The aim of this paper is to discuss the role played by Plato in The Birth of Tragedy and the extent to which Nietzsche's position in this work would have an echo in his Lectures on Plato, presented from 1871 to 1876 at the University of Basel. It analyzes Plato's image as someone who, being both a philosopher and an artist, allows us to bring into question the assumed boundaries between art and philosophy, while also making us think whether the (...) arising philosophy in Greece could be thought of as a form of art that denies itself from within. (shrink)

Since the launch of applications such as DALL-E, Midjourney, and Stable Diffusion, generative artificial intelligence has been controversial as a tool for creating artwork. While some have presented longtermist worries about these technologies as harbingers of fully automated futures to come, more pressing is the impact of generative AI on creative labour in the present. Already, business leaders have begun replacing human artistic labour with AI-generated images. In response, the artistic community has launched a protest movement, which argues that AI (...) image generation is a kind of theft. This paper analyzes, substantiates, and critiques these arguments, concluding that AI image generators involve an unethical kind of labour theft. If correct, many other AI applications also rely upon theft. (shrink)

This chapter discusses Clive Staples Lewis's views about the purpose of life. Lewis himself believed that nature does not have its own purposes. Instead, he thought God created the natural world, and the human beings which inhabit it, for a purpose. Lewis believed the purpose of life is that we experience a happiness that he variably described as eternal, infinite, complete, or perfect. The experience of this happiness is the life of the blessed. Lewis thought happiness is experiencing pleasure, where (...) experiencing pleasure is the purpose for which God created us. A hedonist about happiness is someone who believes not only that pleasure is intrinsically good but also holds that pain is intrinsically evil. To say that the experience of pain is intrinsically evil is to say that pain is evil and does not derive its evilness from its relationship to anything else. (shrink)

O presente trabalho analisa o itinerário do ensino de filosofia no Brasil, analisando o percurso da ausência desta disciplina nos currículos escolares, até a recente obrigatoriedade legal, que fundamenta a criação de propostas tais como a do Programa Institucional de Bolsas de Iniciação à Docência (PIBID). Abordamos os objetivos e os resultados do programa desenvolvido na Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA), contextualizando as ações empreendidas na escola pública, desde 2010, tendo como enfoque o projeto Filosofia na Cozinha.

Explores C. S. Lewis's views of the purpose of higher education and his distinctive answer: to experience pleasure.

How do we prepare engineering students to make ethical and responsible decisions in their professional work? This paper presents an approach that enhances engineering students’ engagement with ethical reasoning by simulating decision-making in a complex scenario. The approach has two principal inspirations. The first is Anthony Weston’s scenario-based teaching. Weston’s concept of a scenario is a situation that changes in response to choices made by participants, according to an inner logic. Scenarios can dynamically explore open-ended complex problems without imposing predetermined (...) results, allowing students to apply their ethical reasoning in a more realistic fashion. The second inspiration is Thi Nguyen’s theory of games. According to Nguyen, games are the “art of agency,” meaning that they provide a structure under which some result is agreed to be valuable, along with prescribed ways of achieving that result, in a relatively low-stakes and temporary social arrangement. By playing many games, Nguyen argues, we can develop a “library of agency,” that is to say, a set of values and means to achieving them that can inform how we make high-stakes decisions in real life. Engaging with carefully designed game scenarios, then, can enable students to practice making ethical decisions within a structured framework, which unfolds in response to their choices, while their decisions are driven by some defined goal. This roleplaying game–based approach thus allows students to build their own ethical libraries of agency, in preparation for professional decision-making. The approach is illustrated using a specific example recently deployed in a seminar on engineered living materials (building materials that incorporate living tissues). The scenario uses techniques from tabletop roleplaying games (e.g. Dungeons & Dragons) for outcome resolution, adventure design, and character creation. Through the game, students practice making difficult decisions in a humanitarian context. (shrink)

In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on a deterministic scenario. Fischer uses this result (i) to rebut the Dilemma Defense - a well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to PAP; and (ii) to maintain that: If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities. In this article, we argue that Fischer's new argument against PAP fails, thus leaving points (i) and (...) (ii) unsupported. (shrink)

