A demanding introduction to logic and critical thinking, this book offers more traditional means of teaching the art of reasoning at a time when the field has become almost mathematical. Francis Dauer has rethought the framework for teaching reasoning in general and formal logic in particular, the desired epistemological context, and the role of the fallacies. The result is a coherent and very readable work, informed by Dauer's extensive experience teaching and writing on the subject.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXV, Numbers 1 and 2, April/November 1999, pp. 83-99 Force and Vivacity in the Treatise and the Enquiry FRANCIS W. DAUER Hume's appeal to "force and vivacity" presents a challenge to those of us who try to render his views as plausible as possible. Of course, if we reject "folk psychology " or an appeal to our consciousness, the challenge becomes insurmountable. Fortunately, in today's (...) philosophical climate such appeals are no longer universally rejected, and at least in some quarters there may be interest in discerning what such appeals may reveal. But even granting such an appeal, is there anything given to our consciousness that will do the kind of work Hume intends for force and vivacity? I shall attempt to make an affirmative answer as plausible as I can. Recall that Hume appeals to force and vivacity to distinguish (1) impressions from ideas, (2) memory from other ideas, and (3) beliefs from fictions of the fancy. In my defense of Hume, I shall urge that, taken separately, each of these appeals has some plausibility and to this extent provides some tentative suggestions on what it is like to perceive, remember, and believe. Before proceeding to this defense, several preliminaries are called for. Hume's view on force and vivacity underwent changes in his writings, and no one view can be said to be his account of force and vivacity. His initial view occurs in Book I of the Treatise (which was published along with Book II). By the time the Appendix of the Treatise was published with Book III, we see Hume shifting away from his initial view. Further changes, as well as a full appreciation of the shift, can be found in the Enquiry. For most of this paper I shall primarily be concerned with his later views, though earlier views will Francis W. Dauer is a professor at the Department of Philosophy, South Hall, University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93105, USA. e-mail: dauer@humanitas.ucsb.edu 84 Francis W. Dauer occasionally be mentioned for contrast. In the final section, I shall address the more exegetical issues concerning Hume's change of mind over the years. While space constraints prevent a discussion that will do justice to the views of other commentators, a few words may be in order to indicate what I think is needed to render Hume's views plausible. Leaving aside commentators finding fatal defects with his account, those trying to salvage a tolerable reading of Hume more or less identify force and vivacity with belief (which Hume on one occasion says is the true and proper name for the feeling). One group focuses on Hume's use of 'force' and proposes a functionalist account of force and vivacity whereby it is a causal property of "perceptions" (in the wide sense) to produce such states as passions and actions which are functionally related to beliefs.1 At least on the face of it, this is at odds with force and vivacity being available to consciousness, and I shall take it that Hume took force and vivacity to be so available. Beyond this, while I shall take it that Hume appealed to force and vivacity to distinguish impressions from ideas, a functionalist account has difficulties in preventing impressions from degenerating into mere beliefs (unless something quite foreign to the Humean framework is appealed to).2 A second line of thought is due to Wayne Waxman, who identifies force and vivacity with something like a felt sense of reality or truth, with impressions having this quality in the highest degree.3 While this avoids the first defect of the functionalist account, I believe it fails to avoid a variant of the second problem: without appealing to something quite un-Humean, some impressions can become mere beliefs, and vice versa.41 shall assume that force and vivacity must be consciously available, and that appealing to them, at least in one guise, must allow impressions and ideas to be distinguished. Impressions Hume introduces the distinction between impressions and ideas in the Treatise by saying: The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which... (shrink)

Naturalised epistemology has shunned rationality, a hallmark of humanity since ancient Greece. One of Quine's explicit motivations is that Hume's problem of induction cannot be solved. However, Hume himself suggests a solution and the narrow focus of the paper is to present a ‘Humean Solution’ which is an elaboration and defence of Hume's suggestion. What emerges will be argued to be a naturalised conception of rationality which makes naturalised epistemology more continuous with traditional epistemology's focus on rationality.

This chapter contains section titled: Looking at the Text (T 1.3.14) Three Readings Reconstructions and Speculations References Further Reading.

Colin McGinn urged that while a brain state P explains consciousness, a conception P is cognitively inaccessible to us. This paper argues that McGinn's argument for his form of materialism is committed to P being epiphenomenal or causally inert relative to such things as the movements of our bodies. As a result, McGinn's materialism creates a duality in the brain and thereby faces the same problem of epiphenomenalism which plagues the Cartesian dualist.

