In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Adrian Del Caro PAUL CELAN'S UNCANNY SPEECH On October 22, 1960, Paul Celan was in Darmstadt, West Germany, to accept the prestigious Georg-Bûchner-Preis. Winners of this prize are required by custom to give a speech on some aspect of Georg Büchner's writings, and Celan followed suit with a speech entitled "Der Meridian." The speech itself, as an address given in German in Germany to German listeners, (...) was uncanny, but it was Celan's "uncanny" discourse that had earned him this prize in the first place. In his poetry die uncanny takes on a life of its own. In the Meridian speech, dimensions of the uncanny in Büchner's writings are explored for the purpose of shedding light on the artistic impulse, and on poetry in particular. The poetic of Paul Celan is difficult to define from the aggregate of his poems, and hardly transparent in the Meridian speech, either. But it is the concentration on the uncanny in "Meridian" that makes the effort worthwhile. I will use the Meridian speech, examples from German literature, and examples of Celan's poems to unpack this uncanny. "Meridian," like so many words chosen by Celan, is full. Among the things it can mean are highest point, prime of life, circle from pole to pole, and lines numbered according to degrees of longitude. We speak also of a prime meridian, namely Greenwich, having the property of a center, of a locus from which we determine our bearings. Celan the linguist and etymologist knew and considered all meanings. "Uncanny" as a translation of German das Unheimliche is not quite sufficient, but it is a good starting point. German heim is English home, and unheimlich, unheimisch would be unhomely or unhomey—at least in the etymological spirit. When things are not as they are at home, they are unheimlich. Grimm's dictionary tells us that it wasn't until die end of Philosophy and Literature, © 1994, 18: 211-224 212Philosophy and Literature the eighteenth century that an emotive quality was added to this formerly cognitive adjective; it began at diis time to be associated with feelings of terror, dread, and anxiety. The Romantic Ludwig Tieck was among the first German writers to treat supernatural, uncanny themes, and as unheimlich became associated with the supernatural, it began to lose its sense of homeliness. Later on, E. T. A. Hoffmann became a master of die uncanny in his numerous weird tales. English "uncanny," which is still the best translation we have for unheimlich, experienced a similar development away from its origins in Scottish, where canny meant quiet, snug, cozy, and pleasant. The Oxford English Dictionary tells us that "supernatural, mysterious, uncomfortably strange or unfamiliar" were properties ascribed to "uncanny" after 1850. Poe's writings are uncanny in this modern sense. Freud devoted an essay to the uncanny in 1919. He made die point diat das Unheimliche is merely das Heimliche that we have repressed. Ifwe romanticize this idea, dien in the beginning all things were heimlich or homey to us, and it is only after consciousness thatwe become alienated from our home in nature, a condition which makes us feel unheimlich. Celan certainly had strong reason to focus on the earliest meaning of unheimlich, since he experienced homelessness in virtually every conceivable sense of the word, but then, so did his people, dieJews; first in their experience of the Diaspora, then in their "final" eradication during the Holocaust. The people without Boden or land became, by 1945, a people no longer of die earth. Freud linked the concept of das Unheimliche to its origin in heimlich. After exhaustively quoting the lexicologists Sanders and Grimm, Freud concluded that only Schelling had added a new dimension to das Unheimliche: "Uncanny would be everything that is supposed to remain a secret, remain concealed, but has emerged."1 This is credible enough, and fits Freud's repression theory. Freud's statement at the conclusion of the first part of his long essay would have appealed to Celan: "Heimlich is a word according to whose meaning an ambivalence develops until finally it corresponds in any uncanny way with its opposite. Unheimlich is somehow a kind ofheimlich... (shrink)

To everyone else, and especially to those who wish to exclude him from the charmed circle of philosophers, Nietzsche is a poetic, dithyrambic, romantic-aesthetic writer. But he insists that he is anti-romantic and engages in a long, drawn-out argument against romantic pessimism and romantic idealism. Del Caro poses a simple question that requires a complex, multidimensional answer: what was Nietzsche's relation to romanticism in general and German romanticism in particular?

