The series Studien zur deutschen Literatur (Studies in German Literature) presents outstanding analyses of German-speaking literature from the early modern period to the present day. It particularly embraces comparative, cultural and historical-epistemological questions and serves as a tradition-steeped forum for innovative literary research. All submitted manuscripts undergo a double peer-review process.

Georges Sorel's Study on Vico is a revelatory document of the depths and stakes of French social thought at the end of the 19th century. What brought Sorel to the 18th century Neapolitan theorist of history? Acute awareness of the limitations of Marxist thought in his day, a profound concern with the material underpinnings of language, law, and culture, and the imperative to understand the possibilities of revolutionary change. We find here a different Sorel, one who speaks in surprising ways (...) to the 21st century. The translation is accompanied by an introduction and by a set of notes which situate the text both in Sorel's overall intellectual trajectory and in the fin de siècle debates from which it emerged. (shrink)

Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race understands Black embodiment within the context of white hegemony within the context of a racist, anti-Black world. Yancy demonstrates that the Black body is a historically lived text on which whites have inscribed their projections which speak equally forcefully to whites' own self-conceptualizations.

Without question, Process Philosophy and Political Liberalism: Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne, is Daniel Dombrowski's most important and well-argued treatise to date within his growing, prolific literary corpus. Bringing his expertise on John Rawls's political thought to bear on the process thinking of A. N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, he explores commonalities of approach and ventures the interpretive hypothesis that Rawls is, at least broadly speaking, a process philosopher. He also argues that each of these philosophers appropriately shares the appellation “political liberal” (...) when that term is carefully defined. I find this strongly plausible. (shrink)

George Grant's magnificent four-part meditation sums up much that is central to his own thought, including a critique of modern liberalism, an analysis of John Rawls's Theory of Justice, and insights into the larger Western philosophical ...

ABSTRACT In the Bible, the human God-relationship is typically established through and by the phenomenon of “calling”. However, for much subsequent theology, this has been displaced by “vision”, “taste” or “feeling”. Referring to the notion of an inner word, the paper follows Kierkegaard's treatment of silence as, alternatively, a mode of inattention and attention to such an inner word. With Heidegger, the paper turns to the notion of vocation, both as in the discussion of the call of conscience in Being (...) and Time and the poetic vocation exemplified in the figure and poetry of Hölderlin. Finally, it considers the possible difference between such a poetic vocation and a divine calling. (shrink)

To the uninitiated, academic philosophy can be intimidating. Its extensive history (over two millennia) and seemingly all-encompassing breadth and depth of study makes knowing everything about philosophy impossible. Philosophers are fortunate because they are expected to specialize in specific areas, but librarians are not as fortunate. Librarians often have collection development responsibilities for a variety of academic disciplines. Collection development in philosophy can seem like a world unto itself in part because philosophical inquiry reaches into other academic disciplines. Amongst academic (...) philosophers, there are different approaches or methodologies for doing philosophy, including eastern and western philosophy, as well as a divide between analytic and continental philosophers. In addition to growing the collection, the philosophy subject librarian may be called upon by philosophers and aspiring philosophers (i.e., students) for research assistance. To make matters more intimidating, philosophers seem to think and speak differently than others. The complex ideas and esoteric terminology that rarely finds its way outside of the philosophy classroom can make collection development, research services, and even simple faculty-to-librarian communication difficult. To succeed as a librarian subject specialist, you should work hard to develop an adequate understanding of the types of materials that are most valuable to your community. Cultivating this knowledge is critical because budgets are limited. This volume will help librarians thrust into the position of philosophy subject specialist to get up to speed and begin excelling in their new roles. The goal of this guide is to simplify collection development and research assistance for philosophy. To accomplish this, I will provide a brief overview of philosophy as a field and share the information you need to succeed in your role as the new philosophy selector. This volume will help to alleviate some of the communication barriers between philosophers and librarians and will provide practical advice, recommendations, and resources for building a strong philosophy collection. (shrink)

To the uninitiated, academic philosophy can be intimidating. Its extensive history (over two millennia) and seemingly all-encompassing breadth and depth of study makes knowing everything about philosophy impossible. Philosophers are fortunate because they are expected to specialize in specific areas, but librarians are not as fortunate. Librarians often have collection development responsibilities for a variety of academic disciplines. Collection development in philosophy can seem like a world unto itself in part because philosophical inquiry reaches into other academic disciplines. Amongst academic (...) philosophers, there are different approaches or methodologies for doing philosophy, including eastern and western philosophy, as well as a divide between analytic and continental philosophers. In addition to growing the collection, the philosophy subject librarian may be called upon by philosophers and aspiring philosophers (i.e., students) for research assistance. To make matters more intimidating, philosophers seem to think and speak differently than others. The complex ideas and esoteric terminology that rarely finds its way outside of the philosophy classroom can make collection development, research services, and even simple faculty-to-librarian communication difficult. To succeed as a librarian subject specialist, you should work hard to develop an adequate understanding of the types of materials that are most valuable to your community. Cultivating this knowledge is critical because budgets are limited. This volume will help librarians thrust into the position of philosophy subject specialist to get up to speed and begin excelling in their new roles. The goal of this guide is to simplify collection development and research assistance for philosophy. To accomplish this, I will provide a brief overview of philosophy as a field and share the information you need to succeed in your role as the new philosophy selector. This volume will help to alleviate some of the communication barriers between philosophers and librarians and will provide practical advice, recommendations, and resources for building a strong philosophy collection. (shrink)

In the Bible, the human God-relationship is typically established through and by the phenomenon of “calling”. However, for much subsequent theology, this has been displaced by “vision”, “taste” or...