International human rights treaties and declarations lay out the interconnection of civil and political rights with economic, social, and cultural rights. However, it was not until 1993 at the 2nd UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna that governments agreed that all of women’s rights are an integral part of human rights. Promoting women’s economic, social, and cultural rights is a critical human rights advocacy issue. Poverty leaves women more exposed to violence and less able to escape it, and severely (...) restricts women’s ability to organize and fight for change. The article describes work by AI and other NGOs on violence against women and its connection with women's poverty and lack of education, healthcare, housing, and access to land in Africa. Besides the burgeoning of African women’s organizations calling for protection of all women’s human rights, a second hopeful development has been approval in July 2003 of an historic Protocol on the Rights of women in Africa. (shrink)

Things make sense to us. The identity of a thing is a meaningful style that expresses the usability of the thing. The usability is a dynamic order of the praxis in which the thing is embedded and in which we are ourselves de-centered. According to Merleau-Ponty, this sociocultural and psychosocial order is a formation of practical understanding and interpretation that rests upon and resumes the elementary, perceptual-expressive structuring of being. The Spiel is one of the three dimensions of corporeal intentionality, (...) in which this entire organization of meaning and experience unfolds. So, the Spiel of usability is a corporeal and practical intentionality that reaches from an aesthetic-ontological structuring of meaning to the order of the things in modern everyday praxes. (shrink)

Corporeality and historicity in our very experience are focal points of the phenomenological movement as it becomes attentive to human existence. In existential and hermeneutic phenomenology, historicity is understood as experienced meaning: temporality. This actualizes the Aristotelian conception of historical development as the realization of power potentials, where culture and reason are associated with human nature. Of interest is also the post-Hegelian thinking of history as both de-centered and centered existence. In the face of contemporary difficulties (ever since Hegel) in (...) grasping historicity as connected nature and reason, phenomenology points to the bodily intentionality, with which meaning as well as experience are structured on different levels of being in human existence: aesthetic presence, body-in-the-world, speech, praxis, action, and thinking. (shrink)

Based upon a brief outline of existential-phenomenological ontology we present a theoretical and practical understanding of humanbeing, which is suited for a methodologically reflected approach to qualitative research. We present the phenomenological distinction between threedimensions of corporeal intentionality(structural, generative and dialectic intentionality) that form elementary events and structures of meaning. Various aspects of human being are better scrutinized with these concepts of intentionality, such as the association of individual being or collective being (e.g. groups) with the less differentiated anonymity of (...) human being. The aim of our framework is to support the qualitative researcher in grasping the experience of the human life in closer accord with how this being actually unfolds and is lived. Application of the presented framework is illuminated with empirical examples from educational, health and psychological contexts. Finally, we discuss the methodological implications that our approach has for qualitative investigations of human being. (shrink)

Bewegungen sind nicht nur an räumliche, sondern auch an zeitliche Verhältnisse gebunden. Die daraus resultierenden Widersprüche gelten bis heute als ungelöst. So ist es zwar möglich, Bewegungen zu messen und zu berechnen - als problematisch erweist sich jedoch die weitergehende Frage, wie ein beweglicher Körper im selben Zeitmoment an unterschiedlichen Orten zugleich sein kann. Da einfache empirische Antworten sowie rein gedankliche Lösungen nicht zu geben sind, fokussiert Franz Bockrath vor allem auf jene sozialphilosophischen und kulturwissenschaftlichen Ansätze, die Zeit und Bewegung (...) in ihr... (shrink)

Mit diesem 1957 von Gilles Deleuze zusammengestellten Band, der in einer kongenialen Aneinanderreihung von Textpassagen aus allen wichtigen Werken Bergsons einen guten Überblick über das Bergsonsche Denken vermittelt, begann die Wiederentdeckung Bergsons in Frankreich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Dabei wird sichtbar, dass es neben der Intuition, dem Gedächtnis und dem *élan vital* vor allem die Dauer ist, die begrifflich im Mittelpunkt von Bergsons Philosophie steht. Sämtliche Texte wurden von Margarethe Drewsen einheitlich neu übersetzt; der Band lässt sich dadurch wie (...) eine kompakte Einführung aus Bergsons eigener Feder lesen. (shrink)

The constituents of social entities (and of social continuants in particular) determine whether or not a social thing comes to be, persists and perishes. John Searle hints at two very different accounts for the persistence of social entities, a mere past related account and an acceptance theoretic account, whereas Margaret Gilbert's account is based on deontic entities like obligations or joint commitments. I demonstrate that Gilbert's account can also accommodate Searle's examples. While oblivion, protests or violence can be historical causes (...) of the destruction of social entities, they cannot be considered to be the ultimate causes of the perishing from Gilbert's point of view. Social entities rather perish because of the treatises or divorces that dissolve their deontic constituents. (shrink)

One important aspect of biological explanation is detailed causal modeling of particular phenomena in limited experimental background conditions. Recognising this allows one to appreciate that a sufficient condition for a reduction in biology is a molecular model of (1) only the demonstrated causal parameters of a biological model and (2) only within a replicable experimental background. These identities—which are ubiquitous in biology and form the basis of ruthless reductions (Bickle, Philosophy and neuroscience: a ruthlessly reductive account, 2003)—are criticised as merely (...) “local” (Sullivan, Synthese 167:511–539, 2009) or “fragmentary” (Schaffner, Synthese, 151(3):377–402, 2006). However, in an instructive case, a biological model is preserved in molecular terms, demonstrating a complex phenomenon that has been successfully reduced. (shrink)