Logik ist nach dem traditionellen Verständnis eine ars iudicandi, eine Kunst, die Gültigkeit von Schlüssen zu prüfen. Da mit die normalen Mittel der modernen Logik zu diesem Zweck eingesetzt werden können, müssen erst Formeln an die Stelle von Sätzen treten: umgangssprachliche Schlüsse müssen adäquat formalisiert werden. Die richtige Formel entwickelt ein theoretisches Konzept des Formalisierens und praktisch anwendbare Adäquatheitskriterien für Formalisierungen. Dabei werden zentrale Fragen der Philosophie der Logik unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Zusammenspiels von Umgangssprache und Formalismus untersucht. Die ausführliche (...) und systematische Diskussion von Formalisierungstests bietet eine wichtige Ergänzung zu den traditionellen Logiklehrbüchern. (shrink)

Does artificial intelligence (AI) exhibit consciousness or self? While this question is hotly debated, here we take a slightly different stance by focusing on those features that make possible both, namely a basic or fundamental subjectivity. Learning from humans and their brain, we first ask what we mean by subjectivity. Subjectivity is manifest in the perspectiveness and mineness of our experience which, ontologically, can be traced to a point of view. Adopting a non-reductive neurophilosophical strategy, we assume that the point (...) of view exhibits two layers, a most basic neuroecological and higher order mental layer. The neuroecological layer of the point of view is mediated by the timescales of world and brain, as further evidenced by empirical data on our sense of self. Are there corresponding timescales shared with the world in AI and is there a point of view with perspectiveness and mineness? Discussing current neuroscientific evidence, we deny that current AI exhibits a point of view, let alone perspectiveness and mineness. We therefore conclude that, as per current state, AI does not exhibit a basic or fundamental subjectivity and henceforth no consciousness or self is possible in models such as ChatGPT and similar technologies. (shrink)

Die um 1800 aufgeworfenen anthropologisch-psychologischen Fragestellungen sind Gegenstand dieses Buches. Sie bildeten einen wichtigen Bestandteil der damaligen Wissenschaftskultur und wurden unter Namen wie "Empirische Psychologie", "Erfahrungsseelenkunde", "Experimentalseelenlehre" oder auch "Seelenphysik" abgehandelt. Das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen einem empirisch-erfahrungswissenschaftlichen und einem apriorisch-fundamentalphilosophischen Zugang zur Anthropologie bzw. Psychologie, wie es sich besonders im Ereignisraum Weimar-Jena verdichtete, steht im Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung. Das Buch vermittelt ein differenziertes Bild des anthropologisch-psychologischen Diskurses in jener Phase der Kultur- und Wissenschaftsentwicklung, in der sich Aufklärung, Klassizismus, Klassik, Idealismus und (...) Romantik überlagerten. (shrink)

Kant stellte seine ‘Rassenlehre’ erstmals 1775 vor; und obwohl er sie dann 1785 und 1788 weiter ausarbeitete, blieben die Grundzüge dieselben; und auch in den 1790er Jahren hat er sie im Wesentlichen nicht verändert oder gar aufgegeben. Auch hat es zu keiner Zeit irgendwelche Inkonsistenzen zwischen seiner ‘Rassenlehre’ und seiner eigentlichen Philosophie, insbesondere seiner Moralphilosophie, gegeben. Einerseits können (moralische) Unterschiede zwischen Menschen als freien Wesen (Personen) im Hinblick auf Kants Aussagen zu Rassen als solchen keine Rolle spielen, da solche Unterschiede (...) nicht angeboren, geschweige denn innerhalb einer Rasse sowie im Falle von Rassenmischung notwendig vererblich sind. Andererseits können (empirische) Unterschiede zwischen Menschen als bloßen Naturwesen (Tieren) im Hinblick auf Kants moralische Urteile keine Rolle spielen, da sie nicht zurechenbar sind. Der Vorwurf des “Rassismus” ist nur in zwei Fällen möglich: (1) Eine wissentlich falsche Aussage über Rassen erfolgt in alleiniger Diskriminierungsabsicht. Das müssten Kants Gegner beweisen. (2) Empirische Unterschiede, ob wirklich gegeben oder irrtümlich angenommen, dienen als Grundlage für rechtliche oder soziale Diskriminierung. Genau das ist mit Kant’s Moralphilosophie prinzipiell und in Bezug auf die ganze Menschheit ausgeschlossen. Die Literatur, in der Kant “Rassismus” vorgeworfen wird, zeigt einen eklatanten Mangel an systematischer, methodenkritischer und prinzipientheoretischer Sorgfalt und Textvertrautheit bei der Kant-Exegese. (shrink)

