Recent work by Wan and McLean has shown that all quantum measurements may be reduced to local position measurements. Using an array of particle detectors as the measuring apparatus we show how a model employing superselection rules and unitary evolution leads to a single detector triggering in each act of measurement. We also present an explicit model of particle detection as a unitary ionization process producing a single ion in the detector, subsequent amplification of which to the visible can be (...) described adequately in classical terms. (shrink)

Founding our analysis on the Geneva-Brussels approach to the foundations of physics, we provide a clarification and classification of the key concept of observation. An entity can be observed with or without a scope. In the second case, the observation is a purely non-invasive discovery process; in the first case, it is a purely invasive process, which can involve either creation or destruction aspects. An entity can also be observed with or without a full control over the observational process. In (...) the latter case, the observation can be described by a symmetry breaking mechanism, through which a specific deterministic observational process is selected among a number of potential ones, as explained in Aerts’ hidden measurement approach. This is what is called a product test, or product observation, whose consequences are that outcomes can only be predicted in probabilistic terms, as it is the case in typical quantum measurements. We also show that observations can be about intrinsic (stable) properties of the observed entity, or about relational (ephemeral) properties between the observer and observed entities; also, they can be about intermediate properties, neither purely classical, nor purely quantum. Our analysis allows us to propose a general conceptual characterization of quantum measurements, as observational processes involving three aspects: (1) product observations, (2) pure creation aspects and (3) ephemeral relational properties. We also discuss the important concept of non-spatiality and emphasize some of the differences and similarities between quantum and classical/relativistic observations. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is threefold. Firstly, it aims to present, in an educational and non-technical fashion, the main ideas at the basis of Aerts’ creation-discovery view and hidden measurement approach : a fundamental explanatory framework whose importance, in this author’s view, has been seriously underappreciated by the physics community, despite its success in clarifying many conceptual challenges of quantum physics. Secondly, it aims to introduce a new quantum machine—that we call the δ quantum machine —which is able to (...) reproduce the transmission and reflection probabilities of a one-dimensional quantum scattering process by a Dirac delta-function potential. The machine is used not only to demonstrate the pertinence of the above mentioned explanatory framework, in the general description of physical systems, but also to illustrate (in the spirit of Aerts’ ∊-model) the origin of classical and quantum structures, by revealing the existence of processes which are neither classical nor quantum, but irreducibly intermediate. We do this by explicitly introducing what we call the k-model and by proving that its processes cannot be modelized by a classical or quantum scattering system. The third purpose of this work is to exploit the powerful metaphor provided by our quantum machine, to investigate the intimate relation between the concept of potentiality and the notion of non-spatiality , that we characterize in precise terms, introducing for this the new concept of process-actuality. (shrink)

We investigate indeterminism in physical observations. For this, we introduce a distinction between genuinely indeterministic observational processes, and fully deterministic observational processes, which we analyze by drawing a parallel between the localization properties of microscopic entities, like electrons, and the lateralization properties of macroscopic entities, like simple elastic bands. We show that by removing the randomness incorporated in certain of our observational processes, acquiring over them a better control, we also alter these processes in such a radical way that in (...) the end they do not correspond anymore to the observation of the same property. We thus conclude that a certain amount of indeterminism must be accepted and welcomed in our physical observations, as we cannot get rid of it without also diminishing our discriminative power. We also provide in our analysis some elements of clarification regarding the non-spatial nature of microscopic entities, which we illustrate by using an analogy with the process of objectification of human concepts. Finally, the important notion of relational properties is properly defined, and the role played by indeterminism in their characterization clarified. (shrink)

There are two prominent viewpoints regarding the nature of rationality and how it should be evaluated in situations of interest: the traditional axiomatic approach and the newer ecological rationality. An obstacle to comparing and evaluating these seemingly opposite approaches is that they employ different language and formalisms, ask different questions, and are at different stages of development. I adapt a formal framework known as SCOP to address this problem by providing a comprehensive common framework in which both approaches may be (...) defined and compared. The main result is that the axiomatic and ecological approaches are in far greater agreement on fundamental issues than has been appreciated; this is supported by a pair of theorems to the effect that they will make accordant rationality judgements when forced to evaluate the same situation. I conclude that ecological rationality has some subtle advantages, but that we should move past the issues currently dominating the discussion of rationality. (shrink)

