_Socrates_ presents a compelling case for some life-changing conclusions that follow from a close reading of Socrates' arguments. Offers a highly original study of Socrates and his thought, accessible to contemporary readers Argues that through studying Socrates we can learn practical wisdom to apply to our lives Lovingly crafted with humour, thought-experiments and literary references, and with close reading sof key Socratic arguments Aids readers with diagrams to make clear complex arguments.

Socrates argued that the unexamined life is not worth living. What this means is we are so ignorant that we are guilty of criminal negligence how to lead our lives, unless we do our due diligence by philosophising.

In this study, George Rudebusch addresses whether Socrates was a hedonist--whether he believed pleasure to be the good. In attempting to locate Socrates' position on hedonism, Rudebusch examines the passages in Plato's early dialogues that are the most disputed on the topic. He maintains that Socrates identifies pleasant activity with virtuous activity, describing Socrates' hedonism as one of activity, not sensation. This analysis allows for Socrates to find both virtue and pleasure to be the good, thus solving the textual puzzle (...) and showing the power of Socratic argument in leading human beings toward the good. (shrink)

I defend the argument in Plato's Lysis that true love is requited. I state the argument, the main objections, and my replies. I begin with a synopsis of the dialogue.

In the Protagoras, Socrates argues that all the virtues are the very same knowledge of human wellbeing so that virtue is all one. But elsewhere Socrates appears to endorse that the virtues-such as courage, temperance, and reverence-are different parts of a single whole. Ambiguity interpretations harmonize the conflicting texts by taking the virtue words to be equivocal, such as between theoretical and applied expertise, or between a power and its deeds. I argue that such interpretations have failed in their specifics (...) and in general, as I defend an alternative that takes into account Socrates' higher purpose in testing others, namely to show them their ignorance of virtue. (shrink)

Plato's "theaetetus" (187-200) raises puzzles about false belief. Frege's explanation of how an identity statement can be informative is often seen as a solution to socrates' puzzles. The strategy of frege's solution is to explain a "mistake" as a "mismatch". But it turns out that socrates' argument, In fact, Is aware of and rejects this strategy.

Intellectualism about human virtue is the thesis that virtue is knowledge. Virtue intellectualists may be eliminative or reductive. If eliminative, they will eliminate our conventional vocabulary of virtue words-'virtue', 'piety', 'courage', etc.-and speak only of knowledge or wisdom. If reductive, they will continue to use the conventional virtue words but understand each of them as denoting nothing but a kind of knowledge (as opposed to, say, a capacity of some other part of the soul than the intellect, such as the (...) will or the appetites). Virtue intellectualists may be pluralists or monists. If pluralist, they identify the virtues with distinct kinds of knowledge. If monist, they identify all the virtues with one and the same kind of knowledge. In a number of dialogues-including the Euthyphro, Apology, Charmides, Euthydemus, Laches, Lysis, Protagoras, and Republic I-Socrates gives arguments that support Reductive Monist Intellectualism (RMI) about human virtue. I disarm an influential objection to RMI as the correct interpretation of Socrates. (shrink)

A dilemma has stymied interpretations of the Stranger’s method of dividing kinds into subkinds in Plato’sSophistandStatesman. The dilemma assumes that the kinds are either extensions or intensions. Now kinds divide like extensions, not intensions. But extensions cannot explain the distinct identities of kinds that possess the very same members. We propose understanding a kind as like an animal body—the Stranger’s simile for division—possessing both an extension and an intension. We find textual support in the Stranger’s paradigmatic four steps for collecting (...) a subkind. (shrink)

I describe an aporetic structure found in certain dialogues and explain the structure by showing how it serves, better than expository writing, the pedagogical goal of avoiding giving readers a false sense of knowledge in producing understanding of a philosophical account.

The review argues that Plato makes a valid distinction between inferior hypothetical and superior unhypothetical methods. Given the distinction, the book confuses the hypothetical for unhypothetical dialectic.