What is neurophilosophy? Different variants of connecting neuroscience and philosophy emerged in recent years. Besides reductive, parallelistic, and neurophenomenological variants, we here focus on Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy as introduced by the author of this paper. NRNP can methodologically be characterized by the inclusion of multiple domains and various methodological strategies – this amounts to domain pluralism and method pluralism. That is combined with an iterative methodological movement between the different domains and, specifically conceptual and empirical domains resulting in concept-fact iterativity. Such (...) non-reductive neurophilosophical approach can make major contributions to both neuroscience and philosophy. Concerning the latter, we demonstrate how a non-reductive neurophilosophical approach allows taking into view a deeper neuro-ecological and spatiotemporal layer of Martin Heidegger’s Fundamental ontology and its “being in the world”. This may also require a more fundamental approach to consciousness in both its phenomenological features and neural basis – this has recently been proposed in the “Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness”. In sum, due to its particular methodological strategy, NRNP allows providing a broader more comprehensive framework to philosophical problems like subjectivity, consciousness, and mind-body problem. Moreover, NRNP may provide a novel deeper framing and reading of historical authors which may allow to connect them to current and systematic philosophical and even neuroscientific issues. ER -. (shrink)

Innerhalb der Komplexitat der religiosen Erscheinungswelt gibt es -Religionen-, deren Zuordnung zur Religionsgeschichte moglich wird, indem unter religionswissenschaftlichen Aspekten z.B. besonders die religionssoziologischen und religionsphanomenologischen Inhalte einer von Europa ausgehenden - aber hier fast in Vergessenheit geratenen - -Religion der Menschheit- in ihrer historischen Existenz aufgezeigt werden. Dabei geht es vor allem um den Inhalt der -Positivistischen Religion- in Brasilien und um ihre religiose, kirchliche und organisatorische Prasenz.".

This paper reevaluates Adorno’s theory of non-identity following from a critical examination of his reading of Hegel. The main discussion revolves around two theses central to both philosophers: 1. Conceptual thinking forms the centre of philosophical thought (identification). 2. Philosophical thought aspires to become everything (totality). The analysis of two distinct interpretations, one stricter and one more moderate, demonstrates that Adorno takes the hardline view. With the moderate view, however, not only do the limits of Hegelian philosophy become more pronounced, (...) they also reveal novel systematic connections with pivotal concepts inherent to Critical Theory – connections that have notably lacked substantial consideration within relevant research. (shrink)

It is often assumed that cosmopolitan thinkers since the Renaissance have simply adopted and refined concepts from classical antiquity. This study argues that modern European cosmopolitanism should be perceived as a unique phenomenon, distinct from Greek and Roman forms of cosmopolitan thinking. One key feature is its dynamism, or the idea of change built into modern theories of cosmopolitanism. Covering the period from the 1530s to the 1920s, this book investigates various manifestations of cosmopolitanism, including normative individualism, the dawn of (...) historical thinking, and the dynamic conceptions of law and rights and of the international community. It analyses the international legal theories of selected authors from Francisco de Vitoria to Austrian lawyers Heinrich Lammasch and Alfred Verdross. The author focuses in particular on the development of hospitality rights and the right to immigration, republicanism and cosmopolitanism, and cosmopolitan education. (shrink)

El concepto de segunda naturaleza promete proporcionar una explicación de cómo la naturaleza y la razón se pueden reconciliar. Pero dicho concepto está cargado de ambigüedad: se entiende como aquello que une todas las actividades cognitivas y se concibe como un tipo de naturaleza que puede ser modificada por actividades cognitivas. Se intenta investigar esta ambigüedad distinguiendo una concepción kantiana de otra hegeliana. Se sostiene que la idea de una transformación de un ser de prim- era naturaleza en un ser (...) de segunda naturaleza, que se encuentra en el corazón de la concepción kantiana, es errónea. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 56, Issue 3, Page 399-407, June 2022.