En nous laissant guider par la notion de champ qui en faitdomine toute la physique nous définissons la nature physique d'un système, ses propriétés et ses états possibles. Nous proposons alors un cadre très générale permettant la description de telssystèmes et la construction de modèles consistants.Nous en donnons des exemples et pour illustrer les concepts de notrethéorie nous décrivons différents types d'évolutions. Pour terminer nous discutons en détails unprocessus physique, les échos de spins.

In this dialogue we explain why nonrelativistic and relativistic quantum mechanics are basically the same and how the Lorentz group operates canonically only on the dynamics.

The present article discusses shared epistemological characteristics of two distinct areas of research: the field of first-person inquiry and the field of quantum mechanics. We outline certain philosophical challenges that arise in each of the two lines of inquiry, and point towards the central similarity of their observational situation: the impossibility of disregarding the interrelatedness of the observed phenomena with the act of observation. We argue that this observational feature delineates a specific category of research that we call the non-trivial (...) domain. Unlike the trivial domain, non-trivial research cannot assume the view from nowhere on which the observed phenomena could be regarded as existing independently of the process of observation. Presenting first-person inquiry and quantum mechanics as two of its examples, we show that non-trivial research violates several fundamental observational presuppositions of the trivial domain, exemplified in the principles of classical physics. Drawing on Niels Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics and the constructivist notion of enaction, we stress the constructive, participatory, and irreversible nature of observation in the non-trivial domain. We discuss the possibility of developing a non-representationalist epistemology of the non-trivial, and consider the implications of our discussion for research in the non-trivial domain, as well as for the general understanding of the scientific inquiry. (shrink)

It is frequently argued that reality and locality are incompatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. Various investigators have used this as evidence for the existence of hidden variables. However, Bell's inequalities seem to refute this possibility. Since the above arguments are made within the framework of conventional probability theory, we contend that an alternative solution can be found by an extension of this theory. Elaborating on some ideas of I. Pitowski, we show that within the framework of a generalized (...) probability theory, reality, locality, hidden variables, and the predictions of quantum mechanics can be maintained together. Although our principal model in this work is a spin system, there are indications that this program can be extended to more general systems. (shrink)

Propensities are presented as a generalization of classical determinism. They describe a physical reality intermediary between Laplacian determinism and pure randomness, such as in quantum mechanics. They are characterized by the fact that their values are determined by the collection of all actual properties. It is argued that they do not satisfy Kolmogorov axioms; other axioms are proposed.

The standard interpretation of quantum physics (QP) and some recent generalizations of this theory rest on the adoption of a rerificationist theory of truth and meaning, while most proposals for modifying and interpreting QP in a “realistic” way attribute an ontological status to theoretical physical entities (ontological realism). Both terms of this dichotomy are criticizable, and many quantum paradoxes can be attributed to it. We discuss a new viewpoint in this paper (semantic realism, or briefly SR), which applies both to (...) classical physics (CP) and to QP. and is characterized by the attempt of giving up verificationism without adopting ontological realism. As a first step, we construct a formalized observative language L endowed with a correspondence truth theory. Then, we state a set of axioms by means of L which hold both in CP and in QP. and construct a further language Lv which can express bothtestable andtheoretical properties of a given physical system. The concepts ofmeaning andtestability do not collapse in L and Le hence we can distinguish between semantic and pragmatic compatibility of physical properties and define the concepts of testability and conjoint testability of statements of L and Le. In this context a new metatheoretical principle (MGP) is stated, which limits the validity of empirical physical laws. By applying SR (in particular. MGP) to QP, one can interpret quantum logic as a theory of testability in QP, show that QP is semantically incomplete, and invalidate the widespread claim that contextuality is unavoidable in QP. Furthermore. SR introduces some changes in the conventional interpretation of ideal measurements and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. (shrink)