The argument used by Socrates to refute the thesis that piety is what all the gods love is one of the most well known in the history of philosophy. Yet some fundamental points of interpretation have gone unnoticed. I will show that (i) the strategy of Socrates' argument refutes not only Euthyphro's theory of piety and such neighboring doctrines as cultural relativism and subjectivism, but nominalism in general; moreover, that (ii) the argument needs to assume much less than is generally (...) thought, and finally that (iii) while Socrates' argument, properly understood in its full force, appears to be inconsistent with the goal of his own inquiry, his own 'Platonic' position escapes the inconsistency. (shrink)

The success of relativism as a solution to skeptical problems depends upon the relativist's object of knowledge being invulnerable to the same skeptical doubts which we might have about the undiscovered world. Naturally, therefore, a traditional Platonic response is to argue that the relativist's selected object of knowledge cannot be known apart from knowledge of the undiscovered world. This indeed is the Platonic thesis of this article, as it applies to tradition. I begin by giving a philosophical analysis of tradition.

I look at (I) the problem of false speech which Plato faces, (II) the solution he gives in the Sophist, and (III) how that very solution is undermined by the argument of the Theaetetus. I conclude that we ought to see the account of the Theaetetus as overruling the account of the Sophist. On this alternative, Plato holds that false speech and thought really is impossible.

After defining dramatic prefiguration, I show how (1) the initial meeting between Polemarchus's party and the smaller group of Socrates and Glaucon prefigures the Republic's theme of how to install the philosophical element in its proper place as ruler in the soul; (2) the relay race of torches carried on horseback prefigures the theory of the soul as tripartite, containing reason, spirit, and appetite; and (3) the opening image of Socrates descending to the Piraeus prefigures the descent of the reasoning (...) element back from the forms to give birth to works of wisdom. (shrink)

One reason why Confucius is preeminent among Chinese philosophers is his teaching about ren 仁. Interpreters have said many different things about ren, yet two basic assumptions are pervasive: that ren is a virtue and that ren is benevolence. I argue that it is more respectful to the text of the Analects to discard both assumptions. Instead of virtue, ren is a priority in one's motives. Instead of benevolence, ren is humane courtesy.

At Philebus 23c4-26d10 Socrates makes a division into three kinds: Unbounded (apeiron), Bound (peras), and Mix (meikton). I review problems for the main interpretations of Unbounded and Mix and review kinds of scales defined in abstract measurement theory. Then I take 23c4-26d10 speech by speech, interpreting the Unbounded as a kind containing partial scales, Bound as the kind containing the relations and quantities needed to turn partial scales into appropriate ratio scales, and Mix as the kind containing ratio scales appropriate (...) for the good things that come to be in the world. (shrink)

The sentence setting the stage for the philosophical investigation within the Philebus is, naively translated, “He says that to enjoy is good.” Instead of the predicate adjective “good,” most interpreters prefer to translate with a definite description, “the good,” with consequences that affect the interpretation of the dialogue as a whole. Part one defends the naïve translation, both in the context of Socrates’ first seven speeches and viewing the dialogue as a whole. Part two considers and rejects the reasons given (...) against the naïve translation on the basis of grammar, idiosyncratic Platonic style, immediate context, and later restatements. (shrink)

