104 found
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  1. Concepts and stereotypes.Georges Rey - 1983 - Cognition 15 (1-3):237-62.
  2. When Other Things Aren’t Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity.Paul Pietroski & Georges Rey - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.
    A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora (...)
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  3. Concepts and conceptions: A reply to Smith, Medin and Rips.Georges Rey - 1985 - Cognition 19 (3):297-303.
  4. A reason for doubting the existence of consciousness.Georges Rey - 1982 - In Richard J. Davidson, Gary E. Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation. New York: Plenum. pp. 1--39.
  5.  70
    Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach.Georges Rey - 1997 - Cambridge, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
    This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires.
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  6. Sensational sentences switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.
  7.  29
    Representation of Language: Philosophical Issues in a Chomskyan Linguistics.Georges Rey - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Georges Rey presents a much-needed philosophical defense of Noam Chomsky's famous view of human language, as an internal, innate computational system. But he also offers a critical examination of problematic developments of this view, to do with innateness, ontology, intentionality, and other issues of interdisciplinary interest.
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  8. Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach.Georges Rey - 1998 - Mind 107 (425):246-250.
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  9. What’s Really Going On in Searle’s “Chinese room‘.Georges Rey - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (September):169-85.
  10. A narrow representationalist account of qualitative experience.Georges Rey - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:435-58.
  11.  57
    12. Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception.Georges Rey - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 264-296.
  12.  33
    The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution.Georges Rey & Colin McGinn - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (2):274.
  13. A Naturalistic A Priori.Georges Rey - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):25 - 43.
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  14.  20
    A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience.Georges Rey - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):435-457.
  15. A question about consciousness.Georges Rey - 1986 - In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  16. Toward a projectivist account of conscious experience.Georges Rey - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 123--42.
  17.  26
    The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Georges Rey - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  18.  92
    Innate a nd Learned: Carey, Mad Dog Nativism, and the Poverty of Stimuli and Analogies.Georges Rey - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (2):109-132.
    In her recent (2009) book, The Origins of Concepts, Susan Carey argues that what she calls ‘Quinean Bootstrapping’ and processes of analogy in children show that the expressive power of a mind can be increased in ways that refute Jerry Fodor's (1975, 2008) ‘Mad Dog’ view that all concepts are innate. I argue that it is doubtful any evidence about the manifestation of concepts in children will bear upon the logico-semantic issues of expressive power. Analogy and bootstrapping may be ways (...)
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  19. Sensational sentences.Georges Rey - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Blackwell.
     
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  20. Functionalism and the Emotions Explaining Emotions.Georges Rey - 1980 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions. University of California Press.
     
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  21. Innateness.Steven Gross & Georges Rey - forthcoming - In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.
    A survey of innateness in cognitive science, focusing on (1) what innateness might be, and (2) whether concepts might be innate.
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  22.  42
    Chomsky, Intentionality, and a CRTT.Georges Rey - 2003 - In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 105–139.
    This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Chomsky's Commitment to CRTT Prospects and Problems of CRTT Technical Notions? Does Chomsky Need Intentionality? Chomsky's Dilemma.
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  23.  88
    Conventions, Intuitions and Linguistic Inexistents: A Reply to Devitt.Georges Rey - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):549-569.
    Elsewhere I have argued that standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking seriously talk of “representations of” standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”), such as NPs, VPs, morphemes, phonemes, syntactic and phonetic features. However, it is very doubtful there are tokens of these “things” in space and time. Moreover, even if were, their existence would be completely inessential to the needs of either communication or serious linguistic theory. Their existence is an illusion: an extremely stable perceptual state we regularly enter (...)
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  24. The intentional inexistence of language — but not cars.Georges Rey - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 237-55.
  25. Functionalism and the Emotions.Georges Rey - 1980 - In A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions. Univ of California Pr. pp. 21.
  26. Intentional content and a chomskian linguistics.Georges Rey - 2003 - In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of language. Oxford University Press. pp. 140--186.
  27. Resisting normativism in psychology.Georges Rey - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    “Intentional content,” as I understand it, is whatever serves as the object of “propositional” attitude verbs, such as “think,” “judge,” “represent,” “prefer” (whether or not these objects are “propositions”). These verbs are standardly used to pick out the intentional states invoked to explain the states and behavior of people and many animals. I shall take the “normativity of the intentional,” or “Normativism,” to be the claim that any adequate theory of intentional states involves considerations of value not essentially involved in (...)
     