The Geneva–Brussels approach to quantum mechanics (QM) and the semantic realism (SR) nonstandard interpretation of QM exhibit some common features and some deep conceptual differences. We discuss in this paper two elementary models provided in the two approaches as intuitive supports to general reasonings and as a proof of consistency of general assumptions, and show that Aerts’ quantum machine can be embodied into a macroscopic version of the microscopic SR model, overcoming the seeming incompatibility between the two models. This result (...) provides some hints for the construction of a unified perspective in which the two approaches can be properly placed. (shrink)

A comprehensive formal system is developed that amalgamates the operational and the realistic approaches to quantum mechanics. In this formalism, for example, a sharp distinction is made between events, operational propositions, and the properties of physical systems.

The effects in a quantum-mechanical system form a partial algebra and a partially ordered set which is the prototypical example of the effect algebras discussed in this paper. The relationships among effect algebras and such structures as orthoalgebras and orthomodular posets are investigated, as are morphisms and group- valued measures (or charges) on effect algebras. It is proved that there is a universal group for every effect algebra, as well as a universal vector space over an arbitrary field.

In the foundations of quantum mechanics Gleason’s theorem dictates the uniqueness of the state transition probability via the inner product of the corresponding state vectors in Hilbert space, independent of which measurement context induces this transition. We argue that the state transition probability should not be regarded as a secondary concept which can be derived from the structure on the set of states and properties, but instead should be regarded as a primitive concept for which measurement context is crucial. Accordingly, (...) we adopt an operational approach to quantum mechanics in which a physical entity is defined by the structure of its set of states, set of properties and the possible (measurement) contexts which can be applied to this entity. We put forward some elementary definitions to derive an operational theory from this State–COntext–Property (SCOP) formalism. We show that if the SCOP satisfies a Gleason-like condition, namely that the state transition probability is independent of which measurement context induces the change of state, then the lattice of properties is orthocomplemented, which is one of the ‘quantum axioms’ used in the Piron–Solèr representation theorem for quantum systems. In this sense we obtain a possible physical meaning for the orthocomplementation widely used in quantum structures. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. We will argue that there exists a general confusion within the foundational literature arising from the improper “scrambling” of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. While the first one, introduced by Bohr, is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality which stresses the incompatibility of measurement situations described in classical terms; the second meaning of contextuality is related to a purely formal understanding of contextuality as (...) exposed by the Kochen–Specker theorem which focuses instead on the constraints of the orthodox quantum formalism in order to interpret projection operators as preexistent or actual properties. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an “omelette of contextuality” which has been fully widespread through a popularized “epistemic explanation” of the KS theorem according to which: The measurement outcome of the observableAwhen measured together withBor together withCwill necessarily differ in case\, and\. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and formal perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. Finally, we analyze the consequences of such widespread epistemic reading of KS theorem as related to statistical statements of measurement outcomes. (shrink)

Founding our analysis on the Geneva-Brussels approach to quantum mechanics, we use conventional macroscopic objects as guiding examples to clarify the content of two important results of the beginning of twentieth century: Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen’s reality criterion and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. We then use them in combination to show that our widespread belief in the existence of microscopic particles is only the result of a cognitive illusion, as microscopic particles are not particles, but are instead the ephemeral spatial and local manifestations of (...) non-spatial and non-local entities. (shrink)

SummaryThe Bohr‐Einstein debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics may be viewed as a discussion on the epistemological status of knowledge gained by physics. It is shown that in fact the advent of quantum theory has led, in a new context, to an old philosophical controversy between epistemological realism and phenomenalism . An inquiry into this controversy, taking into account the contemporary understanding of quantum mechanics based on the axiomatic study of its foundations, leads to the conclusion that contrary to (...) widespread opinion, it is perfectly possible to formulate quantum mechanics in an entirely realistic manner according to the postulate of Einstein. We demonstrate that Bohr's episteme‐logy, in which the role of experimental arrangements in the physical description is taken as a starting point, does not necessarily imply phenomenlism, but may be justifiably considered as a complementary standpoint to the realistic epistemology of Einstein, which is based on the notion of a mental construction which pictures reality. (shrink)

In their seminal paper Birkhoff and von Neumann revealed the following dilemma:[ ] whereas for logicians the orthocomplementation properties of negation were the ones least able to withstand a critical analysis, the study of mechanics points to the distributive identities as the weakest link in the algebra of logic.