This book is an anthology with the following themes. Non-European Tradition: Bussanich interprets main themes of Hindu ethics, including its roots in ritual sacrifice, its relationship to religious duty, society, individual human well-being, and psychic liberation. To best assess the truth of Hindu ethics, he argues for dialogue with premodern Western thought. Pfister takes up the question of human nature as a case study in Chinese ethics. Is our nature inherently good (as Mengzi argued) or bad (Xunzi’s view)? Pfister ob- (...) serves their underlying agreement, that human beings are capable of becoming good, and makes precise the disagreement: whether we achieve goodness by cultivating autonomous feelings or by accepting external precepts. There are political consequences: whether government should aim to respect and em- power individual choices or to be a controlling authority. Early Greek Thinking: Collobert examines the bases of Homeric ethics in fame, prudence, and shame, and how these guide the deliberations of heroes. She observes how, by depending upon the poet’s words, the hero gains a quasi- immortality, although in truth there is no consolation for each person’s inevi- table death. Plato: Santas examines Socratic Method and ethics in Republic 1. There Socrates examines definitions of justice and tests them by comparison to the arts and sciences. Santas shows the similarities of Socrates’ method to John Rawls’ method of considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. McPherran interprets Plato’s religious dimension as like that of his teacher Socrates. McPherran shows how Plato appropriates, reshapes, and extends the religious conventions of his own time in the service of establishing the new enterprise of philosophy. Ac- cording to Taylor, Socrates believes that humans in general have the task of helping the gods by making their own souls as good as possible, and Socrates’ unique ability to cross-examine imposes on him the special task of helping others to become as good as possible. This conception of Socrates’ mission is Plato’s own, consisting in an extension of the traditional conception of piety as helping the gods. Brickhouse and Smith propose a new understanding of Socratic moral psychology—one that retains the standard view of Socrates as an intellectualist, but also recognizes roles in human agency for appetites and passions. They compare and contrast the Socratic view to the picture of moral psychology we get in other dialogues of Plato. Hardy also proposes a new, non-reductive understanding of Socratic eudaimonism—he argues that Socrates invokes a very rich and complex notion of the “Knowledge of the Good and Bad”, which is associated with the motivating forces of the virtues. Rudebusch defends Socrates’ argument that knowledge can never be impotent in the face of psychic passions. He considers the standard objections: that knowledge cannot weigh incom- mensurable human values, and that brute desire, all by itself, is capable of moving the soul to action. Aristotle: Anagnostopoulos interprets Aristotle on the nature and acquisition of virtue. Though virtue of character, aiming at human happiness, requires a complex awareness of multiple dimensions of one’s experience, it is not properly a cognitive capacity. Thus it requires habituation, not education, according to Aristotle, in order to align the unruly elements of the soul with reason’s knowledge of what promotes happiness. Shields explains Aristotle’s doctrine that goodness is meant in many ways as the doctrine that there are different analyses of goodness for different types of circumstance, just as for being. He finds Aristotle to argue for this conclusion, against Plato’s doctrine of the unity of the Good, by applying the tests for homonymy and as an immediate cons- equence of the doctrine of categories. Shields evaluates the issue as unresolved at present. Russell discusses Aristotle’s account of practical deliberation and its virtue, intelligence (phronesis). He relates the account to contemporary philo- sophical controversies surrounding Aristotle’s view that intelligence is neces- sary for moral virtue, including the objections that in some cases it is unnecessary or even impedes human goodness. Frede examines the advantages and disadvantages of Aristotle’s virtue ethics. She explains the general Greek con- ceptions of happiness and virtue, Aristotle’s conception of phronesis and compares the Aristotle’s ethics with modern accounts. Liske discusses the question of whether the Aristotelian account of virtue entails an ethical-psy- chological determinism. He argues that Aristotle’s understanding of hexis allows for free action and ethical responsibility : By making decisions for good actions we are able to stabilize our character (hexis). Hellenistic and Roman: Annas defends an account of stoic ethics, according to which the three parts of Stoicism—logic, physics, and ethics—are integrated as the parts of an egg, not as the parts of a building. Since by this analogy no one part is a foundation for the rest, pedagogical decisions may govern the choice of numerous, equally valid, presentations of Stoic ethics. Piering interprets the Cynic way of life as a distinctive philosophy. In their ethics, Cynics value neither pleasure nor tradition but personal liberty, which they achieve by self-suffi- ciency and display in speech that is frank to the point of insult. Plotinus and Neoplatonism: Gerson outlines the place of ordinary civic virtue as well as philosophically contemplative excellence in Neoplatonism. In doing so he attempts to show how one and the same good can be both action-guiding in human life and be the absolute simple One that grounds the explanation of everything in the universe. Delcomminette follows Plotinus’s path to the Good as the foundation of free will, first in the freedom of Intellect and then in the “more than freedom” of the One. Plotinus postulates these divinities as not outside but within each self, saving him from the contradiction of an external foundation for a truly free will. General Topics: Halbig discusses the thesis on the unity of virtues. He dis- tinguishes the thesis of the identity of virtues and the thesis of a reciprocity of virtues and argues that the various virtues form a unity (in terms of reciprocity) since virtues cannot bring about any bad action. Detel examines Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of normativity : Plato and Aristotle (i) entertained hybrid theories of normativity by distinguishing functional, semantic and ethical normativity, (ii) located the ultimate source of normativity in standards of a good life, and thus (iii) took semantic normativity to be a derived form of normativity. Detel argues that hybrid theories of normativity are—from a mo- dern point of view—still promising. Ho ̈ffe defends the Ancient conception of an art of living against Modern objections. Whereas many Modern philosophers think that we have to replace Ancient eudaimonism by the idea of moral obligation (Pflicht), Ho ̈ffe argues that Eudaimonism and autonomy-based ethics can be reconciled and integrated into a comprehensive and promising theory of a good life, if we enrich the idea of autonomy by the central elements of Ancient eudaimonism. Some common themes: The topics in Chinese and Hindu ethics are perhaps more familiar to modern western sensibilities than Homeric and even Socratic. Anagnostopoulos, Brickhouse and Smith, Frede, Liske, Rudebusch, and Russell all consider in contrasting ways the role of moral character, apart from intellect, in ethics. Brickhouse / Smith, Hardy, and Rudebusch discuss the Socratic con- ception of moral knowledge. Brickhouse / Smith and Hardy retain the standard view of the so called Socratic Intellectualism. Shields and Gerson both consider the question whether there is a single genus of goodness, or if the term is a homonym. Bussanich, McPherran, Taylor, and Delcomminette all consider the relation between religion and ethics. Pfister, Piering, Delcomminette, and Liske all consider what sort of freedom is appropriate to human well-being. Halbig, Detel, and Ho ̈ffe propose interpretations of main themes of Ancient ethics. (shrink)