The paper aims to further concretise our previously proposed normative-functional concept of the criminal offense. It is rooted in a liberal paradigm and guides not only the criminal offense doctrine, which provides for specific criteria to warrant a legitimate verdict and the determination of legal consequences (in the sense of an adequate additional hardship imposed in the context of the sentencing itself). Furthermore, it offers a much-needed refinement in cases where the same act violates more than one criminal statute (Konkurrenzen), (...) and for the concept of the criminal offense within the criminal proceedings. Our concept characterizes the offense by a sufficiently substantial breach of a legally required conduct norm (along with specific consequences thereof, in some cases). Such a legal rule of conduct – determined for the respective individual according to the specific circumstances they find themselves in – affects at the least their personal autonomy, and thus requires legitimisation. This legitimisation must heed the constitutional standard of proportionality – the benchmark of which establishes the individual opportunity for self-expression that is compatible with the legitimate interests of others. At its core lies a broad understanding of freedom that appropriately explains the trade-off between conflicting interests necessary for the justification of legally required standards of behaviour, at the same time. This offers a solution to the issue of trying to identify the minimum level of applicable criminal sanctions. Thus, this concept is preferable to competing concepts. (shrink)

In this paper, the Executive Head of the Global Compact shares some of his own reflections on the evolution of the Global Compact initiative – United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s voluntary corporate citizenship initiative in the area of human rights, labor, the environment and anti-corruption. Two main themes are addressed. The first considers the Global Compact’s institutional context, examining how such an initiative is even possible in the historically hierarchical and traditionally business-unfriendly UN. The second concerns the voluntary nature of (...) the initiative and how it interacts with regulatory approaches. It explains what the Global Compact has to offer as a voluntary initiative, as well as how it can make a unique and complementary contribution to regulation-backed initiatives. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of what the future holds for the Global Compact. (shrink)

The ‘extended mind’ thesis asserts that cognitive processes are not bound by the skull or even skin of biological individuals, but actively incorporate environmental structures such as symbols, tools, artifacts, media, cultural practices, norms, groups, or institutions. By distributing cognition across space, time, and people in canny ways, we circumvent or overcome the biological limitations of our brains. Human beings are creative, albeit opportunistic experts in cognitive ‘self-transcendence.’ This entry surveys discussions of EM in philosophy of mind and cognitive science (...) which point to this overarching theme. (shrink)

In der Philosophiegeschichte findet sich keine detailliert ausformulierte Philosophie des Abschieds. Die Publikation liefert hierzu die Spur des Abschieds, die als ein abwesend anwesendes Phänomen nachzuzeichnen ist. Neben der Rekonstruktion der relevanten philosophischen Thanatologien von der Antike bis ins 20. Jahrhundert, der Phänomenologie von Leiden und Schmerz, des Trostes und der Trauer werden vorrangig über Nietzsches Philosophie der tragischen Bejahungpraxis philosophische Orientierungen für ein souveränes Verhaltengegenüber dem existentiellen Phänomen des Abschieds präsentiert"--Page 4 of cover.

Für Nietzsches Philosophie der tragischen Bejahung, die eine der Transformation ist, sind die Relationen zwischen dem Übermenschen und der ewigen Wiederkehr von enormer Bedeutung. Um diese herauszuarbeiten, untersucht die Studie die nietzscheanischen Menschentypen? ausgehend von der These, dass es Nietzsche immer um den schaffenden Menschen geht? vom 'Heerdenthier' bis zum Übermenschen, sodass die mit ihnen verbundenen Dispositive (Metaphysik, Religion, Moral, Philosophie und Kunst) in Nietzsches Evaluation transparent werden.

Activism undertaken by CEOs has been on the rise in recent years. Research on this practice has been primarily concerned with determining the conditions under which a CEO’s public statements on sociopolitical issues are beneficial or detrimental to her firm’s business performance. We complement this instrumental perspective on CEO activism with an ethical investigation of the implications of CEO activism for the democratic process. Drawing on political philosophy, we show that the answer to the question of whether CEO activism is (...) conducive to the democratic process depends on the view of democracy that is adopted. From the perspective of liberalism, the sole requirement that an instance of CEO activism must fulfill is that it is lawful, provided that the applicable law sufficiently protects people’s essential rights. However, from the viewpoint of republicanism, this is not a sufficient condition. Besides being law-abiding, CEOs should be “civic-minded” when intervening in public debates, i.e., concerned with the quality and fairness with which those debates are conducted. Based on the literature on republicanism, we suggest four possible criteria that civic-minded CEOs can apply to gauge the democratic conduciveness of a possible public intervention: added insight, timeliness, constructiveness, and transparency. Our article complements the predominantly instrumentally oriented literature on CEO activism and contributes, more broadly, to the literature that explores the normative dimensions of corporate political involvement, as well as to a growing strand of research that draws on philosophical theory to inform business leaders’ ethical decision-making. (shrink)