Caribbean sociology accords with the Du Boisan paradigm of sociology as a science. Caribbean sociology originated as an undifferentiated discipline. It is a panoply of social thought integrated with history, political science, anthropology, psychology, and philosophy. Sociology has never been a discipline sufficient unto itself. To speak of Caribbean sociology is to introduce space and place, territory, and identity as parameters of a social scientific discipline that is yet to adhere to its own boundaries or adequately define itself. Caribbean countries (...) constitute the poor West, and it is a challenge of the discipline to study a region where half of its peoples have migrated and are migrating to the global north. Caribbean sociology contributed diverse if not also original perspectives on significant humanity and is rich in the quality and sophistication of its thought. The sociology of the Caribbean is a sociology of possibilities—a sociology of solutions to the problems of underdevelopment and unfreedom. In the tradition of the scientific sociology of W. E. B. Du Bois it is a quest for social justice. (shrink)

This article is about knowledge and argument. The purpose is to dramatize certain questions of knowledge: how and why does the better knowledge not become the better argument; what are the voices access ible to the claiming of new knowledge; what are the limits and destinies of contemporary expertise? The article is also an experiment in aca demic and intellectual forms, an experiment which corresponds to the central inquiry: how should knowledge speak now? There are three parts. The first part (...) tells a story about enlightenment and persuasion. The second part is a dialogue between two voices which speak for the argumentative ethos of knowledge - Newtonian is a voice of the centre, and Paracelsan speaks from and for the margins. The third part is a dia logue between Critic and Speculator, a dialogue about the fate of know ledge in postmodernity. Throughout, the text includes a range of quotations, synchronized with its arguments. The continuous source of excerpts is the BSE news, which is taken to represent aspects of know ledge in our time. There is a strong association made between questions of contemporary knowledge and ecological crisis. Major reference points include: Beck; Baudrillard; Blanchot; Jabes. (shrink)

This article shows how, in recent works of cultural analysis, the concept of ‘assemblage’ has been been derived from key sources of theory and put to work to provide a structure-like surrogate to express certain prominent values of a modernist sensibility in the discourse of description and analysis. Assemblage is a sort of anti-structural concept that permits the researcher to speak of emergence, heterogeneity, the decentred and the ephemeral in nonetheless ordered social life. There are other related concepts, like collage, (...) which have been used to give these values substance in research, but currently assemblage is enjoying a popularity perhaps because of the continuing fascination of the work of Deleuze and Guattari. (shrink)

George GrantÑphilosopher, conservative, Canadian nationalist, ChristianÑwas one of Canada’s most significant thinkers, and the author of Lament for a Nation, Technology and Empire, and English-Speaking Justice. Admirers and critics of the author will welcome these compelling essays about society’s traditional values in a technological age.

This study explores how paradoxical tensions between economic growth and environmental protection are avoided through organizational mythmaking. By examining the European oil and gas supermajors’ “CEO-speak” about climate change, we show how mythmaking facilitates the disregarding, diverting, and/or displacing of sustainability tensions. In doing so, our findings further illustrate how certain defensive responses are employed: regression, or retreating to the comforts of past familiarities, fantasy, or escaping the harsh reality that fossil fuels and climate change are indeed irreconcilable, and projecting, (...) or shifting blame to external actors for failing to address climate change. By highlighting the discursive effects of enacting these responses, we illustrate how the European oil and gas supermajors self-determine their inability to substantively address the complexities of climate change. We thus argue that defensive responses are not merely a form of mismanagement as the paradox and corporate sustainability literature commonly suggests, but a strategic resource that poses serious ethical concerns given the imminent danger of issues such as climate change. (shrink)

Benjamin Franklin famously wrote that “the good [that] men do separately is small compared with what they may do collectively” (Isaacson 2004). The ability to join with others in groups to accomplish goals collectively that would hopelessly overwhelm the time, energy, and resources of individuals is indeed one of the greatest assets of our species. In the history of humankind, groups have been among the greatest workers, builders, producers, protectors, entertainers, explorers, discoverers, planners, problem-solvers, and decision-makers. During the late 19th (...) and early 20th century, many social scientists employed the notorious “group mind” idiom to express the sensible idea that groups can function as the seats of cognition, intelligence, and agency in their own right (Allport 1968; Wilson 2004). In their quest to stress (rightly) that group phenomena are something “over and above” the sum of individual contributions, a fondness for vitalist metaphors led them to believe (wrongly) that genuine group cognition must be the result of tapping into individualistically inaccessible, “holistic” forces. Today, inspired in part by historically unparalleled forms of mass collaboration enabled by the internet, it has once again become popular to speak of collective intelligence, group agency, or even the emergence of a “global brain” (cf. the wiki-edited MIT Handbook of Collective Intelligence). -/- In this chapter, I review some contemporary developments of the idea of group cognition, defined broadly as the collaborative performance of cognitive tasks such as remembering, problem-solving, decision-making, or verbal creativity for the purpose of producing a group-level outcome. My discussion serves a two-fold purpose. First, by discussing how the idea of group cognition can be operationalized, I seek to show that we can retain some central theoretical insights of the “group mind” thesis without succumbing to its eccentric metaphysical overtones. Second, by providing a useful array of generalizable taxonomic resources, I hope to foster greater degrees of mutual awareness among insufficiently integrated areas of research on group performance. (shrink)