I review White's account of the swan song, of Socrates' last words, and of the importance of myth in Plato. Against any account of myth as a remedy in the nature of rational argument, I defend Hegel's account that myth addresses a less-than-fully-rational part of the soul.

Paul Hoffman (in “Kripke on Private Language”, Philosophical Studies 47, 1985, 23-28) argues that Kripke’s Wittgenstein fails in his solution to his own sceptical paradox. I argue that Hoffman fails to see the importance for Kripke’s Wittgenstein of the distinction between agreement in fact and judged agreement. Hoffman is right that no solution to the sceptical paradox can be based on agreement in fact, but the solution of Kripke’s Wittgenstein depends upon judged agreement. An interpretation is given: by ‘judged agreement’ (...) Kripke’s Wittgenstein does not mean understanding oneself to judge agreement but having a feeling of agreement. On this interpretation Hoffman’s argument fails. (shrink)

The text of Sophist 237-9 is aporetic and shares with many other dialogues this structure: A question is asked and an answer, given in a single sentence, is reached and accepted by the interlocutor. The the interlocutor is examined further and his assent undermined. I argue that the Stranger does not share Theaetetus' perplexity and holds the rejected answer. I explain the Stranger's behavior by appealing to his pedagogy.

In 'Plato on Sense and Reference' (Mind,1985, pp. 526-37), I argued that Plato 'understood and rejected' a general strategy for explaining false belief, and that Frege's explanation of false belief was an instance of that general strategy. Michael Beaney ('Mistakes and Mismatches: A Reply to Rudebusch', Mind, 1987, pp. 95-8) replied that there is a feature of Frege's explanation that enables it to escape the argument. In this rejoinder I argue that Beaney's escape is not Fregean and that it fails.

