and desire altogether. The first three chapters are devoted to developing this argument, mainly negatively. He distinguishes between “motivating” and “grounding” (or “justifying”) reasons in the customary way (e.g., Baier distinguishes “explanatory” from “justificatory” reasons to much the same effect'), and argues that “whereas desire or wanting and the reasons tied to it belong to the theory of motivation, where they are central, reason, in the sense of the reason(s) that a person has for or against doing a thing, is tied essentially to value, and the two are not to be confused” (9). “… The existence of grounding reasons (though not of motivating reasons) has no internal or necessary connection with desires of any kind” (37). “… All value is necessarily objective, in the sense that it is never a function of desire (or will); nothing is ever valuable or desirable in virtue of being desired” (84). “Value is not to any extent whatever a function or product of desire” (155). (shrink)

The article presents history of liberty in the past and contemporary liberal thought. This article grounds that creators of liberalism passed by a long way to define precisely the phenomenon of liberty. When creators were closer to the present day, they tried to separate liberty from metaphysics and morality with reference to the ideals of democracy. However, they confused the cult of equality with the liberty to show that the truth always must be at liberty’s service. But the liberty should (...) be understood like a competence to realize person’s rights. Not till then, liberalism will conceal the historic and present–time demons. (shrink)

The Squaring of the Bermuda Triangle. In the course of the great success of theory programs and the funding of young researchers within media studies and the history of science over the past 15 years, a generation of scholars has emerged (including the authors of this article) who have been genuinely trained in approaching interdisciplinary problems and objects. However, in view of a recently increasing renaissance of scientific ‘disciplines’, this raises the question of how to deal with such an innate (...) lack of discipline in the future. We respond here with two personal scenes that are by no means intended as a self‐adulation of our own research approaches, but as pleas for a continued multi‐voicedness between the history of science, media studies, the history of technology, and other interdisciplinary (non‐)disciplines. (shrink)

Building on William G. Lycan’s insight that proper names are paronymous, I pursue two goals in this paper: I argue that Lycan’s insight is not restricted to proper names, but can be extended to include certain general terms, and I aim to demonstrate how this contributes to a better understanding of sentences in the context of scientific discovery. To this end, I first address the question of how to best grasp the largely unknown concept of paronymy by tracing it back (...) to Aristotle, and by exploring recent developments in the philosophy of language and in linguistics. I then focus in greater detail on Lycan’s argument that proper names are paronymous and extend this reasoning to general terms, using analogous examples to show that general terms, like proper names, exhibit paronymy. Shifting the focus to scientific discovery, I show how recognizing the paronymy of general terms enhances our understanding of how scientific terms evolve over time and relate to other terms. My analysis also reveals that the “is” in scientific sentences does not necessarily function as the “is” of identity but can, among others, also be interpreted as the “is” of explication. This allows not only for the resolution of various puzzles, but also for different readings of sentences to coexist peacefully. (shrink)

On the basis of literature on delay discounting, potential mechanisms of relations between self-control and altruism are considered. The discussed possibilities are: cause-and-effect relationship, common mechanism, role of intelligence as a factor related both to self-control and altruism, and role of psychological distance. Relations between described perspectives are pointed out, and directions for further research are suggested.

The chapter provides illustrations of the link between Hegel's work and Vygotsky's and shows how the argument that Vygotsky employed an abstract decontextualised form of reason, is groundless. Kant sets out to resolve the dualism of world and mind by positing the categories of understanding. Although Kant's later work moved towards overcoming the rigid separation of concept and intuition and of spontaneity from receptivity, dualism remained. Hegel dealt with dualism from a radically different standpoint, and this transformed the terms in (...) which it can be posed. In contrast to Kant, he rejected the categorical separation of subject and object, thereby opening a philosophical space within which the antinomies of dualism could be transcended. Most reactions to Hegel after Marx were intermingled with reactions to Marx. Misinterpretation of Hegel is communicated to readings of Vygotsky, where the influence of Hegel is read as evidence of hierarchical conceptions of abstract reason. (shrink)

The paper deals with selected philosophical and methodological problems concerning the building of the quantum theory of gravitation, which is expected to unify general relativity and the quantum field theory into a single consistent and comprehensive theory. It outlines the basic ontological characteristics of such a theory, its structure and the limitations set upon it by the general relativity and the quantum field theory. Models of such a theory are described as well.

The article investigates characteristics of legal concepts as found in academic articles, focusing upon the knowledge base of legal experts. It is a cognitively oriented study of one of the semiotic basics of communication for academic legal purposes. The purpose is to study the structure of knowledge elements connected to the concept of “Criminal liability of corporations” from US law in and across individual experts in order to look for individual differences and similarities. The central concern is to investigate the (...) conditions for the observable efficiency of semiosis in academic discourse. In a first basic section I discuss aspects relevant for a cognitively oriented study of academic discourse. The empirical part of the article consists of an analysis of text passages from two articles in American law journals. The results of the study support the assumption that high efficiency and precision of semiosis is due rather to the use of specific cognitive processing skills than to total identity of cognitive structures across individual experts. (shrink)

The main thesis of this monograph, and its novelty, is the attempt to read Newman's work not only as a defence of the author's life, but as a defence of individual life in general. This reading is done against the background of his profound personalism based on two foundations: truth and responsibility.

Tato práce se zabývá možnými přístupy k etice sexuality, jejich klady i zápory. Etikou sexuality zde není míněno moralizování, stejně tak sexualitou není míněn pouze koitus, pohlavní chování je zde míněno v širším významu tedy včetně rozlehlé oblasti lidského svádění, okolků či otálení. Popsány jsou čtyři klasické přístupy k etice sexuality: tradicionalistický, romantický, marxisticko-feministický a liberální, avšak uvážen je i přístup antinatalistický, který vyplývá z asymetrického argumentu Davida Benatara uveřejněného v jeho práci Nebýt či být. Benatarův antinatalizmus totiž vytváří etiku (...) pohlavního chování, v níž pouze sex, který nevede k rozmnožení, může být morální. I když je tento pátý, antinatalistický přístup značně kontroverzní a zdaleka ne intuitivní, extrémnost jeho pozic se příliš neliší od tradicionalistického pohledu, v němž je morální pouze sex k rozmnožení vedoucí, tyto dva přístupy tak lze postavit do přímé opozice jako dvě krajní možnosti uvažování o etice pohlavního chování. Roli střední cesty v takovém řazení potom zaujme liberální přístup, který jako jediný etiku sexuality nevidí jako etiku odlišnou od jiných lidských činností. (shrink)