The condition of explicit theoretically discursive cognitive performance, as it culminates in scientific activity, is, I claim, the life world. I contrast life world and scientific world and argue that the latter arises from the first and that contrary to the prevailing views the scientific world (actually, worlds, since the classical world is substantially different from the quantum world) finds its completion in the life world and not the other way around. In other words: the closure we used to search (...) in a complete and comprehensive scientific description of all aspects of experience by referring it back to underlying atoms, genes and other scientific objects and the covering laws ruling them, should be sought in a reintegrating and occasionally dissolving of the abstract scientific model in the self-organizational fluidity and superposition-like indeterminateness and non-locality of the life world: “We have to acknowledge the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon” (Merleau-Ponty in his The Phenomenology of Perception). (shrink)

The mathematical description of the three distinct fundamental notions of “individual sample” of “preparing procedure,” and of “Piron's state” of a physical entity are precisely introduced in the framework of the Piron's “preparation-question structure” (without specific axioms C, P, A) based on Ludwig's “selection structure.” We compare our realization of the above notions with a similar use of the standard terminology of the “Geneva School” adopted by Pykacz and Santos in a recent paper.

The notion of coexistence between questions is introduced in the framework of Piron's approach to quantum physics, using Aerts' notion of performable-together questions. Relationships between coexistence of questions and Piron's compatibility of propositions are investigated. In particular, properties generated by coexistent and primitive questions are compatible.

The formalism of abstracted quantum mechanics is applied in a model of the generalized Liar Paradox. Here, the Liar Paradox, a consistently testable configuration of logical truth properties, is considered a dynamic conceptual entity in the cognitive sphere (Aerts, Broekaert, & Smets, [Foundations of Science 1999, 4, 115–132; International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 2000, 38, 3231–3239]; Aerts and colleagues[Dialogue in Psychology, 1999, 10; Proceedings of Fundamental Approachs to Consciousness, Tokyo ’99; Mind in Interaction]. Basically, the intrinsic contextuality of the truth-value (...) of the Liar Paradox is appropriately covered by the abstracted quantum mechanical approach. The formal details of the model are explicited here for the generalized case. We prove the possibility of constructing a quantum model of the m-sentence generalizations of the Liar Paradox. This includes (i) the truth–falsehood state of the m-Liar Paradox can be represented by an embedded 2m-dimensional quantum vector in a (2m) m -dimensional complex Hilbert space, with cognitive interactions corresponding to projections, (ii) the construction of a continuous ‘time’ dynamics is possible: typical truth and falsehood value oscillations are described by Schrödinger evolution, (iii) Kirchoff and von Neumann axioms are satisfied by introduction of ‘truth-value by inference’ projectors, (iv) time invariance of unmeasured state. (shrink)

We introduce a model with a set of experiments of which the probabilities of the outcomes coincide with the quantum probabilities for the spin measurements of a quantum spin- $ \frac{1}{2} $ particle. Product tests are defined which allow simultaneous measurements of incompatible observables, which leads to a discussion of the validity of the meet of two propositions as the algebraic model for conjunction in quantum logic. Although the entity possesses the same structure for the logic of its experimental propositions (...) as a genuine spin- $ \frac{1}{2} $ quantum entity, the probability measure corresponding with the meet of propositions using the Hilbert space representation and quantum rules does not render the probability of the conjunction of the two propositions. Accordingly, some fundamental concepts of quantum logic, Piron-products, “classical” systems and the general problem of hidden variable theories for quantum theory are discussed. (shrink)

Using the mathematical notion of an entity to represent states in quantum and classical mechanics, we show that, in a strict sense, proper superpositions are possible in classical mechanics.