For fifty years, Willard Van Orman Quine's books and articles have stimulated intense debate in the fields of logic and the philosophy of language. Many scholars in fact, regard Quine as the greatest living English-speaking philosopher; yet his views remain widely misunderstood and misinterpreted. This book provides the first major explication and defense of Quine's systematic philosophy and is ideally suited for use as a required or supplementary text in a wide variety of undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy and (...) linguistics.The book explores the far-reaching implications of Quine's views on language for contemporary analytic philosophy. It is unique in providing a lucid and rich description and reconstruction of the historical context from which Quine's work grew, focusing in particular on the role that Russell and Wittgenstein played in shaping the problems inherited by Quine. It presents Quine's difficult later views in an accessible fashion, bringing out as no other study has the very radical nature of his position. One of the book's highlights is its careful examination and assessment of Tarski's theory of truth as it relates to the traditions of Russell and Wittgenstein and to Quine's own philosophy.George D. Romanos took his Ph.D. in philosophy under George D. W. Berry and Paul T. Sagal at Boston University. This book grew out of his dissertation with the active criticism and support of Quine himself. (shrink)

Speaking is an introduction to the philosophy of language from an existential and phenomenological point of view. Gusdorf's central concern is to analyze speech within the context of human reality.

The present revival of metaphysics seems to be characterized primarily by the fact that it is now once again respectable to turn one's attention to perennial problems and to speak of them openly as metaphysical problems. Amid the resulting discussions, a certain amount of uncertainty and caution pervades the air, and there is still a great deal of doubt about how far one may or should go with respect to metaphysical speculation. Discussion seems to be centering primarily on the meaning (...) and function of metaphysics itself and on the approaches one may legitimately take in dealing with questions concerning the existence of God and of a soul or self. Less emphasis is placed on solving specific problems, and Aristotle's notion of "being as such" or Heidegger's concern with the ground of being seem to provoke little interest this side of the Channel. In general, there is little concern with trying to tie the philosophical loose ends which characterize the present state of philosophy by producing either a bold synthesis or a new Weltanschauung. (shrink)

Humans have developed various practices to confront the indeterminacy of their existence. Roughly speaking, there are two types of such practices. On the one hand are those through which humans control the uncertainty that permeates their actions and choices. These are practices of self-reassurance and risk reduc- tion. On the other hand are practices in which humans welcome or search out uncertainty, practices that are explicitly open to the risk of failure. One particu- larly remarkable example of the latter set (...) is art. Art is a practice that embraces the uncertainty of human existence in a special way. Generally speaking, art- works do not aim to reassure. Rather, they are open to uncertainty. Thus, art represents a special mode of reflecting on a constitutive feature of human exis- tence, namely, the possibility of failure. What does it mean that art is, in princi- ple, always susceptible to failure? The present article explores this question. (shrink)

PREFACE. THE Author of this very practical treatise on Scotch Loch - Fishing desires clearly that it may be of use to all who had it. He does not pretend to have written anything new, but to have attempted to put what he has to say in as readable a form as possible. Everything in the way of the history and habits of fish has been studiously avoided, and technicalities have been used as sparingly as possible. The writing of this (...) book has afforded him pleasure in his leisure moments, and that pleasure would be much increased if he knew that the perusal of it would create any bond of sympathy between himself and the angling community in general. This section is interleaved with blank shects for the readers notes. The Author need hardly say that any suggestions addressed to the case of the publishers, will meet with consideration in a future edition. We do not pretend to write or enlarge upon a new subject. Much has been said and written-and well said and written too on the art of fishing but loch-fishing has been rather looked upon as a second-rate performance, and to dispel this idea is one of the objects for which this present treatise has been written. Far be it from us to say anything against fishing, lawfully practised in any form but many pent up in our large towns will bear us out when me say that, on the whole, a days loch-fishing is the most convenient. One great matter is, that the loch-fisher is depend- ent on nothing but enough wind to curl the water, -and on a large loch it is very seldom that a dead calm prevails all day, -and can make his arrangements for a day, weeks beforehand whereas the stream- fisher is dependent for a good take on the state of the water and however pleasant and easy it may be for one living near the banks of a good trout stream or river, it is quite another matter to arrange for a days river-fishing, if one is looking forward to a holiday at a date some weeks ahead. Providence may favour the expectant angler with a good day, and the water in order but experience has taught most of us that the good days are in the minority, and that, as is the case with our rapid running streams, -such as many of our northern streams are, -the water is either too large or too small, unless, as previously remarked, you live near at hand, and can catch it at its best. A common belief in regard to loch-fishing is, that the tyro and the experienced angler have nearly the same chance in fishing, -the one from the stern and the other from the bow of the same boat. Of all the absurd beliefs as to loch-fishing, this is one of the most absurd. Try it. Give the tyro either end of the boat he likes give him a cast of ally flies he may fancy, or even a cast similar to those which a crack may be using and if he catches one for every three the other has, he may consider himself very lucky. Of course there are lochs where the fish are not abundant, and a beginner may come across as many as an older fisher but we speak of lochs where there are fish to be caught, and where each has a fair chance. Again, it is said that the boatman has as much to do with catching trout in a loch as the angler. Well, we dont deny that. In an untried loch it is necessary to have the guidance of a good boatman but the same argument holds good as to stream-fishing... (shrink)

"While the great Hungarian critic and philosopher George Lukacs wrote voluminously over a 60-year period, his work is insufficiently known in the English-speaking world. In this remarkable study, George Lichtheim interprets Lukacs' political career and his equally controversial literary critiques, relating them to the traditional issues of Central European philosophy that inform all of Lukacs' work..." - Book jacket.

Award-winning author, scholar, and social visionary George Yancy brings together the greatest minds of our time to speak truth to power and welcome everyone into a conversation about the pursuit of justice, equality, and peace.

Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionalism, but I see no reason (...) for him to resist a properly deflated version of it that I sketch. Moreover, such intentionalism seems to me to stand a better chance than Clark's reliance on properties in explaining the peculiar ways in which experience appears to us that so concern the qualiaphile. (shrink)

In The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl argues that the only way to respond to the scientific Krisis of which he speaks is with phenomenological reflections on the history, method, and task of philosophy. On the assumption that an accurate diagnosis of a malady is a necessary condition for an effective remedy, this paper aims to formulate a precise concept of the Krisis of the European sciences with which Husserl operates in this work. Thus it seeks (...) an answer to the question: What exactly, according to Husserl, is “the ‘crisis’ [Krisis] of the European sciences”? There are two different tendencies in the literature on this question. According to the traditional interpretation, the Krisis of the European sciences lies not in the inadequacy of their scientificity but in the loss of their meaningfulness for life. According to an innovative suggestion, the Krisis lies not in the loss of their meaningfulness for life but in the inadequacy of their scientificity. These readings are mutually exclusive because each claims that the other misidentifies the Krisis as something that it is not. The argument of this paper, however, is that, given the many different senses of Krisis in The Crisis, an adequate understanding of the Krisis that Husserl identifies requires not a disjunctive but an inclusive approach. Therefore the paper proposes that Husserl’s Krisis of the European sciences is both a crisis of their scientificity and a crisis of their meaningfulness for life. The relevance of this result to Husserl’s philosophical and historical sense-investigations in The Crisis—as well as to the present critical situation of philosophy—is self-evident. (shrink)

I argue that there are analytic claims that, if true, can be known a priori, but which also can turn out to be false: they are expressive of merely default instructions from the language faculty to the conceptual system, which may be overridden by pragmatic or scientific considerations, in which case, of course, they would not be known at all, a priori or otherwise. More surprisingly, I also argue that they might not be, strictly speaking, conceptual: concepts may be importantly (...) different from the meaning instructions for the words we use to express them. I will press all this in the context of a general Quinean “naturalism,” where the epistemology that interests me is “a chapter of natural science,” but where the science won't be Quine's behaviorism, but a Chomskyan theory of the “I-semantics” of “I-language.” But, relying on a distinction I draw between an explanatory and a working epistemology, I will be pressing it largely as an explanatory claim, not one that will have serious consequences for on-going philosophical practice, neither with regard to the world, nor, more surprisingly, even with regard to armchair “conceptual analysis.” As Putnam observed, there may be analytic truths, but they don't cut much philosophical ice. (shrink)

Intellectualism about human virtue is the thesis that virtue is knowledge. Virtue intellectualists may be eliminative or reductive. If eliminative, they will eliminate our conventional vocabulary of virtue words-'virtue', 'piety', 'courage', etc.-and speak only of knowledge or wisdom. If reductive, they will continue to use the conventional virtue words but understand each of them as denoting nothing but a kind of knowledge (as opposed to, say, a capacity of some other part of the soul than the intellect, such as the (...) will or the appetites). Virtue intellectualists may be pluralists or monists. If pluralist, they identify the virtues with distinct kinds of knowledge. If monist, they identify all the virtues with one and the same kind of knowledge. In a number of dialogues-including the Euthyphro, Apology, Charmides, Euthydemus, Laches, Lysis, Protagoras, and Republic I-Socrates gives arguments that support Reductive Monist Intellectualism (RMI) about human virtue. I disarm an influential objection to RMI as the correct interpretation of Socrates. (shrink)

Positivism, in its standard outlook, is normative contextualism: If legal reasons are content-independent, then their content may vary with the context or point of view. Despite several advantages vis-à-vis strong metaphysical conceptions of reasons, contextualism implies relativism, which may lead further to the fragmentation of the point of view of agency. In his Oxford Hart Lecture, Coleman put forward a fresh account of the moral semantics of legal content, one that lays claim to preserving the unity of agency while retaining (...) the social facts thesis, which has been a key intuition of positivism. The present essay identifies potential weaknesses with this account and proposes a reconstruction along rationalist lines: First, it advances a descriptive account of reflective agency that is delivered in terms of a modest conceptual analysis; secondly, this is combined with a context-sensitive or "buck-passing" account of value, which illustrates that substantive reasons for action must be anchored, ontologically speaking, to particular social practices (Social Dependency Thesis). In the end the unity of agency comes at an affordable price, for it is no longer necessary to resort to metaphysical necessity and the most demanding conditions this imposes, in order to defend it. (shrink)

Despite Lyotard’s proclaimed end of metanarratives in a post-modern predicament, metanarratives appear to be making a comeback. This is the case for antinatalism, a relatively recent ideological formation or moral philosophical perspective that has spawned a new social movement with an active presence in social media. The organizational and structural aspects of NSMs render them amenable to being labeled as ‘post-modern’. In this context, the emergence of ideologies as moral philosophies, such as antinatalism, loom like an outsider, or like a (...) retro fissure in a plastic canvass. The reason is that antinatalism shares the holistic, fundamentalist and totalizing discursive traits of modernist metanarratives that were heralded by Lyotard (1984) as being outmoded in a post-modern condition. Yet, this metanarrative is also different in fundamental aspects from traditional metanarratives. These aspects pertain to its rhetorical self-reflexivity and to its pre-occupation with rooting the propounded arguments in empirical particulars, rather than in a metaphysical or transcendentalist realm. This new form of metanarrative I call metametanarrative as it constitutes a philosophical regression, so to speak, in a pre post-modernist cultural milieu. (shrink)

