This book undertakes a critical survey of art history across Europe, examining the recent conceptual and methodological concerns informing the discipline as well as the political, social and ideological factors that have shaped its development in specific national contexts.

Essays discuss the themes of worldliness, affectedness, understanding, and the care-structure found in Heidegger's work on the nature of existence.

Our contemporary nihilism -- Homer's polytheism -- From Aeschylus to Augustine : monotheism on the rise -- From Dante to Kant : the attractions and dangers of autonomy -- Fanaticism, polytheism, and Melville's "evil art" -- David Foster Wallace's nihilism -- Conclusion : lives worth living in a secular age.

OF THE many issues surrounding the new interest in hermeneutics, current debate has converged upon two.

Peut-on atteindre l'extériorité radicale, et, si oui, comment? Tout fonctionne comme si la racine de l'extériorité ne rencontrait jamais celle de l'intériorité. Mais que serait le monde si le monde intérieur et le monde extérieur n'avaient pas de racine commune? Serions-nous, alors, dans l'irrémédiable séparation? Dans l'indépassable solitude? Dans la totale altérité? Dans l'infinie différence et l'infinie indifférence? Problème philosophique et existentiel fondamental ; outre que l'art s y confronte en inventant ses voies. I l en va, entre autres, de (...) l'intériorité, de la subjectivité, de l'existence des choses matérielles, mais aussi de leur essence, des moyens de les connaître et des conditions de possibilité de cette connaissance et de ces moyens : quels enjeux! L'interprétation semble être la seule voie — bien périlleuse — pour représenter l'extériorité. Mais, alors, quel(s) type(s) d'interprétation? Philosophique, esthétique et poétique — les trois moments de ce livre? Le problème est donc à la fois celui de l'extériorité et celui de l'interprétation : eu égard à ses enjeux et à ses présupposés, il est incontournable. Le travailler éclaire sur l'interprétation et sur l'extériorité. (shrink)

Husserl and Searle agree that, for a bodily movement to be an action, it must be caused by a propositional representation. Husserl's representation is a mental state whose intentional content is what the agent is trying to do; Searle thinks of the representation as a logical structure expressing the action's conditions of satisfaction. Merleau-Ponty criticises both views by introducing a kind of activity he calls motor intentionality, in which the agent, rather than aiming at success, feels drawn to reduce a (...) felt tension. I argue that Searle can account for Merleau-Ponty's kind of coping only by broadening his notion of propositional representation to include indexicals, but that, in so doing, he covers up the way representational intentionality depends upon motor intentionality. (shrink)

Detachment, Involvement, and Rationality: are we Essentially Rational Animals? Philosophers have long thought that what differentiates humans from mere animals is that humans are essentially rational. The rational nature of human beings lies in their ability to detach themselves from ongoing involvement and to ask for as well as give reasons for activity. According to the philosophical tradition, human action and perception generally should be understood in light of this ability. This essay examines a contemporary version of this conviction, one (...) promulgated by John McDowell. McDowell follows the tradition in suggesting that people are always able to step back and to ask as well as answer why questions about what they are doing, i.e., they always have reasons for their actions. This essay shows that people have no reasons for many of the things they do. They often, instead, simply respond to shifting situational fields of attraction and repulsion. These attractions and repulsions cannot be captured in propositional form—any attempt to describe, or even just name, them turns them into objects and robs them of their motivational force. The demands of the situation are not available as reasons, but exist only as embodied in actions. McDowell, consequently, errs in claiming that conceptual capacities are inextricably implicated in human activity. Nor is the detached, rational way of being any more essential to human life than is involved coping. (shrink)

I shall translate Kierkegaard's account of the dangers and opportunities of what he called the Press into a critique of the Internet so as to raise the question: what contribution -- for good or ill -- can the World Wide Web, with its ability to deliver vast amounts of information to users all over the world, make to educators trying to pass on knowledge and to develop skills and wisdom in their students? I will then use Kierkegaard's three-stage answer to (...) the problem of lack of involvement posed by the Press -- his claim that to have a meaningful life the learner must pass through the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious spheres of existence -- to suggest that only the first two stages -- the aesthetic and the ethical -- can be implemented with Information Technology, while the final stage, which alone makes meaningful learning possible, is undermined rather than supported by the tendencies of the desituated and anonymous Net. (shrink)