We put forward a new view of relativity theory that makes the existence of a flow of time compatible with the four-dimensional block universe. To this end, we apply the creation-discovery view elaborated for quantum mechanics to relativity theory and in such a way that time and space become creations instead of discoveries and an underlying non temporal and non spatial reality comes into existence. We study the nature of this underlying non temporal and non spatial reality and reinterpret many (...) aspects of the theory within this new view. We show that data of relativistic measurements are sufficient to derive the three-dimensionality of physical space. The nature of light and massive entities is reconsidered, and an analogy with human cognition is worked out. (shrink)

In classical Newtonian physics there was a clear understanding of “what reality is.≓ Indeed in this classical view, reality at a certain time is the collection of all what is actual at this time, and this is contained in “the present.≓ Often it is stated that three-dimensional space and one-dimensional time hare been substituted by four-dimensional space-time in relativity theory, and as a consequence the classical concept of reality, as that which is “present,≓ cannot be retained. Is reality then the (...) four-dimensional manifold of relativity theory? And if so, what is then the meaning of “change in time?≓ This problem confronts a geometric view (as the Einsteinian interpretation of relativity theory) with a process view (where reality changes constantly in time). In this paper we investigate this problem, taking into account our insight into the nature of reality as it came by analyzing the problems of quantum mechanics. We show that with an Einsteinian interpretation of relativity theory, reality is indeed four-dimensional, but there is no contradiction with the process view, where this reality changes in time. (shrink)

Elaboramos aquí una nueva interpretación propuesta recientemente de la teoría cuántica, según la cual las partículas cuánticas son consideradas como entidades conceptuales que median entre los pedazos de materia ordinaria los cuales son considerados como estructuras de memoria para ellos. Nuestro objetivo es identificar qué es lo equivalente para el ámbito cognitivo humano de lo que el espacio-tiempo físico es para el ámbito de las partículas cuánticas y de la materia ordinaria. Para ello, se identifica la noción de "historia" como (...) el equivalente en la esfera cognitiva humana de lo que la materia ordinaria es en el ámbito físico cuántico. Analizamos también el papel desempeñado por los conectivos lógicos de disyunción y de conjunción con respecto a la noción de localidad. De manera similar a lo que hemos hecho en investigaciones anteriores referidas a esa nueva interpretación de la teoría cuántica, se utiliza el entorno cognitivo específico de la Internet para dilucidar las comparaciones que hacemos entre el ámbito cognitivo humano y el ámbito físico cuántico. We elaborate the new interpretation of quantum theory that we recently proposed, according to which quantum particles are considered conceptual entities mediating between pieces of ordinary matter which are considered to act as memory structures for them. Our aim is to identify what is the equivalent for the human cognitive realm of what physical space-time is for the realm of quantum particles and ordinary matter. For this purpose, we identify the notion of 'story' as the equivalent within the human cognitive realm of what ordinary matter is in the physical quantum realm, and analyze the role played by the logical connectives of disjunction and conjunction with respect to the notion of locality. Similarly to what we have done in earlier investigations on this new interpretation of quantum theory, we use the specific cognitive environment of the Internet to elucidate the comparisons we make between the human cognitive realm and the physical quantum realm. (shrink)

Many advocates of the Everettian interpretation consider that theirs is the only approach to take quantum mechanics really seriously, and that this approach allows to deduce a fantastic scenario for our reality, one that consists of an infinite number of parallel worlds that branch out continuously. In this article, written in dialogue form, we suggest that quantum mechanics can be taken even more seriously, if the many-worlds view is replaced by a many-measurements view. This allows not only to derive the (...) Born rule, thus solving the measurement problem, but also to deduce a one-world non-spatial reality, providing an even more fantastic scenario than that of the multiverse. (shrink)

We present a model that allows one to build structures that evolve continuously from classical to quantum, and we study the intermediate situations, giving rise to structures that are neither classical nor quantum. We construct the closure structure corresponding to the collection of eigenstate sets of these intermediate situations, and demonstrate how the superposition principle disappears during the transition from quantum to classical. We investigate the validity of the axioms of quantum mechanics for the intermediate situations.