In this article I shall concern myself with the question ‘Is some type of justification required in order for belief in God to be rational?’ Many philosophers and theologians in the past would have responded affirmatively to this question. However, in our own day, there are those who maintain that natural theology in any form is not necessary. This is because of the rise of a different understanding of the nature of religious belief. Unlike what most people in the past (...) thought, religious belief is not in any sense arrived at or inferred on the basis of other known propositions. On the contrary, belief in God is taken to be as basic as a person's belief in the existence of himself, of the chair in which he is sitting, or the past. The old view that there must be a justification of religious belief, whether known or unknown, is held to be mistaken. One of the most outspoken advocates of this view is Alvin Plantinga. According to Plantinga the mature theist ought not to accept belief in God as a conclusion from other things he believes. Rather, he should accept it as basic, as a part of the bedrock of his noetic structure. ‘The mature theist commits himself to belief in God; this means that he accepts belief in God as basic.’. (shrink)

Les photos de ce portfolio ont été prises par Philippe Carta, Julien Goetz, Francis Guermann, Bernard Muscat et Michel Noirez. Projecteur et enrouleur 35 mm mobiles installés dans le vestibule de l’Opéra-Théâtre pour la projection de Moïse et Aaron – 24 mars 2011. Avant la projection de Moïse et Aaron, Jean-Marie Straub, debout face à l’écran de l’Opéra-Théâtre, vérifie la qualité de l’image et du son. François Narboni et Régine Palucci présentent Moïse et Aaron. A...

Over the past decade, there has been a growing interest among analytic philosophers in life's meaning, but this surge of work is nearly all by naturalists theorizing from non-theistic starting points. To answer the need for a theistic philosophical perspective, God and Meaning features leading thinkers in analytic philosophy of religion and theology exploring important issues in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and biblical theology that intersect with life's meaning.

Resumo O objetivo deste artigo é sintetizar os principais elementos do confronto entre o pensamento do teólogo reformado Karl Barth e o do filósofo alemão Ludwig Feuerbach com relação aos temas da religião, teologia e antropologia, que na abordagem de ambos apresentam conexão direta. Para tanto, este estudo inicia-se com uma panorâmica apresentação feuerbachiana da interpretação antropológica da teologia e religião, particularmente a partir de sua obra mais famosa “A Essência do Cristianismo”, que conduz às suas conclusões de ataque à (...) teologia e re-significação da função da religião. A seguir, a reação de Barth às idéias de Feuerbach são contempladas, a partir de sua visão teológica teocêntrica. Nesse sentido, há a exposição de duas fases da reação barthiana ao pensamento de Feuerbach. Na primeira delas Barth apresenta certos elementos de concordância e aproveitamento das noções feuerbachinas, ao passo que na segunda fase a discordância é total. Em suas conclusões o artigo aponta que o debate entre Barth e Feuerbach gira em torno da idéia de reducionismo teológico ou religioso, tão presente nos debates epistemológicos dos estudos em Ciências da Religião. Palavras-chave : Barth; Feuerbach; teologia; religião; antropologia.This article aims to summarize the main elements of the confrontation between the reformed theologian Karl Barth’s conception and the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach’s thought concerning religion, theology and anthropology, which maintain straight connection in both approaches. For so much, this study begins with a feuerbachian panoramic presentation of the anthropological interpretation of theology and religion, particularly from his most famous work “The Essence of the Christianity”, which leads to his conclusions of attack upon theology and a re-signification of the function of religion. Thereafter, Barth’s reaction to Feuerbach’s ideas is discussed from his theocentric theological perspective. In this sense, there is an exposure of two phases of barthian reaction to Feuerbach. Firstly Barth presents topics of agreement with feuerbachian notions, while in the second phase the disagreement is total. Among the article’s conclusions there is an indication that the Barth-Feuerbach debate deals with religious or theological reductionism, usually present in epistemological discussions on Religious Studies. Key words : Barth; Feuerbach; theology; religion; anthropology. (shrink)

This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes (...) an approach to epistemology that we refer to as non-ideal epistemology. In this introductory chapter we introduce and contextualise the ten essays that comprise this volume, situating them within four broad sub-fields: vice epistemology, epistemic injustice, inter-personal epistemic practices, and applied epistemology. We also provide a brief overview of several other important growth areas in non-ideal epistemology. (shrink)