PREFACE. THE Author of this very practical treatise on Scotch Loch - Fishing desires clearly that it may be of use to all who had it. He does not pretend to have written anything new, but to have attempted to put what he has to say in as readable a form as possible. Everything in the way of the history and habits of fish has been studiously avoided, and technicalities have been used as sparingly as possible. The writing of this (...) book has afforded him pleasure in his leisure moments, and that pleasure would be much increased if he knew that the perusal of it would create any bond of sympathy between himself and the angling community in general. This section is interleaved with blank shects for the readers notes. The Author need hardly say that any suggestions addressed to the case of the publishers, will meet with consideration in a future edition. We do not pretend to write or enlarge upon a new subject. Much has been said and written-and well said and written too on the art of fishing but loch-fishing has been rather looked upon as a second-rate performance, and to dispel this idea is one of the objects for which this present treatise has been written. Far be it from us to say anything against fishing, lawfully practised in any form but many pent up in our large towns will bear us out when me say that, on the whole, a days loch-fishing is the most convenient. One great matter is, that the loch-fisher is depend- ent on nothing but enough wind to curl the water, -and on a large loch it is very seldom that a dead calm prevails all day, -and can make his arrangements for a day, weeks beforehand whereas the stream- fisher is dependent for a good take on the state of the water and however pleasant and easy it may be for one living near the banks of a good trout stream or river, it is quite another matter to arrange for a days river-fishing, if one is looking forward to a holiday at a date some weeks ahead. Providence may favour the expectant angler with a good day, and the water in order but experience has taught most of us that the good days are in the minority, and that, as is the case with our rapid running streams, -such as many of our northern streams are, -the water is either too large or too small, unless, as previously remarked, you live near at hand, and can catch it at its best. A common belief in regard to loch-fishing is, that the tyro and the experienced angler have nearly the same chance in fishing, -the one from the stern and the other from the bow of the same boat. Of all the absurd beliefs as to loch-fishing, this is one of the most absurd. Try it. Give the tyro either end of the boat he likes give him a cast of ally flies he may fancy, or even a cast similar to those which a crack may be using and if he catches one for every three the other has, he may consider himself very lucky. Of course there are lochs where the fish are not abundant, and a beginner may come across as many as an older fisher but we speak of lochs where there are fish to be caught, and where each has a fair chance. Again, it is said that the boatman has as much to do with catching trout in a loch as the angler. Well, we dont deny that. In an untried loch it is necessary to have the guidance of a good boatman but the same argument holds good as to stream-fishing... (shrink)

Prometheus, having lamented the burden of his brother Atlas, speaks of earthborn Typhos and his punishment by Zeus. The text and apparatus of lines 351 to 357 are given in Sir Denys Page's edition thus.

Through dialogue new worlds can be imagined. In this imaginary dialogue between the vision of Daedalus, speaking through J. B. S. Haldane, and the Old Testament visionary, Job, the relationship between nature and science is re-explored, re-examined and re-engaged. Their words bounce back off the media's contemporary imagining of the BSE crisis in Britain, an episode that profoundly questioned this nature-science interrelationship.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:98 COMMENTS ON TWEYMAN AND DAVIS Tweyman contends that in Parts X and XI of the Dialogues Philo sets aside his Pyrrhonian or skeptical approach to theology, which consists in falsifying or casting doubt on the hypotheses of Cleanthes, and instead argues for a thesis of his own, viz. what we might call the "indifference thesis" that the original source of all things is morally indifferent. Davis counters with (...) an alternative interpretation of these two Parts of the Dialogues, arguing that Philo's approach to Cleanthes' arguments is consistent throughout the Dialogues and that Philo's aim is always the same, viz., to show that if cleanthes remains true to his principles and accepts their logical consequences, it is Cleanthes who is the Pyrrhonian and Philo who is the moderate skeptic. My position is that neither Tweyman nor Davis have given a proper analysis of Parts X and XI. I would agree with Davis that Tweyman' s position does seem to have an initial implausibility to it for at least two reasons. First of all, in Part II Philo commits himself to the "mystical incomprehensibility thesis" that the attributes of God are perfect but incomprehensible; and the mystical incomprehensibility thesis is incompatible with the indifference thesis. It cannot be the case both that God has perfect but incomprehensible attributes and that we also know he is morally indifferent. Moreover, the mystical incomprehensi2 bility thesis is reiterated in Part VI and more importantly, in Part X: "None but we mystics, as you were pleased to call us, can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by deriving it from attributes, infinitely perfect, but incomprehensible" 99 (D 199). Since Philo appears to stick to the mystical incomprehensibility thesis, Tweyman has a problem explaining how Philo can hold one position on the attributes of God in Part X (the mystical incomprehensibility thesis) and then supposedly reverse himself in Part XI to argue for another (the indifference thesis). Second, Tweyman' s position seems to contradict the strategic position outlined by Philo in Part II: "You seem not to apprehend, replied Philo, that I argue with Cleanthes in his own way; and by showing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion." (D 145) The strategy is to show Cleanthes that any position but that of the mystics has dangerous, i.e., skeptical or theologically unwelcome consequences, and so should be abandoned. Philo's strategy is not to defend his own position, but rather to reveal the weaknesses in Cleanthes' position. Thus far I would agree that Davis' interpretation is more consistent with both Philo's strategic position and with his mystical incomprehensibility thesis. Yet Davis does not directly take up the important point about Parts X and XI which Tweyman raises: that Philo changes his way of arguing in Parts X and XI from that which he had been employing previously in the first eight sections, i.e., that he changes from a Pyrrhonian to a non-Pyrrhonian way of arguing. This is how Tweyman puts it: In the first eight sections, Philo argues against Cleanthes' hypothesis by advancing his own hypotheses. His effort to advance hypotheses must be assessed in light of the fact that (by his own admission) all such hypotheses are based on insufficient 100 data, and, therefore, none is, strictly speaking, acceptable. Their use is not to establish truths about the nature of God, but to establish the conclusion which we find at the end of Part VIII that 'a total suspense of judgment is here our only reasonable resource.' The design of the world is compatible with, and could have arisen from, an indefinite number of designing principles. On the other hand, we have seen that in dealing with Cleanthes' hypotheses in Parts X and XI we are able to proceed more scientifically, and, in this manner, eliminate all but one of the hypotheses which can be introduced to explain the design of the world. (Tweyman 84-85) Now Tweyman does seem to have a point here. It is true that Philo takes his arguments in Parts X and XI to have a conclusiveness which he did not attribute to his... (shrink)