We prove that if the physical entity S consisting of two separated physical entities S1 and S2 satisfies the axioms of orthodox quantum mechanics, then at least one of the two subentities is a classical physical entity. This theorem implies that separated quantum entities cannot be described by quantum mechanics. We formulate this theorem in an approach where physical entities are described by the set of their states, and the set of their relevant experiments. We also show that the collection (...) of eigenstate sets forms a closure structure on the set of states, which we call the eigen-closure structure. We derive another closure structure on the set of states by means of the orthogonality relation, and call it the ortho-closure structure, and show that the main axioms of quantum mechanics can be introduced in a very general way by means of these two closure structures. We prove that for a general physical entity, and hence also for a quantum entity, the probabilities can always be explained as being due to a lack of knowledge about the interaction between the experimental apparatus and the entity. (shrink)

We analyze different aspects of our quantum modeling approach of human concepts and, more specifically, focus on the quantum effects of contextuality, interference, entanglement, and emergence, illustrating how each of them makes its appearance in specific situations of the dynamics of human concepts and their combinations. We point out the relation of our approach, which is based on an ontology of a concept as an entity in a state changing under influence of a context, with the main traditional concept theories, (...) that is, prototype theory, exemplar theory, and theory theory. We ponder about the question why quantum theory performs so well in its modeling of human concepts, and we shed light on this question by analyzing the role of complex amplitudes, showing how they allow to describe interference in the statistics of measurement outcomes, while in the traditional theories statistics of outcomes originates in classical probability weights, without the possibility of interference. The relevance of complex numbers, the appearance of entanglement, and the role of Fock space in explaining contextual emergence, all as unique features of the quantum modeling, are explicitly revealed in this article by analyzing human concepts and their dynamics. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new categorical approach which attempts to provide an original understanding of QM. Our logos categorical approach attempts to consider the main features of the quantum formalism as the standpoint to develop a conceptual representation that explains what the theory is really talking about —rather than as problems that need to be bypassed in order to allow a restoration of a classical “common sense” understanding of what there is. In particular, we discuss a solution to (...) Kochen-Specker contextuality through the generalization of the meaning of global valuation. This idea has been already addressed by the so called topos approach to QM —originally proposed by Isham, Butterfiled and D ̈oring— in terms of sieve-valued valuations. The logos approach to QM presents a different solution in terms of the notion of intensive valuation. This new solution stresses an ontological reading of the quantum formalism and the need to restore an objective conceptual representation and understanding of quantum physical reality. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. In the first part we will argue that a general confusion within the literature comes from the improper "scrambling" of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. The first one is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality, introduced by Bohr, which stresses the incompatibility of quantum measurements. The second, is related to an ontic notion of contextuality, exposed through the Kochen-Specker theorem, which focuses on the (...) constraints to discuss about actual properties within the orthodox formalism of QM. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an "omelette of contextuality" which has been fully widespread through a popularized "epistemic explanation" of the KS theorem according to which: The outcome of the observable A when mea- sured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A,B] = [A,C] = 0, and [B,C] ̸= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and ontic perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. In the second part of the paper, we will analyse the relation between ‘classical contexts’ and QM. We will show that three accepted presuppositions found within the orthodox literature are, in general, false. Namely: that quantum contextuality does not preclude an objective description of physical reality, that the choice of a context restores a classical description of reality, and that the choice of a context is a necessary condition for accounting for empirical statements in QM. (shrink)