According to Miranda Fricker, a hermeneutical injustice occurs when there is a deficit in our shared tools of social interpretation, such that marginalized social groups are at a disadvantage in making sense of their distinctive and important experiences. Critics have claimed that Fricker's account ignores or precludes a phenomenon I call hermeneutical dissent, where marginalized groups have produced their own interpretive tools for making sense of those experiences. I clarify the nature of hermeneutical injustice to make room for hermeneutical dissent, (...) clearing up the structure of the collective hermeneutical resource and the fundamental harm of hermeneutical injustice. I then provide a more nuanced account of the hermeneutical resources in play in instances of hermeneutical injustice, enabling six species of the injustice to be distinguished. Finally, I reflect on the corrective virtue of hermeneutical justice in light of hermeneutical dissent. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é discutir a maneira como Nietzsche coloca a questão do niilismo em seus textos preparados para publicação, sobretudo em alguns daqueles que se concentram entre 1886 e 1888. Neste momento mais tardio de sua obra, o autor formula suas hipóteses genealógicas acerca dos valores morais, e evidencia o vínculo existente entre a moralidade de origem socrático-platônica e os valores cristãos que marcam fortemente a cultura ocidental. A modernidade, ao atualizar e oferecer novas roupagens às formas de (...) detração da vida engendradas pelos ideais ascéticos, é qualificada por Nietzsche como niilista por excelência. Pretende-se discutir em que medida, ao analisar o niilismo como fator determinante para se caracterizar a própria modernidade, e ao indicar com sua genealogia que todas as grandes coisas pereceriam por si mesmas, segundo a lei de uma “necessária ‘autossuperação’”, Nietzsche abre a possibilidade de se pensar a arte e a sua gaia ciência como potentes forças contrárias ao niilismo e aos ideais ascéticos. A arte, sendo o lugar do culto ao não-verdadeiro e instância plenamente afinada ao próprio movimento de criação e destruição de formas que compõe a vida, seria o vetor central através do qual a gaia ciência nietzschiana poderia contribuir para a efetivação de uma transvaloração dos valores. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Millennium Jahrgang: 10 Heft: 1 Seiten: 281-292.

Taking into account the debate about the continuity or discontinuity in Heb 1-12 and Heb 13, with the implication of whether the hortatory material in chapter 13 is consistent with chapters 1-12 or it is a list of miscellaneous exhortations instead, this article seeks to discern connections between the concept of marriage in 13:4 with the ideas stated in 12:28–13:6. This endeavor is informed by a reading of 12:28-13:6 made in three steps. First, 12:28-29 is read as a transition for (...) the hortatory material in chapter 13. Second, 13:1-6 is traced as a conceptual structure for the understanding of marriage in 13:4. Third, the article identifies connections of the exhortation about marriage in 13:4 with ideas developed in 12:28-29 and 13:1-6. (shrink)

Accumulating empirical evidence suggests that anger elicited in one situation can influence trust behaviors in another situation. However, the conditions under which anger influences trust are still unclear. The present study addresses this research gap and examines the ways in which anger influences trust. We hypothesized that the social distance to the trustee, and the trusting person’s gender would moderate the effect of anger on trust. To test this hypothesis, a study using a 2 (Anger vs. Control) × 2 (Low (...) vs. High social distance) × 2 (Men vs. Women) factorial design was conducted in Germany (N= 215) and in China (N= 310). Results reveal that in both countries men’s trust behavior was not influenced by the manipulations (i.e., anger and social distance). The pattern for women, however, differed by country. In Germany, women’s trust to a stranger (i.e., high social distance) was increased by anger; while in China, women’s trust to someone who they have communicated with (i.e., low social distance) was increased by anger. These results indicate that women’s trust levels seem to be more context-sensitive than men’s. (shrink)

Interactions in service ecosystems, as opposed to the service dyad, have recently gained much attention from research. However, it is still unclear how they influence a customer’s experiential value and trigger desired prosocial behavior. The purpose of this study is to identify which elements of the multi-actor service ecosystem contribute to a customer’s experiential value and to investigate its relation to a customer’s interaction attitude and inter-customer helping behavior. The authors adopted a scale development procedure from the existing literature. Service, (...) brand, retail and tourism management research as well as expert feedback is used to generate a pool of 33 items. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis were conducted. The scale was validated based on more than 468 responses to a CASI at one of the world’s largest trade shows. Scale-development procedure was followed by structural equation modeling. CFA supports that experiential value in multi-actor ecosystems comprises five dimensions. The functional value of personnel, the perception of other customers’ appearance, the perception of other customers’ behavior, multisensory stimuli, and a customer’s enjoyment. Experiential value positively and directly relates to a customer’s interaction attitude and inter-customer helping behavior. Furthermore, the effect of experiential value on inter-customer helping behavior is partially mediated by interaction attitude. Managers interested in getting more out of interactions with customers will develop an understanding for the interplay between the physical environment and individuals within a multi-actor ecosystem. Social scientists and managers can use the scale to assess experiential value, encourage a customer’s interaction attitude and utilize the customers’ influence on their peers. This paper synthesizes insights from existing research on experiential value, from various fields, in one scale. This holistic approach is the first to simultaneously account for a customer’s interactions with the multisensory physical environment, personal interactions with employees and interactions between customers in a multi-actor service ecosystem. (shrink)