ABSTRACT: This 1974 paper builds on our 1969 paper (Corcoran-Weaver [2]). Here we present three (modal, sentential) logics which may be thought of as partial systematizations of the semantic and deductive properties of a sentence operator which expresses certain kinds of necessity. The logical truths [sc. tautologies] of these three logics coincide with one another and with those of standard formalizations of Lewis's S5. These logics, when regarded as logistic systems (cf. Corcoran [1], p. 154), are seen to be equivalent; (...) but, when regarded as consequence systems (ibid., p. 157), one diverges from the others in a fashion which suggests that two standard measures of semantic complexity may not be as closely linked as previously thought. -/- This 1974 paper uses the linear notation for natural deduction presented in [2]: each two-dimensional deduction is represented by a unique one-dimensional string of characters. Thus obviating need for two-dimensional trees, tableaux, lists, and the like—thereby facilitating electronic communication of natural deductions. The 1969 paper presents a (modal, sentential) logic which may be thought of as a partial systematization of the semantic and deductive properties of a sentence operator which expresses certain kinds of necessity. The logical truths [sc. tautologies] of this logic coincides those of standard formalizations of Lewis’s S4. Among the paper's innovations is its treatment of modal logic in the setting of natural deduction systems--as opposed to axiomatic systems. The author’s apologize for the now obsolete terminology. For example, these papers speak of “a proof of a sentence from a set of premises” where today “a deduction of a sentence from a set of premises” would be preferable. 1. Corcoran, John. 1969. Three Logical Theories, Philosophy of Science 36, 153–77. J P R -/- 2. Corcoran, John and George Weaver. 1969. Logical Consequence in Modal Logic: Natural Deduction in S5 Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 10, 370–84. MR0249278 (40 #2524). 3. Weaver, George and John Corcoran. 1974. Logical Consequence in Modal Logic: Some Semantic Systems for S4, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15, 370–78. MR0351765 (50 #4253). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Second Copy Thesis in Hume? George S. Pappas The copy thesis which applies to simple ideas andimpressionsin Hume is well known; every simple idea is supposed to be a copy of, that is, to exactly resemble, some simple impression. Or very nearly so, at any rate, for there is the famous missing shade ofblue to take into account. There seems to be another copy thesis in Hume, (...) however, and one on which Hume places a great deal ofweight. We find it expressed early on in the Treatise, incorporated into Hume's discussion of space and time. He says: Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations, contradictions and agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects; and this we may in general observe to be the foundation of all human knowledge. But our ideas are adequate representations of the most minute parts of extension; and thro' whatever divisions and subdivisions we may suppose these parts to be arriv'd at, they can never become inferior to some ideas, which we form. The plain consequence is, that whatever appears impossible and contradictory upon the comparison of these ideas, must be really impossible and contradictory, without any farther FogeUn has recently described this as a "remarkable passage," one which is "a match for anything found in the writings of the rationalists."2 Perhaps it is such a match, perhaps not, but Fogelin is certainly right to regard this as a remarkable passage, at least for Hume. After all, Hume here seems to be endorsing some form of representationalism, a doctrine we typically do not associate with Hume's philosophy. Two important questions emerge from this passage:just what are these adequate ideas ofwhich Hume speaks; and, in what sense can it be true that they form the foundation ofall ofour knowledge? I believe that a correct answer to each of these questions has some strong imphcations for our understanding ofHume's philosophy. I. Humean Adequate Ideas So far as I can discover, the above-quoted passage is the Only place where Hume talks about adequate ideas. The only text which I have Volume XVII Number 1 51 GEORGE S. PAPPAS found which even suggests the same sentiments occurs in "Of the Passions" where Hume discusses ideas and truth (T 448-49), but no mention is made there of adequate ideas. So I think we have to concentrate on the passage from the Treatise in the attempt to understand what Hume is telling us. Hume seems to refer to adequacy as a feature ofindividual ideas, and also to groups or systems ofideas. The latter is suggested by his reference to relations, contradictions, and agreements between ideas, while the former is indicated by the first clause ofthe quoted passage, where Hume mentions adequacy but makes no reference to relations between ideas. Instead, adequacy in the relationsbetween ideas seems to be a consequence of adequacy of individual ideas. Moreover, that individual ideas are supposed to be adequate is made clear from the argument Hume immediately gives regarding the alleged infinite divisibility of space. He writes: I first take the least idea I can form ofa part ofextension, and beingcertainthatthereis nothingmoreminute than thisidea, I conclude, that whatever I discover by its means must be a real quality ofextension. (T 29) Hume's reasoning here can be interpreted in two different ways, but both rest on the adequacy of individual ideas. He might be read as saying that one starts with a least-sized idea, and infers that there are bits of extension which are the same size as the least-sized idea. The inference from the feature of the idea to the feature of the bit of extension rests on the claimed adequacy ofthe idea. The other reading of Hume's reasoning is that one starts with the least-sized idea and then infers that there is (a) a bit ofextended matter that small, and (b) that there is no smaller bit of extended matter. Ofthese two readings, I think the second is the right way to understand Hume here, for only it supports the argument's conclusion that space is not infinitely divisible.3 But notice that this second version ofHume... (shrink)