Rencontre Ce numéro est le fruit de la rencontre entre CLIO, Histoire Femmes et Sociétés, revue d’histoire des femmes et du genre, et les historiens du sport. S’agit-il d’une stratégie de renforcement et de légitimation réciproque? Il n’en est rien. Les champs de recherche ne sont pas de même nature : le sport est un objet, le genre un concept devenu catégorie d’analyse. De plus, il est possible d’affirmer, sans naïveté ni arrogance, mais peut-être avec une touche d’optimisme, que l’illégiti...

Actual AI research began auspiciously around 1955 with Allen Newell and Herbert Simon's work at the RAND Corporation. Newell and Simon proved that computers could do more than calculate. They demonstrated that computers were physical symbol systems whose symbols could be made to stand for anything, including features of the real world, and whose programs could be used as rules for relating these features. In this way computers could be used to simulate certain important aspects intelligence. Thus the information-processing model (...) of the mind was born. But, looking back over these fifty years, it seems that theoretical AI with its promise of a robot like HAL appears to be a perfect example of what Imre Lakatos has called a "degenerating research program". (shrink)

For some years there has been a controversy about whether brain state variables such as EEG or neuronal spike trains exhibit chaotic behaviour. Wright & Liley claim that the local dynamics measured by spike trains or local field potentials exhibit chaotic behaviour, but global measures like EEG should be governed by linear dynamics. We propose a different scheme. Based on simulation studies and various experiments, we suggest that the pointwise dimension of EEG time series may provide some valuable information about (...) underlying neuronal generators. (shrink)

Heartbreaking stories and pictures documenting the phenomenon of populations displaced by climate change—homes, neighborhoods, livelihoods, and cultures lost. "Our job is to tell stories we have heard and to bear witness to what we have seen. The science was already there when we started in 2004, but we wanted to emphasize the human dimension, especially for those most vulnerable." —Guy-Pierre Chomette, Collectif Argos We have all seen photographs of neighborhoods wrecked and abandoned after a hurricane, of dry, cracked terrain that (...) was once fertile farmland, of islands wiped out by a tsunami. But what happens to the people who live in these areas? According to the United Nations, some 150 million people will become climate refugees by 2050. The journalists and photographers of Collectif Argos have spent four years seeking out the first wave of people displaced by the consequences of climate change. Using the massive 2,500-page report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as their guide, these photographers and writers pinpointed nine locales around the world in which global warming has had a measureable impact. In Climate Refugees, they take us to these places—from the dust bowl that was once Lake Chad to the melting permafrost in Alaska—offering a first-hand look in words and photographs at the devastating effects of rising global temperatures on the daily lives of ordinary people. Climate Refugees shows us damage wrought to homes and livelihoods by rapid warming near the Arctic; rising sea levels that threaten the island nations of Tuvulu, the Maldives, and Halligen; farmers displaced by the desert's advance in Chad and China; floods that wash away life in Bangladesh; and Hurricane Katrina evacuees in shelters far away from their New Orleans neighborhoods. Added to the devastating environmental effect of climate change is the immeasurable and irretrievable loss of ethnic and cultural diversity that occurs when vulnerable local cultures disperse. It is this often forgotten and tragic consequence of global warming that Collectif Argos painstakingly documents. Collectif Argos Guy-Pierre Chomette Guillaume Collanges Hélène David Jérômine Derigny Cédric Faimali Donatien Garnier Eléonore Henry de Frahan Aude Raux Laurent Weyl Jacques Windenberger. (shrink)