When a computer system causes harm, who is responsible? This question has renewed significance given the proliferation of autonomous systems enabled by modern artificial intelligence techniques. At the root of this problem is a philosophical difficulty known in the literature as the responsibility gap. That is to say, because of the causal distance between the designers of autonomous systems and the eventual outcomes of those systems, the dilution of agency within the large and complex teams that design autonomous systems, and (...) the impossibility of fully predicting how autonomous systems will behave once deployed, determining who is morally responsible for harms caused by autonomous systems is unclear at a conceptual level. I review past work on this topic, criticizing prior works for suggesting workarounds rather than philosophical answers to the conceptual problem presented by the responsibility gap. The view I develop, drawing on my earlier work on vicarious moral responsibility, explains why computing professionals are ethically required to take responsibility for the systems they design, despite not being blameworthy for the harms these systems may cause. (shrink)

This book is a clear and concise history of the soul in western philosophy, from Plato to cutting-edge contemporary work in philosophy of mind. Packed with arguments for and against a range of different, historically significant philosophies of the soul Addresses the essential issues, including mind-body interaction, the causal closure of the physical world, and the philosophical implications of the brain sciences for the soul's existence Includes coverage of theories from key figures, such as Plato, Aquinas, Locke, Hume, and Descartes (...) Unique in combining the history of ideas and the development of a powerful case for a non-reductionist, non-materialist account of the soul. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is concerned with the improvement of our concepts. The motivating thought behind many such projects is that some of our concepts are defective. But, if to use a defective concept is to do something wrong, and if to do something wrong one must be in control of what one is doing, there might be no defective concepts, since we typically are not in control of our concept use. To address this problem, this paper turns from appraising the concepts (...) we use to appraising the people who use them. First, I outline several ways in which the use of a concept can violate moral standards. Second, I discuss three accounts of moral responsibility, which I call voluntarism, rationalism, and psychologism, arguing that each allows us to find at least some cases where we are responsible for using defective concepts. Third, I answer an objection that because most of our concepts are acquired through processes for which we are not responsible, our use of defective concepts is a matter of bad luck, and not something for which we are responsible after all. Finally, I conclude by discussing some of the ways we may hold people accountable for using defective concepts. (shrink)

When we encounter extremist rhetoric, we often find it dumbfounding, incredible, or straightforwardly unintelligible. For this reason, it can be tempting to dismiss or ignore it, at least where it is safe to do so. The problem discussed in this paper is that such dismissals may be, at least in certain circumstances, epistemically unjust. Specifically, it appears that recent work on the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice compels us to accept two unpalatable conclusions: first, that this failure of intelligibility when we (...) encounter extremist rhetoric may be a manifestation of a hermeneutical injustice; and second, that remedying this injustice requires that we ought to become more engaged with and receptive of extremist worldviews. Whilst some theorists might interpret this as a reductio of this framework of epistemic in/justice, we push back against this conclusion. First, we argue that with a suitably amended conception of hermeneutical justice—one that is sensitive to the contextual nature of our hermeneutical responsibilities, and to the difference between understanding a worldview and accepting it—we can bite the bullet and accept that certain extremists are subject to hermeneutical injustice, but without committing ourselves to any unpalatable conclusions about how we ought to remedy these injustices. Second, we argue that bringing the framework of hermeneutical in/justice to bear upon the experience of certain extremists actually provides a new and useful perspective on one of the causes of extremism, and how it might be undermined. (shrink)