Paul Hoffman argues that Kripke’s Wittgenstein fails in his solution to his own sceptical paradox. I argue that Hoffman fails to see the importance for Kripke’s Wittgenstein of the distinction between agreement in fact and judged agreement. Hoffman is right that no solution to the sceptical paradox can be based on agreement in fact, but the solution of Kripke’s Wittgenstein depends upon judged agreement. An interpretation is given: by ‘judged agreement’ Kripke’s Wittgenstein does not mean understanding oneself to judge agreement (...) but having a feeling of agreement. On this interpretation Hoffman’s argument fails. (shrink)

AUGUSTINE WISHED TO DEFEND AND MAKE AS INTELLIGIBLE AS POSSIBLE THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. I SHOW HOW AUGUSTINE WORKS WITH AN ARISTOTELIAN MODEL OF PREDICATION, DERIVES AN INCOMPLETENESS RESULT WITHIN THE STANDARD FORMS OF PREDICATION, AND ACCEPTS, WITH SOME QUALIFICATION, A NONSTANDARD FORM OF PREDICATION USED BY ARISTOTLE FOR PREDICATING PRIMARY SUBSTANCE OF MATTER.

This paper defends Socrates' argument that death is one of two things against standard objections.

Paul Hoffman argues that Kripke’s Wittgenstein fails in his solution to his own sceptical paradox. I argue that Hoffman fails to see the importance for Kripke’s Wittgenstein of the distinction between agreement in fact and judged agreement. Hoffman is right that no solution to the sceptical paradox can be based on agreement in fact, but the solution of Kripke’s Wittgenstein depends upon judged agreement. An interpretation is given: by ‘judged agreement’ Kripke’s Wittgenstein does not mean understanding oneself to judge agreement (...) but having a feeling of agreement. On this interpretation Hoffman’s argument fails. (shrink)

English translates ‘genos’ as kind and ‘eidos’ as form, which differ in meaning as much as ‘herd’ and ‘brand’ do. But there are hard passages where ‘genos’ and ‘eidos’ have appeared to be synonyms, usually given the new meaning class. We show that, although ‘genos’ and ‘eidos’ are never synonyms and continue to mean kind and form, the word ‘eidos’ can be used figuratively, as a metonym, for a genos.

Selon la description de Platon, Socrate est devenu célèbre après avoir « changé de direction et examiné les paroles du dieu », c’est-à-dire après avoir mis à l’épreuve l’oracle selon lequel il n’existe aucun homme plus sage que lui. Une telle description soulève plus d’une question. En effet, quelle direction Socrate avait-il adoptée avant de tester l’oracle de Delphes? Qu’avait-il donc fait pour inciter Chéréphon à s’enquérir auprès de l’oracle s’il existait un homme plus sage que lui? Sans aucun doute, (...) avant même de consulter l’oracle, Chéréphon devait être convaincu du caractère extraordinaire de Socrate. Toutefois, selon le témoignage de Socrate dans l’Apologie, ce n’est qu’après avoir été mis au fait des paroles de l’oracle qu’il a enfin atteint la grande notoriété que nous lui connaissons. Le témoignage contenu dans l’Apologie apparaît donc comme contradictoire. Je propose une solution à ce casse-tête en distinguant trois moments dans la vie philosophique de Socrate. Tout d’abord, je montre comment, durant la première étape de sa vie, Socrate tient des conversations qui, à défaut de le rendre célèbre, donnent à Chéréphon un motif suffisant pour consulter l’oracle de Delphes. Je distingue ensuite deux étapes ultérieures, caractérisées par des actions différentes : la période durant laquelle Socrate essaie de résoudre l’énigme et celle durant laquelle il l’a résolue. (shrink)