In a recent paper Griffiths [38] has argued, based on the consistent histories interpretation, that Hilbert space quantum mechanics is noncontextual. According to Griffiths the problem of contextuality disappears if the apparatus is “designed and operated by a competent experimentalist” and we accept the Single Framework Rule. We will argue from a representational realist stance that the conclusion is incorrect due to the misleading understanding provided by Griffiths to the meaning of quantum contextuality and its relation to physical reality and (...) measurements. We will discuss how the quite general incomprehension of contextuality has its origin in the ''objective-subjective omelette'' created by Heisenberg and Bohr. We will argue that in order to unscramble the omelette we need to disentangle, firstly, representational realism from naive realism, secondly, ontology from epistemology, and thirdly, the different interpretational problems of QM. In this respect, we will analyze what should be considered as Meaningful Physical Statements within a theory and will argue that Counterfactual Reasoning -considered by Griffiths as ''tricky''- must be accepted as a necessary condition for any representational realist interpretation of QM. Finally we discuss what should be considered as a problem in QM from a representational realist perspective. (shrink)

from non-conscious components by positing that consciousness is a universal primitive. For example, the double aspect theory of information holds that infor- mation has a phenomenal aspect. How then do you get from phenomenal infor- mation to human consciousness? This paper proposes that an entity is conscious to the extent it amplifies information, first by trapping and integrating it through closure, and second by maintaining dynamics at the edge of chaos through simul- taneous processes of divergence and convergence. The origin (...) of life through autocatalytic closure, and the origin of an interconnected worldview through conceptual closure, induced phase transitions in the degree to which informa- tion, and thus consciousness, is locally amplified. Divergence and convergence of cognitive information may involve phenomena observed in light e.g. focusing, interference, and resonance. By making information flow inward- biased, clo- sure shields us from external consciousness; thus the paucity of consciousness may be an illusion. (shrink)

We propose a theory for modeling concepts that uses the state-context-property theory (SCOP), a generalization of the quantum formalism, whose basic notions are states, contexts and properties. This theory enables us to incorporate context into the mathematical structure used to describe a concept, and thereby model how context influences the typicality of a single exemplar and the applicability of a single property of a concept. We introduce the notion `state of a concept' to account for this contextual influence, and show (...) that the structure of the set of contexts and of the set of properties of a concept is a complete orthocomplemented lattice. The structural study in this article is a preparation for a numerical mathematical theory of concepts in the Hilbert space of quantum mechanics that allows the description of the combination of concepts. (shrink)

The use of probability theory is widespread in our daily life as well as in scientific theories. In virtually all cases, calculations can be carried out within the framework of classical probability theory. A special exception is given by quantum mechanics, which gives rise to a new probability theory: quantum probability theory. This dissertation deals with the question of how this formalism can be understood from a philosophical and physical perspective. The dissertation is divided into three parts. In the first (...) part, the formalism of quantum probability theory and its relation to quantum mechanics is presented. The second part considers the possibility of reformulating quantum probability theory to embed it within classical probability. Mathematically, this possibility overlaps with the possibility of the existence of hidden variables theories of quantum mechanics: theories that attempt to solve fundamental problems in quantum mechanics by introducing additional physical properties of systems. The conclusion of this part is that, although classical reformulations of quantum probability theory are formally possible, they offer little insight into the formalism of quantum probability theory itself. The third part regards a more direct investigation of quantum probability theory. A reformulation of quantum probability theory is obtained by constructing a quantum logic on the basis of empirical non-probabilistic predictions of quantum mechanics. In this reformulation quantum probability functions are conditional probability functions on an algebra of propositions about measurements and measurement outcomes. (shrink)

Experiments with remote perception and Random Event Generators (REG) performed over the last decades show small but significant anomalous effects. Since these effects seem to be independent of spatial and temporal distance, they appear to be in disagreement with the standard scientific worldview. A very simple explanation of quantum mechanics is pre- sented, rejecting all unjustified claims about the world. A view of mind in agreement with cognitive neuroscience is introduced. It is argued that mind and consciousness are emer- gent (...) properties of the brain and are understandable without any nonphysical assumptions. A plausible explanation of the results of anomalous experiments, based on the concept of synchronicity, introduced by C.G. Jung and advocated by W. Pauli, is offered. A proof is given that strong correlations should exist between any systems that once interacted. Synchronicity events between parts of the brain and physical objects may be sufficient to explain the results of anomalous experiments. Standard physics is sufficient to understand these phenomena. Motto. (shrink)