In his famous lecture on ‘Politics as a Vocation’, Max Weber coined and elaborated on the antithesis between the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility, which has had a far-reaching impact on the ethics discussions, particularly in German-speaking countries. The article explores what Weber himself meant with this distinction and what implications result from it. As an interesting historical observation, Weber's interpretation of ‘Do not resist an evildoer’ in the New Testament is contrasted with Mahatma Gandhi's diametrically opposed (...) interpretation. After criticizing Weber's position, the article outlines how today's business ethics can be based on a new and different foundation that overcomes the ‘profound antithesis’ between the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility without disregarding the tensions between internal attitudes and external action results. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Homer The Subjectivity Objection Socrates Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Scandal Explicit Doctrine Implicit Conclusion Objections Destiny Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Life Defense Strategy Saving Word Changed Lives Further Reading.

From the beginning of the 19th Century to the present feelings of national identity and religious sentiments have coexisted in a close but ambiguous relationship. For example, national movements in Poland, French-speaking Canada and Ireland have been inextricably linked with the Roman Catholic faith. Pan-Arabism and Zionism could not exist without the underpinnings of Islam and the Jewish faith respectively.On the other hand, these same national movements have frequently been in conflict with the prevailing religious establishment. In many cases, the (...) religious hierarchy has been at odds with nationalist currents.Moreover, often the leaders of nationalist movements were themselve either non-religious or dissenters. However, in order to succeed national movements could not ignore and, indeed, made good use of traditionalreligious feelings.There is a complex relationship between religion and nationalism, and their interplay results in both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary tendencies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Six Poems GEORGE KALOGERIS The Atomists To see what the matter is, in all of its dense, Teeming particulars, and not through the lens Of a microscope but by the most lucid, precise, Leap of imagination: the first was Leucíppus. But it was his student, Democritus, who stated That human understanding was truly futile, Given the random collisions of atoms. Still, He blinded himself to keep from (...) being distracted. When he broke the long-jump record by two whole feet, Bob Beamon dropped to his knees, buried his face In his hands, and wept in a pit of sand—the trace Of his human, Olympian flight still fresh as a heel-print. When the earthquake struck Kalamáta, and Uncle Sotíri Lost everything, he asked a taxi driver To take him to “a nice high place by the sea. And then come back for me in half an hour.” arion 28.3 winter 2021 58 six poems One Credit Seminar on the Odes of Horace We were sitting around a polished oak table, just getting to Those famous lines near the end of the Sestius Ode: Revenant whitefaced Death is walking not knowing whether He’s going to knock at a rich man’s door or a poor man’s When one of the students (Andrew) said it was “totally weird”— Which led us to look at the paleness of Death’s appearance, Whose pallor is what, when he comes, comes with him: the sickness and shock In his ghastly face. And that’s where we stopped. And then It was Jennifer’s email, saying “I’m sorry for missing class, But I’m having panic attacks. I keep flashing back To March 19th, when I entered my dorm-room and found my boyfriend Dead of an overdose... I can get you a note... What reading should I do to be prepared for next week?” O goodlooking fortunate Sestius, don’t put your hope in the future; The night is falling, the shades are gathering around; The walls of Pluto’s shadowy house are closing you in. There who will be lord of the feast? What will it matter, What will it matter there, whether you fell in love With Lycidas, this or that girl with him, or he With her? So David Ferry’s great translation goes, And its tone of tender, knowing, bemusement is Horace’s Pitying voice, but whose pity has come to speak to us Through the whitefaced mouth of revenant Death, still going From house to house, until he gets to Jennifer’s dorm-room. And what will it matter now if Andrew was drawn to the line About fishermen hauling their caulked boats to the water? It’s late September. We’re sitting around a polished oak table Whose wood is sacred to Jove, whose lightning-bolt Has already sounded deep in the heart of Indian summer. George Kalogeris 59 Greek School The very first poem I ever knew by heart: That sing-song forsaken one assigned to me. Recited on our other Independence Day. When some of the girls were dressed in peasant costumes, And some of the boys in kilts of the freedom fighters. And the timid rest of us in our Sunday best. In the church gym, where Father Mihos called us Up to the microphone, and one by one We showed the parents what we’d learned in Greek school. In Horace’s Ode to his Lyre, the poet prays That his song will serve as the medicine of sorrows, His stricken voice the trembling instrument— Schooled as he was in Sappho, who said the ancient Prescription left a bittersweet taste in her mouth: Glukopikron. For me it’s that first-grade poem I stammer to remember: Egwo tha geino Yiatrós... “I shall grow up to be a doctor...” Just saying that, my elders perk up their ears. And even if Poetry wasn’t the kind of calling Expected of me, and one by one they all Got sick and died, it’s still the medicine That keeps them leaning forward on their folding chairs. 60 six poems Money Doesn’t Grow On Trees But evergreen the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John Dewey in Chicago: Some BiographicalNotes* GEORGE DYKHUIZEN DEWEY'S REPUTATION in philosophical, psychological, and educational circles brought him many invitations to lecture at other institutions of higher learning, and he was frequently kept busy meeting these engagements. In July, 1896, for example, he headed the departments of psychology and pedagogy at the Summer Institute of Martha's Vineyard,1 and in August delivered a series of lectures on "Imagination in (...) Education" at Chatauqua. 2 During the summer of 1901, he gave courses at the University of California in Berkeley~ and in the spring of 1904 gave six lectures on "Problems of Knowledge" at Columbia University and three lectures on "Moral Education" at Brooklyn Institute3 Dewey was also very much in demand as a speaker at professional meetings of philosophers, psychologists, and educators. In the spring of 1896 he spoke at the first annual meeting of the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools.5 He was elected president of the American Psychological Association for the year 1899-1900 and gave as his presidential address, "Psychology and Social Practice." Later, in December, 1901, he addressed the Association on "Interpretation of Savage Mind." g Dewey was also an active member of the American Philosophical Association and was to become its president in 1905 He was a member of the Illinois Society for Child Study and of the National Herbart Society and frequently addressed meetings of these organizations. With so much of his spare time taken up with off-campus engagements, Dewey could not take as great a part in on-campus activities as he may have wished. Nevertheless, like other members of the faculty, he took his turn speaking at the Wednesday afternoon lecture series which the University provided for the students. The most outstanding of Dewey's talks on these occasions were the two he delivered on successive Wednesdays in the summer of 1897. These were entitled "Evolution and Ethics," and created quite a stir because in them Dewey defended evolution and attacked the dualism between the cosmic and ethical processes set up by T. H. Huxley in his Romanes lecture of 1893. Dewey argued that the ethical has its roots in the cosmic and is continuous with itY *This is the second of two articles on John Dewey'sChicago years. For the first of these articles, see my "John Dewey: The Chicago Years," Journal of the History o/ Philosophy, I1:2 (Oct., 1964),227-253. 1University Record, I (July, 1896),278. Ibid. (Aug.7, 1896),311. 81bid. VI (July 26, 1901),171. ~Ibid. IX (June, 1904),92. 51bid. I (April10, 1896),35. *Ibid. VI (March, 1902), 358. Dewey's talk appeared in Psychological Review, IX (May, 1902),217-230. Ibid. II (July, 1897),162.Dewey'stalks werepublished in the Monist, III (1898),321-341. [217] 218 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY There is no record of Dewey having spoken, as did many of the other faculty members, at the University Chapel services held, for a while, each noon on the campus. Indeed, during his Chicago years and thereafter, Dewey disassociated himself more and more from organized religion and instead devoted his energies to educational and social affairs. He did not join the Hyde Park Congregational Church upon surrendering his membership in the Congregational Church in Ann Arbor, and he did not require that his children do so. When his mother, a loyal and pious Congregationalist who was living with them, remonstrated and declared that the children ought to be sent to Sunday School, Dewey's reply was that in his youth he had gone to Sunday School enough to make up for his children's failure to do so. Dewey attended only irregularly the meetings of the University Senate, being present at only eleven of the nineteen meetings held during his years at Chicago. But he made his voice heard when he was present. He was one of two opposed to the establishment of a separate school of commerce and political science;s he moved to waive the requirement of Latin for graduation from the Senior College ;9 he proposed "a modification of the requirements respecting history in the undergraduate course"; 1~and he voted in favor of requiring one... (shrink)