How we engage in epistemic practice, including our methods of knowledge acquisition and transmission, the personal traits that help or hinder these activities, and the social institutions that facilitate or impede them, is of central importance to our lives as individuals and as participants in social and political activities. Traditionally, Anglophone epistemology has tended to neglect the various ways in which these practices go wrong, and the epistemic, moral, and political harms and wrongs that follow. In the past decade, however, (...) there has been a turn towards the non-ideal in epistemology. This volume gathers new works by emerging and world-leading scholars on a significant cross section of themes in non-ideal epistemology. Articles focus on topics including intellectual vices, epistemic injustices, interpersonal epistemic practices, and applied epistemology. In addition to exploring the various ways in which epistemic practices go wrong at the level of both individual agents and social structures, the papers gathered herein discuss how these problems are related, and how they may be addressed. -/- Contributors: Alison Bailey, Olivia Bailey, Simon Barker, Heather Battaly, Havi Carel, Quassim Cassam, Charlie Crerar, Miranda Fricker, Trystan S. Goetze, Heidi Grasswick, Keith Harris, Casey Rebecca Johnson, Ian James Kidd, and Alessandra Tanesini. (shrink)

David Widerker has forcefully argued that a libertarian is on firm ground in believing that the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) is true. Eleonore Stump has argued that not all libertarians need accept PAP, and that its acceptance is not required for a rejection of compatibilism.This paper is a defense of Widerker against Stump. I argue that it is not at all clear that Stump’s view of freedom is libertarian in nature, and that she has not provided a good reason (...) for thinking that a libertarian can abandon PAP. (shrink)

My dissertation consists of two main parts. In the first part, I begin by assuming the plausibility of the libertarian thesis that agents sometimes could have done otherwise than they did given the very same history of the world. In light of this assumption, I undertake to develop a model of agency which does not employ the concept of agent-causation. My agency theory is developed in three main stages: I suggest that any agency theory must satisfy four desiderata: It must (...) adequately account for the freedom and responsibility of human agents. It must provide an adequate answer to the question of what distinguishes human actions from mere happenings. It must adequately account for the epistemological fact that human agents have an immediate and nonobservational awareness of their actions. It should have the support of a respectable philosophical tradition. I argue that agent-causation provides a theory of agency which fails adequately to satisfy these four desiderata. I claim both that human actions are uncaused exercisings by agents of their powers and that human agents typically act for reasons. I maintain that the central issue dividing agency theorists and nonagency theorists is whether reasons for performing actions cause the latter. I maintain that the sense of 'because' in 'I did x because...' is not causal in nature, but teleological. ;Having developed my model of agency, in the second part of my dissertation I investigate what are some of the paradigmatic actions human agents perform. I claim that bodily actions, such as moving an arm, are psychological in nature. Essential to my argument is the concept of a body-image. A normal agent 'feels' as if she is present in her physical arm. The way a normal agent feels is revealed in the case of a phantom limb. The subject of a phantom arm feels as if her amputated physical arm is still there and she can move while feeling armishly. I maintain that the bodily action of moving an arm is the agent's movement as a psychological arm-image of her physical arm, whether the physical arm is present or not. (shrink)

In this paper, I assume that if we have libertarian freedom, it is located in the power to choose and its exercise. Given this assumption, I then further assume a version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities which states that an agent is morally responsible for his choice only if he could have chosen otherwise. With these assumptions in place, I examine three recent attempts to construct Frankfurt‐style counterexamples to PAP. I argue that all fail to undermine the intuitive plausibility (...) of PAP. (shrink)

Rape of women by men might be generated either by a specialized rape adaptation or as a by-product of other psychological adaptations. Although increasing number of sexual partners is a proposed benefit of rape according to the “rape as an adaptation” and the “rape as a by-product” hypotheses, neither hypothesis addresses directly why some men rape their long-term partners, to whom they already have sexual access. In two studies we tested specific hypotheses derived from the general hypothesis that sexual coercion (...) in the context of an intimate relationship may function as a sperm competition tactic. We hypothesized that men’s sexual coercion in the context of an intimate relationship is related positively to his partner’s perceived infidelities and that men’s sexual coercion is related positively to their mate retention behaviors (behaviors designed to prevent a partner’s infidelity). The results from Study 1 (self-reports from 246 men) and Study 2 (partner-reports from 276 women) supported the hypotheses. The Discussion section addresses limitations of this research and highlights future directions for research on sexual coercion in intimate relationships. (shrink)