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  28.  21
    Holism: A Consumer Update.Georges Rey (ed.) - 1993 - Amsterdam: Rodopi.
  29.  74
    The unavailability of what we mean: A reply to Quine, Fodor and Lepore.Georges Rey - 1986 - In Abraham Zvie Bar-On (ed.), Grazer Philosophische Studien. Distributed in the U.S.A. By Humanities Press. pp. 61-101.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
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  30.  65
    The Unavailability of What We Mean.Georges Rey - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:61-101.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
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  31.  23
    The Unavailability of What We Mean.Georges Rey - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46 (1):61-101.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
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  32.  50
    In Defense of Folieism.Georges Rey - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):177-202.
    According to the “Folieism” I have been recently defending, communication is a kind of folie à deux in which speakers and hearers enjoy a stable and innocuous illusion of producing and hearing standard linguistic entities (“SLE”s) that are seldom if ever actually produced. In the present paper, after summarizing the main points of the view, I defend it against efforts of Barber, Devitt and Miščević to rescue SLEs in terms of social, response-dependent proposals. I argue that their underlying error is (...)
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  33.  16
    Transcending transcendentalism.Michael Devitt & Georges Rey - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (June):87-100.
  34.  77
    A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thought.Georges Rey - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:201-22.
  35. Survival.Georges Rey - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
     
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  36.  54
    (Even Higher-Order) Intentionality Without Consciousness.Georges Rey - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1 (1):51-78.
  37. Physicalism and psychology: A plea for a substantive philosophy of mind.Georges Rey - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
  38.  6
    Externalism and inexistence in early content.Georges Rey - 2012 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 503-530.
  39.  50
    Dennett’s Unrealistic Psychology.Georges Rey - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):259-89.
  40.  10
    Dennett’s Unrealistic Psychology.Georges Rey - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):259-289.
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  41.  85
    XV*—Semantic Externalism and Conceptual Competence.Georges Rey - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1):315-334.
    Georges Rey; XV*—Semantic Externalism and Conceptual Competence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 315–334, https.
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  42.  33
    An explanatory budget for connectionism and eliminativism.Georges Rey - 1991 - In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 219--240.
  43.  38
    Constituent causation and the reality of mind.Georges Rey - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):620-621.
  44.  74
    Concepts versus conceptions (again).Georges Rey - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):221-222.
    Machery neglects the crucial role of concepts in psychological explanation, as well as the efforts of numerous of the last 40 years to provide an account of that role. He rightly calls attention to the wide variation in people's epistemic relations to concepts but fails to appreciate how externalist and kindred proposals offer the needed stability in concepts themselves that underlies that variation.
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  45. Philosophy of Linguistics.Georges Rey, Alex Barber, John Collins, Michael Devitt & Dunja Jutronic - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (23).
     
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  46.  49
    Remembering Jerry Fodor and his work.Georges Rey - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):321-341.
    This is a reminiscence and short biographical sketch of the late philosopher and cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor. It includes a summary of his main proposals about the mind: his “Language of Thought” hypothesis; his rejection of analyticity and conceptual role semantics; his “mad dog nativism”; his proposal of mental modules and—by contrast—his skepticism about a computational theory of central cognition; his anti‐reductionist, but still physicalist, views about psychology; and, lastly, his attacks on selectionism. I conclude with some discussion of his (...)
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  47.  86
    Sensations in a language of thought.Georges Rey - 1991 - Philosophical Issues 1:73-112.
  48.  21
    The innocuousness of folieism and the need of intentionality where transduction fails: Replies to Adger and to Stainton & Viger.Georges Rey - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (2):274-282.
    I reply to Stainton and Viger by pointing out that my “folieist” claim—that standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”) such as words and phonemes are illusions—would not have the calamitous consequences for linguistics that they fear. Talk of “a language” need only be understood as talk of an I‐language precisely as Chomskyans have proposed; and I reply to Adger by pointing out that, since SLEs are not generally describable as real, local physical phenomena, perception of them cannot be explained as any sort (...)
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  49. What are mental images?Georges Rey - 1981 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol.
     
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  50. What implicit conceptions are unlikely to do.Georges Rey - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:93-104.
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