Without so much as an America Online account, Timothy Dwight, president of Yale University two centuries ago, learned of an evil plot -- hatched in France by Freemasons hopped up on Enlightenment philosophy -- to overthrow the United States Government. A Bavarian secret society called the Order of the Illuminati was also involved. Unable to access alt.conspiracy or even a good E-mail program, Dwight had to resort to public speaking to spread the word.

In Lucian's highly competitive and exhibitionist world, hyper-Atticism, the use of recondite, archaic words for the sake of impression, has become a sort of plague. In this article, I discuss how Lexiphanes focuses precisely on the literal and metaphorical associations of hyper-Atticism as a disease, by paying particular attention on the medical verdict - articulated in the text by Lucian's authorial double, Lycinus - that the dialogue's eponymous character suffers from melancholia. Rather than constitute a passing reference to the colloquial (...) vocabulary of insanity, melancholia, I argue, helps Lucian forcefully assimilate the accumulation of pretentious words to the raving of the insane, a non-sensical blabbering that is void of meaning. At the same time, Lucian aims also to expose the presence of melancholy in the cultural and medical idiom of his time as a disease that typically affects 'great spirits', people of exceptional intelligence. By calling Lexiphanes 'melancholic', Lucian scolds Lexiphanes' pretentiousness both as a hyper-Atticist and, no less importantly, as a pseudo-intellectual who is shaping his public image, temperamentally and physiognomically, as a genius whose atrabilious constitution entitles him to act and speak in strange ways. (shrink)

Bishop John A.T. Robinson's Honest to God was exceptionally successful. In the decade following its publication more than a million copies were sold in seventeen different languages. Robinson was aware that numerous awkward questions were being asked about traditional Christian beliefs, which it was no longer possible to ignore. His purpose was not so much to question traditional ideas of God as to suggest alternatives for those who found them unsatisfactory . He wanted to convince such persons that an inability (...) to believe what is stated in the Bible or the prayer book does not disqualify them from calling themselves Christians and presenting themselves at church. He speaks of traditional Christian beliefs, as stated in the New Testament, as a ‘language’ and thinks that Christianity should be conveyed to people in a variety of languages. By employing, as he does, the language of such Christian scholars as Bonhoeffer, Tillich and Bultmann, an atheist may find himself able to call himself a Christian. But the old familiar language of the Bible remains more pleasing to most of God's children, particularly to his ‘older children’ , so we must not give it up, although he allows that it is becoming increasingly unpopular, so that without ‘the kind of revolution’ he is advocating, ‘Christian faith and practice … will come to be abandoned’. (shrink)