The Matrix raises several familiar philosophical problems in such new ways that students all over the country are assigning it to their philosophy professors. In so doing, they have offered us a great opportunity to illustrate some of the basic insights of existential phenomenology. The Matrix might seem to renew Descartes’s worry that, since all we ever experience are our own inner mental states, we might, for all we could tell, be living in an illusion created by a malicious demon. (...) In that case, most of our beliefs about reality would be false. But there is a way of understanding The Matrix that denies the mediation of mental states and shows those living in the Matrix to be in direct touch with Matrix reality. The Matrix world is public and objective, not a private subjective dream. Still, there is clearly a sense in which the Matrix world, while not merely mental, is not real either. There is after all a demon—the AI intelligences and their computer—that has in some sense fooled all those who accept the reality of the Matrix world. Thus, the film’s account of our situation is even more disturbing than Descartes’s claim that we are each confined to our own mind. The Matrix world is a vivid illustration of Descartes’s additional prescient claim that we could never be in direct touch with the real world because we are all what we would now call brains in vats. (shrink)

"This translation is based upon the revised third edition, issued by Nagel in 1961. English translation c1964 by Northwestern University Press. First published 1964 ny Northwestern University Press."--Title page verso.

Heidegger and the study of his thought have earned wide acceptance, extending beyond philosophy to influence an array of other disciplines. Critically selected by leading scholars in the field, the articles in this new collection bring together the most essential and representative scholarship on Heidegger. Focusing on the major phases of his work which attracted most attention from contemporary thinkers, as well as exploring new and important areas of Heidegger scholarship, this four-volume set is an invaluable resource for any curriculum (...) supporting philosophy, as well as political theory, literature, classics, anthropology, and cultural studies. This volume is available on its own or as part of the four-volume set, Heidegger Reexamined . For a complete list of the volume titles in this set, see the listing for Heidegger Reexamined [ISBN: 0-415-94041-9]. (shrink)

of autonomous agency. Yet neither denies the importance of human freedom. In Heidegger's early work the subject is reinterpreted as Dasein -- a non autonomous, culturally bound (or thrown) way of being, that can yet change the field of possibilities in which it acts. In middle Heidegger, thinkers alone have the power to disclose a new world, while in later Heidegger, anyone is free to step back from the current world, to enter one of a plurality of worlds, and, thereby, (...) facilitate a change in the practices of one's society. Likewise, for early Foucault, the subject is reduced to a function of discourse; for middle Foucault, writing can open up new worlds, and in later Foucault, freedom is understood as the power to question what is currently taken for granted, plus the capacity to change oneself and, perhaps, one's milieu. In short, while both Heidegger and Foucault reject the Enlightenment idea of an autonomous subject, they have a robust notion of freedom and action. And it will turn out for both thinkers that each person can modify his or her cultural practices by openness to embeddedness in them. All this needs a great deal of explanation. We need to determine, on the one hand, just what each rejects and why, and, on the other, what series of understandings of the self and its possibilities for action each introduces. (shrink)

Résumé À partir du catalogue de l’exposition « La peinture photographe », voici l’évocation d’une collaboration qui commence en 1975 au Musée national d’art moderne, se continue au château d’Oiron et croise parfois l’œuvre de Marcel Duchamp. Passant de la « peinture photographe » à l’idée d’une « peinture sculptrice », Jean-Hubert Martin interroge le non-peint et les postures de la peinture.

First published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

One's model of skill determines what one expects from neural network modelling and how one proposes to go about enhancing expertise. We view skill acquisition as a progression from acting on the basis of a rough theory of a domain in terms of facts and rules to being able to respond appropriately to the current situation on the basis of neuron connections changed by the results of responses to the relevant aspects of many past situations. Viewing skill acquisition in this (...) ways suggests how one can avoid the problem currently facing AI of how to train a network to make human-like generalizations. In training a network one must progress, as the human learner does, from rules and facts to wholistic responses. As to future work, from our perspective one should not try to enhance expertise as in traditional AI by attempting to construct improved theories of a domain, but rather by improving the learner's access to the relevant aspects of a domain so as to facilitate learning from experience. (shrink)